Teamsters "General" Local No. 200

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 12, 1968

172 N.L.R.B. 1193 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

TEAMSTERS "GENERAL" LOCAL NO. 200 1 193
Teamsters "General" Local No. 200, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America and
Howard Bachman , Joseph B . Bachman and
Myron J. Coplan , a Partnership d/b/a Bachman
Furniture Company. Cases 30-CP-17 and
30-CP-24
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the settlement agree-
ment in Case 30-CP- 17 be, and hereby is, rein-
stated.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
July 12, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On April 16, 1968, Trial Examiner Robert Cohn
issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceedings, finding that the Respondent had not
engaged in unfair labor practices subsequent to the
settlement agreement in Case 30-CP-17, as alleged
in the complaint in Case 30-CP-24, and recom-
mending the dismissal of the complaint in Case
30-CP-24, and reinstatement of the settlement
agreement in Case 30-CP-17, as set forth in the at-
tached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the
General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exx-
ceptions, and the Respondent filed cross-excep-
tions, to the Trial Examiner's Decision, together
with supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-ex-
ceptions, briefs, and the entire record in these cases
and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner as
modified below.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint
in Case 30-CP-24 be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
' In view of our adoption of the Trial Examiner 's determination that the
1967 picketing of the warehouse did not constitute a violation of the Act,
we further agree with the Trial Examiner that the settlement agreement in
Case 30-CP-17 should be reinstated In view of our determination, how-
ever, contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find it unnecessary to pass upon
whether or not the 1966 picketing of the warehouse violated Section
8(b)(7)(C) of the Act
172 NLRB No. 119
ROBERT COHN, Trial Examiner: These con-
solidated proceedings, heard at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, on January 30, 1968, present the
question whether or not picketing engaged in by
Respondent Union' was pursuant to an object
proscribed by Section 8(b)(7) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the
Act).2
Upon the entire record, my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and consideration of the
briefs filed by counsel for all parties, I make the fol-
lowing:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE CHARGING PARTY
Howard Bachman, Joseph B. Bachman and
Myron J. Coplan, a partnership d/b/a Bachman
Furniture Company (herein called Bachman), is en-
gaged in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the retail sale
and distribution of furniture and appliances. During
the past calendar year, Bachman's gross volume of
sales exceeded $500,000. During the same period,
Bachman purchased and received goods and
materials directly from points outside the State of
Wisconsin, valued in excess of $50,000. On the
basis of the foregoing facts, I find, as the Respon-
dent admits, that Bachman is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Teamsters "General" Local No. 200, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (herein
called the Respondent), is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Statement of the Issue
As noted previously, the sole issue herein is
whether the Respondent violated Section
' Teamsters "General" Local No 200, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
Y The consolidated complaint was issued January 5 , 1968, pursuant to a
charge filed December I, 1967, in Case 30-CP-24 The original charge in
Case 30-CP-17 was filed on October 31, 1966 (amended on November
25, 1966), which case was originally resolved by a settlement agreement, of
which more anon
354-126 O-LT - 73 - pt. 2 - 4
1194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8(b)(7)(C) of the Act in picketing Bachman's
warehouse in 1967, continuing into 1968.3 The
General Counsel and Bachman contend that such
picketing has as an object the forcing or requiring
Bachman to recognize or bargain with the Respon-
dent or forcing or requiring the employees of
Bachman to accept the Respondent as their collec-
tive-bargaining representative within the proscrip-
tion of that section 4 Respondent denies the claim
of the General Counsel contending rather that its
purpose was two-fold: (1) to protest the unfair
labor practices of Bachman and make the Company
"an object lesson . . to other employers the Union
may deal with " (Resp. br. p 11); (2) ". . . to bring
pressure to bear on Bachman to get him to conform
to area standards in relation to labor costs, re-
gardless of whether his employees were unionized
or not." (Resp. br. p. 15.)
B Backgrounds
The genesis of this controversy goes back to
March 24, 1960, when the Union, having received
signed authorization cards from a majority of the
seven employees at Bachman's warehouse, de-
manded recognition and bargaining on their behalf.
On March 30, 1960, the Union filed a representa-
tion petition under Section 9(c) of the Act, and on
April 8 a consent-election agreement was signed.
The election was held on April 15, resulting in two
votes for the Union, three against, and three ballots
being challenged. However, before the challenges
were ruled upon, the Union filed objections to the
election and also filed charges of unfair labor prac-
tices against Bachman.
On June 1, 1960, the Regional Director issued
his report overruling the objections because all of
the alleged misconduct, with one exception, oc-
curred before the date of the election agreement.6
In the same report, the Regional Director disposed
of the challenged ballots and the ultimate tally of
ballots shows three votes for the Union and four
against. Accordingly, on June 13, 1960, the Re-
gional Director issued a certification of results of
the election attesting to the Union's defeat.
Respecting the charge of alleged unfair labor
practices, the parties, on June 1, 1960, signed an
informal "settlement agreement" which was ap-
proved by the Regional Director on June 3. Such
settlement agreement provided that the Company
would cease and desist from interrogating their em-
ployees concerning the latter's union activities or
"in any other manner" invade their rights under the
Act, and would post a notice for 60 days to that ef-
fect.' On June 9, the Employer commenced posting
the notice.
On June 28, 1960, the Union for the first time
commenced picketing Bachman's premises. How-
ever, such picketing occurred solely at the retail
store and not at the warehouse, located some 5 or 6
miles away, where the majority of the employees
comprising the bargaining unit were employed. The
legends on the picket signs at the retail store were
as follows:
Bachman admits unfair labor practices
Unfair labor practices violate Federal law
Such picketing was the subject of a charge of
violation of Section 8(a)(,7)(B) of the Act in
Bachman I. A majority of the Board (two members
dissenting) affirmed the Trial Examiner's dismissal
of the complaint (134 NLRB 670). The picketing
of the retail store has taken place continuously
from 1960 to the date of the hearing herein. In ad-
dition to the picketing, the Respondent com-
menced, from about 1964 to the date of the hear-
ing, distributing handbills to customers. The lan-
guage on the handbills is as follows:
PLEASE DO NOT PATRONIZE THIS STORE
In 1960, the truck drivers and warehousemen
of Bachman Furniture Company authorized
Teamsters Local 200 to represent them for
purposes of negotiating improved wages, hours
and conditions of employment. Shortly before
the election, conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board, Bachman Company coerced
its employees into dropping their Union affilia-
tion and admitted conduct which violated the
federal law.
Since that time, the truck drivers and
warehousemen have been paid wages and
benefits which are substantially less than those
which prevail in the Milwaukee Area.
' Section 8(b)(7)(C) provides, in relevant part , as follows
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed , or threaten to picket or cause
to be picketed , any employer where an object thereof is forcing or
requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organiza-
tion as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the
employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization
as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor or-
ganization is currently certified as the representative of such em-
ployees
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under Section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not
to exceed thirty days from commencement of such picketing
4 It is agreed that such picketing was conducted without a petition under
Section 9(c) being filed within 30 days from the commencement of such
picketing
' All parties agreed that the statement of background facts may be taken
from the first Board decision involving the parties reported at 134 NLRB
670, herein for convenience called Bachman I
'The rule of the Board at that time was that alleged misconduct occur-
ring before the execution of a consent agreement could not be made the
basis of setting an election aside Subsequently, in 1962, the rule was
revised making the cutoff date the filing of the petition rather than the date
of the consent-election agreement See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Com-
pany, 138 NLRB 453
' It is noted that the settlement agreement did not contain an exculpatory
clause
TEAMSTERS "GENERAL" LOCAL NO. 200 1 195
The members and families represented by
Teamsters Local 200 ask you not to patronize
Bachman Furniture Company until its truck
drivers and warehousemen receive the wages
and benefits which prevail in this area.
The members and
families of Teamsters
Local 200
C. The 1966 Picketing of Bachman 's Warehouse
The parties stipulated that the Respondent
picketed Bachman's warehouse continually from
October 24, 1966, through December 6, 1966.
During the course of this picketing, Respondent
utilized two picket signs which stated as follows:
Sign No 1:
BACHMAN ADMITS UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES
TEAMSTERS GENERAL LOCAL 200
and
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW
Sign No. 2:
SUBSTANDARD WAGES AND BENEFITS
UNDERMINE UNION CONDITIONS
PLEASE DO NOT PATRONIZE
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 200
and
DO NOT PATRONIZE
TRUCKDRIVERS AND WAREHOUSEMEN
EMPLOYED BY BACHMAN FURNITURE CO.
RECEIVE SUBSTANDARD WAGES AND
BENEFITS
For purposes of the picketing, Respondent util-
ized two retired members of the Union and paid
them $2 an hour for their services." The picketing
of the warehouse, which was apparently successful
in obstructing and delaying the flow of goods and
materials, became the subject of a charge of unfair
labor practice by Bachman against the Respondent
(Case 30-CP-17). This case was resolved by an all
party settlement agreement approved by the Re-
gional Director on December 6, 1966, at which
time picketing of the warehouse ceased. It is noted
that this settlement agreement, unlike the one
signed by Bachman in 1960, contained an exculpa-
tory clause as follows: "By entering into the settle-
ment agreement, the Respondent does not admit
having engaged in any unfair labor practices."9
Counsel for the General Counsel proffered
evidence of several incidents which occurred dur-
ing the course of the 1966 picketing which he urges
in support of his contention that such picketing vio-
lated Section 8(b)(7) of the Act. Such evidence
was received in the record herein as background
evidence bearing on establishment of ". . . the mo-
tive or object of a Respondent in its post settlement
activities, ..."10 Thus a truckdriver for a common
carrier, when attempting to make a delivery of fur-
niture to the warehouse, asked the pickets, "How
come you are picketing if they're (Bachman's em-
ployees) not on strike?" One of the pickets replied,
"They were trying to force Bachman to join the
Union."" The warehouse manager of Bachman
testified that he heard a similar statement made to a
truckdriver by the picket Molski, i.e., that the pur-
pose of the picket was to "organize us (Bachman)
into a union." Molski conceded that during the
course of the 1966 picketing he had a conversation
with one employee of the warehouse who asked if
"we were going to do them (Bachman's employees)
any good," to which Molski replied, "Well, that's
what we're here for, to try ... if you guys get
together, and go down to the Hall, to talk it over, I
think we wouldn't have to be out here, then." Mol-
ski told another employee who was physically car-
rying merchandise from the street to the warehouse
(in the case where a truckdriver refused to cross
the picket line), "If you employees get together, go
down to the Hall and talk it over, you wouldn't
have to be carrying this stuff in."
Howard Bachman, one of the partners of
Bachman, testified that one of the pickets at the
retail store, during the summer of 1966, advised
him that "you can settle the whole thing by going
down to the Union and getting this whole thing off
your back."
D. The 1967 Picketing of Bachman's Warehouse
On November 30, 1967, Respondent commenced
to picket Bachman's warehouse again . The parties
stipulated that during the course of this picketing
(which continued to the date of the hearing), the
pickets utilized signs bearing the same legend as
sign No. I utilized in the 1966 picketing, supra. It
was also stipulated that the pickets distributed the
leaflet hereinabove quoted.
Frank Ranney, chief executive officer of Respon-
dent, testified that the reason for placing the
pickets at the warehouse of Bachman at this time
was that he had received a report from another
representative of Respondent who had been
negotiating on behalf of Respondent with an as-
sociation of retail furniture dealers; that such
negotiations had been "severely handicapped"
because the association claimed that a number of
concerns (presumably retail stores whose em-
8 On neither occasion of picketing, either at the retail store or at the
warehouse , were any of Bachman 's employees engaged
e See G C Exh 2
See Northern California District Council of Hodcarriers and Common
Laborers of America, AFL-CIO (Joseph's Landscaping Service), 154 NLRB
1384
11 This testimony was admitted over the objection of Respondent who
claimed that Respondent was not responsible for such utterances, the
pickets not being agents of Respondent That issue will be discussed, infra
1196 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees were not represented by Respondent), were
paying substandard wages , and that therefore the
association dealers were resisting a demand by the
Respondent for a wage increase . Ranney also
testified that the purpose was to put more
economic pressure on Bachman ( the picketing took
place just before Christmas-Bachman 's busiest
season ), and that he felt that the Respondent could
legally maintain the picket line there if the Respon-
dent refrained from doing things that " we were ac-
cused of doing prior , in the settlement."
The record reflects only one incident which
occurred during the 1967 picketing which pur-
portedly reflects upon the objective thereof.
Warehouse Manager Sassi testified that, on or
about December 1, 1967, he had a conversation
with Fred Hammer , an admitted official of Respon-
dent , on the picket line. Sassi inquired of Hammer
why the Respondent was picketing "when none of
the employees of Bachman 's here wants the union."
According to Sassi , Hammer replied , "The unfair
wages that Bachman 's pays the employees , the em-
ployees of Bachman 's needs [sic ] the union .1112
E. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The contentions of the parties
The essence of General Counsel's argument is
that there is substantial evidence to prove that the
1966 picketing of the warehouse by Respondent
was pursuant to an objective proscribed by Section
8(b)(7), and that the 1967 picketing was merely a
resumption of the 1966 picketing as indicated by
the similar timing, picket signs and other circum-
stances, including the statement of Hammer to
Sassi that ". . . the employees of Bachman's needs
[sic] the union."
The Union denies that either the 1966 or the
1967 picketing had a recognition or organizational
objective. It argues that the 1967 picketing was
"but one dimension of a 7-1 /2 year campaign
designed to make an object lesson of Bachman to
other employers that the Union may deal with."
(Union's br. p. 11.) Thus, the argument runs, the
Employer's unfair labor practices in 1960 effective-
ly precluded the employees from organizing and
having the Union represent them in collective bar-
gaining, that the settlement agreement in that case
in which the Union reluctantly joined because there
was no other reasonable alternative, offered no
meaningful relief, that thereafter it embarked upon
a course of conduct designed to protest such ad-
mitted unfair labor practices and bring economic
pressure upon Bachman as an object lesson to other
employers that they might expect similar con-
sequences if they engaged in such coercive conduct
" Hammer testified that he recalled the incident , but testified that when
Sassi came to the picket line and asked what was going on there Hammer
told him , " Read the signs You'll find out what's going on " I will assume
the veracity of Sassi's version for the purpose of discussion of the issue
toward their employees, that such course of con-
duct included picketing and leaf letting at the retail
store and utilization of communications media of
other labor organizations to effect a consumer
boycott of Bachman; and that, finally, all Bachman
had to do to remove the pickets was to conform to
various standards relating to labor costs.
2. The 1966 picketing of the warehouse
As previously noted, General Counsel, in con-
tending that an objective of the 1966 picketing was
to achieve recognition or to organize the em-
ployees, relies on statements of the Respondent's
pickets to Bachman's employees or other persons
while on the picket line. It seems apparent that cer-
tain statements, referred to hereinabove, reflect an
organizational objective of the picketing;'3 the
question remains whether or not such objective
may be legally imputable to the Respondent. The
answer to that question turns on whether or not the
pickets were agents of the Respondent for that pur-
pose.
It is to be recalled that the pickets involved were
two retired members of the Respondent who engaged
in this activity on a sporadic basis, and were paid
$2 per hour by the Respondent for their services.
Both men (Molski and Wambach) were subpenaed
as witnesses by General Counsel. While neither was
openly hostile or recalcitrant on the witness stand,
it was clear that they were both unwilling and non-
cooperative witnesses. Their testimony was vague,
evasive and sometimes contradictory in material
respects to previously sworn statements. Thus, both
men testified at the hearing that the only instruc-
tion which they received from an authorized union
representative respecting their duties on the picket
line was to secure the signs and walk, showing the
signs to the drivers. The union representative,
Hammer, testified that his instructions to the
pickets were not to talk to any employee of
Bachman but only to the drivers, and to tell the
drivers that they were protected under their collec-
tive-bargaining contract'4 if they saw fit not to go
through the picket line, and it was the Union's
desire that they did not go through the picket line.
At the hearing, I sustained an objection to
General Counsel's introduction of the two pickets'
prehearing affidavits submitted as substantive
evidence on the theory of past recollection
recorded. This because, as explained on the record,
there was an absence of a necessary predicate.15
In his brief, General Counsel urges that I recon-
sider and reverse my ruling at the hearing. I have
reconsidered this ruling in the light of the record as
a whole, and recalling the impression of these par-
ticular witnesses upon me, I deem this situation
° But see Local No 716, IBT (Joe R Norman Contractors, Inc ), 169
NLRB 156
° This is a reference to the National Master Freight Central States agree-
ment
° See 3 W igmore, Evidence, § 734, et seq
TEAMSTERS "GENERAL" LOCAL NO. 200
akin to that which Judge Learned Hand had in
mind in the following quotation from Dyer v. Mac-
Dougall , 201 F.2d 265, 269 (C.A. 2).16
For the demeanor of a witness
... may satisfy the tribunal , not only that
the witness ' testimony is not true , but that
the truth is the opposite of his story, for
the denial of one, who has a motive to
deny, may be uttered with such hesitation,
discomfort , arrogance or defiance, as to
give assurance that he is fabricating, and
that, if he is, there is no other alternative
but to assume the truth of what he denies.
Accordingly, I discredit their denials at the hear-
ing and believe the opposite to be true, which is in
accord with their testimony as sworn to in their
pretrial affidavits ( all of which were taken in
November 1966, a year closer in time to the actual
events ). I therefore am convinced that a part of
their instructions from Hammer was that an objec-
tive of the 1966 picketing was organizational as
well as economical.17
3. The 1967 picketing of the warehouse
Having concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the charge that an objective of
the 1966 picketing was one proscribed by Section
8(b)(7), it does not necessarily follow, of course,
that the 1967 picketing here at issue must similarly
fall. The 1966 evidence was received simply as
background; the alleged violation in 1967 must, on
its own, meet substantial evidence standards. I con-
clude that it does not.
Thus, as previously noted, Respondent com-
menced picketing Bachman's warehouse again on
November 30, 1967, approximately 1 1 months fol-
lowing the cessation of the previous picketing. The
record shows no contact between the Respondent
and Bachman or its employees during this hiatus;
the record is similarly silent respecting any
evidence of any organizational campaign by
Respondent seeking recognition of Bachman's em-
ployees during this period. As set forth above, the
Respondent's Secretary-Treasurer Ranney, who im-
pressed me favorably as a witness, and whose
testimony in this respect is undenied, stated that the
resumption of the picketing was prompted in sub-
stantial measure from reports of his representative
in bargaining negotiations that the Union's request
for wage increases in such negotiations was being
resisted by pleas from the employers of labor cost
competition. Ranney testified further.
And I felt that we had entered into a settle-
ment agreement with the Board in 1966. And
" s Cited with approval by the Supreme Court in N L R B v Walton
Manufacturing Company, 369 US 404, 408
" 1 am therefore reversing my ruling at the hearing and receiving the af-
fidavits (G C Exhs 6, 7, 9, and 10), into evidence on the ground that the
pickets, having received these instructions fiom an admitted agent of
Respondent , were agents of the Respondent for this purpose (see, e g ,
Knttgoods Workers' Union Local 155 ( Boulevard Knitwear Corp ), 167
NLRB 763, Local 25, Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union
1197
that time had elapsed, and if we put our picket
lines back at the warehouse, and not do the
things that we were accused of doing prior, in
the prior settlement, then we could maintain
the picket line there and put more economic
pressure on the Bachman Furniture Company.
Those two things actually motivated me.
As previously set forth, General Counsel points
to only one incident which occurred during the
1967 picketing which, he argues, reflects an illegal
motivation. This is the statement made by Union
Agent Hammer to Warehouse Manager Sassi that
"The unfair wages that Bachman's pays the em-
ployees, the employees of Bachman's needs [sic]
the union." General Counsel argues that the last
phrase of this statement ". . . admits of only one
meaning and that meaning evidences Respondent's
organizational intent" (G.C. br. p. 16). Assuming
the validity of the General Counsel's hypothesis,
the true meaning of the whole statement must in-
clude a consideration of the preliminary phrase.
This phrase is consistent with Respondent's conten-
tion that the purpose of the picketing relates to
area standards indeed, it seems equally reasonable
to interpret the statement giving emphasis to the
first phrase as reflecting the true purpose of the
picketing and relegating the second phrase to a
posture of being merely the personal opinion of the
speaker. In any event, the statement is, at best, am-
biguous and insufficient, in my judgment, without
more, to sustain the General Counsel's burden.18
The remainder of General Counsel' s argument
rests, as it must, from inferences to be gleaned from
the facts. Thus he contends that since Respondent
has been picketing the retail store for more than 5
years, the picketing of the warehouse ". . . surely is
a campaign to force Bachman through economic
pressure to recognize Respondent." I cannot, on
this record, agree that this kind of either/or reason-
ing provides a substantial basis for a finding of
violation. To the extent that a labor union is in the
business of organizing the unorganized, it may
reasonably be said that any activity on its part, in-
cluding picketing, has as an ultimate objective,
gaining of new members. But there is no evidence
here that the Respondent has sought recognition
from Bachman since 1960, or engaged in an or-
ganizational campaign since that time-except the
evidence respecting what the pickets said during
the 1966 picketing, and, in view of their vacillation,
I hesitate to accord great weight to such testimony.
The Board has upheld the legitimacy of area
standards picketing where it has been shown that
such is the immediate if not the sole purpose of
(King 's Bakery , inc ), 116 NLRB 290, 294-295) 1 thus receive the exhibits
as substantive evidence, as admissions against interest Skouras Theaters
Corporation, 155 NLRB 157, 162, Hribar Trucking, Inc , 143 NLRB 327,
329 at fn 4
'" "An unlawful purpose is not lightly to be inferred " N L R B v T A
McGahey, Sr , et al , dlbla Columbus Marble Works, 233 F 2d 406, 413
(C A 5)
1198 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
such action.19 General Counsel contends that such
was not Respondent's true objective in this case
because of the "careless manner in which Respon-
dent went about determining what wages and
benefits Bachman said," i.e., that Respondent re-
lied on rumors rather than making an inquiry of
Bachman. In support of this argument, the case of
Retail Clerks International Association, Local Union
No. 899 (Giant Foods), 166 NLRB 818, is cited.
However, the parties stipulated that "the cost to
Bachman of the wages and other benefits paid by
Bachman to and on behalf of the truckdrivers, help-
ers and warehousemen is less than the cost of the
wages and other benefits required under Respon-
dent's collective-bargaining agreements with other
employers in the same industry in the Milwaukee,
Wisconsin area." It would not appear to be critical
how the Union became apprised of this information
so long as it was reasonably accurate The situation
here is distinguishable from that in the cited case
There, the Trial Examiner (affirmed by the Board)
deemed quite significant to his decision the finding
that the Respondent Union, in meetings with the
Employer, expressed its demands for area standards
be defined in terms of benefits set forth in the area
contracts. He concluded:
The lawful object effectively can be achieved
by assuring that the unorganized employer is
required to pay employee costs equivalent to
those paid by the organized employer. To insist
that its negotiated standards are in danger un-
less the unorganized employer is subjected to
equal costs is a reasonable pursuit of the lawful
object, but an attempt to dictate how the cost
package is to be distributed sounds in terms of
bargaining. Unless the union purports to
represent and bargain for the employees of the
picketed employer, what legitimate concern
does it have insisting that such employees have
health and welfare benefits or pensions or, in-
deed, specific benefits of any sort whatsoever,
let alone benefits equivalent to those of the
represented employees? It is quite possible that
the unrepresented employees themselves might
infinitely prefer that the economic package
designed to impose equal costs upon the un-
represented employer be give [sic] wholly in
terms of a wage increase. However whether it
be given them in that form or any other should
be of no concern to the union so long as it
receives assurance that the cost package is the
same. Thus it would appear reasonable that a
union might picket for equal wages or for
equivalent costs but when it undertakes to go
beyond this and to dictate what benefits are to
be granted, it is attempting to engage in pro
tanto bargaining to gain benefits for employees
which it does not claim to represent.
The unions in the instant case specifically
demand equivalent benefits. I am convinced,
and find, that by couching their demands in
such a manner, they are in reality undertaking
to bargain for State-Mart employees and to
control certain of their working conditions.
There is no evidence of any such conduct by the
Respondent in the instant case.
General Counsel points out that there is no
evidence that Respondent has picketed other unor-
ganized establishments. This is true, but to so
require to establish a defense might be quite un-
realistic unless one knows the ratio of such firms to
Respondent's financial capabilities. The record
reflects no such evidence. Additionally, General
counsel notes that since the 1966 settlement agree-
ment, Respondent has made no attempt to disavow
its organizational or recognitional objectives. The
short answer is that Respondent never admitted
that it engaged in picketing for such objectives. To
disavow would in effect constitute an implied ad-
mission.
Finally, General Counsel argues that since the
1966 picketing was shown to have had an organiza-
tional objective, and Respondent failed to disavow
it, it follows that the 1967 picketing was similarly
motivated since "the picketing of Bachman is, and
has been, one continuous campaign" (G.C. br. p.
15). It is true that the record shows that the
Respondent has, since 1960, been engaged in a
continuous campaign of protestation and pressure
against Bachman, which campaign has included
picketing and economic boycott However, it does
not necessarily follow that all picketing can be so
easily encompassed by Section 8(b)(7), as witness
the Board's decision in Bachman I. In other words,
each aspect of picketing must be analyzed and scru-
tinized on its own facts since . . there still must be
some substantial basis for inferring a wrongful
rather than a legitimate motive ... 1120 And the
Respondent here, having once been found by the
Regional Director to have transgressed, ". . ought
not be viewed as having such a propensity for sin
that every episode is given the worst interpretation,
or be condemned by indiscriminate repetition of
the phrase that its conduct `must be assessed
against the background of its earlier unfair labor
practices'. , .11 21
In sum , while I am not entirely relieved of suspi-
cion, I find and conclude, for the reasons
hereinabove expressed, that the General Counsel
has failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence in the record considered as a whole, that
the picketing by the Respondent of Bachman's
19 See International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union
of America, Local No 4/, AFL-CIO (Calumet Contractors Association and
George De Jong), 133 NLRB 512, Houston Building and Construction
Trades Council (Claude Everett Construction Company), 136 NLRB 321,
Local / 07, International Hod Carriers, AFL-CIO (Texarkana Construction
Company), 138 NLRB 102, cf Local 25, International Brotherhood ofElec-
trical Workers, AFL-CIO (Sarrow-Suburban Electric Co , Inc ), 152 NLRB
531
PO N L R B v General Drivers, Local 968 (Otis Massey), 225 F 2d 205,
211 (C A 5), cert denied 350 U S 914
21 N L R B v Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc , 341 F 2d 725 (C A 2), see
also N L R B v Dijco Laboratories, Inc , 389 F 2d 663 (C A 6)
TEAMSTERS "GENERAL" LOCAL NO. 200
warehouse, which commenced in November 1967,
was for an objective proscribed by Section
8(b)(7).22 I shall therefore recommend that the
complaint be dismissed, and that the settlement
agreement in Case 30-CP-17 be reinstated.23
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
22 In reaching this conclusion , I have given little or no weight to the
legend on the picket signs which was, as the undisputed testimony shows,
suggested by the Respondent 's attorneys
1199
3. Respondent has not engaged in the unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint subsequent
to the settlement agreement in Case 30-CP-17.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It is ordered that the complaint be, and it hereby
is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor prac-
tices based on the charge in Case 30-CP-24, and
that the settlement agreement in Case 30-CP-17
be, and it hereby is, reinstated.
' See Conroe Creosoting Company, 149 NLRB 1174