Teamsters Local No. 379

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 17, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 629 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 379
Teamsters Local No. 379, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America and Gerrity Company, Inc.
Cases 1-CP-223, 1-CB-2366, and 1-CC-1203
June 17, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS
FANNING AND JENKINS
On March 27, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding . Thereafter , the Charging Party filed
exceptions and a supporting brief . Respondent filed
cross-exceptions and a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three -member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions , cross-
exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
rulings , findings , and conclusions ' of the Adminis-
trative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended
Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Teamsters Local No.
379, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order.
1 In the absence of exceptions , we adopt, pro forma, the Administrative
Law Judge's conclusions that Respondent violated Sec . 8(b)(7XC) and Sec.
8(bx1)(A) of the Act.
DECISION
THOMAS A. RICCI, Administrative Law Judge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held on February 6 and 7, 1974, at
Boston, Massachusetts, on complaint of the General
Counsel against Teamsters Local No. 379, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, herein called the Respondent, or
Local 379. On separate charges all filed on July 19, 1973,
by Gerrity Company, Inc., the complaint issued on August
17, 1973. The complaint alleges violations by the Respon-
dent of three separate and distinct sections of the statute:
Section 8(b)(7)(C), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(bx4)(i) and (ii)(B).
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE CHARGING COMPANY
629
The Gerrity Company is engaged in the sale and
distribution of lumber, building materials, and related
products . It operates in a number of States , and its sole
location involved in this proceeding is called the Readville
yard, in Boston, Massachusetts. In the ordinary course of
its business this Company causes large quantities of
materials to be purchased and transported in interstate
commerce through the various States to its various
locations , and substantial quantities of building materials
to be transported from its locations into other states.
Annually it sells products valued in excess of $500,000
from Massachusetts to other States, and imports into
Massachusetts materials valued in excess of $50,000. I find
that the Gerrity Company is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
II. THE RESPONDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION
I find that Teamsters Local No. 379, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This proceeding arose from a strike called on July 16,
1973, by Teamsters Local 379 against the Gerrity Compa-
ny's Readville, Massachusetts, operation. The strike,
always accompanied by picketing, lasted through August
22, when the Union both discontinued picketing and
offered to return the employees to their old jobs with the
Company. There are three separate charges which trig-
gered the complaint, each of them involves a distinctive
element of the statute, and each in turn is pressed to the
full in the General Counsel's complaint and case in chief.
(1) The entire strike, and the picketing, is said to have been
illegal because its objective was to wrest from Gerrity
exclusive recognition as bargaining agent in favor of Local
379. (2) In the effort to persuade everybody-Gerrity
employees and strangers alike-to refuse to cross its picket
line, the Union and its agents are charged with having
threatened violence, and to have restrained and coerced
employees, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). (3) Local 379
is charged with having induced employees to strike-Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(i)-and threatened and coerced employers
-Section 8(b)(4)(ii)-with an object of causing employers
other than Gerrity to cease doing business with Gerrity-in
total, Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). The Respondent
advances a number of defenses which will be explained
below.
A. 8(b)(7)(C) Violation
Gerrity's Readville yard covers 23 acres and normally
employs from 80 to 90 persons, of whom about 25 do what
by some witnesses ambiguously called "yard" work,
apparently shipping and receiving lumber and finished
products. During the few days preceding Saturday, July 14,
15 or 20-maybe a few more, the record really does not
211 NLRB No. 92
630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
show-signed cards in favor of Local 379, and on Monday
morning, July 16, the Union called a strike. The number of
Gerrity employees who struck, and picketed thereafter, is
variously described as between 14 and 25 by the several
witnesses , both management agents and employees. That
the purpose of the picketing was to obtain recognition from
the Company could not be clearer on this record. On the
very first day of the strike Local 379 wrote a letter to
Gerrity: "Please be advised a majority of your employees
have designated Local No. 379 as their Union Representa-
tive. Please notify me when it will be convenient for you to
meet for the purpose of Collective Bargaining." On August
24, when Local 379 decided to stop picketing, it wrote
again to the Company, saying its earlier "letter requested
recognition" was now "inoperative." The company replied
on July 18, refusing recognition and suggesting an election
by secret ballot. No election petition with the Board was
filed and the picketing continued for over a month.
Vincent Miller, business representative of the Respondent,
testifying for the defense, admitted it was his purpose not
to file a petition and to obtain recognition via the strike
route, statute or no statute. He spoke of a meeting he held
with the Gerrity employees on Saturday, 2 days before the
picketing: "I recall that the issue whether we should strike
or go to an election was discussed, and considering what
occurred with Local 317 in New York City-or Syracuse,
rather, New York, by a majority overwhelming vote the
men decided to go on strike rather than waste their time
petitioning for an election." I find that by inducing
Gerrity's employees to strike, and by picketing Gerrity's
yard from July 16 to August 22, 1973, the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.
The Respondent makes a number of contentions in
defense, some fairly understandable from a reading of the
transcript, but some only hinted at obliquely. In fact some
of the contentions were so deviously and ambiguously
worded, either by counsel for the Respondent or its defense
witnesses , that it is not possible to state with certainty the
arguments are made at all. Restated: some of the
arguments are so blurred that the Respondent remained in
a position plausibly to assert later it never really did argue
what it seemed to be saying. And perhaps this is because
some of the defenses are so clearly without merit.
Some months before these events another local of the
Teamsters International, its Local 317, was certified after a
Board election as bargaining agent for employees of this
same company at its Syracuse, New York, plant, perhaps
400 miles from Boston. Collective-bargaining negotiations
there had not been completed yet, and it seems Local 317
has been on strike at Syracuse. One contention of Miller,
business representative of Local 379, is that inasmuch as
Local 317 achieved nothing by establishing its majority
status via the election process, what was the use of Local
379 doing the same thing, what good would an election do
with an employer of this kind, and therefore the Respon-
dent was free to force recognition by the strike route, and
never mind how Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act might be a
deterrent against strikes by another union, or even this one,
viz-a-viz some other employer. Miller came up with the
same basic idea-that somehow the Gerrity Company
stands outside the protective pale of the law, in more than
one context. He said that on Friday, the day before it was
decided to strike, some employee had reported to him that
he, the unnamed employee, while soliciting Gerrity
employees in the yard to sign union cards, had overheard
Crowe, a company manager, say he would fire the people
who signed cards. He even said Crowe had fired a man in
retaliation for this very activity. There is no probative
evidence at all, to say nothing of there being no Labor
Board charge or complaint, that this Company violated
either Section 8(a)(1) or (3) with respect to its Readville
yard employees, or Section 8(a)(5) at Syracuse. Still a third
escape sought by the Respondent-this apparently with
respect to the entire three-pronged complaint-is that
whatever happened at the picket line, no matter what
sections of the Act the Union may have violated, it must all
be excused because the Company hired privately employed
security guards who came from other States on this
particular assignment, who were armed, and at times even
had dogs with them. Gerrity did hire policemen from the
cities of Boston and Denham, as well as privately
employed professional guards, to patrol its yard and to
escort vehicles both to and from its yard during the strike.
I find no merit in any of these defenses , if defenses they
are said to be. Each is so patently unpersuasive that no
extended discussion is warranted. "To the extent that this
defense amounts to a reliance on a `clean hands' doctrine,
it is rejected; the fact that an employer may be violating
the Act is no justification for proscribed conduct by a
union, either in retaliation or in defense." United Mine
Workers of America, 160 NLRB 913. "One unfair labor
practice does not excuse another." Plumbers Union of
Nassau County, Local 457, 131 NLRB 1243.
Company counsel also attempted to avoid the thrust of
Section 8(bX7)(C) by charging the Company did not have a
reasonable doubt about Local 379's majority status. "One
of the elements, I take it, that may be involved in the
question of representation is whether or not there was good
faith, belief, in the majority or lack of majority, and
various other items of that nature are pertinent." This is
simply not a refusal-to-bargain case , and in any event the
statutory proscription against recognitional strike and
picketing stands entirely apart from a union's representa-
tive strength. Such a strike is unlawful regardless of
whether the union represents nobody in the bargaining
unit or everybody.
B. Section 8(b)(1)(A)
The picketing was largely concentrated at one of the two
gates of the Readville yard; the second was closed during
the strike. The gate in question is an opening about 30-feet
wide in the fence. The picketing group was large,
concededly often as many as 20 men or more. It is also
clear, and conceded, that their purpose was to prevail upon
everyone not to cross the line-Gerrity's employees
coming to work, Gerrity's trucks coming and going, and
vehicles of any other company doing business with Gerrity
as well. According to the complaint the pickets, with
approval and indeed participation of Local 379 agents,
physically blocked the entrances and threatened employees
and others with physical violence to achieve their determi-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 379 631
nation in preventing entrance or exit from the yard, all in
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
There came a time when the pickets in groups of four,
six, and even more , moved up the road adjacent to the
company property but away from the gate itself; some-
times they were a quarter of a mile, some times they were 1
or 1-1/2 miles distant. Always, however, they stationed
themselves on the road along which trucks coming to and
going from the yard had to pass. They did this pursuant to
directions by Miller, the Union's business representative.
Miller was present on the picket line every day; he was
assisted at all times by two picket captains, William
Wagner and Jim Healy. There developed a pattern of
physical obstruction of the entrance itself, the large groups
of pickets deliberately walking back and forth in front of
the gate so as to make it impossible for vehicles attempting
to pass to do so without endangering the lives of the
pickets. This happened, according to General Counsel
witnesses, also up the road away from the gate, the pickets
at times moving into the road-it is only 20-feet wide and
permits only two vehicles, one in each direction-in order
to block the road, with trucks thereby forced to ride in part
off the road in their attempts to proceed.
That this was done with full approval, if not explicit
instructions, of the Union cannot be doubted, for its
agents, Miller and Wagner, were always somewhere in the
vicinity. In fact, Wagner's own description of the picketing
at the entrance supports the testimony of those witnesses
who said they were physically blocked at the gate. "We
were walking back and forth in a circle , in an orderly line
.... Directly across the road."
There is also direct evidence of Miller's personal
participation in physical attempts to block access to the
yard. L. Paul Lumber Company deals in lumber and has
long done business with Gerrity; its place of business is 75
miles away from Readville. On July 17, the second day of
the picketing, one of Paul's trucks had a tire slashed as it
was leaving Gerrity's, and moth flakes put into its gas tank.
The next day Leon Paul, the owner of the Paul Company,
himself, drove a truck to Readville; as he was leaving the
yard a number of pickets gathered around and slowed his
truck. One asked why was he getting "involved in this,"
and he answered he had nothing to do with Gerrity's
problems. At this point another picket jumped on his
running board and said: "Mr. Paul, you're a pretty big
man. But, I want to tell you your brain can't stop a bullet."
A week later Paul sent three of his trucks to Readville. As
he arrived with a fourth a little later, a mile from the yard,
he met the other three returning empty. One of his drivers
told him they had been unable to go through the picket line
and had to turn back. Paul lined up all four of the trucks
and led them back towards the gate. Straddling the road,
parked at right angles in front of him, he saw Miller's
automobile-all the doors opened, the hood up, and a
number of pickets standing around in the road. Deter-
mined to pass , he drove with his right wheels off the road,
endangering his and the next three trucks. Testifying in
defense, Miller claimed he had trouble with the "starter,"
he always has trouble with the starter in this car, had to
replace it five or six times. He moved his car off the road
when a policeman told him to do so. But cars do not stall,
or fail to start, standing at right angles across a road. I do
not credit Miller at all in these circumstances. He
manifested virtual contempt for this entire proceeding at
the hearing. He volunteered the idea Paul should have used
some other entrance to reach Gerrity's yard, and even
when the policeman told him to remove his car as an
obstruction to traffic, as he himself related: "I said, sir,
they could go down to the other place, if they wished, but
we'll try to roll it off." Miller was deliberately attempting
to prevent Paul's trucks from going across his picket line.
And his own plain tactic was just another message to his
pickets not to hesitate in resorting to illegal means to
implement an overall policy of preventing access to the
Respondent's yard.
I also credit the testimony of the following witnesses. (1)
Crowe, the yard's operations manager, testified that he saw
pickets in great numbers crowd the entrance gate so the
trucks could not enter, and that pickets deliberately parked
their personal cars on the adjacent two-lane road-half on
and half off the road-so that vehicles could not move
through. (2) Clougherty, a Gerrity employee, said that on
August 16, as he walked to work, Wagner, the picket line
captain, gave him a ride while he was still half a mile from
the gate, and asked him to quit his job in sympathy with
the strikers. Clougherty refused, and Wagner then said to
him: "I'd best quit Monday, the following Monday. They
were getting pretty fed up with picketing, and they were
going to start busting heads." (3) Erickson, also a Gerrity
employee, testified he was held up at the gate when he
returned from a delivery with his truck on July 16, and that
a picket there told him ". . . that he hated to see any men
get hurt, but they were on strike, men had been known to
get a broken arm, leg, even necks, and they would
appreciate it if I did not show up for work the following
day." (4) Hunt, one of the yard managers, said that on July
18 he heard Wagner say to the driver of a customer's
(Barboza Company) truck: "We'll stone you in the
truck. . . . You'll never get back to the Cape." (5)
Robinson, the Paul Company driver, said that as he
approached the Readville yard, still about 2 miles up the
road, several pickets stopped him and told him not to cross
the picket line because if he did "The shit's going to hit the
fan." Among these pickets Robinson identified Jerry and
Wagner, the picket captain. (6) David Eck, of Eck's
Trucking, Inc., testified that on July 25, while he was
parked 2 miles from the gate waiting for a Gerrity security
guard to escort him into the yard, three pickets approached
him and said: "Get out. We're going to beat your head in if
you try to run us over." He ignored them and one started
to climb up to his cab, but another pulled the picket off. As
Eck proceeded closer to the gate along the road, 15 or 20
pickets started to crowd the road to force him off it. He
had to swing to the right and in so doing the rear of his
trailer sideswiped a parked private car. As a policeman was
taking his name, address, and registration, one of the
pickets holding a clipboard said to him: "I see you live at
1477 Beacon Street, Brookline . . . Well, we're compiling a
list here . . . we're going to come and get you at your
house." In this group of pickets Eck recognized Miller.
Wagner recalled inviting Cloughert to quit his job, and
asking the Barboza driver to "respect" the picket line, but
632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
denied voicing any threats to any of them . I do not credit
Wagner. His demeanor at the hearing paralleled that of
Miller . Both agents kept repeating it was Mr. Paul , or Eck,
or employees attempting to go into the yard to work, who
threatened the pickets , called them dirty names . Referring
to the incident on the road when Eck was forced off the
highway by crowding pickets, Wagner quoted Eck as
saying "If I come through here again , I am going to run
over every fucking one of youse that are there." There was
no reason for Eck to speak ill to anyone there ; he had no
interest in preventing anybody from doing anything. His
sole concern was in going about his normal duties, whereas
the Union , through Miller and Wagner , was attempting to
make its picket line effective.
I find that by the conduct of its pickets , authorized and
approved by agents of the Respondent, in blocking the
entrances to Gerrity 's yard , in blocking the roads leading
to the yard , and in threatening to inflict bodily injury upon
employees to force them not to cross the Union 's picket
line, by the conduct of its picket line captain Wagner in
threatening to do bodily harm to employee Clougherty,
and by the conduct of its business representative Miller in
obstructing the roadway leading to the yard to prevent
passage by the Paul Company trucks, the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.'
The General Counsel asked for a specific finding that
when Paul 's truck had a tire slashed while leaving the
Gerrity yard on July 17, it was the Respondent's pickets
who did the damage , and that therefore this was another
violation of the Act chargeable to Local 379. There were
pickets clustered about the front of the truck when the tire
blew; in fact one of the pickets was injured when it
practically exploded . None of the witnesses actually saw
who did it; the finding of culpability in the Union would
have to be an inference. It would probably not be a bad
inference , but giving the facts the evidence is indirect, that
findings of mass picketing, physical obstruction and
threats of violence have already been made, and that a
further finding would not enlarge the cease -and-desist
order to be issued , no useful purpose would be served by
speculating, as it were , just who it was that slashed that
particular tire.
C. Section 8(b)(4)
The facts underlying this third major component of the
complaint are no less clear than those which were
determinative of the first two. The object of the picketing
was to obtain recognition . The methods used to make the
picket line effective were coercive. Whether or not the
object of the picketing was primary or secondary is also a
question of fact, but it bears no relationship to the first two
factual questions . And in the answer to this final
query-was the picketing primary or secondary-lies
resolution of the third allegation , which is that by the
conduct of its agents the Union revealed its object as being
to force neutral employers " to cease doing business" with
Gerrity . Paul's , Triangle, and, perhaps, but not clearly,
Eck's also, were neutral to whatever Local 379's quarrel
with Gerrity was. A primary picket line-and this is
precisely what the Respondent 's picket line at Gerrity's
was-has as its purpose convincing Gerrity to cease doing
business with everybody, in fact, to put him out of business
altogether if he does not yield . Merely because the whole of
necessity includes the sum of its parts , it does not follow,
on well-established law, that the Union 's object can be said
to have been secondary at all.
There can be no question on this record but that every
time the pickets , or the union agents, approached employ-
ees of the neutral companies, or the stranger employer
representatives themselves , all they ever asked them to do
was honor the primary picket line . This fact is so clear it is
really unnecessary to belabor the point here.
Two miles away Paul's driver , Robinson , is told "not to
cross the picket line." When Eck stopped his truck a mile
or so up the road because Gerrity was sending a security
guard to him, the whole arrangement was to facilitate his
entry into the yard across the picket line. When the pickets
out at that point then told Eck they would beat his head in,
it had to be because he was headed for the picket line at the
gate . Crowe, a major witness for the General Counsel, used
to go from the gate to meet the incoming trucks of
Gerrity's customers and heard the pickets tell the drivers,
employees of the neutrals, "we don't want you to go in .. .
have regard for us." Asked what did he understand the
pickets to mean when they said do not come "in," Crowe
said : "They meant, into the Gerrity yard."
Of course the picket line wanted secondary employers to
cease doing business with Gerrity; every primary picket
line has that one objective among others. The best answer
to the General Counsel's argument in support of this
complaint appears in the General Counsel's brief to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia , a defense of the Board 's dismissal of a
complaint very much like this one , in American Federation
of Musicians of the United States and Canada v. N. L. R. B. ,
186 NLRB 646:
Section 8(bX4) is directed at "secondary boycots,"
i.e., the involvement of neutral employers in labor
disputes not their own. The language of Section 8(b)(4)
is broad, but its application has been limited to
secondary situations in conformity with the "dual
Congressional objectives of preserving the right of
labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on
offending employers in primary labor disputes and
shielding unoffending employers and others from
pressures in controversies not their own." N.L.R.B. v.
Denver Building Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951). Traditional primary strike activity although
having an impact on neutral employers and seemingly
within the sweeping terms of Section 8(b)(4) has been
held to be not violative of the Act. International Rice
Milling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951); Di
Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 89 U.S. App. D.C. 155,
I Among the many suggestions apparently advanced by Respondent's Local 317 signs did appear before Gerrity 's property , and someone did
counsel at the hearing as additional defenses to all of this misconduct, is the identify a Carpenter 's local agent at the picketing area on one occasion.
possibility agents or pickets of Teamsters Local 317 from Syracuse, New Against the direct and cumulative evidence of activities by Local 379 and its
York, may have been responsible for it all, or maybe an AFL carpenter agents, this collateral and totally unsupported broad-side defense is totally
local union . Before Local 379 called the strike on July 16, pickets bearing unconvincing.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 379 633
162, 191 F .2d 642 , 649 (C .A. D.C., 1951 ), cert . denied,
342 U .S. 869.
In enacting the 1959 amendments to the Act,
Congress significantly added the proviso "that nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful , where not otherwise unlawful , any primary
strike or primary picketing ." The legislative history of
this provision reveals that the recognition thus given to
the lawfulness of primary activity was meant to leave
undisturbed the basic distinction between lawful
primary activity and unlawful secondary activity which
the decisions had drawn in cases arising under the 1947
Act. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn v. N.L.R.B.,
386 U .S. 612, 632-633 (1967).
... court and board decisions . . . have emphasiz-
ed the line of demarcation between primary and
secondary conduct . . . . one test of the lawfulness of a
union 's picketing or other strike activity in the course
of its dispute with an employer is the identification of
the strike activity with the actual functioning of the
primary employer's business at the situs of the labor
dispute . The Supreme Court . . . recently affirmed this
general principle when it stated that a traditional goal
of primary strike activity has been to direct appeals for
support to "all those approaching the situs whose
mission is selling , delivering or otherwise contributing
to the operations which the strike is endeavoring to
halt." United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B.
[Carrier Corp.], 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964). And see,
Local 761 , International Union of Electrical Workers v.
N. L. R. B. [General Electric Co.], 366 U .S. 667 , 680-686
(1960); National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. N.L.R.B.,
supra, 386 U .S. at 620-630 (1967)... .
The validity of the Board 's conclusion is not affected
by the fact that the Union's appeals did not take place
at the Club itself , the situs of the dispute , but were
communicated through union publications to musi-
cians at other locations . The decided cases make clear
that it is irrelevant where the appeal is made, the
important considerations being (a) that the action
induced is confined to a refusal to perform services
only at the premises of the primary employer , and (b)
that the appeal is aimed solely at enhancing the
effectiveness of the primary strike conduct . Thus, in
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 175 v.
N.L.R.B., Il I U.S. App . D.C. 65 , 294 F .2d 261 (1961),
this Court held that neither picketing nor non-situs
appeals to neutral truck drivers asking them not to
make deliveries to the strike premises were unlawful.
Accord: Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. N.L.R. B., 285 F.2d
325, 326 (C.A. 7, 1960). The Board also has frequently
held that appeals by letter or otherwise made away
from the situs of the dispute where they call for action
only at the situs, does not convert conduct which has a
primary objective into a violation of Section 8(b)(4).
See, Oil Workers International Union (Pure Oil), 84
NLRB 315, 319 ( 1949); Newspaper and Mail Deliverers'
Union (Interborough News Co.), 90 NLRB 2135,
2149-2150 (1950). And in Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., supra, 89 U.S. App. D.C. at 162, 191 F.2d at
649, aff g, 87 NLRB 720 (1950), the inducement took
the form of disciplinary action against union members
who disobeyed the union's instructions.
Accordingly , I shall recommend dismissal of the com-
plaint allegation that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent and its agents have
engaged in certain unfair labor practices , the statutory
scheme requires that an order be entered requiring them to
cease and desist from such practices . The violations of the
proscriptions of the statute revealed on this total record are
extensive and the Respondent must therefore be enjoined
not only to cease and desist from hereafter violating the
statute with respect to the Gerrity Company , but also with
respect to any other employers within its jurisdiction.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of all
four of the companies discussed above , have a close,
intimate , and substantial relation to trade , traffic, and
commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Gerrity Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Teamsters Local No . 379, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America , is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By picketing the premises of the Gerrity Company at
its Readville yard, in Boston , Massachusetts, and by
calling its employees on strike , on July 16, 1973, and for
over a month thereafter , with an object of forcing or
requiring that Company to recognize or bargain with it as
representative of employees , without being currently
certified as the representative of such employees and
without filing a petition under Section 9(c) within a
reasonable period of time , Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.
4. By blocking the entrances to Gerrity 's yard, by
blocking the roads leading to the yard , and by threatening
to inflict bodily harm upon employees to force them to
honor the Respondent 's picket line , the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law , and the entire record, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
ORDER2
The Respondent, Teamsters Local No. 379, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, its officers , representatives, and
agents, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Picketing the premises of the Gerrity Company, or
calling its employees on strike, where an object thereof is
forcing or requiring said employer to recognize or bargain
with it as representative of the Gerrity employees, in
violation of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.
(b) Blocking the entrances to the Gerrity yard in the
course of strike picketing , blocking the roads leading to
that yard, or threatening to inflict bodily injury upon
employees or other persons for the purpose of preventing
them from crossing the picket line, in violation of Section
8(b)(IXA) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of said
notice , to be duly furnished by the Regional Director for
Region 1, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of the Respondent Union, be posted
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu-
ous places , including all places where notices to its
members are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
(b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to the
Regional Director for Region 1, for posting by Gerrity
Company, Inc., that Company being willing, at all places
where notices to its employees are customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Decision , what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint
be, and it hereby is dismissed , to the extent it alleges
violations of Section 8(bX4)(i) and (ii)(B).
7 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
3 In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT picket the premises of the Gerrity
Company , Inc., at Readville , Massachusetts, or call
its employees out on strike , with an object of forcing or
requiring that company to recognize or bargain with
this union as representative for collective bargaining
purposes of any of its employees.
WE wiLL NOT restrain or coerce the employees of
Gerrity Company, Inc., or of any other employer, in
regard to their rights to engage in union activities, or to
refrain from engaging in union activities , by blocking
the entrances to Gerrity's place of business at Read-
ville, Massachusetts , by blocking the roads leading to
that location, or by threatening any employees or
persons with bodily harm for the purposes of prevent-
ing them from crossing any picket line.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 379,
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 7th
Floor, Bulfinch Building, 15 New Chardon Street , Boston,
Massachusetts , 02114, Telephone No. 617-223-3330.