Teamsters, Chauffeurs, etc., Local 901

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 25, 1962

137 N.L.R.B. 808 (N.L.R.B. 1962)

808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
7. By demanding contract clauses sand by engaging in a strike for same to force
Oregonian . Publishing Co. and Journal Publishing Co. to hire only foremen who are.
union members , Respondents have restrained and coerced the above-named em-
ployers in the selection of representatives for the adjustment of grievances , thereby
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b)(1)(B) of the
Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers , Local 901,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America [Valencia Baxt Express,
Inc.] and Seafarers International Union of North America,
Atlantic , Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, P.R. Divi-
sion, AFL-CIO. Case No. 24-CC-76. June 25, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 20, 1962, Trial Examiner Benjamin Lipton issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the.
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report, incorporating therein its brief to the Trial
Examiner.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommended
order of the Trial Examiner.'
-ORDER
The Board hereby adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial
Examiner.
1 while approving the Trial Examiner 's finding of the continued validity of the certifica-
tion at the time of the picketing here, in reaching our decision we are not required to, and
do not, rely on his more broadly stated principle that only changed conditions which are
reflected by a later ruling of the Board may impair the continuing validity of a certification'
137 NLRB No: 95.
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, ETC., LOCAL 901 809
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding was heard in Santurce, Puerto Rico, on December 18, 19, 22, 26,
27, and 28, 1961, on a complaint by the General Counsel that the Respondent,
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 901, herein called Team-
sters Local 901, violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (C) of the National Labor
Relations Act. All parties were represented and participated in the hearing, and
at the close thereof were afforded opportunity to argue orally on the record.
Briefs received from the Respondent and General Counsel have been fully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation, is engaged in truck-
transportation operations on the island of Puerto Rico. During the year 1961, the
Company had a gross income in excess of $50,000 from trucking services per-
formed pursuant to contracts or arrangements with, or as agent for, certain inter-
state common carriers, including North American Van Lines, operating between
Puerto Rico and various States of the United States. During the same period'
the Company furnished truck transportation services valued in excess of $50,000'
to employers engaged in interstate commerce. The respondent admits, and I find,
that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The Respondent, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local
901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, and the Charging Party, Seafarers International Union of North
America, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, P.R. Division, AFL-CIO,
herein called the SIU, are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Pleadings and contentions
The complaint alleges in substance that, following a Board-conducted election,
the STU was duly certified on November 4, 1960, as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of the Company's employees; and notwithstanding the SIU certification,
the Respondent Teamsters Local 901, on November 6 and 7, 1961, by picketing the
Company's terminal and place of business, and by other conduct, induced and
encouraged individuals employed by the Company and other employers engaged
in commerce to refuse to perform services, and also threatened, coerced, and re-
strained the Company, all with an object of forcing and requiring the Company to
recognize and bargain with Respondent, in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and
(ii) (C) of the Act.' The Respondent during the hearing admitted that it engaged
in the alleged picketing activities, and amended its answer to the complaint to assert
the following affirmative defenses: (a) during March 1961, and at all times since,
the SIU abandoned its representation of the employees of Valencia Baxt Express,
Inc., (b) during March 1961, and at all times since , an overwhelming majority of
said employees withdrew and revoked their authorization of the SIU as bargaining
representative, with written notification to the SIU and to Valencia Baxt Express,
Inc.; (c) since on or about March 1961, the overwhelming majority of the employees
of Valencia Baxt have authorized the Respondent to represent them for purpose of
collective bargaining: (d) on November 6, 1961, the SIU was not certified within the
meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (C) of the Act; (f) Respondent's conduct, complained of
herein, was privileged under the provisions of Section 8(b)(7) of the Act; (g) Ray-
mond J. Compton, Regional Director and complaining party herein, is estopped to
I The allegation in paragraph V (b) of the complaint that "pursuant to said certifica-
tion." the Comnany is "currently recognizing" the STU, I construe to mean that as a
matter of law the certification was current and viable Section 8(b) (4) (C) speaks only
in terms of the certification, not recognition of another labor organization As will be
further shown, the fact of current recognition of the certified union is not required or
necessary to support a violation under this section.
810 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
complain of Respondent 's conduct herein , for the reason that he has failed and
refused to conduct an election forthwith in Case No. 24-RC-1816, as he was
required to do under Section 8(b) (7) of the Act .2
B. Background and essential facts
With respect to the General Counsel's prima facie case, there is no dispute as
to the material facts, namely, the SIU certification, and the Respondent's picketing
and other activities with an object of recognition.
From December 1, 1957, until November 30, 1960, the Company maintained
contractual relations with the SIU 3 as collective-bargaining agent for the Company's
employees, consisting chiefly of drivers, helpers, and mechanics. On a petition filed
by Teamsters Local 901, a Board election among the employees was conducted
on July 1, 1960, and as a consequence the incumbent SIU was certified on November
4, 1960, as the majority representative pursuant to Section 9 of the Act. Bargaining
negotiations for a new contract proceeded between the SIU and the Company.
On February 22, 1961, the SIU struck. On March 17, 1961, a settlement stipu-
lation was executed and the strike was terminated. Under the terms of the settlement,
negotiations were to commence on March 24, 1961, and, if agreement could not
be reached within 15 days thereafter, the "entire matter" would be submitted to
arbitration for settlement, final and binding on both parties.4 No agreement resulted
from negotiations during the 15-day period , and the matter was assigned to arbi-
tration. After arbitration proceedings, which were opposed by the Company and
apparently by certain of the employees, the arbitrator on August 13, 1961, handed
down an award, which included a complete collective-bargaining contract to be
retroactively effective from December 1, 1960, for a period of 2 years .5 The Com-
pany refused to accept or honor the arbitration contract on various grounds attack-
ing its legality and, as appears, also for the reason that it was too costly.6 Thereafter,
extensive litigation ensued in the insular tribunals of Puerto Rico and Federal
district courts, unnecessary here to specify, with the SIU seeking to enforce the
arbitration award and with counteractions by the Company and certain employees
seeking to set the arbitration aside.? The issue as between the SIU and the Company
concerning the legality and effectiveness of the arbitration contract was still unre-
solved at the time of this hearing. Consequently, from February 22, 1961,8 through
the remainder of the certification year, and since, no collective-bargaining contract
has been operative in the representation of the employees while the SIU and the
Company have thus been stalemated. The situation was further complicated by the
presence on the scene of Respondent Teamsters Local 901 which, as evident from
Respondent's amended answer, claims majority representation since March 1961.
It is apparent that, during this period, the ability of the certified SIU to carry out
2 In its original answer, Respondent stated as affirmative defenses* (a) its belief that
the SIU certification expired on or about November 5, 1961 ; (b) that on or about Novem-
ber 6 or 7, 1961, Respondent "legally" represented the majority of the Company's em-
ployees , and (c) if it picketed the Company on November 6 and 7, 1961, the picketing
was legal
° The parties stipulated that the contract expired November 30, 1960, although it else-
where appears in the evidence that the Company took the position in a dispute with the
SIU that the contract did not expire but continued in effect until November 30, 1901
4 The settlement was made subject to ratification by the union membership within 36
hours after signing. Respondent contends that the settlement was not properly or legally
ratified I find it Immaterial in this proceeding to resolve such question
° Another employer, Maritime Trucking Company, whose employees were represented in
the same amalgamated local of SIU, was involved on the same dates as Valencia Baxt
Express in the strike, the settlement stipulation, and the arbitration
° Uncontradicted testimony which I credit
a Since March 1961, a number of petitions for election and unfair labor practice charges
were filed by various parties with the National Labor Relations Board Some have been
withdrawn or dismissed; others are presently pending investigation, including election
petitions filed by Respondent respectively on August 29 and November 6, 1961. The
parties stipulated that the Board was not processing the latter petitions because it took
the position that the instant unfair labor practice case constitutes a blocking action.
I also take official notice of an order of the Board dated January 12, 1962, remanding the
November 6 petition for hearing
6 Between November 30, 1960, and February 22, 1961, the date of the strike, both
parties continued to observe the terms of the expired contract, which provided that pend-
Ing negotiations for a new contract the economic conditions of the expired contract would
be maintained in force
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, ETC., LOCAL 901 811
the daily and routine representative functions at the company plant was, at least
to an extent, circumscribed. I find it unnecessary for the purposes of this proceed-
ing-and in consideration of Respondent's defense of "abandonment"-to measure
the precise degree to which SIU's active representation activities on behalf of the
Company's employees had fallen off since the culmination of its strike in March
1961. Nor need I recite all the details of documentary material and testimony,
much of it in conflict, advanced by Respondent allegedly to show "abandonment,"
as for example-failure to process grievances, to furnish health and welfare benefits,
to hold meetings, collect dues, visit the plant, maintain and check on the steward
system, and apply or enforce the union security, hiring hall, and arbitration pro-
visions of the contract awarded by the arbitrator. It is sufficiently clear from the
evidence and findings already related that there was no desire, attempt, or effect
of "abandonment" 9 in any legal sense by the SIU of its representation of the
employees, or of its certification. Moreover, the evidence indicates that since
March 1961, SIU organizers or officials made some visits to the plant on union
business; there were no grievances of any substantial number or seriousness pre-
sented to S1U for processing which were shown to have been refused or neglected; 10
the Welfare Plan, under control independent of SIU, continued to make benefits
available to company employees until June 20, 1961, when they were cut off because
the Company had stopped making the necessary contributions; meetings of the
SIU amalgamated local were held regularly, and were open for full participation,
as in the past, to members among the company employees; the union security, hiring
hall, and other contract provisions obviously could not be applied unilaterally by
SIU while the Company was contesting the existence of the arbitration contract
sought to be enforced by SIU. Concerning the meeting, much litigated herein,
between SIU and company officials at the San Juan airport on November 6, 1961
(date of Respondent's picketing), it is sufficient to note that, under either of the
conflicting versions, the notion of "abandonment" by the SIU is plainly dispelled.
Rather than a complete withdrawal from the field, as alleged, the airport meeting
reveals an active and positive representative role pursued by the SIU-whether
the SIU's testimony is accepted that the Company proposed a contract less costly
than the arbitration award, with the SIU stating a willingness to consider, or the
Company's version is taken to the effect that it was the SIU which staged the meeting,
that the SIU offered a modified contract from November 1, 1961, and the Company
agreed to consult thereon with principals and lawyers and advise the SIU.
This essentially was the picture when the alleged violations took place. Respond-
ent's picketing of the Company's premises commenced in the early morning of
November 6, 1961. The picket signs read in English, "On strike for recognition-
Teamsters Local 901," and in Spanish, translated, "We ask for recognition-Team-
sters Local 901." Later in the morning, Respondent's president, Jaime Amador,
came into the plant and spoke to Rodolfo Catinchi and Wallace Valencia, officials
of the Company. Amador said, "The men are very itchy, they want to strike, I
know of the condition of the company and I know that a work stoppage would kill
you, but you have to recognize us because we have the cards and you have to sign
a contract with us." Amador threatened to stop the men from working. He dis-
played a "deck of cards" purportedly signed by a majority of employees, which he
offered to show authorization of Respondent. The company officials did not examine
the cards. Catinchi told Amador that he believed the Teamsters had a majority, but
he could not comply as he had to talk to the Company's attorneys. After Novem-
ber 6, Amador had several conversations with Catinchi on the subject. The picketing
ceased at noon on November 7. It was stipulated that the picketing did not actually
result in a cessation or curtailment of work by any individuals employed by the
Company or other person."
For reasons noted below, no useful purpose would be served to detail the lengthy
narrative of Catinchi as to why he "believed" Respondent had a majority or the
various other matter alleged by Respondent to show a shift of majority sentiment
from STU to Respondent as justification for its conduct on November 6 and 7, 1961.
a Abandonment denotes voluntary or deliberate renunciation, or as defined in Webster's
New International Dictionary, 2d ed -"to relinquish or give up with the intent of never
again reclaiming one's rights or interests in "
1O At least one grievance, concerning the discharge of three employees, repeatedly was
pressed by the SIU around June to August 1961 Meetings with the Company were re-
quested but the Company refused and failed to attend, statine. inter alia, that "the
complaint you raised is one based upon the contract" which STU says had expired on
November 30, 1960
"The instant charge was filed by SIU against Respondent on November 8, 1961.
812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Concluding findings
Section 8(b)(4), in pertinent part, makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization "( i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual . . . to,
engage in , a strike or a refusal . . . to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person . . ., where in either case an object thereof is: .
,(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular
labor organization . . . if another labor organization has been certified . . . under
the provisions of section 9." I find that Respondent, by its picketing activities on
November 6 and 7, 1961, induced and encouraged individuals employed by the
Company to refuse to perform services within the meaning of clause (i); 12 and by
the same picketing and its verbal demands upon the Company coupled with the
threat to unleash the employees in a strike, also threatened, coerced, and restrained
the Company under clause ( ii),13 with an object in both cases of forcing the Company
to recognize and bargain with Respondent.
In its affirmative defenses, (1) Respondent challenges the validity of SIU's cer-
tification on grounds that as of November 6, 1961, Respondent, and not SIU, was
the majority choice of its employees, and SIU "had abandoned its representation of
the employees"; and (2) its conduct was permitted under Section 8(b) (7) of the Act.
The Board and the courts have decisively rejected defenses addressed to current
majority status of a certified union in cases indistinguishable in law and principle
from that present here.14 Section 8(b) (4) (C) is plain and unambiguous. There
is no room for reading into it words requiring that the certified union have not only
certification but in addition current representation of a majority of the employees.
A certification, when lawfully made, as here, must be respected until changed con-
ditions are reflected by a later ruling of the Board altering or setting aside the
certification. In the circumstances, there is no cognizable proof that the certified
SIU did not continue to be, on the critical dates, the statutory majority representative.
And even assuming the SIU at the time failed to command a majority, the decisive
factor is the SIU's unrevoked and outstanding certification, not its current majority
status or the extent of the Company's obligation to bargain. It is long established
that the Board, once it settles a representation question and issues a certification,
continues thereafter to police the certification, even on its own motion.15 Thus, it
may clarify, amend, or revoke the certification, or supersede it by certification of a
different union under appropriate procedures. Changes in the status of the certifi-
cation are matters for the Board. Congress has provided the election and certifica-
tion machinery of the Act to promote stability and peaceful settlement of disputed
representation claims. In the context of Section 8(b)(4)(C), and in the circum-
stances of this case, self-help, in the form of economic force, which bypasses the
statutory election machinery in an attempt to change the effect of an existing cer-
tification is not justified. Thus, the only effective test of Respondent's majority
claim on November 6, 1961. was a Board election. Respondent urges that it soueht
by a petition on November 6, and still seeks, a Board election. Whether an election
could then have been, or can now be, conducted is problematical in view of the
disputed effectiveness of the arbitration contract and other possible obstacles to
an election under the Board's Rules. Respondent's proper course was to rely upon
12 This conclusion I Infer from all the relevant evidence on the point ; it is settled that
success or failure of the picket line is not controlling. The only objective of Respondent
in picketing at the Company's main terminal was to force recognition, the picket legend
openly announced the existence of a "strike," and Respondent displayed the purpose of
the picket line in threatening the Company with the full consequences of a stoppage if
its demands were not immediately met It is sufficient that the picketing was used as,
and was, a potential inducement and encouragement of individuals to engage in a work
stoppage, and I find that the natural and probable effect of the picketing would induce
such a stoppage Friden, Inc, 134 NLRB 598; NLRB v. Knitgoods Workers' Union
Local 155, ILOWU, AFL-CIO (James Knitting Mills & Packard Knitwear), 267 F. 2d
916 (C.A. 2) ; cf Minneapolis House Furnishing Company, 132 NLRB 40
18 E.g. , Minneapolis House Furnishing Company, ibid
11 Coca Cola Bottling Company of St Louis (Warehouse & Distribution Workers Union,
Local 688), 116 NLRB 928; Tungsten Mining Corp . 106 NLRB 903, enfd sub nom
N.L R B. v. District 50, United Mine Workers, March 18, 1954 (CA. 4), Court Decisions,
NLRA vol. IX, p. 303: Parks v Atlanta Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union tt8,
243 F. 2d 284 (CA. 5), cert. denied 354 US. 937 (Sec. 303 case) Tungsten Mining
Corp. v. District 50, United Mine Workers, 242 F. 2d 84 (C A N C) (Sec 303 case).
And see Ray Brooks v N L R.B , 348 U S 96; N.L.R B v Ranson Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
195 F. 2d 350 (CA. 5), cert. denied 344 U.S 863
15 See, e g., Hughes Tool Company, 104 NLRB 318.
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, ETC., LOCAL 901 813
the Board's orderly processes. Instead, it proceeded, despite SIU's outstanding cer-
tification, to demand immediate recognition of the Company against the force of an
existing picket line and with oral threats.16
The further affirmative defense that SIU "had abandoned its representation" is
not at all clear as to precise meaning or legal theory-whether it pertains to an
alleged failure properly or fully to carry out its representative functions or whether
it asserts that SIU voluntarily relinquished its certification status. On either basis I
find, as already described, that the defense is unsupported in fact.17 It is therefore
unnecessary to pass upon whether, if factually supported, such a defense would lie
for purposes of Section 8(b) (4) (C).18
Respondent also contends in substance that Section 8(b)(4)(C) and 8(b)(7) 19
must be construed together and that, since it filed an election petition within 30 days
after it commenced picketing,20 it was absolved from violation of 8(b) (7) and there-
fore from violation of 8(b)(4)(C) as well21 I perceive no merit in the argument.
The two subsections reflect separate and different unfair labor practices. It is scarcely
a defense to an alleged violation of one section of the Act that the conduct com-
plained of would not be violative of some other section. From a mere reading of the
two sections it is plain that the two sections do not conflict or overlap; indeed, both
complement each other in effecting a congressional purpose of controlling improper
strikes and other conduct for a recognitional object. As earlier shown, 8(b) (4) (C)
proscribes certain action taken against another labor organization's certification, with
all that this term connotes. Nothing in 8(b)(7) can be read or reasonably con-
strued to relieve a union of the flat interdiction of 8(b)(4)(C). To accept Re-
spondent's construction of the statute would render 8(b) (4) (C) superfluous-an
interpretation which I must reject.22
Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii) (C), as
.alleged.
16 In Coca Cola Bottling Company of St. Louis, supra, the respondent union, which was
found in violation, first filed a representation petition and then resorted to Section
8(b) (4) (C) conduct when the company refused to give in to its demands
11 Particularly in view of the affirmative duties imposed by law on the holder of a Board
-certification (e.g, Hughes Tool Company, supra, and cases cited therein), in a proceed-
ing of this kind the fact of such abandonment of representation or certification would
have to be clearly and unequivocally proved before consideration of the legal question.
16 See Coca Cola Bottling Company of St Louis and Tungsten Mining Corp , supra,
where the Board, finding the alleged defunctness of the certified union was not estab-
lished, did not pass upon whether defunctness constitutes a defense under Section
8(b) (4) (C). Cf. Pepper & Potter Inc v. Local 977, United Auto Workers (D C.S.N Y.),
103 F. Supp. 684, in which the Federal district court held in a Section 303 case that a
certified union may not effect self-decertification by a disclaimer within the certification
year, that the orderly procedure of Section 9 is the sole and exclusive method of
-decertification.
19 Section 8(b)(7) states in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization "to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or
,forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organiza-
tion as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is cur-
rently certified as the representative of such employees: (A) where the employer has
lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act any other labor organization and a
question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of
this Act, . . . (C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days
from the commencement of such picketing. . . 11
20 It also had a petition on file since August 29, 1961
21 Respondent's contention is rejected that the Regional Director (meaning the General
Counsel) is estopped from issuing and proceeding on the instant complaint because he
failed to conduct an expedited election under Section 8(b)(7).
22 At the hearing and in its brief, Respondent argued that to keep alive the SIU certi-
fication it is necessary to establish that an effective contract was in existence and that
the contract question must therefore be determined in this case. I do not agree. Among
other things, it is quite clear in the law that the vitality of a certification is not depend-
•ent upon the existence of a contract-or even de facto recognition. In this connection
the evidence might be noted of the Company's position, in its contract dispute with the
SIU, that the same contract in existence for 1960 continued in binding effect until
-November 30, 1961
814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operation of the Employer here involved, set forth in section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct-
ing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (C)
of the Act, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local
901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, and the Charging Party, Seafarers International Union of North America,
Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, P.R. Division, AFL-CIO, are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(2) of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging individuals employed by the Company to refuse
to perform services, and by threatening, coercing, and restraining the Company,
with an object of forcing or requiring the Company to recognize and bargain with
Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of the Company's employees,
notwithstanding that the SIU has been certified by the Board as the representative
of such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and
(ii) (C) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, its officers, repre-
sentatives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual
employed by the Company, or by any person engaged in commerce, to engage in, a
strike or refusal to perform services, or threatening, coercing, or restraining the
Company, where an object thereof is to force or require the Company to recognize
and bargain with the Respondent as the collective-bargaining representative of the
Company's employees, if and so long as the SIU is certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Post in conspicuous places and all places where notices to members are cus-
tomarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix," in
Spanish translation.23 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director
for the Twenty-fourth Region, shall, after being duly signed by a duly authorized
representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Upon request by the said Regional Director, after receipt from him of copies
of the said notice in Spanish translation, return to him sufficient copies, dated and
duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, for posting, the Company willing,
for 60 consecutive days at the various places of business of the Company in Puerto
Rico, in conspicuous places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
23 In the event that these Recommendations be adopted by the Board, the words "A Deci-
sion and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial
Examiner" In the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a
decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the
United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order "
ADAMS DAIRY, INC. 815
(c) Notify the said Regional Director , in writing , within 20 days from the date
of the receipt of this Intermediate Report , what steps the Respondent 'has taken to
comply herewith 24
24 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Boaid , this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS, LOCAL 901 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA , AND To ALL EMPLOYEES AND' INDI-
VIDUALS EMPLOYED BY VALENCIA BAXT EXPRESS, INC.
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed
by Valencia Baxt Express, Inc., or by any person engaged in commerce, to
engage in , a strike or refusal to perform services , and we will not threaten,
coerce, or restrain the said company, where an object thereof is to force or
require the said company to recognize and bargain with Respondent, Team-
sters Local 901 as the collective bargaining representative of the Company's
employees , if and so long as Seafarers International Union of North America,
Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District , P.R. Division , AFL-CIO, is
certified as the representative of such employees under the provision of Section 9
of the National Labor Relations Act.
TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS,
LOCAL 901, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM-
STERS, CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Credito
Building, P.O. Box 11007 , 1506 Ponce de Leon Avenue, Fernandez Juncos Station,
Santurce , Puerto Rico , Telephone Number 723 -3200 , if they have any questions
concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Adams Dairy, Inc.' and The Independent Wholesale Dairy Prod-
ucts Salesmen 's Association . Cases Nos. 14-CA-2268 and 14-
CA-2268-2. June 25, 1962
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 14, 1960, Trial Examiner Arnold Ordman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. There-
after, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions z and
1 Respondent 's name appears as corrected by stipulation of the parties at the hearing
2 The General Counsel excepted only to the failure of the Trial Examiner to include an
essential element of the recommended Board order in the "Notice to All Employees " We
find merit in the exception and have therefore revised the notice as requested
137 NLRB No. 87.