Teachers College, Columbia University

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 2017

365 NLRB No. 86 (N.L.R.B. 2017)

365 NLRB No. 86
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Teachers College, Columbia University and Local
2110, United Auto Workers. Case 02–CA–
164870
May 31, 2017
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA AND MEMBERS
PEARCE AND MCFERRAN
On December 30, 2016, Administrative Law Judge
John T. Giannopoulos issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Teachers College, Columbia
University, New York, New York, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the actions set forth in
the Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 31, 2017
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Chairman
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Susannah Z. Ringel, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Ceilidh B. Gao, Esq. (Levy Ratner, P.C.), for the Charging
Party.
Tara E. Daub, Esq., Alexander E. Gallin, Esq. (Nixon Peabody,
L.L.P.), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me in New York, New York, on Septem-
ber 7, 2016, based upon a Complaint and Notice of Hearing
issued by the National Labor Relations Board (Board) alleging
that Teachers College, Columbia University (Respondent or
Teachers College) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (Act) by failing to furnish relevant
information to Local 2110, United Auto Workers (Union).1
Based upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses,2 and after considering the briefs
filed by the General Counsel, the Union, and Respondent, I
make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
Teachers College is a New York nonprofit educational insti-
tution with a campus located in New York City. Respondent
derives annual revenues in excess of $1 million , and purchases
supplies valued in excess of $50,000 directly from firms locat-
ed outside the State of New York. Accordingly, I find Re-
spondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, that this dispute affects com-
merce, and the Board has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 10(a)
of the Act. Respondent admits, and I find, the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
(Tr. 9.)
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
Teachers College is a private nonprofit educational institu-
tion, and has been affiliated with Columbia University since
1898. Although they are separate legal entities, the College
serves as Columbia’s graduate school of education, offering
students graduate degrees in education. Strujan v. Teachers
College Columbia University, 2010 WL 3466251, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). As of the 2015–2016 academic year, over
5,000 students were enrolled at Teachers College. The Union,
or its predecessor, has represented a unit of Respondent’s secre-
tarial and clerical employees since at least the 1990’s. (Tr. 18–
19, 139–142.)
Respondent and the Union are signatories to a collective-
bargaining agreement (CBA) with a recognition clause that
reads as follows:
The College recognizes Local 2110 as the exclusive bargain-
ing agent for, and this Agreement shall apply to, all on cam-

1 Citations to the transcripts will be denoted by “Tr.” with the ap-
propriate page number. Citations to the General Counsel’s Exhibits,
Respondent’s Exhibits, Union Exhibits, and Joint Exhibits will be de-
noted by “GC Exh” “R. Exh.” “U.” and “Jt. Exh.” respectively.
2 When necessary, credibility resolutions have been made based up-
on a review of the entire record in this proceeding. Witness demeanor
was the primary consideration in making credibility resolutions. I also
considered the inherent probability of the testimony and whether such
testimony was in conflict with credited testimony or documentary evi-
dence. Testimony contrary to my findings has been discredited.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
pus full-time and part-time3 . . . secretarial and clerical em-
ployees including clerks, account clerks, secretaries, recep-
tionist-typists, clerk-typists, assistant supervisors in the Word
Processing Center, correspondence clerks, postal clerks, li-
brary assistants, personnel assistants, duplicating equipment
operators, electronic data processing machine operators,
bookkeeping machine operators, bookkeeping machine opera-
tor supervisors, key-punch operators, key-punch operator su-
pervisors, audiovisual technicians, student financial aid coun-
selors, cashiers, and telephone operators . . . excluding part-
timers who work less than twenty hours except as hereinafter
provided, maintenance employees, professional employees,
temporary employees as defined herein, guards, watchmen,
confidential employees, supervisors as defined in the National
Labor Relations Act and all other employees.
The CBA was negotiated in 2007 and expired in February
2012. It was subsequently extended in 2012 and again in 2015
via a written memorandum of agreement (MOU). The CBA is
currently is set to expire in February 2018.4 (Jt. Exh. 1–3.)
In 2012, during a collective-bargaining session, the Union
told Respondent it believed that some professional staff were
being paid hourly, and therefore should be represented by the
Union. On April 2, 2012, the Union filed a grievance, pursuant
to the terms of the CBA, alleging Respondent was improperly
excluding positions from the bargaining-unit. As part of the
grievance, the Union made an information request asking for, in
pertinent part: (1) a list of all nonunit part-time, casual, hourly,
temporary, and internship positions at the College;5 and (2) job
descriptions for each of these positions. After some discus-
sions, including a request from Respondent that the Union clar-
ify the information request, on September 7, 2012, Respondent
informed the Union that they had not identified any issues re-
garding the improper transfer of unit work. Respondent also
expressed its belief that the Union, through the information
request, was seeking evidence to support filing NLRB charges,
and that the College “had no obligation to provide information
that is not available under Board procedures.” The Respondent
asked the Union to “let [them] know” if the Union wanted to
clarify the grievance or to discuss specific cases involving unit
work being transferred outside the unit. (R. Exh. 12, 11; Jt.
Exh. 6; Tr. 148–149.)
Despite their efforts, the parties were unable to resolve their
dispute. On December 4, 2012, the College sent an email to the

3 The agreement defines a part-time employee as “one who is regu-
larly scheduled to work twenty hours or more per week or who works
an average of twenty hours a week or more who is not a student at
Teachers College, Bernard College or Columbia University . . . [a] part-
time employee who subsequently elects to take courses . . . shall re-
main a member of the bargaining unit.” (Jt. Exh. 1 p. 6.)
4 Both MOU’s contain minor changes to the CBA’s basic terms. No
changes were made to the recognition clause.
5 As part of the list of employees, the Union asked for the specific
“name, job title/classification, department, rate of pay, work schedule,
actual number of hours worked per week (if different from work sched-
ule), starting date and termination/end date (where applicable) from
January 2010 to the present.” (R. Exh. 11.)
Union formally denying the grievance.6 On December 13,
2012, the Union provided the College notice of its intention to
arbitrate. The parties exchanged correspondence, disagreeing
as to whether the grievance was arbitrable. On June 13, 2014,
the Union emailed the arbitrator, copying Respondent, stating
that the parties had agreed to his appointment to arbitrate the
matter.7 The arbitrator held a telephone conference asking the
parties submit pre-hearing briefs. Respondent’s brief argued
that the grievance was not subject to arbitration because: (1)
the Union’s request was untimely; and (2) the grievance in-
volved unit placement issues (i.e. the Union was seeking to
include nonbargaining unit positions in the bargaining unit)
which were not subject to arbitration. (R. Exh. 13, 15; Jt. Exh.
4, 5, 6.)
It appears that some time in October 2014, the arbitrator
asked the parties to discuss settlement. Before doing so, on
November 20, 2014, the Union informed the College that it
needed the information responsive to its April 2012 information
request. (R. Exh. 1–2; Tr. 84.)
The attempt at settlement stalled, and on January 21, 2015,
the arbitrator issued his decision finding that the grievance was
timely filed. The arbitrator also held that, while he did not have
authority to order that specific positions be included in the bar-
gaining unit, he did “have authority to determine whether non-
bargaining unit employees are performing unit work, and/or
whether the College has transferred unit work to nonunit em-
ployees, and to fashion an appropriate remedy.”8 Accordingly,
the arbitrator ordered the grievance to proceed to hearing upon
the request of either party. (Jt. Exh. 6.)
On February 20, 2015, the Union informed the College that
it was renewing its information request. The Union stated that,
in order to prepare for the arbitration, it needed the following
records from July 1, 2012, forward:
1. Records of all positions the College classifies as “hourly
professional” including name, title, department, schedule of
hours, rate of pay and job description.
2. Records of all positions the College considers “temporary,”
“interim” or “casual” that have existed in the aggregate for
longer than four months (regardless of the number of employ-
ees who may have filled a particular position or the length of
time art individual was in the position) including name(s), ti-
tle, department, schedule of hours, rate of pay and job descrip-
tion.
3. Records of all internships (excluding students with work-
study grants) that have lasted or are scheduled to exceed four
months including name, title, department, schedule of hours,

6 Among other things, the email noted that there was nothing in the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement which disallowed “positions
outside of the unit to also share the responsibility” of performing work
that is performed by unit members. (R. Exh. 13; Jt. Exh. 6 p. 4.)
7 The parties asked the arbitrator to first decide the issue of arbitra-
bility. (Jt. Exh. 6, p. 5.)
8 Indeed, the arbitrator found that, while the Union’s demand for ar-
bitration was imprecise, “the College understood that the Union was
asserting, perhaps among other things, that some bargaining unit work
at the College was being done by non-bargaining unit employees.” (Jt.
Exh. 6 p. 11.)
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 3
rate of pay and job description.
4. Records of all employees, whether full or part-time, who
are (a) not professional, supervisory, maintenance, confiden-
tial, work-study, or guards or watchmen; and (b) have not
been placed within the bargaining unit. The requested records
include name, title, department, schedule of hours, rate of pay
and job description.
The Union also asked the arbitrator to issue an order setting
forth a schedule for the College to provide the information
requested and to schedule a hearing date. (R. Exh. 3; Jt. Exh.
7.)
On March 25, 2015, the arbitrator issued a decision finding
that, although the Union was entitled to relevant information
requested from the College, the arbitrator was unable to deter-
mine exactly what information the College must provide. Thus,
he directed the parties to reach an agreement within 30 days
regarding what information would be provided to the Union. If
they did so, a hearing would be set within 60 days. Otherwise,
a hearing would be set as soon as practicable and the arbitrator
would determine whether a failure to provide information
would warrant an adverse inference against the College. (Jt.
Exh. 7.)
On April 7, 2015, the attorneys for the Union and Respond-
ent discussed the Union’s information request, with the Union
explaining that it was trying to find a way to streamline the
information production or otherwise tailor the request to assist
with compliance. On April 13, 2015, the Union sent Respond-
ent a letter with a revised information request, in “an attempt to
focus” the request. The letter set forth four categories of posi-
tions, and asked for the names of employees filling the posi-
tions, the position type, department, rate of pay, work schedule,
and job description, from July 1, 2012. The Union included a
list of 31 specific positions that it believed would be encom-
passed by the information request as a “starting point” for their
discussions about what documents the College would produce
pursuant to the arbitrator’s order. (Jt. Exh.. 8; Tr. 106–107.)
On April 17, 2015, the College responded asserting that the
information requested was burdensome. Respondent stated its
willingness to work with the Union regarding the production of
“relevant information relating to a proper purpose” and asked
the Union to: (1) identify the work allegedly transferred to
nonunit employees; (2) provide the basis for the Union’s belief
that work has been transferred to nonunit employees; and (3)
articulate the alleged connection between the unit work and the
information requested. Respondent stated that the Union’s
failure to provide the information requested to Respondent
would “effectively preclude Teachers College from respond-
ing” in a meaningful fashion.9 (Jt. Exh. 9.)
Thereafter, Respondent sent a letter to the arbitrator accusing
the Union of dilatory tactics, and asking that the grievance be
dismissed if the “Union continues its refusal to either move
forward with this arbitration or withdraw its demand for arbitra-

9 Also, the College asserted its belief that the Union’s information
request was being sought for an improper purpose, namely in further-
ance of the Union filing a unit clarification petition with the Board or
for other purposes aimed at expanding the unit. (Jt. Exh. 9.)
tion.” (Jt. Exh. 10 p. 3.) On September 28, 2015, the arbitrator
issued an order denying Respondent’s request to dismiss the
grievance. He gave the parties 30 days to reach an agreement
regarding the Union’s information request. If they did so, a
hearing would be set. If not, the grievance would be dismissed
unless, within an additional 30 days, the Union either: (a) is-
sued a subpoena for the information; (b) requested hearing
dates for the grievance; or (c) filed unfair labor practice charges
with the NLRB. (Jt. Exh. 13.)
After receiving the arbitrator’s order, on September 28 the
College resent its April 2015 letter to the Union, again asking
the Union to: (1) identify the work allegedly transferred to
nonunit employees; (2) provide the basis for the Union’s belief
that work has been transferred to nonunit employees; and (3)
articulate the alleged connection between the unit work and the
information requested. The College stated that this was a good-
faith proposal regarding the scope of documents the College
would be willing to provide, and asked the Union for a re-
sponse.
The Union replied by asking the College whether it would
produce the information requested if the Union provided an
updated list of specific nonunit positions that it believed were
performing bargaining unit work. Respondent asserted that the
Union’s proposal was ambiguous, and asked the Union to iden-
tify the specific “tasks” it believed were being transferred out-
side the unit. (Jt. Exh.. 14.)
As the correspondence between the parties continued, the
Union had its members canvass the College, and review docu-
mentary and other evidence in their possession regarding what
positions were performing unit work. Along with the Union’s
attorney, they compiled a list of nonunit positions that, in the
Union’s belief, performed unit work, going building by build-
ing, department by department, and floor by floor. (Tr. 50–51.)
The Union’s attorney gathered the information they knew about
each position, including the title, department, and history of the
position, and created a chart of 34 nonunit positions. Along
with a list of the position titles, the chart included the depart-
ment for each position, and a short “comments” section setting
forth the basis for the Union’s belief and/or a description of the
specific position in question. On October 22, 2015, the Union
emailed the chart to Respondent, stating its belief that the Col-
lege had improperly transferred bargaining unit work to em-
ployees in the positions set forth in the chart, and asking the
College provide the Union the following information about the
positions, from July 2012 to the present: (1) the title of the posi-
tion; (2) the name or names of employee(s) filling the position;
(3) the position type; (4) the department; (5) the regular sched-
ule for the position; (6) the rate of pay; and (7) the current or
past job descriptions. In its email to Respondent, the Union
stated that the chart was derived by using job postings in the
Union’s possession, along with information about changes to
the unit that came from unit employees, as well as observations
made by unit employees with respect to job functions they had
observed nonunit employees performing. (Jt. Exh. 15.) This
email, and its related chart, is the basis for the unfair labor prac-
tice allegations in the Complaint.
Respondent replied, via letter dated October 28, 2015, assert-
ing that the information sought was not relevant, that the Union
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
was seeking information for inappropriate purposes and that the
request was both overly broad and unduly burdensome. There-
fore, the College did not provide the Union with the infor-
mation requested, asserting that the Union was trying to get
information that it would not otherwise be entitled to receive if
it had filed a unit clarification petition with the Board. Re-
spondent ended the letter asking the Union to identify the spe-
cific work at issue that the Union believed was transferred to
nonunit employees. (Jt. Exh. 16.)
The Union filed its unfair labor practice charge on November
20, 2015. Even after the hearing in this matter was scheduled,
the Union’s grievance continued. On February 26, 2016, the
arbitrator confirmed that the grievance hearing would proceed,
ordered the Union to issue arbitration subpoenas by March 11,
2016, and to provide the College with the specific unit work it
claimed was being performed by nonunit employees.10 (R.
Exh. 8.) On March 29, 2016, the arbitrator informed the parties
that the grievance hearing would start with the transfer of work
in the Department of Health and Behavioral Sciences, which
were the first positions to be arbitrated, and offered a June 15
hearing date. (R. Exh. 9; Tr. 132.) As of the date of the hear-
ing in this matter, the Union had not received the information it
requested.11
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act imposes on an employer the “duty
to bargain collectively” which includes a duty to supply a union
with requested information that will enable it to “negotiate
effectively and perform its duties as bargaining representative.”
New York & Presbyterian Hospital v. NLRB, 649 F.3d 723, 729
(D.C. Cir. 2011), enfg. 355 NLRB 627 (2010). This includes
the duty to furnish the union with information requested in
order to properly administer a collective-bargaining agreement,
and the processing and evaluating of grievances pursuant to that
agreement. Id; Oncor Electric Co., LLC, 364 NLRB No. 58,
slip op. at 20 (2016).
Where the information requested concerns employees in the
bargaining unit, which goes to the core of the employer-
employee relationship, that information is presumptively rele-
vant. Postal Service, 360 NLRB 762, 766 (2014). However,
when the request involves nonunit employees or operations, the
union has the burden of establishing the relevance of the re-
quested information. Id. “In either situation, the standard for
relevancy is the same: ‘a liberal discovery-type standard.’”
Knappton Maritime Corp., 292 NLRB 236, 238–239 (1988)
(quoting NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437
(1967)).12
A union satisfies its burden of proving relevance by demon-
strating “a reasonable belief supported by objective evidence

10 There is no evidence in the record whether the Union did so.
11 There is no evidence in the record as to whether the arbitrator has
ever ordered that the company produce the information the Union had
requested in its October 22, 2015 information request. (Tr. 120.)
12 Potential or probable relevance is sufficient to trigger an employ-
er’s obligation to provide the information. Shoppers Food Warehouse
Corp., 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994).
for requesting the information.” Shoppers Food Warehouse,
315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994); Cannelton Industries, Inc., 339
NLRB 996, 1004–1005 (2003); Postal Service, 360 NLRB 762,
766; Dodger Theatricals Holdings, Inc., 347 NLRB 953, 967–
968 (2006). The union is not required to show that the infor-
mation triggering its request was accurate or ultimately reliable;
indeed a union’s information request may be based on hearsay.
Id; See also, Postal Service, 337 NLRB 820, 822 (2002).
“Even rumors may be pursued, providing that there is at least
some demonstration that the request for information is more
than pure fantasy.” Cannelton Industries, 339 NLRB at 1005.
The Board does not pass on the merits of the underlying griev-
ance, or determine beforehand whether a breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement occurred. Id. at 1003; USPS, 337
NLRB at 822.
B. The Union Established the Relevance of the
Requested Information
Applying these principles, I find that, by the time of its Oc-
tober 22, 2015 information request, the Union had established
and demonstrated to the College both the relevance of the re-
quested information and the existence of evidence that gave rise
to the Union’s reasonable belief in the relevance of that infor-
mation. According to the arbitrator’s July 21, 2015 order, the
Union’s grievance was timely filed, and the arbitrator deter-
mined that he had the authority to determine whether nonbar-
gaining unit employees were performing bargaining unit work,
and/or whether the College transferred unit work to non-unit
employees, and to fashion an appropriate remedy. (Jt. Exh 6.)
Relying upon information received from union members can-
vassing the College in October 2015, along with job postings
and other documents in the Union’s possession, the Union iden-
tified 34 nonunit positions it believed were performing bargain-
ing unit work. In the information request the Union listed, to
the best of its knowledge, the position name and department,
and included a “comment” section describing the specific posi-
tion in question, or identifying the basis of the Union’s belief
that the position was performing unit work.
Although under current Board law the Union was not obli-
gated to disclose the underlying facts giving rise to its belief the
information requested was relevant, Cannelton Industries, Inc.,
339 NLRB at 997, here it did so, explaining that the infor-
mation request was based upon job postings, as well as infor-
mation gathered from members about changes in the unit and
job functions they had observed nonunit employees perform-
ing.13 As such, absent a valid defense, the Union was legally
entitled to receive the information it requested.14 American
Signature, Inc., 334 NLRB 880, 885 (2001).

13 See Jt. Exh 15.
14 The College’s reliance on a General Counsel Advice memoran-
dum in ABM Industries, Inc., 2015 WL 3486488, is misplaced. Advice
Memoranda do not constitute Board law, and are not precedent. Kysor
Industrial Corp., 307 NLRB 598, 602 fn. 4 (1992). Also, unlike the
unions in ABM Industries, here the Union demonstrated “a reasonable
belief supported by objective evidence for requesting the information.”
Shoppers Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB at 259.
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 5
C. Respondent has Failed to Prove a Valid Defense
Although Respondent has raised multiple defenses to its re-
fusal to provide the Union with the information it requested, all
are without merit.
(1) 10(b) defense
First, the College asserts that the Complaint allegations are
time-barred pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Act, because much
of the information the Union requested in its October 22 infor-
mation request was subject to previous information requests.
Respondent Brief, at 18–20. However, the “Board has long
held that each request for information and each refusal to com-
ply gives rise to a separate and distinct violation of the Act.”
Centinela Hospital Medical Center, 363 NLRB No. 44, slip.
op. at 2, fn. 6 (2015) (rejecting 10(b) argument based upon
previous information requests made outside the 10(b) period).
As such, the charge in this matter was timely filed, and Re-
spondent’s 10(b) defense is baseless.
(2) Alleged bad-faith and improper reasons
Next, Respondent asserts that it was privileged to not pro-
vide the Union with the information requested, because the
October 22 information request was made in “bad faith” and for
“improper purposes.” (R. Br., at 29–30.) Specifically, Re-
spondent claims that the information request was made for the
purpose of pursuing a Board proceeding in which discovery is
not available, citing Frontier Hotel& Casino, 318 NLRB 857,
877 (1995); Freemont-Rideout Health Group, 357 NLRB 1899,
1905–1906 (2011); and WXON-TV, 289 NLRB 615, 617–618
(1988). However, these cases involve situations where an in-
formation request was made while another NLRB proceeding
was pending.15 Here, at the time of the information request,
there were no outstanding charges or complaints pending be-
fore the Board; the Union’s information request was not made
as a substitute for discovery.16
Respondent also asserts that the Union’s real objective in
making the information request was to prepare to use Board
procedures to organize or accrete nonunit positions into the
bargaining unit, or to later file a ULP charge for unlawful con-
duct. (R.Br., at 32.) However, the issue here is not whether the
information itself may be of value for some other purpose, but
“whether under the applicable liberal discovery standard of
relevance the General Counsel and the Union have shown the

15 Respondent’s reliance on Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 NLRB 424
(1993), is similarly unavailing. There, the Board found no violation
where the union’s information request was “essentially an attempt by
two competitors of the Respondent, who are contributing members of a
multiemployer pension fund . . . to use the Union as a vehicle to force
the Respondent to provide competitive cost data to them.” Id. at 425.
The facts and holding of Coca-Cola Bottling have no bearing to the
matters herein.
16 In its brief, Respondent also cites to decisions made by NLRB
administrative law judges to support its arguments. See Respondent
Brief, at 30 (citing Crompton Corp., 2003 NLRB Lexis 268, at * 21
(NLRB May 28, 2003); See also, Id. at p. 32 (citing Time Inc., 2016
NLRB Lexis 574, at *112–113). Administrative law judge decisions
are “simply a recommendation to the Board,” are not precedent, and
serve as “no authority binding on any other administrative law judge.”
Austin Fire Equip., LLC, 360 NLRB 1176, 1188 (2014).
relevance of the requested information.” See Blue Diamond
Co., 295 NLRB 1007, 1011 (1989) (finding a violation, and
rejecting the employer’s contention that the union’s true pur-
pose for an information request was to use the information as
an aid to an organizing drive.) Moreover, a potential charge or
petition is “not a valid reason for depriving the Union of rele-
vant information.” Fallbrook Hospital Corp., 360 NLRB 644,
644 fn. 3 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (employer’s con-
tention that the union was trying to use an information request
as a discovery device for contemplated unfair labor practice
charges was without merit), enfd., 785 F.3d 729 (DC Cir.
2015). As set forth above, the General Counsel and the Union
have shown the relevance of the October 22 information re-
quest, thereby obligating Respondent to provide the infor-
mation to the Union.
(3) Claims the Union committed unfair labor practices
Respondent claims that its obligation to respond the Union’s
information request was “excused” because the Union “was
itself in violation of the NLRA” by not properly replying to the
College’s April 17, 2015, request for information. (R. Br., at
35–37.) The College presented no evidence that an unfair labor
practice charge was filed regarding its April 17 letter to the
Union. Moreover, even if Respondent was correct in the char-
acterization of the Union’s actions, under the circumstances
presented here, they would not constitute a defense to the Com-
plaint allegations. “Even in labor relations two wrongs do not
make a right.” Meier & Frank Co., Inc., 89 NLRB 1016, 1034
(1950). As set forth above, the Union has shown the relevance
of its information request and “a reasonable belief supported by
objective evidence for requesting the information.” Shoppers
Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB at 259. That the College may
have made its own independent information request, which it
claims the Union has not properly responded to, does not serve
as a defense to Respondent’s continued failure to provide the
Union with relevant information.
(4) Claims the request was overly broad and burdensome
Respondent asserts that its failure to provide information to
the Union is privileged because the October 22 information
request was “over broad and unduly burdensome.” (R. Br., at
33.) I disagree. Regarding the breadth of the information re-
quest, it is specifically targeted to the individual positions the
Union had identified as performing bargaining unit work,
which is the subject of the outstanding grievance. The infor-
mation sought by the Union relates directly to the specific posi-
tions, and is the type of information that would either directly
assist the Union in the arbitration or assist them in identifying
further evidence to present to the arbitrator. As for the tem-
poral scope of the request, going back to July 2012, the griev-
ance currently being arbitrated was originally filed in April
2012. Thus the Union is seeking information covering the gen-
eral time period of the grievance. Therefore, the information
request is not overly broad.
Similarly, the information request is not burdensome.
Claims of undue costs and burden of compliance ordinarily will
not justify an initial refusal to supply relevant data. “Issues
focused on these factors typically are considered instead at the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
compliance stage of a disclosure proceeding, where the parties
may bargain over the allocation of costs of producing the re-
quested information.” Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local
Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 363–364 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing
Safeway Stores, 252 NLRB 1323, 1324 (1980)), enfd., 691 F.2d
953 (10th Cir. 1982). Moreover, there is no evidence in the
record to verify any of Respondent’s claims or estimates re-
garding the alleged burden of compliance. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 261 NLRB 90, 92 (1982), enfd. sub. nom., 711 F.2d 348
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“while respondent has estimated for each of
the possible sources of information the number of documents
involved and the man-hours and costs of locating and identify-
ing the data and furnishing it to the union, there is no evidence
on the instant record to verify such estimates—certain of which
in any event appear to contain exaggerations.”); Goodyear
Atomic Corp., 266 NLRB 890, 891 (1983) (employer offers no
substantiation to its claim that the request would be prohibitive-
ly expensive in time, labor, and resources to fulfill). Thus,
Respondent is obligated to provide the Union with the respon-
sive information.17
Accordingly, because the Union has met its burden of estab-
lishing the relevance of its October 22, 2015 information re-
quest, I find that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act by failing to provide this information.18
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Teachers College, Columbia University is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Local 2110, United Auto Workers, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees constitute an appropriate unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All on campus full-time and part-time secretarial and clerical
employees including clerks, account clerks, secretaries, recep-
tionist-typists, clerk-typists, assistant supervisors in the Word

17 If it is clearly shown, during compliance proceedings, that sub-
stantial costs are involved, then the parties must bargain in good faith
as to the allocation of such costs. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 266 NLRB
890, 891 (1983). “Absent agreement on the distribution of costs, Re-
spondent must grant the Union access to the records from which the
information can be derived,” in conformance with any State and Feder-
al privacy regulations and statues. Id.
18 At trial, Respondent attempted to introduce into evidence a col-
lective-bargaining agreement from 1975 and an arbitration award from
2004, which were excluded from evidence based upon the General
Counsel’s relevance objections. (R. Exh. 10, 14; Tr. 143, 163–164.) In
its brief Respondent asks that I reverse these evidentiary rulings, argu-
ing that the 1975 CBA shows that students have been historically ex-
cluded from the unit, answering phones while receiving work-study
financial aid, and that the award shows the arbitrator rejected the Un-
ion’s claim that the CBA’s part-time employee provision is a work
preservation clause, and that certain job duties are reserved for the
bargaining unit. (R. Br., at 15–17.) However, these arguments go to
the merits of the Union’s underlying grievance, upon which the Board
does not pass when ruling on an information request. Cannelton Indus-
tries, 339 NLRB at 1003; USPS, 337 NLRB at 822. Both documents
were properly excluded from evidence.
Processing Center, correspondence clerks, postal clerks, li-
brary assistants, personnel assistants, duplicating equipment
operators, electronic data processing machine operators,
bookkeeping machine operators, bookkeeping machine opera-
tor supervisors, key-punch operators, key-punch operator su-
pervisors, audiovisual technicians, student financial aid coun-
selors, cashiers, and telephone operators, excluding part-
timers who work less than twenty hours except as hereinafter
provided, maintenance employees, professional employees,
temporary employees as defined herein, guards, watchmen,
confidential employees, supervisors as defined in the National
Labor Relations Act and all other employees.
4. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with the in-
formation it requested on October 22, 2015, Respondent has
been engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that they must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the polices of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended Order:19
ORDER
The Respondent Teachers College, Columbia University,
New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to provide the Union with requested infor-
mation that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s perfor-
mance of its duties as collective-bargaining representative of
the Respondent’s employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Promptly provide the Union with: all relevant infor-
mation requested by the Union in its email dated October 22,
2015, and related attachment.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
New York, New York facility copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”20 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-

19 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
20 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 7
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since October, 22, 2015.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 2 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., December 30, 2016
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose a representative to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide Local 2110, United Auto
Workers (Union) with requested information that is relevant
and necessary to the Union's performance of its duties as col-
lective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL promptly provide the Union with all relevant in-
formation requested in its email dated October 22, 2015, and
related attachment.
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA-164870 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.