Teamsters Local 792 (Johnson Bros.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 26, 1987

283 N.L.R.B. 111 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 792 (JOHNSON BROS.)
Local 792, Allied Sales Drivers , Ambulance, Beer
Brewery, Grain Elevator, Retail Liquor, Livery,
Malt House, Spring Water, Soft Drink, Taxi-
cab, Vending Drivers, Helpers, Inside Employ-
ees and General Workers Union, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
and Bryan Jamison , Attorney, for and on behalf
of Johnson ' Bros. Wholesale Liquor Co. Case
18-CB-1590
26 February 1987
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND BABSON
On 8 October 1986 Administrative Law Judge
Marvin Roth issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
the Charging Party filed ' an answering brief, and
the General Counsel filed a Statement of Cross-Ex-
ceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,1 and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order2
as modified.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below Wand orders that the Re-
spondent, Local 792, Allied Sales Drivers, Ambu-
lance, Beer Brewery, Grain Elevator, Retail
Liquor, Livery, Malt House, Spring Water, Soft
Drink, Taxicab, Vending Drivers, Helpers, Inside
Employees and General Workers Union, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b).
' The judge inadvertently used the word "Company" instead of
"Union" in sec. III,B, L. 49 We correct this error.
8 The General Counsel has requested that the Order include a visita-
torial clause authorizing the Board, for compliance purposes, to obtain
discovery from the Respondent, under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure under the supervision of the United States court of appeals enforc-
ing this Order. Under the circumstances of this case, we find it unneces-
sary to include such a clause. Accordingly, we deny the General Coun-
sel's request,
8 We shall modify the judge's recommended Order and notice to con-
tain the Board's standard language for narrow cease-and-desist orders
against unions
111
"(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section T of the Act."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 130ARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered' us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT impose fines or other discipline on
employees who crossed or worked behind our
picket line during the strike against Johnson Bros.,
Wholesale. Liquor Co. in December 11985, in con-
travention of the strike-contract settlement agree-
ment between the parties.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re-
strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the fines imposed on Harold
Edelman, Melvin Emerson, Larry DeSmith, ]Doug-
las Forester, Donald Johnson, James Reiter, and
Richard Schneider, and remove all records of the
disciplinary actions against them, and notify each
of them in writing that this has been done.
WE WILL refund any such fines or part thereof
that has been paid, with interest.
LOCAL 792, ALLIED SALES DRIVERS,
AMBULANCE, BEER BREWERY,
GRAIN ELEVATOR, RETAIL LIQUOR,
LIVERY, MALT HOUSE, SPRING
WATER, SOFT DRINK, TAXICAB,
VENDING DRIVERS,, HELPERS , INSIDE
EMPLOYEES AND GENERAL WORKERS
UNION, AFFILIATED WITH INTERNA-
TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSE-
MEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA
Robert V. Johnson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard Williams, Esq., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
the Respondent.
Steven C. Miller, Esq., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the
Charging Party".
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARVIN ROTH, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard at Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 13 August
283 NLRB No. 20
112 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1986.-1 The charge was filed- on I 1 March by Bryan Ja-
mison, attorney , for and on behalf of Johnson Bros.
Wholesale Liquor Co. (Company). The complaint, which
issued on 21 July, alleges that Local 792, Allied Sales
Drivers , Ambulance, Beer Brewery, Grain Elevator,
Retail Liquor , Livery, Malt House , Spring Water, Soft
Drink , Taxicab , Vending Drivers , Helpers, Inside Em-
ployees and General Workers Union , affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Union or Re-
spondent) violated Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act. The gravamen of the complaint is
that the Union allegedly imposed court collectible fines
on seven company employees who crossed the Union's
picket line and continued to work during an economic
strike, notwithstanding that the Company and the Union
entered into a strike settlement agreement that allegedly
provided in pertinent part that the Union would not
impose internal discipline on its members as a' result of
their conduct during the strike . The Union's answer
denies the commission of the alleged unfair labor prac-
tices. All parties were afforded full opportunity to par-
ticipate, to present ' relevant evidence , to argue orally,
and to file briefs.
On the entire record in this case2 and from my obser-
vation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having con-
sidered the arguments of counsel and the briefs submitted
by the General Counsel, the Company, and the Union, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a Minnesota corporation with an office
and place of business in St. Paul, Minnesota, is engaged
in the wholesale and distribution of liquor and related
products. In the operation of its business, the Company
annually receives at its St. Paul facility goods and mate-
rials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points out-
side of Minnesota, and annually ships from its St. Paul
facility goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points outside of Minnesota. I find that the
Company is' an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE RESPONDENT LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
The Union is the collective-bargaining- representative
of a unit of the Company's employees, including drivers
and warehouse personnel, at the St. Paul facility. On
Thursday, 19 December, the Union commenced a lawful
strike and picketing at the St. Paul facility in support of
' All dates herein are for the period from I December 1985 through 30
November 1986 unless otherwise indicated
2 Errors in the official transcript of proceedings have been noted and
corrected
its efforts to secure a successor collective-bargaining
contract. The strike lasted throughout 3 workdays (19,
20, and 21 December). On Sunday, 22, December, the
Company and the Union reached agreement on the terms
of a successor contract. In the interim, seven unit em-
ployees (Harold Edelman, Melvin Emerson, Larry DeS-
mith, Douglas Forester, Donald Johnson, James Reiter
and Richard Schneider), all union members, crossed the
Union's picket line and continued to work3
On Sunday, 22 December, the Company and the
Union met in a lengthy session at the offices of the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMC), includ-
ing both formal negotiations and so-called off-the-record
or side-bar discussions , which culminated in agreement
on the terms of a new contract. Company Attorney
Martin Garden prepared a memorandum of agreement
that was signed by representatives of both parties. The
agreement specifically provided in item six of seven
listed items in the memorandum: "Contract language as
agreed to-and both parties agree that there will be no
retaliation against anyone."
Donald Gerdesmeier, president and business agent of
Teamsters Local 503, was a member of the Union's ne-
gotiating team, and actively participated in the negotia-
tions. Gerdesmeier had recently negotiated a contract be-
tween his own local and another wholesale liquor firm,
and the president of the area Teamsters' Joint Council
requested him to participate in the Union's negotiations.4
Gerdesmeier testified concerning an off-the-record or
side-bar discussion between himself, Company Attorney
Garden, and Federal Mediator Earl Smith, at which time
they reviewed Garden's draft of the proposed memoran-
dum of agreement. Attorney Bryan Jamison, Garden's
associate, was also present. Gerdesmeier testified in sum
as follows: He objected to Jamison's presence at what he
considered to be an off-the-record conversation. Garden
said that Jamison was present to take notes, whereupon
Gerdesmeier replied that if he were quoted, he 'would
stick the notes up Garden's nose. They reviewed the lan-
guage of the proposed memorandum . After reaching
agreement on wages, they discussed item 6. Garden said
he was concerned that the Union would,pursue pending
unfair labor practice charges, and was also concerned
about sabotage by returning strikers'and "things of a get
even nature." Gerdesmeier said that he was concerned
about discipline of returning strikers for picket line activ-
ity, and possible reprisals against them, and that he
would talk to the Union about the matter. Gerdesmeier
went to speak to Union Secretary-Treasurer Bryant, and
then returned to his conversation with Garden and
Smith, telling them that the Union concurred in the
memorandum, and that they could sign the document.5
a It is immaterial how the employees managed to cross the picket line
I'assume, for the purpose of this case, that as contended by the Union,
they hid in the back of a van that was driven across the picket line by a
management employee.
4 In its brief, the Union refers to Gerdesmeier as a "mediator." How-
ever, in its answer the Union admitted that Gerdesmeier was an interme-
diary "on behalf of" the Union, and that he personally handled negotia-
tions of the clause at issue in this case.
5' I excluded ' testimony by Gerdesmeier concerning his conversation
with Bryant.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 792 (JOHNSON BROS.)
There was no further discussion about the "no retalia-
tion" clause. Gerdesmeier was vague and equivocal
about some aspects of the conversation. He testified that
Garden gave specific examples of sabotage, such as
breakage, but then qualified his testimony by saying that
Garden said "words to that effect." Gerdesmeier testified
that he could not recall whether Garden said there
would not be any "shit" by either side, or whether the
mediator said that the same went for the Union. Garden,
who was present as a General Counsel witness, testified
that prior to the conversation on 22 December, he ex-
pressed concern to Gerdesmeier that Secretary -Treasurer
Bryant would be vengeful because seven of his members
crossed the picket line, and that he could not agree to a
final settlement unless there was a clear understanding
that there would be no retaliation. Garden further testi-
fied that when they reviewed the proposed memorandum
of agreement, Gerdesmeier did not object to the lan-
guage of item 6. Garden testified that he said in effect
that "we didn't want any shit from either party," adding
that the Company would not be able to fire any strikers,
that mediator Smith said "the union likewise," and that
Gerdesmeier made no comment about the no-retaliation
clause. Garden testified that at a later date, he tele-
phoned Gerdesmeier and complained that the Union was
disciplining the employees . Gerdesmeier stated, and
Garden agreed , that there was no discussion at the 22
December meeting about whether the no-retaliation
clause limited the Union's ability to apply internal disci-
pline to its members . However, Garden asserted that
"we had a broad no retaliation agreement " and that this
meant there would be no fines against anybody. Gerdes-
meier disagreed with this interpretation. Attorney Ja-
mison, who was presented as a charging party , witness,
substantially corroborated Garden's testimony concern-
ing the 22 December meeting. Jamison testified that the
first time the parties had a side -bar meeting , Gerdesmeier
questioned his presence, and told Garden that "if you
ever try to use those notes, I'm going to shove them up
your ass." However , Gerdesmeier did not again refer to
Jamison 's presence at such meetings . Jamison testified
that when they discussed the proposed memorandum,
Garden explained : "I've added a no retaliation clause.
There is not going to be any shit going from either way.
The Company may try to fire some strikers, they can't."
Mediator Smith then commented, "The same goes for
the Union." There was no further discussion of item 6.
Jamison specifically testified that there was no mention
of the pending charges or acts of sabotage . Jamison's tes-
timony was corroborated by his notes at the meeting,
which were presented in evidence by the Union.
I credit Garden and Jamison.6 As indicated, Gerdes-
meier's testimony was vague and equivocal in important
6 Their testimony , like that of Gerdesmeter, may properly be consid-
ered as evidence in this case . There is no Board policy that precludes an
attorney from testifying in a Board proceeding concerning matters of
which he has personal knowledge Indeed, neither Garden nor Jamison
participated as trial counsel in this case , although Board policy does not
require such abstention Operating Engineers Local 9 (Fountain Sand), 210
NLRB 129 fn. 1 (1974) There is also no Board policy that precludes tes-
timony concerning so-called off-the-record conversations during contract
negotiations , or which precludes testimony by persons who heard such
conversations, regardless of whether their presence was accepted or even
113
respects. Gerdesmeier's version of the 22 December con-
versation was also improbable in one significant respect.
If Garden , an experienced attorney, were concerned
about the continuing pendency of unfair labor practice
charges, then it is probable that he would have expressly
provided in the memorandum of agreement that the
Union request withdrawal of such charges. It is also
probable that Garden would have conditioned the entire
agreement on approval of such withdrawal by the
Board's Regional Director . However, he did not request
withdrawal of the pending charges (which concerned
statements by the Company to its employees in corre-
spondence and meetings) until 14 January, some 3 weeks
after the parties reached agreement on a contract. There-
fore, it is evident that at least in the Union 's view, with-
drawal of the charges was unrelated to its obligations
under item 6 of the memorandum of agreement.
It is undisputed that by identicalletters dated 25 Feb-
ruary, the Union by its president, Steven Lucht, notified
six of the seven employees who crossed the picket line
(all but Larry DeSmith) as follows:
On January 10, 1986, you were sent notice of a
hearing to be held before the Executive Board on
Wednesday, January 22, 1986. This hearing was to
determine whether or not disciplinary action should
be taken against you for crossing the picket lines
and working during the recent strike at Johnson
Bros. Liquors.
The hearing was held and you, did not appear.
The Executive Board hearing committee, chaired
by Vice-President Anthony Tiemann, examined the
evidence and reached the following conclusions:
On the basis of an investigation of the facts pre-
sented and signed affidavits submitted, you worked
while a strike was in progress at your employers
[sic] place of business. The Board assessed a fine
against you in the amount of $1400 .00. The Board
however determined that one-half of the fine would
be forgiven, therefore, you owe your union Local
792 the amount of $700.00 for working while a
strike was in progress.
DeSmith appeared at the Union's executive board hear-
ing, was assessed a fine in the amount of $1200 , of which
one-half was forgiven, and he paid the remaining $600.
The other employees did not pay their fines. None of the
fines were rescinded. Douglas Forester filed an appeal
with Teamsters Joint Counsel No. 32, but received no
reply. The Union admits that it imposed the fines be-
cause the employees crossed its picket line and worked
for the Company while its strike was in progress.
B. Concluding Findings
I find that the Union negotiated and executed an
agreement with the Company whereby it agreed that it
would not impose internal discipline on its members as a
result of their conduct during the strike. Therefore, the
known by the other participants Indeed, it was the Union that sought to
introduce testimony concerning the conversation on 22 December, over
the objection of the General Counsel and the Company
114 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Company violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by imposing such
discipline. Office Employees Local ' 129, 267 NLRB ' 1017
(1983); Hospital Workers Local 250 (Associated Hospitals),
254 NLRB 834 (1981); Hospital Workers -Local 250 (Da-
mero 'n Hospital), `248 NLRB 1390 (1980); Retail Clerks
Local 1364 (Food Employers), 240 NLRB 1127 (1979);
Stationary Engineers Local 39 (San Jose Hospital), 240
NLRB 1122 (1979). The first two decisions cited above
are particularly in point. In Associated Hospitals, which
involved an arbitration decision in settlement of a strike,
the administrative law judge specifically held that the
phrase "no retaliation" applied to union discipline of its
members for their conduct during the strike . Office Em-
ployees involved an oral agreement that provided that
there would be "no reprisals by either side against strik-
ers or nonstrikers ." The parties never expressly referred
to internal union charges . Nevertheless, the Board, af-
firmed the 'administrative law judge's determination that
in the context of a strike settlement agreement, the
quoted language applied to such charges. The terms "re-
taliation" and "reprisal" are, insofar as pertinent , synony-
mous, i .e., they refer in sum to acts of putting or inflict-
ing in return, as with an injury or wrong . Webster 's Third
New International Dictionary (G & C Merriam Co., 1981).
A no-retaliation agreement in the-context of a strike set-
tlement , as here, should be given its generally accepted
meaning, in light of applicable Board precedent, unless
extrinsic evidence - indicates that the parties intended oth-
erwise.7
The credited evidence adduced at the hearing confirms
rather' than contradicts the General Counsel's position.
First, at no time did the parties say or agree that the no-
retaliation clause would not apply to internal union disci-
pline. - Indeed, prior - to writing up the memorandum of
agreement , Attorney Garden made clear to the Union
that the Company wanted a clear understanding that
there would be no retaliation by the Union against em-
ployees who crossed the picket line. It is undisputed that
nothing else was said between the parties on this subject
at any other time during the negotiations and, specifical-
ly, that nothing was said when the parties went over the
clause at issue . Therefore, as internal union discipline
would constitute "retaliation" under both Board law and
plain English , the clause should be so interpreted.
7 I do not agree with the General Counsel's argument (Br. 3-4) that I
am precluded by the parol evidence rule from considering any evidence
of the parties ' intent beyond the language of the agreement itself. The
question presented is one of contract interpretation , which should be gov-
erned by the mtentions of the parties NLRB v. Ortiz Funeral Home Corp,
651 F 2d 136, 139-140 (2d Cir. 1981). This is also a case involving the
alleged relinquishment of a right protected by Section 7 and Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Compare Indianapolis Power Co, 273 NLRB 1715
(1985), revd. and remanded sub nom Electrical Workers IBEW Local
1395 a NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027 (D C Cir 1986). Indeed, in Office Employ-
ees, the most recent decision relied on by the General Counsel, the ad-
ministrative law judge expressly took into consideration the negotiations
and other statements by the parties. This is not a case such as those cited
by the General Counsel Hawaii Teamsters Local 996 (Dairymen 's Assn.),
III NLRB 1220 (1955), Seattle Bakers' Bureau, 101 NLRB 1344 (1953),
and Peterson & Lytle, 60 NLRB 1070 (1945), in which a party seeks to
present evidence of a prior or contemporaneous understanding that
would clearly be at variance with or supplemental to the written agree-
ment. Rather the meaning of the written agreement itself is at issue, and
therefore the parties may adduce evidence concerning their discussions,
or lack of discussion , concerning the clause
Second , the agreement in context would make no sense
unless it covered internal union discipline . At the hear-
ing, the Union - argued in sum that by the no -retaliation
clause , the parties agreed that the Union would with-
draw its charges against the Company, there would- be
no sabotage by employees, the Company would not re-
taliate against returning strikers, and the Company would
not take disciplinary action against employees because of
picket line misconduct . However, it is questionable at
best whether the pendency of unfair labor
.
practices
would be regarded as an act of "retaliation." For the rea-
sons previously discussed , the evidence indicates that the
Company was not concerned about the pending charges,
and the Union did not contemplate that they were cov-
ered by the agreement . In its brief (Br. 4) the Union at-
taches significance to the fact that the agreement re-
ferred to "both parties," i.e., the Company and the
Union , and "does not incorporate, by its terms, individ-
ual union members ." However, the agreement in Office,
Employees similarly referred to reprisals `''by either side."
If I were to carry the Union's argument to its logical
conclusion, it would mean that the agreement might not
apply to , acts of sabotage because such acts might consti-
tute individual rather than union action . However, inter-
nal union discipline would constitute union action, i.e.,
action by one of the parties to the agreement . Moreover,
company discrimination against returning strikers and
acts of sabotage by returning strikers would constitute,
respectively, unlawful and unprotected conduct , whether
the parties had an agreement . It is unlikely that the par-
ties would be concerned that the other refrain from
doing that which in any event would be unlawful.
Rather, it is probable that the parties, in the interest of
reaching a "settlement providing for industrial peace"
agreed to refrain from doing that which they could or
might lawfully do in the absence of an agreement . Office
Employees, supra, 267 NLRB at 1021 (1981). Therefore,
it is evident that the ' Company agreed to refrain from
taking disciplinary action against employees because of
picket line misconduct , and the Union agreed that it
would not impose internal discipline on its members as a
result of their conduct during the strike.8
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within-the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By imposing fines on Harold Edelman, Melvin Em-
erson, Larry DeSmith , Douglas Forester, Donald John-
son, James Reiter , and Richard Schneider , in contraven-
tion of a strike-contract settlement agreement between
the Company and the Union, the Union engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.'
8 I reject the General Counsel 's alternative argument that the fines
were unlawful at least in part because they were unreasonable in amount
In determining the lawfulness of union fines on members or former mem-
bers, the Board does not consider whether the fines are reasonable in
amount . NLRB v. Boeing Co, 412 U S. 67 (1973)
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 792 (JOHNSON BROS.)
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Union has committed violations
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I shall recommend that
it be required to cease and desist therefrom and from like
or related conduct, to post appropriate notices, and to
furnish and give appropriate notices to the Company. I
shall further recommend that the Union be ordered to re-
scind the fines imposed on the above-named employees,
remove all records of the disciplinary actions taken
against them, and to refund any such fines or part there-
of that has been paid, with interest thereon to be com-
puted in the manner and amount prescribed in Florida
Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).9 I am rejecting the
General Counsel's request for a visitatorial clause be-
cause the General Counsel has failed to demonstrate that
there are circumstances in this case that warrant such a
remedy. See Rebel Coal Co., 279 NLRB 141 fn. 2 (1986).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
edlo
ORDER
The Respondent, Local 792, Allied Sales Drivers, Am-
bulance, Beer Brewery, Grain Elevator, Retail Liquor,
Livery, Malt House, Spring Water, Soft Drink, Taxicab,
Vending Drivers, Helpers, Inside Employees and Gener-
al Workers Union, affiliated with International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Imposing fines or other discipline on employees
who crossed or worked behind its picket line during the
strike against Johnson Bros., Wholesale Liquor Co. in
8 See generally Isis Plumbing Co, 138 NLRB 716, 717-721 (1962)
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 10246 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, ' the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
115
December 1985, in contravention of the strike-conduct
settlement agreement between the parties.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining , or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the fines imposed on Harold Edelman,
Melvin Emerson, Larry DeSmith, Douglas Forester,
Donald Johnson, James Reiter, and Richard Schneider,
remove all records of the disciplinary actions against
them, and notify each of them in writing that this has
been done.
(b) Refund any such fines or part thereof that has been
paid, with interest, as set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(c) Post at its offices and meeting halls, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."" 1 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 18 , after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Furnish to the Regional Director for Region 18,
signed copies of the notice for posting, if Johnson Bros.
Wholesale Liquor Co. is willing, at its St. Paul facility, in
the places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Copies of the notice, to be furnished, by the Re-
gional Director for Region 18, after being signed by Re-
spondent's representative, shall be forthwith returned to
the Regional Director for posting.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."