Teamsters Local 251 (Ryder Student Transportation)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 18, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 1009 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 251 (RYDER STUDENT TRANSPORTATION) 1009
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No.
251, AFL–CIO (Ryder Student Transportation)
and Ann Greenwood and Ann Ramos and Fran-
cisco Santana. Cases 1–CB–9273, 1–CB–9274,
and 1–CB–9280
April 18, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
HURTGEN
AND WALSH
On April 28, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Arthur
J. Amchan issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions and sup-
porting briefs, and the General Counsel filed an answer-
ing brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions as
modified and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied and set forth in full below.
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by attempting to collect union dues
from employees Francisco Santana, Alicia Ramos, and
Ann Greenwood pursuant to a contractual union-security
clause without notifying them of their rights under NLRB
v. General Motors Corp.1 to be dues-paying nonmembers
and of the rights of nonmembers under Communications
Workers v. Beck2 to object to the expenditure of their
dues on nonrepresentational activities and to obtain a
commensurate reduction in dues and fees. The judge
also found that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by asking the Employer to discharge
those employees, and by causing it to discharge Santana
and to suspend Ramos and Greenwood, for failing to pay
dues pursuant to the union-security clause. We affirm
those findings.3

1 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
2 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
3 A union ordinarily may not lawfully seek to have an employee dis-
charged for failing to pay dues under a union-security clause when it
has not informed the employee of his or her Beck rights. Production
Workers Local 707 (Mavo Leasing), 322 NLRB 35 (1996), enfd. 161
F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1998).
No exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Respondent
acted unlawfully with regard to Ramos and Greenwood.
Although the judge found that “Santana appears to be a classic ‘free
rider’” as that term is used in, e.g., Seafarers Great Lakes District
(Tomlinson Fleet Corp.), 149 NLRB 1114, 1120–1121 (1964), the
record does not indicate that Santana would have refused to pay even
the representational portion of his delinquent dues had he been apprised
of his rights under Beck and General Motors. We therefore find it
unnecessary to pass on the judge’s suggestion that a union can never
lawfully attempt to have an employee—even a true “free rider”—
discharged for failure to comply with the requirements of a union-
security clause unless it first informs him of those rights.
The judge, however, found it unnecessary to address
the General Counsel’s allegation that the Respondent
also acted unlawfully by pursuing to arbitration a griev-
ance concerning the Employer’s failure to discharge
Ramos and Greenwood as it had requested. The judge
found that, even if that conduct constituted a violation, it
was duplicative of the other violations found. The Gen-
eral Counsel has excepted to the judge’s failure to find a
separate violation, and we find merit in that exception.
Although taking the grievance to arbitration was, in a
sense, a continuation of the Respondent’s original unlaw-
ful attempt to have the two employees discharged, it was
also a separate and distinct act. Moreover, in attending
the arbitration, Ramos and Greenwood may have lost
earnings if they had to take time off from work, and also
may have incurred expenses in the process. For these
reasons, we find that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by pursuing the grievance to arbitra-
tion, and we shall modify the Order and notice to provide
for Ramos and Greenwood to be made whole for any
earnings they may have lost and expenses they may have
incurred as a result of attending the arbitration proceed-
ing.
The judge ordered the Respondent to make the dis-
criminatees whole by paying them backpay for the earn-
ings they lost as a result of its unlawful actions. How-
ever, he also recommended that the Respondent be al-
lowed to offset against its backpay liability any dues law-
fully owed by the discriminatees. The General Counsel
has excepted to the latter provision. Again, we find merit
in that exception. The Board has held that collection of
dues is an internal union matter and that it is improper to
allow a union to inject such a matter into compliance
proceedings and thus, in effect, to litigate a private cause
of action as a claimed general creditor.4 We shall, there-
fore, delete the dues offset provisions from the judge’s
recommended Order and notice.5

4 Teamsters Local 705 (Randolph Paper Co.), 227 NLRB 694
(1977). In that case, the Board reasoned that the Act does not confer
private rights, but exists to enforce the public interest in preventing
unfair labor practices. Thus, a backpay right is not a private right, but a
public one imposed to enforce the law against the violator, discourage
unlawful discrimination, and thereby vindicate the policies of the Act.
It would be contrary to those purposes to allow a union to reduce the
amount of backpay owed by the amount of its private claim for dues.
5 We shall also modify the Order and notice to be consistent with the
Board’s decision in Mavo Leasing, supra.
333 NLRB No. 129
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1010
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully caused
the Employer to discharge Francisco Santana and to sus-
pend Alicia Ramos and Ann Greenwood, we shall order
the Respondent to notify the Employer in writing, with
copies to the discriminatees, that it has no objection to
their employment and that it affirmatively requests
Santana’s reinstatement. We shall also order the Re-
spondent to notify Santana, Ramos, and Greenwood of
their rights under General Motors and Beck and to in-
form them that they are not subject to discharge or sus-
pension for nonpayment of union dues in the absence of
such notification.6 We shall further order the Respondent
to make Ramos and Greenwood whole for any loss of
wages and benefits they may have suffered as a result of
its unlawful conduct, and for any loss of earnings or ex-
penses they may have incurred as a result of attending
the October 1998 arbitration, less net interim earnings.
In addition, we shall order the Respondent to make
Santana whole for any loss of wages and benefits he may
have suffered as a result of the Respondent’s conduct
until he is either reinstated by the Employer to his former
or a substantially equivalent position, or until he obtains
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, less net
interim earnings.7 All amounts of make-whole relief
shall be computed with interest as provided for in New
Horizons for the Retarded.8
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local No. 251, AFL–CIO, Providence, Rhode Island, its
officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to notify bargaining unit employees, when
it first seeks to obligate them to pay fees and dues under
a union-security clause, of their right under NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and
remain nonmembers and of the rights of nonmembers

6 The complaint allegations are limited to the Respondent’s failure to
inform Santana, Ramos, and Greenwood of their General Motors and
Beck rights and its requesting their discharges and causing the dis-
charge of Santana and the suspensions of Ramos and Greenwood. The
complaint does not allege a failure to inform unit employees generally
of their General Motors and Beck rights. The amended remedy there-
fore addresses the violations alleged and found. See Mavo Leasing,
supra, 322 NLRB at 36 fn. 2.
7 Id. at 36; Sheet Metal Workers Local 355 (Zinsco Electrical Prod-
ucts), 254 NLRB 773 (1981).
8 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988), to object to paying dues and fees for union activi-
ties that are not germane to the Respondent’s duties as
bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in dues and
fees for such activities.
(b) Causing or attempting to cause Ryder Student
Transportation to suspend or discharge Francisco
Santana, Alicia Ramos, Ann Greenwood, or any other
employees for failing to pay union dues pursuant to a
union-security clause without first notifying them of their
General Motors and Beck rights, advising them of the
amount of the dues delinquency, and affording them a
reasonable opportunity to pay the amounts owed.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Notify Francisco Santana, Alicia Ramos, and Ann
Greenwood in writing of their rights under General Mo-
tors to be and remain nonmembers and of the rights of
nonmembers under Beck to object to paying for union
activities not germane to the Respondent’s duties as bar-
gaining agent and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees
for such activities. The notice must also include suffi-
cient information to enable the employees to intelligently
decide whether to object, as well as a description of any
internal union procedures for filing objections.
(b) Make whole Francisco Santana, Alicia Ramos, and
Ann Greenwood for any loss of wages or other rights and
benefits they may have suffered, or any expenses they
may have incurred, as a result of the Respondent’s
unlawful conduct, in the manner set forth in the amended
remedy section of this decision.
(c) Notify Ryder Student Transportation, in writing,
with copies to Santana, Ramos, and Greenwood, that it
has no objection to their employment and that it requests
that Santana be reinstated.
(d) Notify Santana, Ramos, and Greenwood that it will
not cause or attempt to cause Ryder Student Transporta-
tion to discharge or suspend them for nonpayment of
dues without first notifying them of their General Motors
and Beck rights and affording them a reasonable oppor-
tunity to pay the amounts owed.
(e) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files, and ask Ryder Student Transportation to
remove from its files, any reference to the discharge of
Santana and the suspensions of Ramos and Greenwood,
and within 3 days thereafter notify the employees in writ-
ing that this has been done and that the discharge and
suspensions will not be used against them in any way.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 251 (RYDER STUDENT TRANSPORTATION) 1011
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its business office and meeting hall copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees and
members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT fail to notify bargaining unit employ-
ees, when we first seek to obligate them to pay fees and
dues under a union-security clause, of their right under
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to
be and remain nonmembers and of the rights of non-
members under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying dues and fees for
activities that are not germane to our duties as bargaining
agent and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such
activities.
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Ryder Stu-
dent Transportation to suspend or discharge Francisco
Santana, Alicia Ramos, Ann Greenwood, or any other

9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
employees for failing to pay union dues pursuant to a
union-security clause without first notifying them of their
General Motors and Beck rights, advising them of the
amount of the dues delinquency, and affording them a
reasonable opportunity to pay the amounts owed.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL notify Francisco Santana, Alicia Ramos,
and Ann Greenwood in writing of their rights under
General Motors to be and remain nonmembers and of the
rights of nonmembers under Beck to object to paying for
union activities not germane to our duties as bargaining
agent and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such
activities. The notice will also include sufficient informa-
tion to enable the employees to intelligently decide
whether to object, as well as a description of any internal
union procedures for filing objections.
WE WILL make whole Francisco Santana, Alicia
Ramos, and Ann Greenwood for any loss of wages or
other rights and benefits they may have suffered, or any
expenses they may have incurred, with interest, as a re-
sult of our unlawful conduct.
WE WILL notify Ryder Student Transportation, in
writing, with copies to Santana, Ramos, and Greenwood,
that we have no objection to their employment and that
we request that Santana be reinstated.
WE WILL notify Santana, Ramos, and Greenwood that
we will not cause or attempt to cause Ryder Student
Transportation to discharge or suspend them for non-
payment of dues without first notifying them of their
General Motors and Beck rights and affording them a
reasonable opportunity to pay the amounts owed.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files, and ask Ryder Student
Transportation to remove from its files, any reference to
the discharge of Santana and the suspensions of Ramos
and Greenwood, and within 3 days thereafter notify the
employees in writing that this has been done and that the
discharge and suspensions will not be used against them
in any way.

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL NO. 251, AFL–CIO

Donald C. Firenze, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Marc Gursky, Esq. (Gursky Law Associates), of Providence,
Rhode Island, for the Respondent, IBT Local 251.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Boston, Massachusetts, on February 11 and
12, 1999. The charges in Cases 1–CB–9273 and 1–CB–9274
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1012
were filed June 15, 1998; the charge in Case 1–CB–9280 was
filed June 24, 1998. The consolidated complaint was issued
September 23, 1998.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel and the Respondent Union, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Ryder Student Transportation (Ryder) is a corporation with
an office and place of business in Providence, Rhode Island,
where it is engaged in the transportation of school children.
Ryder annually derives gross revenues in excess of $250,000
and performs services valued in excess of $50,000 in States
other than Rhode Island. Ryder is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and the Union, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(IBT), Local 251, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent, IBT Local
251, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) with regard to Alicia
Ramos, Ann Greenwood, and Francisco Santana, all of whom
were school bus drivers employed by Ryder Student Transpor-
tation. The Union requested that Ryder discharge all three
employees in the spring of 1998, pursuant to the union-security
clause of their collective-bargaining agreement. Pursuant to
these requests, Ryder suspended Ramos and Greenwood for
two shifts and terminated Santana’s employment.1 The issue in
these cases is whether the Union was entitled to invoke the
union-security clause and seek the discharge of these three
employees for nonpayment of dues.
Francisco Santana
Francisco Santana was hired by Ryder as a school bus driver
on February 10, 1997. Within a month or two of his hiring,
Local 251’s steward, Wally Akimbi, informed Santana that he
had to join the Union. Santana never did so and never paid any
dues to the Union.2
On May 26, 1998, Business Agent Ed Wiggin sent Santana a
letter which stated:

After reviewing our records, we have found that you are not a
member of this Local Union. In accordance with the Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement, in order to maintain your em-
ployment at Ryder Bus, you must become a member in good

1 The collective-bargaining agreement between Ryder and the Union
runs from July 1, 1995, to June 30, 2000. Art. III requires that all em-
ployees become and remain members in good standing of the Union as
a condition of employment on and after the 31st day following the
beginning of their employment. Ryder is obligated under the contract
to discharge employees, who fail to become members or maintain their
membership in good standing, upon written notice from the Union.
2 While the evidence as to what Akimbi told Santana is sparse,
Santana does not contend that he was unaware that he had to pay union
dues as a condition of his employment. I infer that he has been aware
of that fact since early 1997.
standing, of Teamsters Local Union No. 251. Therefore,
please be advised that you have seventy-two (72) hours after
receipt of this letter to appear at the Union Hall and become a
member of this Local.
If you fail to appear, appropriate action will be taken.

On May 28, Wiggin handed a copy of this letter to Santana.
Within a few days, Union Steward Joyce Brazenor told Santana
that he had to join the Union or he would be terminated.
Santana replied that he was willing to join the Union but would
not pay back dues.
Thereafter, on June 8, the Union wrote Ryder requesting
Santana’s termination in accordance with the collective-
bargaining agreement. The letter referred to Santana’s conver-
sation with Brazenor and indicated that Santana’s willingness
to pay dues prospectively was not acceptable to it. On June 10,
Mark Aussubel, Ryder’s contract manager, summoned Santana
to his office. Santana reiterated his refusal to pay back dues
and Aussubel terminated him.3
Analysis with regard to Santana
Francisco Santana appears to be a classic “free rider.” He
was willing to take advantage of the Union’s failure to collect
his dues to avoid paying amounts that he was clearly required
to pay under the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement.
On the other hand, the Union did not comply with its statutory
obligations.
In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), the
U.S. Supreme Court held than an employee’s membership obli-
gation under a union-security clause is limited to its “financial
core”, i.e., paying an amount equivalent to initiation fees and
dues. More recently, in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 108 S.Ct. 2641 (1988), the Court held that Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act does not permit a
collective-bargaining representative, over the objection of dues-
paying nonmember employees, to expend funds collected under
a union-security agreement on activities unrelated to collective
bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment.
Many of the implications of the Beck decision were clarified by
the Board in California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 324
(1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 119
S.Ct. 47 (1998).
In California Saw, the Board stated that “in general . . . that
if a union seeks to apply a union security clause to unit em-
ployees, it has an obligation under the duty of fair representa-
tion to notify them of their Beck rights before they become
subject to obligations under the clause . . . .” The Board found
3 At p. 10 of its brief, Respondent states that, “if his employment
was in fact terminated, [Santana] was terminated for reasons other than
his failure to pay dues.” This contention is apparently based on the
testimony of Union Steward Joyce Brazenor that Mark Aussubel told
her he was looking for a reason to get rid of Santana and that the Union
gave him the “ammunition” Aussubel was looking for to let Santana go.
I do not credit this testimony. Aussubel was not asked about any other
reasons for Santana’s termination. Moreover, even if I credited Braze-
nor, her testimony would indicate that Santana would not have been
discharged but for the Union’s request that he be terminated for his
refusal to pay back dues.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 251 (RYDER STUDENT TRANSPORTATION) 1013
further that a union has an obligation to give a Beck rights no-
tice to newly hired nonmember employees at the time the Un-
ion seeks to obligate these newly hired employees to pay dues.
Current union members must be told of their General Motors
rights if they have not previously received such notice, in order
to be certain that they have voluntarily chosen full membership
and a concomitant relinquishment of Beck rights, Paperworkers
Local 1033 (Weyerhauser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB 349 (1995).
The Union’s May 26 letter is a blatant violation of the
Santana’s General Motors and Beck rights. Given the fact that
General Motors was decided in 1963 and Beck was decided in
1988, I assume that the Union was aware these rights. The
issue, therefore, is whether the Union should be precluded from
demanding Santana’s discharge, despite his unwillingness to
pay back dues, due to its failure to comply with its obligations,
or whether the Union’s failure to comply with Beck and Gen-
eral Motors can be excused by Santana’s unwillingness to pay
any back dues. I conclude that Union is barred from invoking
the union-security clause and requesting Santana’s discharge.
The Board has long held that before a union requests that an
employer discharge an employee pursuant to a union security
agreement, it has a duty to notify the employee of the precise
nature of their obligations to the union, including the amount of
money that is owed, e.g., Philadelphia Sheraton Corp., 136
NLRB 888, 896 (1962). Local 251 did not satisfy these re-
quirements. Instead, it demanded that Santana become a full-
fledged union member and demanded the payment of both the
representational and nonrepresentational portion of his dues—
without informing him that he could choose to be a dues-paying
nonmember of the Union and object to the payment of the non-
representational portion of the Union’s dues.4
An exception to the Philadelphia Sheraton principle appears
to have evolved in a line of cases indicating that a union will
not be held to strict compliance with the rules for notifying
employees regarding dues delinquencies, when to do so would
excuse nonpayment by an employee who knowingly evaded his
dues obligations, e.g., Seafarers Great Lakes District
(Tomlinson Fleet Corp.), 149 NLRB 1114, 1120–1121 (1964),
Teamsters Local 630 (Ralph’s Grocery), 209 NLRB 117, 124
(1974); Big Rivers Electric Corp., 260 NLRB 329 (1982), I.B.I.
Security, 292 NLRB 648 (1989); Communications Workers
Local 9509 (Pacific Bell), 295 NLRB 196 (1989); Food &
Commercial Workers Local 368A (Professional Services), 317
NLRB 352, 354–355 fn. 8 (1995).
Some of these cases excusing a union’s failure to fully notify
an employee of his or her obligations involve situations in
which the employees had knowledge of these obligations from
other sources, e.g., Teamsters Local 630 (Ralph’s Grocery),
and Big Rivers Electric. However the basic proposition enun-
ciated in the Seafarers case could be extended to allow a Union

4 The General Counsel emphasizes the fact that the Union did not
give Santana a figure representing the amount of back dues he owed to
it. I regard this as relatively unimportant since Santana made it clear he
was unwilling to pay any amount of back dues. Moreover, any figure
the Union would have given Santana may have been incorrect in light
of its failure to provide him his General Motors and Beck notices.
to seek the discharge of Santana despite the fact that it never
afforded him his GM and Beck rights.

[W]here the circumstances are such that it may be inferred
that but for the union’s excessive demand the employee
would have made a proper tender and that he was deterred
from doing so by the apparent futility thereof, it would be in-
equitable to deny relief to the employee because of his failure
to make such tender. It does not follow that this “futility” rule
should be extended to the case of an employee . . . who . . .
was an avowed “free rider,” and who, it is clear, was not de-
terred from making a tender by the nature of Respondent’s
demand, but was motivated solely by his aversion to paying
any part of his dues obligations and would not have complied
even with a proper demand.
[S]uch a result would not be consistent with the con-
gressional policy underlying Section 8(b)(2) and proviso
(B) in Section 8(a)(3). That policy . . . was not to protect
free riders against excessive union demands, but rather to
insure that employees who were willing to pay their finan-
cial obligations were not discharged for improper reasons.

Seafarers at 149 NLRB 1120–1121.
On the other hand, it would be inconsistent with California
Saw to allow a union to demand the discharge of employee
before affording the employee his or her rights under General
Motors and Beck. Before requesting the termination of an em-
ployee pursuant to a union security agreement, a union must
notify the employee of his or her Beck and General Motors
rights, if that employee has not previously received such notice.
Only after the employee has the opportunity to exercise these
rights may the union seek his or her discharge—regardless of
the amount and duration of the employee’s delinquency. Had
Local 251 advised Santana of these rights in May or June 1998,
it would have been able to seek his discharge unless he was
willing to commit to a reasonable payment plan for at least the
representational portion of his back dues. I see no injustice in
holding the Union liable for backpay when it could so easily
have avoided this liability by complying with its obligations.
Moreover, insistence on compliance with General Motors and
Beck in cases such as Santana’s will insure that such rights are
afforded employees as was intended by the Supreme Court.5
In fashioning an order to remedy this violation, I will rec-
ommend that the Board not lose sight of the fact that the Union
is entitled to a significant amount of dues money from Santana,
even if he chooses to be a nonmember and exercises his Beck
rights. I will therefore recommend that the Union be allowed to
offset any dues it is lawfully owed against the backpay it owes
to this charging party. Moreover, once the Union fulfills its
5 I do not agree with the General Counsel’s argument that the charg-
ing parties are not free riders because there is no evidence that they
defied the Union’s request that they pay their back dues. In this regard
I note that current Board precedent holds that a Union may reject a
belated attempt to pay back dues and insist that the employer terminate
a employee who has not been paying his or her union dues, General
Motors Corp., 134 NLRB 1107 (1961), Acme Fast Freight, 134 NLRB
1131 (1961). The Union’s insistence on the employee’s termination is
unlawful only if motivated by factors other than his or her dues delin-
quency.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1014
obligations to notify Santana of his GM and Beck rights, it has a
right to insist, in a nondiscriminatory manner, that his contin-
ued employment with Ryder be conditioned upon timely pay-
ment of his lawful current and back dues obligations.
Alicia Ramos
Alicia Ramos was hired by Ryder in 1989. She applied for
membership in the Union and signed a dues-checkoff authori-
zation form on March 27, 1996. The Union waived her initia-
tion fee and Ramos paid her monthly dues on a more or less
timely basis through August 1996. On August 19, 1996,
Ramos took a withdrawal card, which suspended her obligation
to pay dues. She returned to work and returned the withdrawal
card to the union hall on October 16, 1996. Ramos, however,
did not resume paying her monthly dues.
When she got three months in arrears on December 9, 1996,
Ramos’ union membership was suspended. She paid the Union
$25 via checkoff on December 16, and the suspension was
lifted. In February, Ramos was again three months behind in
her dues and was again suspended. This cycle continued until
July 2, 1997, when Ramos took another withdrawal card as a
paid-up member in good standing.6
Ramos returned to work in the fall of 1997, but did not return
her withdrawal card to the union hall and did not pay any union
dues between July 2, 1997, and October 1, 1998.7 On May 11,
1998, the Union sent a letter to Mark Aussubel, Ryder’s con-
tract manager, informing him that eight employees, including
Ramos and Greenwood, were working without being active
members of the union in good standing. The letter demanded
that the eight appear at the Union hall within 72 hours to pay all
dues owed to the Union. The letter stated further that failure of
the employees to comply with this demand would lead the Un-
ion to instruct Ryder to terminate their employment.
Union Steward Joyce Brazenor handed each of the employ-
ees a copy of the May 11 letter on Thursday, May 14.8 Ramos
tore her letter up immediately.9 Most, or all, of the employees
named in the letter took immediate steps to pay all or part of the
dues they owed. On May 15, Ramos met with Wally Akimbi,
who was an alternate union steward. Akimbi showed Ramos a
computer printout indicating that she owed the Union $250.

6 Ryder employees who did not work during the summer school pe-
riod generally took withdrawal cards to stop their dues deductions
while they were not working.
7 Ramos was off work due to illness for 7 months. The record is
confused as to when this occurred but I conclude it was from Septem-
ber 1995 to February 1996. This would explain why Ramos did not
start paying union dues when the collective-bargaining agreement first
became effective.
8 I credit Ramos’ testimony that she was shown the letter on May
14th over that over Brazenor that this occurred on May 12. Ramos was
completely forthright in her testimony even with regard to issues on
which her testimony does not necessarily cast her in a favorable light.
Moreover, the Union’s evidence as to when other employees started
paying their arrears, although incomplete, is consistent with Ramos’
testimony.
9 In the spring of 1998, a decertification petition was circulating
amongst Ryder’s employees. The record does not indicate whether any
of the charging parties signed this petition or were in favor of it. How-
ever, there was some personal animosity between Brazenor and Ramos.
Ramos told Akimbi that she would get a check from her credit
union and bring the money to the union hall on Monday.
On Monday morning, May 18, the Union hand delivered a
second letter to Mark Aussubel demanding that Ryder termi-
nate Ramos and Greenwood immediately for failure to pay their
back dues. After her shift on Monday morning, May 18,
Ramos went to the Union hall and tendered $250 to Union
Business Manager Ed Wiggin. Wiggin refused to accept it,
telling Ramos she had been terminated. 10
When Ramos reported to work for her afternoon shift, Mark
Aussubel called her into his office and told her that he had to
terminate her. Ramos told Aussubel that she had tried to pay
the Union and that it refused to take her money. Aussubel sent
Ramos home and called his supervisor. He then reinstated
Ramos beginning with the afternoon shift of May 19. On May
19 and/or 20, Aussubel met with Wiggin and Brazenor. At one
point Wiggin indicated that it would be acceptable to the Union
if Ramos and Greenwood paid their dues by the end of that
week. However, after being so instructed by the Union’s ex-
ecutive board, Wiggin called Aussubel and said the Union was
demanding the termination of both employees, and that it
would file an unfair labor practice charge against Ryder if they
were not terminated.
A week or so after her suspension, Ramos returned to the
Union hall with a coworker, Ann DeWare. Ramos offered to
pay the Union $250; DeWare offered the Union between $60
and $100 which she had collected from a number of Ryder
employees to pay Ann Greenwood’s back dues. Wiggin told
them that pursuant to his instructions from the Union’s execu-
tive board, he could not accept the money since the Union was
insisting on the termination of Ramos and Greenwood.
Ramos did not work during the summer of 1998, but re-
turned to work in September of that year. On October 1, 1998,
she paid $50 in union dues via checkoff. Shortly thereafter, on
October 13, she attended an arbitration meeting regarding the
Union’s grievance against Ryder alleging that it failed to com-
ply with the collective-bargaining agreement by refusing to
terminate Ramos and Greenwood. The grievance was settled
by a stipulation agreed to by the two employees that they would
pay the Union $100 by October 16, and $50 per month thereaf-
ter. On October 19, the Union sent Ryder a letter stating that it
10 After Ramos testified that she tendered payment to the Union, I
was skeptical as to her credibility on this issue. Her testimony was not
corroborated by other witnesses or documents (although Aussubel
testified that Ramos told him about the tender on May 18). Respon-
dent’s first witness was Kathye Kiras, who normally receives dues
payments at the union hall. In response to a question from the bench
and a followup question from Union counsel, Kiras testified that she
had never refused to take dues money from anyone. On cross-
examination by the General Counsel, Kiras revealed that she was out of
work on medical leave between May 13 and June 5. The General
Counsel then asked if any union official had told her of attempts by
Ramos, Greenwood or Ann Deware (on behalf of Greenwood) to pay
dues. Kiras answered in the negative. Business agent Wiggin then
testified on direct without mentioning Ramos’ attempt to pay on May
18. Not until I asked Wiggin at the conclusion of his direct testimony
did he corroborate Ramos’ effort to pay on the morning of the 18th. In
my view the Union should have stipulated that Ramos tried to pay,
either when Ramos testified or when Kiras testified.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 251 (RYDER STUDENT TRANSPORTATION) 1015
had not received these payments and renewing its demand that
the two employees be terminated. Ramos paid $50 in dues to
the Union the next day but has not paid anything since. As of
the February 11, 1999 trial, she was $350 in arrears.
Finally, the record indicates that at no time has the Union
ever informed Ramos that she could choose to be a dues-paying
nonmember of the Union and that if she chose to be a non-
member she could object to the payment of dues that was being
used for activities other than collective bargaining, contract
administration or grievance adjustment.
Analysis with regard to Ramos
Section 8(b)(2) makes it a violation of the Act for a labor or-
ganization to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee with respect to whom membership in that that organiza-
tion has been denied or terminated on some ground other than
his or her failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership. The record establishes that on May 15, Ramos
told Union Steward Akimbi that she would pay her back dues
and that she tendered this dues to the Union midday on May
18.11 The Union refused to accept payment and continued to
insist on her termination instead. Faced with this insistence,
Ryder suspended Ramos for two shifts.
The complaint alleges an 8(b)(2) violation with regard to the
union demand for Ramos’ termination on May 18. I conclude
this violation has been established. Ramos committed to pay
her arrears the day after payment was demanded by the Union.
By refusing her payment the following working day, the Union
did not provide her a reasonable opportunity to pay her back
dues, Carpenters Local 296 (Acrom Construction), 305 NLRB
822 (1991). Moreover, the record does not provide a basis for
distinguishing Ramos’ situation and that of the other employees
named in the Union’s May 11 letter. Given the fact that the
Union was told that Ramos was obtaining the funds to pay her
back dues on May 15, I infer that for its insistence on her ter-
mination was motivated by something other than her delin-
quency. See General Motors Corp., 134 NLRB 1107 (1961).
I also find that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), as al-
leged, in seeking to apply its union-security clause to Ramos
prior to notifying her that she could chose to be a dues-paying
nonmember of the Union and that if she chose to be a non-
member she had the opportunity to object to paying that portion
of the dues that would be allocated to nonrepresentational ac-
tivities.12
As with Santana, the Union is entitled to a significant
amount of dues money from Ramos even if she exercises her
Beck rights. I will therefore recommend that the Union be al-
lowed to offset any dues it is owed against the backpay it owes

11 I consider Akimbi to be an “agent” of the Union. The record es-
tablishes his “apparent authority” to act on its behalf.
12 Whether the apparent unwillingness of Ramos and Greenwood to
pay any dues excuses the Union’s failure to comply with its obligations
is dealt with in my discussion of Santana’s case. The Union argues that
California Saw should not be applied retroactively to Ramos and
Greenwood, who were hired before the case was decided. This argu-
ment has no merit since the Union invoked its union-security clause
against these employees long after the Board decided California Saw.
to Ramos. Moreover, once the Union fulfills its obligations
under General Motors and Beck, it has a right to insist, in a
nondiscriminatory manner, that her continued employment with
Ryder be conditioned on timely payment of her lawful current
and back dues obligations.
Ann Greenwood
Ann Greenwood has been a bus driver with Ryder since
January 1995. She joined the Union and signed a checkoff
authorization form in the summer of 1995, at the time the col-
lective-bargaining agreement went into effect. At no time did
the Union explain to Greenwood that she could be a nonmem-
ber dues payer or that if she chose to be a nonmember she could
object to paying that portion of the dues that was allocated to
nonrepresentational activities.
Greenwood paid her dues on a regular basis through July 2,
1997, when she took a withdrawal card. However, when she
returned to work in September 1997, her dues were not de-
ducted via checkoff and she did not pay her dues in any other
manner. By May 1998, Greenwood was over $200 behind in
her dues payments.
On May 14, Union Steward Brazenor gave Greenwood a
copy of the Union’s May 11 letter to Aussubel. Greenwood
met with Wiggin and Akimbi and promised to pay $30 a week
beginning Friday, May 15. However, she did not attempt to
make any payments prior to sometime around May 25.13 Aus-
subel suspended Greenwood on May 18. She did not work the
afternoon shift on that day or the morning shift on May 19. On
May 19, Greenwood told Aussubel that she had planned to go
to the Union hall on the day before, but that her van broke
down. She did not tell the Union about her vehicle problems.
Aussubel allowed Greenwood to return to work for the after-
noon shift on May 19, and lifted the suspension.
Greenwood’s coworker, Ann DeWare, took up a collection
for Greenwood. On or about May 25, DeWare went to the
union hall and tendered between $60 and $100 to Wiggin on
Greenwood’s behalf. Wiggin refused to accept the money.
Greenwood did not work during the summer of 1998 but re-
turned to work in the fall. She attended the arbitration pro-
ceeding between Ryder and the Union on October 13. Like
Ramos, Greenwood agreed to pay $100 by October 16, and $50
per week afterwards. On October 19, the Union renewed its
demand for Greenwood’s termination, citing her failure to live
up to the arbitration settlement. Thereafter, Greenwood and
DeWare made dues payments of $50 on October 22, and De-
Ware paid another $10 on Greenwood’s behalf on November 2.
Forty dollars was deducted by Ryder for union dues on Decem-
ber 21, which was the last payment made prior to the instant
hearing. By the date of the hearing, her arrearage was almost
$300.
Analysis with regard to Greenwood
Greenwood’s situation differs from that of Ramos in that she
never attempted to pay the Union any dues before her suspen-
sion. Nevertheless, the Union violated Section 8(b)(2) in seek-
13 Greenwood had to pay towing charges for two different cars on
May 15 and 18, which she cites, along with her pregnancy, as the rea-
son she did not make the promised payments to the Union.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1016
ing her dismissal and Section (b)(1)(A) in seeking to invoke the
union-security clause as to Greenwood, prior to notifying her of
her General Motors and Beck rights.14 As in the case of
Santana and Ramos, the Union should be allowed to offset
whatever dues Greenwood owes against the backpay that it
owes to this charging party. This determination can be made
only after she decides whether to be a full member, or dues
paying nonmember, and whether she exercises her Beck rights
if she chooses to be a nonmember. Moreover, after fulfilling its
obligations, the Union has a right to insist, on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, that Greenwood’s continued employment with Ry-
der be conditioned upon timely payment of her lawful current
and back dues obligations.

14 In view of this conclusion, I deem it unnecessary to decide the
General Counsel’s allegation that Respondent violated the Act in pursu-
ing its grievance concerning Ryder’s failure to terminate Greenwood
and Ramos to arbitration. Even if this constitutes a violation it is dupli-
cative of the allegations decided herein.
On the other hand, I decline to find that Respondent violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by seeking payment of back dues from Ramos and
Greenwood, rather than by seeking payment exclusively from Ryder.
The General Counsel’s argument relies on the Board’s decision in
Producers Transport, Inc., 125 NLRB 1056 (1959), enf. denied 284
F.2d 438, 441 (7th Cir. 1960). Given the Board’s adoption in John J.
Roche & Co., 231 NLRB 1082 (1977), of a judge’s decision which
relied on the Seventh Circuit decision in Producers Transport, I con-
clude that Producers is no longer considered precedential by the
Board. Even if it were, I would decline to adopt the General Counsel’s
argument in the instant case since Ryder’s failure to deduct Ramos and
Greenwood’s dues was the result of their failure to return their with-
drawal card to the Union when they resumed work. Neither employee
contended that this was an oversight, and I conclude that both know-
ingly avoided their dues obligations. Their failure to pay dues since
May 18, supports the inference that their failure to pay prior to that date
was intentional.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, IBT Local 251, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) in requesting that Ryder Student Transportation dis-
charge Alicia Ramos on May 18, 1998.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) in caus-
ing the suspension of Alicia Ramos on May 18–19, 1998.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) in re-
questing the termination of Ann Greenwood on May 18, 1998.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) in causing
the suspension of Ann Greenwood on May 18–19, 1998.
5. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) in re-
questing and causing the June 10, 1998 termination of Fran-
cisco Santana.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) in attempting to
collect dues from Ramos, Greenwood,and Santana without
notifying them of their rights under General Motors and Beck.
THE REMEDY
Having found that IBT Local 251 unlawfully caused Ryder
Student Transportation to suspend Alicia Ramos and Ann
Greenwood and unlawfully discharge Francisco Santana, it is
recommended that the Union make these employees whole for
any loss of wages and benefits they may have suffered as a
result of the Union’s action, less their net interim earnings and
less the dues they owe the Union after the charging parties have
an opportunity to exercise their rights under General Motors
and Beck. The amount of backpay shall be computed with
interest as provided for in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1173).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]