Taylor Ridge Paving and Construction, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 16, 2017

365 NLRB No. 168 (N.L.R.B. 2017)

365 NLRB No. 168
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Taylor Ridge Paving and Construction, Co.1 and Lo-
cal Union No. 309, Laborers’ International Un-
ion of North America. Case 25–CA–135372
December 16, 2017
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA AND MEMBERS PEARCE
AND MCFERRAN
On September 21, 2015, Administrative Law Judge
Melissa M. Olivero issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief and a cross-
exception, and the Respondent filed a reply to the an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended order as modified. 2
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Respondent, Taylor Ridge Paving and Construc-
tion, is a paving and asphalt contractor in the construc-
tion industry. The issue in this case is whether the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
repudiating its collective-bargaining agreement with
Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local
309 (Union). We affirm the judge’s finding of a viola-
tion.
On January 23, 2012, the Respondent signed an
agreement binding itself to the preexisting 2008–2012
collective-bargaining agreement (2008 Agreement) be-
tween the Associated Contractors of the Quad Cities and
the Union.3 The 2008 Agreement was set to expire on
December 31, 2012, but absent 60 days’ notice of termi-
nation by the Respondent or the Union, the 2008 Agree-
ment would automatically renew for a 1-year period. It
is undisputed that neither party furnished 60 days’ notice
of termination in advance of the December 31, 2012 ex-

1 In accordance with the General Counsel’s cross-exceptions and
unopposed motion at the hearing, the case caption has been corrected to
reflect the correct name of the Respondent.
2 In accordance with our decision in AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc.,
363 NLRB No. 143 (2016), we shall modify the judge’s recommended
tax compensation and Social Security reporting remedy. We shall
modify the judge’s recommended Order and substitute a new notice to
reflect this remedial change.
3 The Respondent is not a member of the Associated Contractors.
piration date of the 2008 Agreement; therefore that
agreement renewed for a 1-year period ending December
31, 2013.
Also on January 23, 2012, the Respondent signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)4 with the Great
Plains Laborers’ District Council in which the Respond-
ent adopted “all of those Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments between the [District Council] and . . . the Associ-
ated Contractors.” The MOA listed the Union as a
member of the District Council. The MOA also included
the following provisions:
The EMPLOYER herein adopts all of those Collective
Bargaining Agreements between the UNION and the . .
. ASSOCIATED CONTRACTORS OF THE QUAD
CITIES, . . . and all other employer associations with
whom the UNION or any of its affiliated locals has a
duly negotiated and executed bargaining agreement,
and adopts all such agreements together with all
amendments thereto.
* * *
This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect
through April 30, 2013, and shall continue thereafter
unless there has been sixty (60) days written notice, by
registered or certified mail, by either party hereto of the
desire to modify and amend this Agreement for negoti-
ations. The EMPLOYER and the UNION agree to be
bound by the area-wide negotiated contracts with the
various Associations, incorporating them into this
Memorandum of Agreement and extending this
Agreement for the life of the newly negotiated con-
tract, if not notified within the specified period of time
(emphasis added).
Based on these provisions, the judge found that the MOA
had an April 30, 2013 expiration date, but would continue in
effect and bind the parties to “any newly negotiated con-
tract,” unless either party gave 60 days’ notice of intent “to
modify and amend.” Thus, the Respondent’s signature on
the MOA bound the Respondent to current and newly nego-
tiated agreements between the Union and the Associated
Contractors.
In early 2013, the Associated Contractors of the Quad
Cities and the Union entered into a successor collective-
bargaining agreement that was effective by its terms
from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2015 (Successor
Agreement). The Successor Agreement was signed by
members of the Associated Contractors and the Union on

4 The judge inadvertently stated that the Respondent signed the
MOA on January 23, 2013, instead of January 23, 2012. This inadvert-
ent error does not affect our decision.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
various dates from February to April 2013. Although the
Respondent did not sign the Successor Agreement, the
judge found that the Respondent was bound by this
agreement, by virtue of its signature on the extended
2008 Agreement, along with the MOA, above (collec-
tively, the Agreements).
On October 30, 2013, the Respondent wrote the Union,
stating that it “has determined to terminate our contract
with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the con-
tract on 31 December 2013.” The letter did not specify
whether Respondent sought to terminate the 2008
Agreement, the MOA, or both. Thereafter, the Respond-
ent sent the Union its last signed pension contribution
report, which was dated December 15, 2013, but was
received on January 27, 2014.5
The Respondent sent a second letter to the Union on
January 23, 2014, stating that it “has determined to ter-
minate our contract and the Memorandum of Agreement
with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the con-
tract and/or Memorandum of Agreement on 30 April
2014.” Union Business Manager Brad Long telephoned
the Respondent regarding this letter on January 27 or 28,
2014. In the course of that call, the Respondent’s vice
president and part owner, Chris Dowell, told Long that
he “want[ed] out of the agreement” and that the Re-
spondent “is not going to pay the benefits no more.”
Long responded that “it does not work that way, you
have to follow the Collective Bargaining Agreement.”
On January 28, 2014, the Respondent’s president and
part owner, Lindsay Dowell, told Long she was certain
she could get out of the agreement. Again, Long re-
sponded, “it doesn’t work that way.”
The Respondent’s business is seasonal; it generally
operates for 7 to 8 months of the year, as it is unable to
lay asphalt in cold weather. The Respondent, therefore,
did not operate from at least January to March 2014. In
late March or early April 2014, the Union attempted to
refer an asphalt job to the Respondent. Chris Dowell
refused the referral and stated that, as far as he was con-
cerned, there was no existing agreement between the
Respondent and the Union—a claim the Union disputed.
The Respondent then sent the Union a third letter on
April 29, 2014, stating that it was “terminating the bar-
gaining relationship with Laborer’s Local 309 effective
immediately” and that there was “no obligation to bar-
gain.” After consulting with counsel, the Union re-

5 The report includes the following language: “The signature certi-
fies this report is correct and hereby becomes or continues as a signato-
ry employer to the currently applicable collective bargaining agreement
with Local Union 309. . . .” On the report, the Respondent checked the
box indicating that it wanted the Union to send additional contribution
report forms.
sponded in a May 13, 2014 letter, refuting the Respond-
ent’s contentions and stating that the Respondent was
clearly signatory to the Successor Agreement which ter-
minated December 31, 2015. The Union filed the charge
in this case on August 26, 2014.
In her decision, the judge found that the Respondent
was bound by the Successor Agreement through Decem-
ber 31, 2015, pursuant to the provision in the MOA bind-
ing the Respondent to all newly negotiated agreements.
Thus, the judge concluded that the Respondent’s at-
tempted repudiation of the agreements prior to that date
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The judge
additionally rejected the Respondent’s argument that the
General Counsel’s complaint was untimely under Section
10(b) of the Act, finding that the Respondent had not
provided clear and unequivocal repudiation of the con-
tracts until the April 29, 2014 letter, and the charge was
therefore filed within 6 months of the unfair labor prac-
tice.6 For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
judge’s conclusions that the charge is not barred by 10(b)
and that the Respondent unlawfully repudiated the
agreements.
II. ANALYSIS
Under Section 8(f) of the Act, employers and unions in
the construction industry are permitted to enter into col-
lective-bargaining agreements before the unions have
established their majority status. Parties entering into
8(f) agreements are bound to those contracts for their
terms, but either party is free to repudiate the collective-
bargaining relationship once the 8(f) contract expires.
See John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1386
(1987), enfd. sub nom. Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied 488 U.S. 889
(1988).
Construction industry employers can bind themselves
to 8(f) agreements by various means. For example, em-
ployers may enter into 8(f) agreements directly, through
membership in multi-employer associations which bar-
gain on their behalf. Employers that are not members of
a multi-employer association may also execute memo-
randa of understanding (“me-too” agreements) which
bind them to agreements negotiated by the union and the
association. GEM Management Co., 339 NLRB 489,
496 (2003), enfd. 107 Fed.Appx. 576 (6th Cir. 2004).
These “me-too” agreements may bind an employer not
only to an existing agreement, but to successor master
contracts negotiated between the employer association

6 The Respondent also argued that the unit was comprised of a sin-
gle employee and it was therefore not obligated to bargain with the
Union. For the reasons stated by the judge, we reject this affirmative
defense.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 3
and union. See, e.g., W. J. Holloway & Son, 307 NLRB
487, 489 (1992) (agreement employer signed bound it to
terms of current master agreement and “any successor
agreements”); Construction Labor Unlimited, 312 NLRB
364, 367 (1993), enfd. 41 F.3d 1501 (2d Cir. 1994) (ac-
ceptance agreement bound an employer to current master
agreement and “any successor agreement(s)”); Neosho
Construction Co., 305 NLRB 100, 100 (1991) (agree-
ment bound employer to “all future master agreements”).
In order to determine an employer’s obligation under a
“me-too” agreement, the Board will look to the actual
terms of the separate agreement(s) referenced in the “me-
too” document it signs. If those separate agreements
have automatic renewal provisions, those renewal provi-
sions will be given effect and bind the non-signatory
“me-too” employer to the continuation of the agree-
ments. See Cedar Valley Corp., 302 NLRB 823, 823
(1991), enfd. 977 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1992) (respondent
bound by newly negotiated “me-too” contract; attempted
repudiation during the term of a current contract was
invalid).
Examining the terms of the separate agreements here,
the judge first found that the Respondent was bound by
the 2008 Agreement, which had automatically extended
for a year beyond its December 31, 2012 termination
date due to the Respondent’s failure to give the required
60-day notice of termination. The judge next found that
the Respondent was bound by the MOA it signed (con-
taining a “me-too” agreement) which was effective until
April 30, 2013, and thereafter unless 60 days’ written
notice of intent to terminate was given—notice the judge
found the Respondent failed to provide. Finally, the
judge found that the MOA—by its express terms—
additionally bound the Respondent to any existing
agreements between the Union and the Associated Con-
tractors, as well as “newly negotiated contracts.” Be-
cause the Union and the Associated Contractors entered
into the Successor Agreement while the MOA remained
in effect, the judge found that the 2013–2015 Successor
Agreement extended the life of the MOA until December
31, 2015.7

7 Our dissenting colleague asserts that we impose the Successor
Agreement on an “unwitting employer,” contrary to Deklewa, “since
the Respondent had no way of knowing, when it signed the 2008
Agreement and the MOA, that it would be bound by an agreement that
did not even exist at that time.” We disagree with both propositions—
i.e. that our decision runs contrary to Deklewa, and that the Employer
was “unwitting.” While, under Deklewa, either party may repudiate an
agreement at the time of expiration, “[w]hether the contract itself per-
mits repudiation. . . is another matter.” See Sheet Metal Workers Local
2 v. McElroy’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1093, 1097–1099 (10th Cir. 2007), and
cases cited therein. Thus, nothing in Deklewa or the Act prohibits
duration clauses in 8(f) agreements that contain a contractual obligation
We agree with the judge’s reading of the three appli-
cable contracts, as described above. We therefore find
that the Respondent was bound to the 2013–2015 Suc-
cessor Agreement. See W. J. Holloway & Son, 307
NLRB at 489 (agreement employer signed bound it to
terms of current master agreement and “any successor
agreements”). Thus, the Respondent was not free to ter-
minate the Successor Agreement until 60 days prior to its
expiration—October 31, 2015. See GEM Management
Co., 339 NLRB at 496; Cedar Valley Corp., 302 NLRB
at 823. Accordingly, the Respondent’s repudiation was
unlawful. See Cedar Valley, 302 NLRB at 823 (“A party
may not lawfully repudiate an 8(f) agreement during its
term.”) (citing John Deklewa & Sons, supra).
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we also agree
with the judge’s finding that the Respondent failed to
establish, as an affirmative defense, that the Union’s un-
fair labor practice charge was time barred by Section
10(b) of the Act.8 The Board has long required “a party,
in order to avoid the time bar, to file an unfair labor prac-
tice charge within 6 months of its receipt of clear and
unequivocal notice of total contract repudiation.” A & L
Underground, 302 NLRB 467, 468 (1991). “[T]he
Board’s long-settled rule [is] that the 10(b) period com-
mences only when a party has clear and unequivocal
notice of a violation of the Act.” Id. at 469. “[T]he bur-
den of showing that the charging party was on clear and
unequivocal notice of the violation rests on the respond-
ent.” Id. The time-bar does not apply where the charg-
ing party’s “delay in filing is a consequence of conflict-
ing signals or otherwise ambiguous conduct by the other
party.” Id. Here, the Respondent has not met its high
burden of proof.
In this case, the charge was filed and served on August
26, 2014, so the 10(b) period started on February 26,
2014. We find that the Union did not have clear and
unequivocal notice that the Respondent had repudiated
the Successor Agreement prior to February 26. While
the Respondent relies on its two letters (October 2013
and January 2014) and two phone calls in late January

to negotiate a successor agreement. Id. Furthermore, our colleague
errs in asserting that it is “contrary to the MOA’s own duration provi-
sion” to find that the MOA was extended until the Successor Agree-
ment terminated. That is exactly what the MOA provides: that the
Respondent will be bound by area-wide negotiated contracts with the
Associations, and that those contracts will be incorporated into the
MOA, “extending this Agreement [the MOA] for the life of the newly
negotiated contract.” We will honor that agreement. See also W. J.
Holloway & Son, 307 NLRB at 489; Neosho Construction Co., 305
NLRB at 100.
8 Section 10(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “no complaint shall
issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board….”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
2014 to the Union as evidence of its intent to terminate
the Agreements, we find that all four communications
were insufficient to give clear and unequivocal notice
that the Respondent was repudiating the Agreements.
Indeed, the Respondent created confusion through these
communications by referencing two different effective
dates for contract termination, using tentative language in
the calls, and failing to clarify which of the contractual
relationships it was terminating.9 See A & L Under-
ground, 302 at 468.
Moreover, it is undisputed that, due to the seasonal na-
ture of the construction business, the Respondent had no
active operations from January to March of 2014. Thus,
it was not until late March or early April 2014 that the
Respondent refused an attempted referral of work from
the Union, claiming that the Respondent was not bound
by a contract. That action, combined with the Respond-
ent’s letter dated April 29, 2014, which terminated any
existing contract immediately and declared there was no
obligation to bargain, provided clear notice of contract
repudiation. Because these actions occurred within 6
months of the date the charge was filed and served, how-
ever, the charge was timely.
Finally, the Respondent also acted inconsistently with
any attempted repudiation by requesting additional con-
tribution forms (presumably for future submissions when
it resumed operations in March), thereby sending the
Union “conflicting signals.” See, e.g., Gulf Coast Rebar,
Inc., 365 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 2 (2017) (noting that
respondent sent the Union a “conflicting signal” concern-

9 As noted above, it is undisputed that the Respondent failed to fur-
nish 60 days’ notice of termination of the 2008 agreement by October
31, 2012, thereby renewing the contractual relationship for 1 year (until
December 31, 2013). Thus, by the time the two letters were sent and
the phone calls made, the Respondent was already bound to the Succes-
sor Agreement, which was entered into in early 2013. Accordingly,
both the October 30, 2013 letter (noting a December 31, 2013 contract
termination date) and the January 23, 2014 letter (noting an April 30,
2014 termination date) referenced nonexistent contract termination
dates.
Likewise, both of the Respondent’s January 2014 phone calls to the
Union were insufficiently specific to give clear and unequivocal notice
of repudiation of the Agreements. The Respondent’s January 27 or 28
call from Brad Long to Chris Dowell, in which Dowell said he “‘want-
ed out’ of the agreement,” failed to specify which agreement (i.e. the
2008 Agreement, the MOA, or the Successor Agreement) the Respond-
ent wished to terminate. Likewise, the Respondent’s January 28 phone
call from President Lindsay Dowell to the Union in which she ex-
pressed that she was “certain that she could get [Respondent] out of the
Agreement” was merely a threat of future action and therefore did not
constitute clear and unequivocal notice that the Respondent was imme-
diately repudiating the agreements. See Howard Electrical & Mechan-
ical, 293 NLRB 472, 475 (1989) (“Notice of an intent to commit an
unlawful unilateral implementation . . . does not trigger the 10(b) period
with respect to the unlawful act itself.”), enfd. 931 F.2d 63 (10th Cir.
1991).
ing its position on the Agreement’s continuing validity
by seeking to arbitrate after repudiation); Vallow Floor
Coverings, Inc., 335 NLRB 20, 20 (2001) (distinguishing
between failure to abide by terms of collective bargain-
ing agreement and outright repudiation). Taken together,
these factors amply support the judge’s conclusion that
the Respondent did not effectively repudiate the contrac-
tual relationship with the Union (in both the Successor
Agreement and the MOA) until April 29, 2014, well
within the 10(b) period.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Taylor
Ridge Paving and Construction, Co., Taylor Ridge, Illi-
nois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(d).
“(d) Compensate the unit employees for any adverse
tax consequences of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 25,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is
fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a report allo-
cating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar
years for each employee.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2017
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CHAIRMAN MISCIMARRA, dissenting.
The issue in this case seems simple enough, but the
case itself is complicated. The issue is whether the em-
ployer, Taylor Ridge Paving and Construction, Co. (Tay-
lor Ridge or Respondent), violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) by refusing
to comply with a 2013–2015 collective-bargaining
agreement (CBA). The 2013-2015 CBA was not negoti-
ated or explicitly agreed to by Taylor Ridge. Nonethe-
less, the judge found, and my colleagues agree, that Tay-
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 5
lor Ridge was bound by the 2013–2015 CBA based on
the following events.
(1) On January 23, 2012, Taylor Ridge signed an
agreement that bound it to a 2008–2012 CBA, expir-
ing December 31, 2012, between the Associated
Contractors of the Quad Cities and Laborers’ Inter-
national Union of North America, Local 309. The
2008–2012 CBA contained an automatic-renewal
provision extending the CBA one year at a time, un-
less written notice of intent to modify or terminate
was served 60 days before expiration. No written
notice having been served, the 2008–2012 CBA ex-
tended through December 31, 2013.
(2) Also on January 23, 2012, Taylor Ridge signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a Laborers’
Union affiliate.1 The MOA stated that it was effective
“through April 30, 2013,” with an automatic-renewal
provision extending it thereafter “unless there has been
sixty (60) days written notice . . . by either party hereto
of the desire to modify and amend this Agreement for
negotiations.” However, the MOA also stated that the
employer, by signing the MOA, adopted various “area-
wide negotiated contracts,” and the MOA further pro-
vided that it would be extended by each of those con-
tracts “for the life of the newly negotiated contract, if
not notified within the specified period of time.”
(3) On October 30, 2013, Taylor Ridge sent Local 309
a letter stating that it “has determined to terminate our
contract with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end
of the contract on 31 December, 2013.” On January
23, 2014, Taylor Ridge sent Local 309 a second letter,
stating that it “has determined to terminate our contract
and the Memorandum of Agreement with Laborer’s
Local 309 effective at the end of the contract and/or
Memorandum of Agreement on 30 April 2014.”
According to my colleagues and the judge, the MOA
automatically renewed because Taylor Ridge failed to
give Local 309 60 days’ written notice prior to the
MOA’s April 30, 2013 expiration, and this meant that
Taylor Ridge continued to be bound to the MOA after
April 30, 2013, which then resulted in Taylor Ridge be-
ing bound to a successor 2013–2015 CBA entered into
between Local 309 and the Associated Contractors of the
Quad Cities.

1 The MOA was signed by Taylor Ridge and the Great Plains La-
borers’ District Council, affiliated with the Laborers’ International
Union of North America, AFL–CIO. The judge mistakenly stated that
Taylor Ridge signed the MOA on January 23, 2013. Taylor Ridge
signed the MOA on January 23, 2012, the same day it signed the
agreement that bound it to the 2008–2012 CBA between the Associated
Contractors of the Quad Cities and Local 309.
For two reasons, I respectfully disagree with my col-
leagues and the judge.
First, as explained in Part A below, Section 10(b) of
the Act bars any claims “occurring more than six months
prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the
service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom
such charge is made,” and I believe the allegation against
Taylor Ridge—based on a charge filed outside the 6-
month limitations period—is barred by Section 10(b).
Second, as explained in Part B below, the record con-
tradicts the judge’s and my colleagues’ conclusions. In
my view, the facts reveal that, in the absence of a timely
60-day notice of termination prior to December 31, 2012,
the 2008–2012 CBA automatically renewed for a one-
year period ending December 31, 2013; and the two writ-
ten notices of termination from Taylor Ridge—sent Oc-
tober 30, 2013, and January 23, 2014, respectively—
effectively terminated the extended 2008–2012 CBA and
the MOA, consistent with their provisions. Therefore,
under established Board case law regarding construction
industry pre-hire agreements, Taylor Ridge was not
bound by the successor 2013–2015 CBA negotiated be-
tween Local 309 and the Associated Contractors of the
Quad Cities.
Background
On January 23, 2012, the Respondent signed two
agreements (collectively, the Agreements). First, the
Respondent signed an agreement that bound the Re-
spondent to the 2008–2012 collective-bargaining agree-
ment (2008–2012 Agreement) between the Associated
Contractors of the Quad Cities and the Laborers’ Interna-
tional Union of North America, Local 309 (Union). The
2008–2012 Agreement expired by its terms on December
31, 2012, but absent 60 days’ notice of termination by
the Respondent or the Union, the 2008–2012 Agreement
renewed for a 1-year period.
Second, the Respondent signed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with the Great Plains Laborers’ Dis-
trict Council that bound the Respondent to “the area-
wide negotiated contracts with the various [Contractors’]
Associations” listed in the MOA, including the Associat-
ed Contractors of the Quad Cities, and the listed Laborers
local unions, including the Union. The MOA also in-
cluded the following provision:
This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect
through April 30, 2013, and shall continue thereafter
unless there has been sixty (60) days written notice, by
registered or certified mail, by either party hereto of the
desire to modify and amend this Agreement for negoti-
ations. The EMPLOYER and the UNION agree to be
bound by the area-wide negotiated contracts with the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
various Associations, incorporating them into this
Memorandum of Agreement and extending this
Agreement for the life of the newly negotiated contract,
if not notified within the specified period of time.
Based on this provision, the judge found that the MOA ex-
pired on April 30, 2013, but would continue in effect unless
either party gave 60 days’ notice of intent “to modify and
amend.” The Associated Contractors of the Quad Cities and
the Union entered into a successor collective-bargaining
agreement that was effective by its terms from January 1,
2013 to December 31, 2015 (2013–2015 Agreement). The
Respondent never signed either the 2013-2015 Agreement
or any agreement that bound it to the 2013–2015 Agree-
ment.
It is undisputed that the Respondent did not furnish 60
days’ notice of termination in advance of the December
31, 2012 expiration date of the 2008–2012 Agreement,
and therefore the 2008–2012 Agreement renewed for a 1-
year period ending December 31, 2013. On October 30,
2013, the Respondent sent the Union a letter stating that
it “has determined to terminate our contract with Labor-
er’s Local 309 effective at the end of the contract on 31
December, 2013.” Thereafter, the Respondent sent the
Union its last pension contribution form, which was dat-
ed December 15, 2013, but was received on January 27,
2014.
The Respondent sent a second letter to the Union on
January 23, 2014, stating that it “has determined to ter-
minate our contract and the Memorandum of Agreement
with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the con-
tract and/or Memorandum of Agreement on 30 April
2014.” Union Business Manager Brad Long telephoned
the Respondent regarding this letter on January 27 or 28,
2014, and during that call the Respondent’s vice presi-
dent and part owner, Chris Dowell, told Long that he
“want[ed] out of the agreement” and that the Respondent
“is not going to pay the benefits no more.” On January
28, 2014, the Respondent’s president and part owner,
Lindsey Dowell, told Long she was certain she could get
out of the agreement. Long replied that “it doesn’t work
that way.” In late March or early April 2014, the Union
attempted to refer a paving contract to the Respondent.
The Respondent refused the referral and stated that there
was no existing agreement between the Respondent and
the Union. The Respondent then sent the Union a third
letter on April 29, 2014, stating that it was “terminating
the bargaining relationship with Laborer’s Local 309
effective immediately” and that there was “no obligation
to bargain.” After consulting counsel, the Union re-
sponded by letter dated May 13, 2014, stating that “it is
very clear your Company is currently signatory to the
Laborers’. The current termination date of the Agree-
ment is December 31, 2015 if executed properly.” The
Union filed the charge in this case on August 26, 2014.
Discussion
A. The Complaint is Time Barred under Section 10(b)
of the Act
NLRA Section 10(b) relevantly provides that “no
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor prac-
tice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of
the charge with the Board and the service of a copy
thereof upon the person against whom such charge is
made.” Repudiation of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment is not a continuing violation, and therefore the 6-
month limitations period established in Section 10(b)
begins to run when the nonrepudiating party has clear
and unequivocal notice that the agreement has been re-
pudiated. A & L Underground, 302 NLRB 467, 469
(1991); Vallow Floor Coverings, 335 NLRB 20, 20
(2001). Here, the 10(b) time period began to run when
the Union received clear and unequivocal notice that the
Respondent was repudiating the Agreements. I believe
that such notice was provided no later than January 2014.
Because the charge was not filed until August 26, 2014,
it was untimely.
As set forth above, the Respondent notified the Union
in writing on October 30, 2013, that it was terminating
the 2008–2012 Agreement (which had renewed for 1
year) effective December 31, 2013. On January 23,
2014, the Respondent notified the Union that it was ter-
minating the MOA effective April 30, 2014. During
subsequent phone calls between the Respondent and the
Union in late January 2014, the Respondent confirmed
that it wanted out and, effective immediately, would no
longer pay benefits. These communications provided
clear and unequivocal notice to the Union, no later than
January 28, 2014, that the Respondent had repudiated all
of its agreements with the Union. The Union filed its
charge almost seven months later, on August 26, 2014.
Accordingly, the charge is time barred.
The majority finds that the Respondent’s communica-
tions to the Union were not sufficiently clear and une-
quivocal but rather were mere threats to commit an unfair
labor practice on some future date, and in any event those
communications were undercut by the pension contribu-
tion form dated December 15, 2013. Their reasoning
does not withstand scrutiny.
First, I recognize that a mere threat to repudiate a col-
lective-bargaining agreement does not start the running
of the 10(b) period with respect to a subsequent repudia-
tion. See, e.g., Howard Electrical & Mechanical, 293
NLRB 472, 475 (1989), enfd. 931 F.2d 63 (10th Cir.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 7
1991). But that principle has no application here. The
Respondent did not, as in Howard Electrical, announce
that it would act on some unspecified future date. Ra-
ther, its written notices presently announced that it “had
determined” to terminate each agreement; the notices
clearly indicated the effective date of the terminations;
and in its late January 2014 oral communications with
the Union, the Respondent made clear that the intent of
its October and January letters was to get “out” of its
agreements with the Union. Neither did the Respond-
ent’s notices make contract termination contingent on
some future event that might or might not occur. See
Stage Employees IATSE Local 659, 276 NLRB 881, 882
(1985) (finding that “notice was conditional rather than
unequivocal” because repudiation was predicated “upon
the happening of a certain event”). The Respondent’s
October and January letters did provide advance notice
of termination, and they did so because the agreements
explicitly required advance notice.2 It defies reason to
suggest that the Respondent’s October and January no-
tices were mere threats to commit a future act of repudia-
tion because the Respondent followed to the letter the
very method for providing notice of contract termination
to which the parties had agreed. Moreover, the Re-
spondent’s announcement, no later than January 28,
2014, that it was “not going to pay the benefits no more”
made clear that the Respondent was halting the paying of
benefits effectively immediately.3
Second, I do not believe that the Respondent’s act of
sending its final pension contribution form dated De-
cember 15, 2013, was conduct inconsistent with either its
prior communications to the Union or with contract re-
pudiation. The 2008–2012 Agreement had renewed
through December 31, 2013, and there is no dispute that
the Respondent was contractually obligated to send the
December 2013 report and make the pension contribu-

2 Article 38 of the 2008–2012 Agreement provided for automatic
renewal unless notice of intent to modify or terminate was served 60
days in advance. Likewise, Paragraph 8 of the MOA provided that the
MOA would continue after April 30, 2013, absent 60 days’ written
notice that either party desired to modify and amend the MOA.
3 The judge, whose decision my colleagues adopt, specifically found
that the Respondent’s failure to pay the benefits was evidence of com-
plete repudiation. In these circumstances, I believe it is especially
unreasonable for my colleagues to find that the announcement that the
Respondent was taking that step was insufficient notice of contract
repudiation.
The majority suggests that the Respondent’s third letter, dated April
29, 2014, was materially different from the first two letters in providing
unequivocal notice of repudiation. All three letters, however, fully and
completely terminated the contracts at issue. None of the letters em-
ployed threatening or conditional language that the Board has found
insufficient to repudiate a contract. If the third letter provided effective
notice of repudiation, as the majority finds, then the earlier letters simi-
larly provided effective notice of repudiation.
tions indicated therein. The Respondent’s compliance
with these obligations does not undercut its timely Octo-
ber 2013 announcement that it was terminating the re-
newed 2008–2012 Agreement effective December 31,
2013. Indeed, because the form was dated December 15,
2013, and related to contributions for work performed in
2013, it could not have misled the Union into believing
that the Respondent was reaffirming contractual obliga-
tions after December 31, 2013. Moreover, on January 27
or 28, 2014, the Respondent informed the Union—after
the Union had received the December 2013 contribution
report—that it was “not going to pay the benefits no
more.” A finding of conduct inconsistent with repudia-
tion is especially unwarranted under these circumstances.
Accordingly, even if the Respondent’s repudiation of
the Agreements was unlawful, the Union’s charge alleg-
ing as much was filed outside the 10(b) period, and the
complaint must be dismissed.
B. The Notices of Contract Termination Served by Taylor
Ridge Were Timely and Should Be Given Effect
Apart from the untimeliness of the Union’s charge un-
der Section 10(b), I believe the reasoning of my col-
leagues and the judge is contradicted by the record, basic
principles governing the interpretation of collective-
bargaining agreements, and established Board case law
regarding construction industry prehire agreements.
As noted above, the Respondent signed two agree-
ments with the Union: the 2008–2012 Agreement (more
precisely, an agreement that bound the Respondent to the
2008–2012 Agreement) and the MOA. Article 38 of the
2008–2012 Agreement stated that after December 31,
2012, the 2008–2012 Agreement “shall renew from year
to year, unless either party serves written notice upon the
other of intent to modify or terminate the Agreement not
less than sixty (60) days prior to any expiration date.”
Because neither the Respondent nor the Union served 60
days’ notice of termination or modification prior to De-
cember 31, 2012, it is clear that the 2008–2012 Agree-
ment automatically renewed for a 1-year period, binding
the parties until December 31, 2013. As noted previous-
ly, on October 30, 2013, Taylor Ridge sent the Union a
letter stating that it “has determined to terminate our con-
tract with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the
contract on 31 December, 2013.” This constituted an
effective 60-day notice to terminate the 2008–2012
Agreement, which, having automatically renewed, re-
mained in force until December 31, 2013.
Likewise, on January 23, 2014, Taylor Ridge sent the
Union a second letter, stating that it “has determined to
terminate our contract and the Memorandum of Agree-
ment with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the
contract and/or Memorandum of Agreement on 30 April
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
2014.” Again, the MOA’s duration provision stated that
it was effective after April 30, 2013 “unless there has
been sixty . . . days written notice . . . of the desire to
modify and amend [the] Agreement for negotiations.”
Because Taylor Ridge’s letter, sent January 23, 2014,
advised the Union that the MOA would terminate April
30, 2014—97 days later—this letter clearly satisfied the
MOA duration clause’s requirement of 60 days’ written
notice.
My colleagues disagree with this analysis. In their
view, Article 38 of the 2008–2012 Agreement—i.e., the
duration clause of that agreement—was implicitly re-
pealed by the MOA, which, as noted previously, stated
that “[t]he EMPLOYER and the UNION agree to be
bound by the area-wide negotiated contracts with the
various Associations, incorporating them into this Mem-
orandum of Agreement and extending this Agreement for
the life of the newly negotiated contract, if not notified
within the specified period of time.” My colleagues find
that by signing the MOA, the Respondent agreed to be
bound by any successor agreement negotiated by the
Union and the Associated Contractors of the Quad Cities,
even if the MOA itself was terminated in the meantime.
Thus, under my colleagues’ interpretation, on the same
day the Respondent signed an agreement binding it to the
2008–2012 Agreement—which provided a mechanism
for its termination under the terms set forth in Article 38
of that agreement—the Respondent also agreed to sur-
render the termination rights provided in Article 38 of
the 2008–2012 Agreement and to be bound by any suc-
cessor agreement entered into by the Union and the As-
sociated Contractors of the Quad Cities. Moreover, un-
der my colleagues’ interpretation, the Respondent also
agreed, in advance, to extend the duration of the MOA
until that successor agreement terminated, which is con-
trary to the MOA’s own duration provision.
For several reasons, I believe that the text of the MOA
does not support the reading my colleagues place on it,
and even if it did, I believe that their interpretation of the
MOA is contrary to our statute.
First, nothing in the MOA expressly bound the Re-
spondent to successor agreements. The MOA bound the
Respondent to “the area-wide negotiated contracts with
the various Associations”—such as the 2008–2012
Agreement between the Union and the Associated Con-
tractors of the Quad Cities—but nowhere does the MOA
indicate that it bound the Respondent to agreements suc-
cessive to those in force at the time the MOA was signed.
The MOA states that it will be extended for the life of
“the newly-negotiated contract,” but the MOA does not
identify the contract to which this provision refers.
Moreover, the MOA provides for this extension for the
life of “the [unspecified] newly-negotiated contract,” but
only “if not notified within the specified period of time.”
What is this “specified period of time”? Does this lan-
guage refer to the date specified in the MOA, or does it
refer to a date specified in the underlying “area-wide
negotiated contract[]”? In light of these qualifications,
uncertainties, and ambiguities, I believe that the General
Counsel has failed to prove that the MOA bound the Re-
spondent to the 2013–2015 Agreement.
Second, my colleagues’ analysis is inconsistent with
longstanding NLRB case law regarding construction in-
dustry prehire agreements. It bears emphasis that the
construction industry agreements in this case were en-
tered into pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, which per-
mits an employer “engaged primarily in the building and
construction industry” to recognize and enter into a col-
lective-bargaining agreement with a union without any
showing of majority union support. Indeed, an employer
in the building and construction industry may enter into a
collective-bargaining agreement even if it does not yet
have any employees at the time it enters into the agree-
ment. For this reason, 8(f) agreements are also referred
to as prehire agreements. However, “upon the expiration
of such agreements, the signatory union will enjoy no
presumption of majority status, and either party may re-
pudiate the 8(f) bargaining relationship.” John Deklewa
& Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1377–1378 (1987), enfd. sub
nom. Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
In the instant case, the Respondent was party to two
8(f) agreements, each of which contained an automatic
renewal clause. The Respondent exercised its right of
repudiation under Deklewa by clearly notifying the Un-
ion that it intended to terminate those agreements when
they expired. Those notices were sent in advance of the
agreements’ expiration dates as required by the terms of
the agreements themselves. Moreover, the Union re-
ceived these notices at least 7 months prior to the date it
filed an unfair labor practice charge.
The Board held in Deklewa that either party to an 8(f)
bargaining relationship—a relationship in which the un-
ion does not enjoy a presumption of ongoing majority
support—is entitled to repudiate the relationship when
their 8(f) prehire agreement expires. As the Board there
explained, “the obligations we impose on an 8(f) em-
ployer . . . are limited to prohibiting the unilateral repu-
diation of the agreement until it expires or until that em-
ployer's unit employees vote to reject or change their
representative. Importantly, this limited obligation is not
imposed on unwitting employers. Rather, it is a reasona-
ble quid pro quo that is imposed only when an employer
voluntarily recognizes the union, enters into a collective-
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 9
bargaining agreement, and then sets about enjoying the
benefits and assuming the obligations of the agreement.”
Id. at 1387. So also, “[t]he enforceable Section 9(a) sta-
tus we confer on signatory unions is also only coexten-
sive with the bargaining agreement that is the source of
its exclusive representational authority.” Id. And the
Board emphasized that all parties to an 8(f) relationship
have the right to “know their respective rights, privileges,
and obligations at all stages in their relationship.” Id. at
1385.
The majority’s interpretation of the MOA contradicts
each of these requirements. Deklewa only requires an
employer that signs an 8(f) agreement to adhere to that
agreement until it expires, at which time the employer is
free to repudiate the 8(f) bargaining relationship. Here,
the Respondent complied with its obligations under the
2008–2012 Agreement until that agreement terminated,
and under Deklewa the Respondent was then free to
abandon the relationship. Contrary to Deklewa, my col-
leagues find that the MOA bound the Respondent to the
2013–2015 Agreement as well. Thus, the Respondent’s
obligation, as my colleagues view it, was not “coexten-
sive with the bargaining agreement” but extended long
after the 2008–2012 Agreement expired.4 My colleagues
also impose this obligation on an “unwitting employ-
er”—again contrary to Deklewa—since the Respondent
had no way of knowing, when it signed the 2008–2012
Agreement and the MOA, that it would be bound by an
agreement that did not even exist at that time. Indeed,
there is no evidence that the Respondent learned of the
2013–2015 Agreement at the time the Union and the
Associated Contractors of the Quad Cities entered into it,
or that the Respondent knew about that agreement at the
time the Respondent sent the Union its termination notic-
es in October 2013 and January 2014. Also contrary to
Deklewa, the parties in this case had no way of knowing
“their respective rights, privileges, and obligations at all
stages in their relationship.” No one could have known,
when the Respondent signed the 2008–2012 Agreement,
that the termination rights afforded in that contract would
be rendered illusory by virtue of the MOA the Respond-
ent signed the very same day, as a result of which its
contractual obligations would be deemed extended
through December 31, 2015.5

4 The Union’s own communications reveal that it was not certain
whether the Respondent was bound by the 2013–2015 Agreement. As
noted above, even after consulting counsel the most the Union could
say was that the Respondent was bound by that agreement “if executed
properly.”
5 In these respects, the operation of the MOA, as interpreted by the
majority, is similar to the premature extension of a collective-
bargaining agreement. Under its contract bar rules, the Board will not
allow such a premature extension to extinguish the right of employees
As a final matter, I believe Taylor Ridge’s January 23,
2014 letter, in which Taylor Ridge provided notice of
termination of the MOA, constituted an appropriate, en-
forceable notice of termination under the MOA’s dura-
tion clause, even though that clause did not expressly
mention “termination” and instead provided only for the
employer to provide notice of its “desire to modify and
amend this Agreement for negotiations” (emphasis add-
ed). Both the NLRA and collective-bargaining agree-
ments frequently use the terms “terminate,” “termina-
tion,” “modify” and “modification” interchangeably,6
and notice of intent to “terminate” the MOA (the term
used in Taylor Ridge’s January 23, 2014 letter) provided
effective notice of a desire to “modify” or “amend” the
MOA (the terms used in the MOA itself). Moreover, if
the MOA’s durational language is interpreted literally as
forever prohibiting any termination of the MOA, I be-
lieve such a provision would be unenforceable. Again,
the MOA is a pre-hire agreement, entered into pursuant
to Section 8(f) of the Act, and the record does not show
that the Union has ever demonstrated that it is supported
by any unit employees, let alone a majority. For this
reason, the Board in Deklewa emphasized that pre-hire
agreements cannot mandate continued union representa-
tion of employees, even when the agreement had a fixed
duration, because this was “too absolute in protecting the
union's representative status.”7 Nothing could be more
“absolute,” and more contrary to the principle of em-
ployee free choice, than to permit prehire agreements that
may only be modified and amended but never terminated
and that therefore remain in effect forever. Based on the
statutory imperative of preserving employee free choice,
the Board in Deklewa squarely held that “upon the expi-
ration of [pre-hire] agreements, the signatory union will
enjoy no presumption of majority status, and either party
may repudiate the 8(f) bargaining relationship.” 282
NLRB at 1377–1378. To the extent the MOA fails to
permit itself from ever terminating, it plainly circum-
vents Deklewa and completely frustrates the Act’s re-
quirement of majority support as a prerequisite to ongo-

and rival unions to file election petitions. Instead, the Board essentially
treats the premature extension as a nullity for the purpose of fixing the
open period during which such petitions may be filed. See Deluxe
Metal Furniture, Co., 121 NLRB 995 (1958). I believe that similar
considerations counsel against an interpretation of the MOA that would
effectively extinguish the Respondent’s Deklewa repudiation rights as
provided in the 2008–2012 Agreement.
6 See, e.g., NLRA Sec. 8(d) (providing for service of “written notice
upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or
modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or . . . sixty
days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modi-
fication”).
7 Deklewa, 282 NLRB at 1383 (emphasis added).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
ing union representation, which would require the Board
to find such an arrangement repugnant to our statute and
hence unenforceable.8
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the complaint must be
dismissed because it is based on a charge that was filed
beyond Section 10(b)’s 6 month limitations period, and I
also respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ decision on
the merits.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 2017
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Chairman
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain in good faith
with the Union, Local Union No. 309, Laborers’ Interna-
tional Union of North America, as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of all employees perform-
ing work as set forth in article 2 of the collective-
bargaining agreement between the Union and the Asso-
ciated Contractors of the Quad Cities (Associated Con-

8 For the reasons explained in the text, I disagree with cases sug-
gesting that language in a prehire agreement that effectively continues
such an agreement in perpetuity does not render the agreement unen-
forceable. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 2 v. McElroy’s, Inc.,
500 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2007). In Deklewa, the Board expressly lim-
ited any Sec. 8(f) union relationship to the duration of the applicable
pre-hire agreement, with either party having the right to abandon the
relationship following expiration of the prehire agreement. Permitting
a pre-hire agreement to be converted into an agreement in perpetuity—
an agreement that can never be terminated—would plainly circumvent
Deklewa and be contrary to the Act.
tractors), which is effective from January 1, 2013,
through December 31, 2015.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL honor and comply with the terms and condi-
tions of the 2013–2015 collective-bargaining agreement
between the Union and the Associated Contractors and,
absent timely written notice to the Union, any automatic
renewal or extension of it.
WE WILL make whole all bargaining unit employees
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of our failure to honor the collective-bargaining
agreement.
WE WILL make all contractually-required contributions
to the Union’s fringe benefit funds that we have failed to
make since April 29, 2014, and reimburse our employ-
ees, with interest, for any expenses resulting from our
failure to make the required payments under the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL compensate all unit employees for any ad-
verse income tax consequences of receiving a lump-sum
backpay award, and WE WILL file with the Regional Di-
rector for Region 25, within 21 days of the date the
amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or
Board order, a report allocating the backpay award to the
appropriate calendar years for each employee.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING& CONSTRUCTION, CO.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/25–CA–135372 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Rebekah Ramirez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael E. Avakian, Esq., for the Respondent.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 11
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELISSA M. OLIVERO, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Peoria, Illinois, on February 12, 2015. Local Un-
ion No. 309, Laborers’ International Union of North America
(the Union) filed the charge on August 26, 2014,1 and the Gen-
eral Counsel issued the complaint on November 25. The com-
plaint alleges that Taylor Ridge Paving & Construction2 (Re-
spondent) violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National La-
bor Relations Act (the Act) by refusing to adhere to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.3 (GC Exh. 1(c).) Respondent time-
ly filed an answer to the complaint denying the alleged viola-
tion of the Act and asserting several affirmative defenses. (GC
Exh. 1(e).) Respondent later filed an amended answer. (GC
Exh. 1(f).) The parties were given a full opportunity to partici-
pate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to file briefs. On the entire record,
including my own observation of the demeanor of the witness-
es,4 and after considering the briefs filed by the parties, I make
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, admits that it has been engaged in
the construction industry as a provider of asphalt and paving
services at its facility in Taylor Ridge, Illinois, where it annual-
ly performs services valued in excess of $50,000 in States other
than the State of Illinois. (GC Exh. 1(f).) I find that Respond-
ent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.5
In its answer, Respondent denied knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the statutory labor organization
status of Local Union No. 309, Laborers International Union of
North America (Union). Section 2(5) of the Act defines a labor
organization as, “any organization of any kind, or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which em-
ployees participate and which exist for the purpose, in whole or
in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rate of pay, hours of employment, or condi-
tions of work.” Brad Long, the Union’s business manager,
testified without contradiction that the Union negotiates con-

1 All dates are in 2014 unless otherwise indicated.
2 The name of Respondent appears as corrected at the hearing.
3 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “R. Exh.” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “GC Exh.” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “R. Br.” for Respondent’s brief; and “GC Br.” for
the General Counsel’s brief.
4 Although I have included citations to the record to highlight par-
ticular testimony or exhibits, my findings and conclusions are not based
solely on those specific record citations, but rather on my review and
consideration of the entire record for this case. My findings of fact
encompass the credible testimony and evidence presented at trial, as
well as logical inferences drawn therefrom.
5 Employers engaged in nonretail enterprises, such as Respondent,
meet the Board’s discretionary jurisdictional standard if they have
either inflow or outflow, whether direct or indirect, in excess of
$50,000 annually. Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81, 85 (1959).
tracts, enforces contracts, and protects its members. Jeffrey
Deppe, the Union’s secretary-treasurer, testified without con-
tradiction that he tries to resolve problems for employees on the
job. General Counsel’s Exhibit 2 is a contract between the
Union and the Associated Contractors of the Quad Cities (As-
sociated Contractors), concerning matters such as employee
wages and hours of employment. Therefore, I find that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.6
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Overview of Respondent’s Operations
Respondent is a paving and asphalt contractor in the con-
struction industry. Respondent generally operates for 7 to 8
months a year, based on the weather.7 (Tr. 27.) Respondent
stopped working in December 2014, and had not restarted its
operations as of the date of the hearing. Id. Lindsey Dowell is
Respondent’s president and a 51-percent owner of Respondent.
She had no previous experience in the construction industry
before starting Respondent in 2011. Lindsey Dowell also holds
a full-time position as a human resources specialist for the Fed-
eral Government at the Rock Island Arsenal. Lindsay Dowell’s
husband, Chris Dowell, is Respondent’s vice president and a
49-percent owner of Respondent. Chris Dowell runs Respond-
ent’s day-to-day operations, bid jobs and finds work, and per-
forms paving work alongside Respondent’s employees. He
also has extensive experience as a laborer and was previously a
member of the Union. Respondent admits, and I find, that
Lindsay Dowell and Chris Dowell are supervisors of Respond-
ent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and agents
of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
B. Respondent becomes a Signatory Contractor
When Chris Dowell formed Respondent, he decided to do so
as a union shop. (Tr. 29.) As such, Respondent was able to
obtain employees through the Union’s hiring hall. Dowell met
with Union Business Manager Brad Long three times prior to
Respondent becoming a signatory contractor. (Tr. 38.) During
these meetings, Brad Long went over the Union’s collective-
bargaining agreement and a memorandum of agreement. Brad
Long gave these documents to Chris Dowell to take home.
Chris Dowell brought the documents home where Lindsay
Dowell signed them. Chris Dowell later returned the executed
agreements to the Union.8
Respondent also signed an agreement with the International
Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 (Local 150), to obtain
employees from its hiring hall. Respondent later terminated its

6 The Union’s territorial jurisdiction encompasses Rock Island and
Mercer Counties in Illinois and Scott, Clinton, and Muscatine Counties
in Iowa. (Tr. 37.)
7 Average low temperatures must be above freezing for Respondent
to perform paving work. (Tr. 27.)
8 Lindsay Dowell and Chris Dowell testified that they barely read
and did not understand the agreements she signed. However, a party
who signs a contract is bound by its terms regardless of whether he or
she reads it or considers its legal consequences. GEM Management Co.,
339 NLRB 489, 498 fn. 22 (2003), citing Operating Engineers Pension
Trust v. Cecil Backhoe Services, 795 F.2d, 1501, 1505 (9th Cir. 1986).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
relationship with Local 150. According to reports filed with
Local 150, Respondent employed up to 2 operators between
December 2013 and March 2013, but one or both of these oper-
ators worked less than 5 hours per month. Beginning in April
2013, and continuing through November 2013, Respondent
employed 2 operators with significant hours. December 2013
was the last month for which Respondent provided reports to
Local 150. (R. Exh. 13.)
C. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement and Memorandum
of Agreement
On January 232012, Lindsay Dowell signed the Articles of
Agreement between the Associated Contractors and the Union
(the Agreement) on behalf of Respondent. (GC Exh. 2.) By
signing the Agreement, Respondent became a signatory em-
ployer. Regarding its duration and termination, the Agreement
states:
Art. 38, Sec. 1. This Agreement shall be in force and effect
from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2012, and shall
renew from year to year, unless either party serves written no-
tice upon the other of intent to modify or terminate the
Agreement not less than sixty (60) days prior to any expira-
tion date. Upon notice of termination or modification the par-
ties shall promptly commence negotiations for the purpose of
reaching a new or modified agreement. (Emphasis added.)
October 2, 2012, was 60 days prior to the Agreement’s Decem-
ber 31, 2012 expiration date.
The Agreement covers, among other work, construction of
and improvements to parking lots and pavements. (GC Exh. 2,
p. 1.) The Agreement further gives the Union jurisdiction over
all laborers’ work, including the following: unloading of all
materials; the use of roller compactors; loading and unloading
all concrete buckets/trucks; and the use of small power equip-
ment. (GC Exh. 2, art. 17.) The following job classifications,
among many others, are listed in article 31 of the Agreement:
broom man; operation of tampers; general labor (not covered
elsewhere); roller compactors; asphalt raker or luteman; and
asphalt or concrete curb machine operator.9
The following language appears on the signature page of the
Agreement: “The undersigned Employer hereby becomes a
signatory Employer to this Agreement between the Associated
Contractors of the Quad-Cities and the Laborers’ International
Union of North America, Local Union No. 309.” (GC Exh. 2,
p. 42.)
Lindsay Dowell also signed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with the Great Plains District Council, affiliated with
the Laborers’ International Union of North America, AFL–
CIO, (the District Council) on January 23, 2013. (GC Exh. 19.)
By entering into this MOA, Respondent recognized the District
Council as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative for
all laborers employed by Respondent in the geographical areas
encompassed by the listed local unions and adopted collective-
bargaining agreements between the District Council and several
employer associations, including the Associated Contractors.

9 A luteman uses a lute, a long-handled instrument that looks like a
rake.
One of the listed local unions is the Union. Specifically, the
MOA states:
The EMPLOYER herein adopts all of those Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements between the UNION and . . . the Associ-
ated Contractors.
The EMPLOYER and the UNION agree to be bound by the
area-wide negotiated contracts with the various Associations,
incorporating them into this Memorandum of Agreement and
extending this Agreement for the life of the newly negotiated
contract, if not notified within the specified period of time.
The MOA was effective through April 30, 2013. However,
the MOA stated that it would continue thereafter unless sixty
(60) days written notice was given, by registered or certified
mail, by either party of the desire to modify or amend it. By
signing the MOA, Respondent agreed to be bound by the
Agreement and to extend the life of the MOA for the life of the
Agreement and any newly negotiated contract, if notification of
intent to terminate or modify the MOA was not given within
the specified period of time. Respondent did not give notice of
intent to terminate the MOA by March 1, 2013, 60 days prior to
April 30, 2013.
Prior to the expiration of the Agreement on December 31,
2012, the Union and the Associated Contractors began negotia-
tions for a successor agreement. This successor agreement is
effective from January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2015.
(GC Exh. 6.) All of the same language cited above concerning
job classifications and jurisdiction appears in the successor
agreement. Respondent did not sign the successor agreement.
D. Respondent’s Hiring and Crew
Respondent began operations in the Spring of 2012. At that
time, Respondent rented its equipment, including an excavator
and skid loader. More recently, Respondent has acquired an
asphalt paving machine. (R. Exh. 14; Tr. 186–187.)
In its first year of operations, Respondent employed two la-
borers hired through the Union’s hiring hall. (GC Exh. 3.)
According to contribution reports filed with the Union, Re-
spondent employed tw0 to three union laborers at a time in
2012. (GC Exh. 3.) Chris Dowell is listed as one of these la-
borers.
From January and April 2013, Respondent listed only one
laborer on its contribution reports (employee Jackie West) and
it listed no union laborers in February and March 2013.10 In
May through December 2013, Respondent’s contribution re-
ports to the Union listed Chris Dowell and Jackie West as la-
borers. (GC Exhs. 4, 20.)
Respondent continued to submit contribution reports to the
Union through November 2013.11 These report forms, which

10 Testimony established that Respondent generally does not operate
in the winter months.
11 Respondent’s reports were not received by the Union for some
time after the dates appearing on them. The September 2013 report
was not received by the Union until November 1, 2013, the October
2013 report was not received by the Union until December 12, 2013,
and the November 2013 report was not received by the Union until
January 27, 2104.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 13
were submitted and signed by Chris Dowell, included the lan-
guage, “the signature certifies this report is correct and [Re-
spondent] hereby . . . continues as a signatory employer.”
Moreover, the November 2013 report has a box checked indi-
cating that Respondent wanted the Union to send it additional
contribution report forms. Respondent has not sought referrals
for employees from the Union or submitted any reports, dues,
or benefit payments to the Union since January 2014. (Tr. 174.)
Beginning in January 2014, Respondent began operating
with what Chris Dowell called a “composite crew.” (Tr. 185–
186; 199.) At that point, Dowell no longer classified his em-
ployees as laborers or operators. Instead, Dowell cross-trained
laborers as operators and operators as laborers. Chris Dowell
testified that he could not have used a composite crew as a
signatory contractor with the Union or Local 150. (Tr. 199.)
Chris Dowell further testified regarding the makeup of Re-
spondent’s employee compliment during 2014. He testified
that one of Respondent’s employees, Alex Johnson, was a col-
lege student and part-time employee. (Tr. 183.) He further
testified that another employee, Eric Holcomb, was a supervi-
sor. (Tr. 195–196.) Respondent did not submit any other evi-
dence, such as payroll records or personnel files, to support
Dowell’s assertions regarding the status of either Johnson or
Holcomb or the number of employees employed by Respondent
in 2014.
E. Respondent Seeks to Terminate its Relationship with
the Union
In October 2013, Lindsey Dowell sent a letter to the Union
indicating that Respondent “has determined to terminate our
contract with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the
contract on 31 December 2013.” (R. Exh. 1.) She did not indi-
cate whether Respondent sought to terminate the Agreement or
the MOA or both.
Respondent sent a second letter to the Union on January 23,
2014, providing what it asserted was 60 days’ notice to termi-
nate the Agreement and MOA with the Union effective April
30, 2014. (GC Exh. 7; R. Exhs. 2, 3.) Specifically, the letter
stated:
This letter is to provide you with the required 60 day notice
that Taylor Ridge Paving and Construction has determined to
terminate our contract and the Memorandum of Agreement
with Laborer’s Local 309 effective at the end of the contract
and/or Memorandum of Agreement on 30 April 2014.
As of the date of Respondent’s January 23 letter, the successor
agreement was already in effect.
After receiving Respondent’s January 23 letter, Brad Long
called Chris Dowell. (Tr. 48.) Dowell told Long he was mad
about being charged a late fee.12 Dowell said he was no longer
going to pay benefits and that he “wanted out” of the agree-
ment. Long told Dowell it doesn’t work that way, you have to
follow the CBA.13 (Tr. 48–49.)

12 Respondent had been late in remitting payments to the Union was
charged a late fee.
13 I credit the testimony of Brad Long over that of Chris Dowell re-
garding this telephone conversation. Dowell testified that during this
On January 28, Lindsey Dowell called the Union and spoke
to Brad Long. (Tr. 49.) After introducing herself, Lindsey
Dowell said that she does this for a living on the Arsenal and
that she is an expert. Lindsey Dowell further stated that she
knows what the labor rules are and that she was certain she
could get [Respondent] out of the Agreement. Long told her it
doesn’t work that way.14
In late March or early April 2014, Brad Long called Chris
Dowell seeking to refer Respondent a small asphalt job. (Tr.
50.) In that conversation, Dowell stated, “as far as [I am con-
cerned], [Respondent] did not have an agreement . . . with [the
Union]. (Tr. 50.) Long replied, “I believe we do.”
On April 29, Lindsey Dowell sent yet another letter to the
Union. (GC Exh. 8; R. Exhs. 5–8.) In this letter, Lindsey Dow-
ell stated that she had spoken to an employee at the NLRB and
that Respondent had no obligation to bargain with the Union.
She stated that Respondent had only one laborer employed at
that time, Chris Dowell, and that he was also vice president and
part owner of the company. She concluded by stating that Re-
spondent was terminating the bargaining relationship with the
Union effective immediately. On May 2, Brad Long sent a
response to Lindsey Dowell’s letter. (GC Exh. 9.) Long indi-
cated that the Union was attempting to determine whether Re-
spondent’s attempt to terminate the Agreement was timely and
lawful.
On May 11, the Union sent a letter to Respondent. GC Exh.
10. In this letter, Brad Long stated that after consulting with
the Union’s attorney, it was clear that Respondent remained
signatory to the successor agreement, which did not expire until
December 31, 2015. He also indicated that the Union had be-
gun monitoring Respondent’s work and noticed a few employ-
ees. Therefore, Long believed that Lindsey Dowell’s statement
that Respondent employed only one laborer was inaccurate.
F. Respondent’s Work in the Union’s Jurisdiction after Seeking
to Terminate its Relationship with the Union
After receiving Lindsey Dowell’s April 29 letter, the Union
sent Secretary-Treasurer and Field Representative Jeffrey
Deppe and now retired Organizer and Field Representative
George Long to investigate Respondent’s work.15 Deppe ob-
served Respondent’s crew working at Kimberly Dodge, a car
dealership, for 2 to 3 hours. (Tr. 115–116.) Deppe was met by
Chris Dowell at this jobsite. Deppe asked Dowell if the guys
working there were laborers, to which Dowell replied no. (Tr.
115.) Deppe then took pictures of the jobsite. (GC Exh. 15.)
While there, he observed a tandem truck pouring asphalt into a
paver. He also observed three individuals on the ground, two

call he told Long that “he was done.” (Tr. 174.) He further testified
that he told Long that Respondent did not need the Union for hiring
anymore and did not need benefits. Long’s account was more specific
than that of Dowell. Dowell’s testimony did not recount what was said
during the conversation, only the type of discussion and generalities
regarding what was discussed. (Tr. 174–175.) Therefore, I credit Brad
Long’s version of the conversation, as set forth herein.
14 Lindsey Dowell denied having a telephone conversation with
Long in January 2014. However, I credit the testimony of Long, as I
found him to be a more credible witness, as discussed infra.
15 George Long is not related to Brad Long.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
with lids, and 1 with a shovel scraping asphalt out of the tan-
dem truck and keeping the edges of the asphalt square. He saw
Chris Dowell using a whacker to pack the asphalt. Deppe testi-
fied, without contradiction, that the work he saw being per-
formed was laborers’ work.
George Long also observed Respondent’s crew working at
Kimberly Dodge. (Tr. 148–151.) He observed three individu-
als spreading and rolling rock in preparation for laying asphalt.
Later, he observed 5–6 men laying blacktop and rolling.
George Long testified that he observed the men using a lute,
adjusting the paver and compactor, shoveling, and cleaning up,
all of which he characterized, without contradiction, as labor-
ers’ work.
Deppe later observed Respondent’s employees working on
two other jobsites. At Co-Op Records in Moline, Illinois,
Deppe observed Respondent operating with a five-person crew.
(Tr. 117.) He did not talk to anyone at this jobsite. Deppe
observed Chris Dowell and another individual operating a pav-
er, and three other individuals on the ground keeping the edges
of the asphalt square and whacking the asphalt.
At a shopping center on 53rd Street in Bettendorf, Iowa,
Deppe observed Respondent operating with a five-person crew.
(Tr. 118.) Again, he observed three individuals using lutes,
come-alongs, and whackers.16 Deppe testified that the workers
running the paver would not be performing laborers’ work,
however, the use of lutes, shovels, and a whacker, and scraping
trucks, was laborers’ work.
During the last week of June, George Long observed Re-
spondent’s four to five-person crew working at Cavanaugh’s
Tavern, located 4–5 blocks from the Union’s Davenport, Iowa
office. Long observed the crew digging out blacktop, bringing
in new gravel, compacting, and paving, all of which he charac-
terized as laborers’ work. (Tr. 151–152.)
In July 2014, George Long observed Respondent’s five-
person crew at a McDonald’s near the Quad Cities airport over
a period of 3 days. Long observed the crew tearing out and
replacing pavement in the drive through lanes.
On May 27, 2014, the Union filed a grievance after Deppe
and George Long observed Respondent operating with five to
six- person crews at the various jobsites in the Quad Cities area.
(GC Exh. 11; Tr. 56.) The Union alleged that Respondent had

16 The General Counsel introduced Deppe’s photographs of the Co-
Op Records and shopping center jobs into evidence as GC Exhs. 13 and
14. After the admission of these exhibits, it was learned that the Union
did not provide the photographs in GC Exhs. 13 and 14 to Respondent,
despite Respondent’s subpoena request for photographs. The Union
provided Respondent with a memory card in response to the subpoena,
but only the photographs from GC Exh. 15, and a few additional photo-
graphs, were on it. As such, I struck GC Exhs. 13 and 14 and placed
both exhibits into a rejected exhibit file. I advised the General Counsel
that she could introduce the additional photographs from the memory
card provided to Respondent, but she did not move to admit the addi-
tional photographs. I also advised the General Counsel that she could
examine witnesses further regarding their observation of the jobsites
because the photographs were no longer in evidence. Although I struck
the photographs as exhibits, I did not strike the testimony given regard-
ing what was observed on these jobsites, and that testimony remains in
the record.
violated the Agreement by using nonunion workers to perform
union work. The grievance proceeded to hearing on August 20,
but no one from Respondent appeared for the hearing. The
Union prevailed on the grievance.17 (GC Exh. 11.)
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Credibility Analysis
A credibility determination may rely on a variety of factors,
including the context of the witness’ testimony, the witness’
demeanor, the weight of the respective evidence, established or
admitted facts, inherent probabilities and reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from the record as a whole. Double D Con-
struction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi Sushi,
335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive Dealership
Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), enfd. 56 Fed.Appx. 516
(D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings need not be all-or-
nothing propositions—indeed, nothing is more common in
judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all, of a witness’
testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB at 622. My credibility
findings are generally incorporated into the findings of fact set
forth above.
I found Brad Long to be a credible witness. He testified in a
straightforward manner and his testimony did not waver under
cross-examination.18 His recollection of the telephone calls he
had with Chris and Lindsey Dowell was specific and sure. As
such, I credit Brad Long’s testimony over that of Chris and
Lindsey Dowell.
I also found George Long to be a credible witness. He testi-
fied in a deliberate and steady manner and I did not find his
testimony to be embellished in any way. His testimony was not
contradicted in any way on cross-examination. I further found
Jeffrey Deppe to be a credible witness. Deppe’s testimony
seemed frank and forthright. His testimony regarding what he
observed at Respondent’s jobsites in 2014 was detailed and
specific. Like George Long, he did not contradict himself un-
der cross-examination. As such, I credit the testimony of
George Long and Deppe.
Conversely, I did not find either Chris Dowell or Lindsey
Dowell to be a credible witness. Both gave critical testimony
in response to leading questions by Respondent’s counsel.
(Tr.174–175, 186, 202, 205–206.) Testimony adduced by lead-
ing questions on direct examination is entitled to only minimal
weight. H.C. Thompson, Inc., 230 NLRB 808, 809 fn. 2 (1977).
In addition, Lindsey Dowell appeared hostile and spoke over
the General Counsel during her examination. She also gave
testimony that seemed insincere. For example, she gave the
following testimony regarding the signing of the Agreement
and the MOA:

17 Although it was intimated during the trial that Respondent did not
receive the grievance, it is clear that it did. In a letter dated June 18,
Lindsey Dowell stated, “[Respondent] has received your grievance
dated May 27, 2014.” (GC Exh. 12.) She also stated that Respondent
considered the grievance invalid and inappropriate, as Respondent had
terminated its bargaining relationship with the Union.
18 Although Long did ask Respondent’s counsel to repeat his ques-
tions on occasion, this was because it was exceedingly noisy in the
hearing room due to construction elsewhere in the building.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 15
Q: Did you meet with the Union or–
A: No, I did not.
Q: Did your husband meet with the Union?
A: You would have to ask him.
Q: Okay. So how did you get this document to sign?
A: My husband brought it to me.
Tr. 21. It defies credulity that Lindsey Dowell would not know
whether or not her husband (and business partner) met with the
Union, especially in light of the fact that he brought her the
Agreement and the MOA to sign. Therefore, for these reasons,
as well as others stated elsewhere in the decision, I do not credit
Lindsey Dowell’s testimony where it conflicts with that of oth-
er witnesses.
Chris Dowell also seemed hostile to questioning by the Gen-
eral Counsel and failed to directly answer her questions. For
example, Dowell engaged in the following exchange with the
General Counsel:
Q: You met with Mr. Long prior to Taylor Ridge sign-
ing on with the Union?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And then how long would you say you met with
Mr. Long to discuss the Union contract before you signed
it?
A: How long—
Q: Yes.
A: Do you mean days or hours or—
Q: You said - - yeah, you said that you met with him.
Did you meet with him once?
A: Once that I—yeah.
Q: Did you recall?
A: Barely.
Q: You don’t recall?
A: I am going to say the one time we came in and
signed the contract.
Q: Okay. But you didn’t sign the contract with your
wife.
A: Yes.
Tr. 29–30.
Chris Dowell also contradicted himself during his testimony.
For example, he initially testified that he did not sign the con-
tribution reports that he sent to the Union on Respondent’s
behalf. (Tr. 169) He later testified that it was “possible” that he
signed them but was “not sure.” Tr. 191. Dowell only admitted
signing the forms after being confronted with signed copies by
the General Counsel. (GC Exh. 20; R. Exh. 11; Tr. 192.)
Furthermore, Chris Dowell gave testimony contradictory to
that of his wife. While Lindsey Dowell testified that she signed
the Agreement and the MOA at home, Chris Dowell testified
that they “came in and signed the contract.” Tr. 22, 30. There-
fore, for the reasons cited here and elsewhere in this decision, I
have credited the testimony of other witnesses over that of
Chris and Lindsey Dowell.
B. Respondent is Bound to the Successor Agreement
The Agreement in this case is an 8(f) prehire agreement.17
Under Section 8(f) of the Act, Congress expressly authorized
the negotiation, adoption, and implementation of collective-
bargaining agreements in the construction industry without
initial reference to a union’s majority status. John Deklewa &
Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1380 (1987). Either party is free to
repudiate the collective-bargaining relationship once an 8(f)
agreement expires by its terms. GEM Management Co., 339
NLRB 489, 496 (2003), citing Iron Workers Local 3 v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
Additionally, an automatic renewal clause in an 8(f) agreement
will be given effect and operates to bind the parties to a contin-
uation of the agreement. GEM Management Co., 339 NLRB at
496, citing Cedar Valley Corp., 302 NLRB 823 (1991), enfd.
977 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1992). Neither employers nor unions
who are party to 8(f) agreements are free to unilaterally repudi-
ate such agreements prior to expiration. John Deklewa & Sons,
282 NLRB at 1385.
Employers in the construction industry, which are not mem-
bers of an employer association, commonly bind themselves to
agreements negotiated between an employer association and a
union by signing what is known as a “me too” or “short form”
agreement. GEM Management Co., 339 NLRB at 496. These
“me too” agreements sometimes bind employers to successor
master contracts negotiated between an employer association
and a union and are enforced by the Board. Id. The MOA in
this case is such an agreement. In signing the MOA, Respond-
ent did not become a member of the Associated Contractors,
but became bound to agreements negotiated between it and the
Union.
The MOA was effective through April 30, 2013. However,
the MOA stated that it would continue thereafter unless sixty
(60) days written notice was given, by registered or certified
mail, by either party of the desire to modify or amend it. Re-
spondent did not give notice to terminate the MOA by March 1,
2013, 60 days prior to April 30, 2013. Therefore, Respondent
remained bound by the MOA after April 30, 2013.
Furthermore, I find, in agreement with the General Counsel,
that the language of the MOA extended both the life of the
MOA and bound Respondent to the successor agreement
through December 30, 2015. GC Br. p. 15. The Board has held
that an employer was bound to successor contracts when it
signed a supplemental agreement whereby it consented to be
bound to area association agreements until it timely served
notice to terminate the agreement. Cedar Valley Corp., 302
NLRB at 830. Even when an employer has not signed a docu-
ment delegating bargaining authority to an association, but has

17 Although the complaint mentions a 9(a) relationship in paragraph
5(d), this is not material. In a preceding subparagraph, the Agreement
is correctly identified as an 8(f) agreement. The Board presumes that a
construction industry bargaining relationship is governed by Section
8(f). MSR Industrial Services, 363 NLRB No. 1, slip op at 2 (2015).
Additionally, the complaint correctly sets forth all of the elements of a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in paragraph 5. GC Exh.
1(c). Therefore, I find the reference to Sec. 9(a) of the Act in the com-
plaint is of no consequence.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
signed an association collective-bargaining agreement with a
union providing for automatic renewal, the employer continues
to be bound by the collective-bargaining agreement until it
serves timely notice of termination of the agreement. Id.
The Board has even stated that, in such circumstances, the
union’s notice of termination of the contract served on the as-
sociation does not terminate the contract as to the employer
who has not delegated bargaining rights to the association. Id.
citing C.E.K. Mechanical Contractors, 295 NLRB 635, 635
(1989), enf. denied 921 F.2d 350 (1990). In C.E.K Mechanical
Contractors, as here, the employer signed a contract between a
union and employer association at a time when it had no em-
ployees working in the union’s jurisdiction and was not a
member of the employer association. 295 NLRB at 635. This
contract contained an automatic renewal clause, which extend-
ed the length of the contract for 1 year. Id. The Board held that
the association’s desire to change the contract did not preclude
the effectiveness of the automatic renewal clause as to the em-
ployer. 295 NLRB at 635–636. Unlike the agreement in C.E.K.
Mechanical Contractors, the MOA here specifically stated that
absent timely notification of termination, it bind signatories to
“newly negotiated” contracts. As such, I find that Respondent
was and remains bound to the successor agreement.
In determining a party’s obligation under a “me too” agree-
ment, the Board will look to the language of the agreement
itself, as well as to the underlying master agreement where
applicable. Id. For example, in Oklahoma Fixture Co., the
Board held that an employer was bound to year-to-year renew-
als based upon the language contained in an agreement. 333
NLRB 804, 808 (2001), enf. denied 74 Fed.Appx. 31 (10th Cir.
2003). However, the contract in that case stated, “this agree-
ment shall remain in full force and effect from year to year
unless either party [notifies] the other in writing of its desire to .
. . cancel . . . this agreement.” The “me too” agreement in Ok-
lahoma Fixture Co. did not contain any language that bound
employers to newly negotiated contracts. 333 NLRB at 808–
809. Instead, the agreements at issue in Oklahoma Fixture Co.
created a year-to-year renewal absent termination. Conversely,
the MOA in this case binds Respondent to “newly negotiated
contract[s]” absent notification. (GC Exh. 19, par. 8.) There-
fore, Respondent, which failed to timely give notice to termi-
nate either the MOA or the Agreement, remains bound to the
successor agreement through operation of the MOA.
The Agreement stated that it would renew from year to year
unless either party served written notice upon the other of intent
to modify or terminate the Agreement, not less than sixty (60)
days prior to its expiration date. As the Agreement’s expiration
date was December 31, 2012, notice would have been required
by October 2, 2012. Respondent did not provide notice of in-
tent to terminate the Agreement by October 2, 2012. Similarly,
the MOA remained in effect through April 30, 2013, and until
sixty (60) days written notice was given of the desire to modify
or amend it. Respondent did not give notice of intent to termi-
nate the MOA by March 1, 2013, 60 days prior to April 30,
2013.20 As such, it remains bound to the MOA.
Furthermore, by signing the MOA, Respondent agreed to be
bound by the “various agreements,” including Agreement,
which was incorporated into the MOA, and extended the MOA
for the life of the negotiated contract absent timely notice of
termination. Respondent did not give timely notice of termina-
tion regarding either the Agreement or the MOA. Moreover, as
the MOA stated that it bound Respondent to newly negotiated
contracts between the Union and the Associated Contractors, I
find that Respondent became bound and remains bound to the
successor agreement.
C. Respondent Violated the Act by Failing to Adhere to
the Agreement
As I have found, Respondent operated with what it called a
composite crew beginning in January 2014. In so doing, Chris
Dowell acknowledged using operators to perform laborers’
work. Additionally, in 2014 George Long and Jeffery Deppe
witnessed Respondent’s four to six–6 person crews working
with two or more individuals performing laborers’ work, such
as luting, shoveling, cleaning up, and raking. The testimony of
Brad Long and Deppe that the work they observed was labor-
ers’ work stands uncontroverted. Such work is clearly reserved
to the Union through the Agreement and the successor agree-
ment.
Chris Dowell admitted that Respondent could not operate
with a composite crew if it was signatory to an agreement with
the Union. As I have found that Respondent remains signatory
to the successor agreement between the Union and the Associ-
ated Contractors, I further find that Respondent violated the Act
by violating the terms of the successor agreement. In addition
to using nonunion employees to perform union work, Respond-
ent failed to remit dues and benefit payments for these employ-
ees to the Union. Thus, Respondent completely repudiated the
successor agreement. By failing to adhere to the terms of the
successor agreement with the Union, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. As discussed in greater detail
below, I find no merit in Respondent’s defenses to this viola-
tion.
D. Respondent’s 10(b) Defense
Respondent asserts that the charge filed by the Union was
time barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. (GC Exh. 1(f).) Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Act provides that “no complaint shall be based
upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months
prior to the filing of the charge with the Board.” 29 U.S.C. §
160(b). It is well settled that the 6-month limitations period
prescribed by Section 10(b) begins to run only when a party has
clear and unequivocal notice, either actual or constructive, of
the violation of the Act. Art’s Way Vessels, Inc., 355 NLRB
1142, 1147 (2010). Thus, a union must file its charge within 6
months of receiving clear and unequivocal notice of contract
repudiation or a complaint based on the conduct will be time-
barred, even with regard to contract violations within the 10(b)

20 Respondent seemed to believe that the MOA continued on from
year-to-year after April 30, 2013, but there is no support for this posi-
tion in the record or within the MOA.
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 17
period. Vallow Floor Coverings, Inc., 335 NLRB 20 (2001).
The burden of showing such clear and unequivocal notice is
on the party raising the 10(b) defense. Broadway Volkswagen,
342 NLRB 1244, 1246 (2004). Where a delay in filing is a
consequence of conflicting signals or otherwise ambiguous
conduct by that party, a 10(b) defense will not be sustained. A
& L Underground, 302 NLRB 467, 469 (1991); Taylor Ware-
house Corp., 314 NLRB 516, 526 (1994), enfd. 98 F.3d 892
(6th Cir. 1996). In order to trigger Section 10(b), repudiation
must be both unequivocal and unconditional. Stage Employees
IATSE Local 659 (Paramount Pictures), 276 NLRB 881, 882
(1985).
The charge in this case was filed on August 26, 2014, there-
fore, in order to be timely, the violation of the Act could have
been committed no earlier than February 26, 2014. I find that
prior to Respondent’s April 29, 2014 letter, the Union did not
have clear and unequivocal notice of Respondent’s contract
repudiation and, as such, Respondent’s 10(b) defense fails.
The Board has found that a statement of intent or a threat to
commit an unfair labor practice does not start the statutory 6-
months period running. Leach Corp., 312 NLRB 990, 991
(1993), citing NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 547 (3d
Cir. 1983). For example, in Leach Corp., the Board found that
beginning to relocate employees to a new facility did not pro-
vide clear and unequivocal notice, finding that such notice oc-
curred only when the relocation process involving 280 employ-
ees was complete. 312 NLRB at 991. Clearly, Respondent’s
statements in its letters of October 2013 and January 2014 were
no more than statements of intent to terminate its relationship
with the Union. I do not find that the statements contained in
either letter provided the Union with clear and unequivocal
notice of contract repudiation.
A threat to take action is not a final, unconditional decision,
and does not trigger the running of the 10(b) period. Stage Em-
ployees IATSE Local 659, 276 NLRB at 882. In Stage Employ-
ees IATSE Local 659, the union threatened to inform employers
that a member was not eligible for employment unless he paid
his dues and insurance premiums. 276 NLRB at 883. The
Board held that this was not a final and unconditional decision,
and that the Section 10(b) period did not begin to run until the
employee was discharged. Id. Analogously, in the instant case,
Respondent’s indications that it wished to terminate its rela-
tionship with the Union via letters in October 2013, and Janu-
ary 2014 and telephone calls in January 2014, did not represent
final and unconditional actions.21 Instead, I find that it was not
until Respondent’s letter of April 2014, in which it stated that it
was “terminating the bargaining relationship with [the Union]
effective immediately,” that Respondent gave clear and une-
quivocal notice of contract repudiation, thereby triggering the
running of the Section 10(b) period.
The earliest potential evidence of repudiation in this case

21 Specifically, Lindsey Dowell stated that she was certain she could
get Respondent out of the Agreement and Chris Dowell stated that he
wanted out of the Agreement. (Emphasis added.) I find that Lindsey
Dowell’s use of the word “could” and Chris Dowell’s use of the word
“wanted” do not constitute clear and unequivocal notice of contract
repudiation.
could be found in Chris Dowell’s telephone conversation with
Brad Long in late March or early April 2014. In that conversa-
tion, Dowell stated, “as far as [I am concerned], [Respondent]
did not have an agreement . . . with [the Union]. However, I
still do not find that this provides clear and unequivocal notice
of repudiation because of Dowell’s use of the qualifying words
“as far as I’m concerned.” See Stanford Realty Associates Inc.,
306 NLRB 1061, 1065 (1992) (finding an employer’s statement
that “as far as she knew [the employer] did not have a contract
[with] the union] and she would await further communication
with the union, was not a clear and unequivocal refusal to bar-
gain).22
Additionally, Respondent engaged in conduct that was con-
trary to a finding of clear and unequivocal notice prior to the
commencement of the 10(b) period. Respondent continued to
submit contribution reports to the Union through November
2013, and this final report was not received by the Union until
January 2014. These reports included the language, “the signa-
ture certifies this report is correct and [Respondent] hereby . . .
continues as a signatory employer.” Moreover, the November
13, 2013 report has a box checked indicating that Respondent
wanted the Union to send it additional contribution report
forms. These actions are inconsistent with Respondent’s posi-
tion that it was terminating its bargaining relationship with the
Union. Furthermore, the Union would have had no reason to
believe that Respondent was operating its business in January
or February 2014, as Chris Dowell testified that Respondent did
not operate during the winter months.
Finally, Respondent’s suggestion that it was acting openly as
a nonunion contractor within the Union’s jurisdiction prior to
the 6-month limitations period also fails. The Union had no
reason to know that Respondent was working as a nonunion
contractor within its jurisdiction until George Long and Jona-
than Deppe went to Respondent’s jobsites in May or June 2014.
The Board in Neosho Construction, 305 NLRB 100 (1991),
rejected a repudiation by conduct claim despite 14 years of
noncompliance with an 8(f) agreement. Such repudiation re-
quires more than mere breach of the contract; instead, the non-
compliance must be so bald as to put the union on notice of the
employer’s intent to repudiate. 305 NLRB at 102. In Neosho
Construction, the judge, affirmed by the Board, found that an
employer’s work within a union’s jurisdiction, even when occa-
sionally observed by that union, was not so sufficiently bald as
to put the union on notice of the employer’s intent to repudiate
an 8(f) agreement. 305 NLRB at 103. Similarly, in the instant
case, I do not find that Respondent’s operation within the Un-
ion’s jurisdiction prior to February 26, 2014, placed the Union
on notice of Respondent’s repudiation. There is no evidence
that any of Respondent’s purportedly nonunion work prior to
May 2014 was observed by the Union. In fact, Respondent
provided no evidence Respondent was operating nonunion or
performing any jobs as a nonunion contractor within the Un-
ion’s jurisdiction prior to May 2014. Thus, I find Respondent’s
defense that it repudiated the successor agreement by its con-
duct prior to February 2014 has no merit.

22 In any event, this conversation occurred well within the 10(b) pe-
riod in this case.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
E. Respondent’s Single-Person Unit Defense
Respondent asserts as an affirmative defense that the bar-
gaining unit at issue consisted of no more than a single employ-
ee. As stated above, an employer’s repudiation of an 8(f)
agreement will generally violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Cedar Valley Corp., 302 NLRB 823 (1991), enfd. 977 F.2d
1211 (8th Cir. 1992). However, an employer may lawfully
repudiate an 8(f) agreement when there is no more than one
employee in the bargaining unit. Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 360
NLRB 869, 876 (2014). See also Stack Electric Inc., 290
NLRB 575, 578 (1988), and Seals Refrigeration, Co., 297
NLRB 133, 135 (1989).
It is Respondent’s burden of proof to establish the existence
of a stable one-person unit. See Galicks, Inc., 354 NLRB 295
(2009), remanded on other grounds 188 L.R.R.M. 3024 (6th
Cir. 2010). The Board requires proof that the purportedly sin-
gle employee unit was a stable one, not merely a temporary
occurrence. McDaniel Electric, 313 NLRB 126, 127 (1993).
In determining the existence of a stable one-person unit, the
Board takes into account typical employment fluctuations in the
construction industry. SAS Electrical Services, 323 NLRB
1239, 1252 (1997), citing McDaniel Electric, 313 NLRB 126,
127 (1993). The Board has found that a period of 17 months
with one employee did not establish that the reduction in work
force was other than a temporary occurrence. SAS Electrical
Services, 323 NLRB at 1251. The Board has also found that
periods of 15 months with 1 journeyman and 16 months with
no journeymen did not establish the existence of a stable, one-
person unit. Galick’s, Inc., 354 NLRB at 299. Analogously, in
the instant case, I do not find that periods of a few months at a
time with one laborer establish the existence of a stable one-
person unit, especially in light of the fact that Respondent was
observed with its crews using more than one employee at a time
to perform laborers’ work in 2014.
As found supra, Respondent has been using other employees
to perform work reserved for the Union in the successor agree-
ment. Respondent’s contribution reports to the Union establish
that it employed 2 union laborers at various times in 2012 and
2013. Furthermore, Respondent has employed a four to six-
person crew while in operation in 2014, and I have found that 2
persons at a time have been performing work reserved to the
Union in the unlawfully repudiated collective-bargaining
agreement. For example, at the Kimberly Dodge jobsite, at
least two persons were witnessed performing laborers’ work,
such as shoveling and cleaning up. Similar work was observed
at the Co-Op Records and 53rd Street shopping center jobs.
That these persons are cross-trained to perform other work is of
no moment as they were, in fact, performing laborers’ work. If
two or more employees perform bargaining unit work, the situ-
ation is not converted into a “one person unit” if the employer
arranges for other employees to perform the work in question.
Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 107 slip op at 1 fn. 1.
Respondent cannot escape its obligation to honor its collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union by assigning unit work to
other employees in violation of the successor agreement. Ac-
cordingly, I find that Respondent’s single-person unit defense
fails.
Moreover, Respondent did not establish that its employees
were other than full-time, nonsupervisory employees. Despite
Chris Dowell’s testimony, which I have not credited, Respond-
ent presented no evidence that one member of its crew was a
part-time college student. Respondent further presented no
evidence that another of its employees was a statutory supervi-
sor. It is well-settled that the party asserting supervisory status
bears the burden of proof on the issue by a preponderance of
the evidence. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 NLRB at 694
(citing Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706, 711–
712 (2001)). “[M]ere inferences or conclusionary statements,
without detailed, specific evidence, are insufficient to establish
supervisory authority.” Alternate Concepts, Inc., 358 NLRB
No. 38, slip op. at 3 (2012); see also Avante at Wilson, Inc., 348
NLRB 1056, 1057 (2006) (“[g]eneral testimony asserting that
employees have supervisory responsibilities is not sufficient to
satisfy the burden of proof when there is no specific evidence
supporting the testimony” (citations omitted)); Golden Crest
Healthcare Center, 348 NLRB 727, 731 (2006). The Board
construes a lack of evidence on any of the elements necessary
to establish supervisory status against the party asserting that
status. Brusco Tug & Barge, 359 NLRB 486, 491 (2012), re-
affd. 362 NLRB No. 28 (2015), citing Dean & Deluca New
York, 338 NLRB 1046, 1048 (2003). Therefore, based on a
lack of credible evidence presented by Respondent, I decline to
find that Alex Johnson was a part-time employee or that Eric
Holcomb was a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11)
of the Act.
F. Respondent’s Other Defenses
In addition to the defenses addressed above, Respondent as-
serted the following affirmative defenses in its amended answer
to the complaint: that the charge was not served on Respondent
by the Charging Party; that the Regional Director served the
charge on an improper entity, i.e. “Taylor Ridge Paving & Con-
struction Co.”; that Respondent has no evidence that a majority
of its employees are represented by the Union and that the Un-
ion has never represented a majority of Respondent’s employ-
ees; that Respondent’s actions were protected by Section 8(c)
of the Act; and that Respondent undertook its actions for legit-
imate nondiscriminatory economic business reasons. (GC Exh.
1(f). )
The General Counsel moved to amend the complaint at hear-
ing in order to correct the name of Respondent and Respond-
ent’s counsel did not object. (Tr. 12.) Clearly, by filing its
answer and amended answer and appearing at the hearing, Re-
spondent received notice of both the charge and complaint in
this case. Therefore, I find Respondent’s defense that the Re-
gional Director served the wrong entity is moot.
Respondent’s defense on the grounds that the charge was
served by the Regional Director and not the Charging Party is
similarly unavailing. Section 10(b) of the Act does not provide
that the charge must be served solely by the charging party.
Phelps Dodge Copper Products, Corp., 96 NLRB 982, 983
(1951). Moreover, although Section 102.14 of the Rules and
Regulations of the Board places the responsibility for service
on the charging party, it also envisages that service may be
effected by the Regional Director. Id. at 983–984. For these
reasons, I reject Respondent’s defense that service of the charge
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 19
was made improperly by the General Counsel.
Respondent’s majority status defense also fails. As indicated
above, the agreement in this case is an 8(f) agreement, which
has no requirement that the Union show majority status. As
such, Respondent’s actions are not excused by the failure of the
General Counsel or Union to show majority status among Re-
spondent’s employees.
Respondent’s reliance on Section 8(c) of the Act as justifica-
tion for its actions is misplaced. Section 8(c) applies to nonco-
ercive expressions of views about union representation in gen-
eral or a specific union, as well as related labor controversies.
The Boeing Co., 362 NLRB No. 195, slip op. at 3 (2015) citing
NLRB v. Gissel Packing, Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (Under
Sec. 8(c), “an employer is free to communicate to his employ-
ees any of his general views about unionism or any of his spe-
cific views about a particular union, so long as the communica-
tions do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.”’). None of the Respondent’s actions here constitute a
communication to employees or views about unionism and, as
such, its Section 8(c) defense fails.
In addition, Respondent’s defense of a legitimate nondis-
criminatory motivation is simply not a defense to an alleged
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. See Treanor Moving &
Storage Co., 311 NLRB 371, 386 (1993). There is no allega-
tion that Respondent’s contract repudiation violates Section
8(a)(3) of the Act and Respondent’s motivation for the repudia-
tion is not at issue. Therefore, Respondent’s suggestion that its
repudiation was nondiscriminatory misses the mark.
G. Cases Relied Upon by Respondent are Distinguishable and
Respondent’s Citation to Supplemental Authority is
Without Merit
The cases relied upon by Respondent in its brief are distin-
guishable. For example, Respondent relies on St. Barnabas
Medical Center, 343 NLRB 1125 (2004), in support of its ar-
gument that the complaint in this case is time-barred. In St.
Barnabas, the parties had a collective-bargaining agreement but
disagreed as to whether it covered a certain group of employ-
ees. The union demanded inclusion of the disputed employees,
but the employer refused to apply the contract to them. 343
NLRB at 1125–1126. The parties engaged in negotiations,
during which the Board found that the employer’s conduct
reinforced its position that it did not consider the disputed em-
ployees to be part of the unit. 343 NLRB at 1128. At no time
during the limitations period did the employer apply any term
of the contract to the disputed employees, and never indicated
that it would do so. Concluding that the employer had never
strayed from its assertion that it did not have to apply the con-
tract to the disputed employees, the Board found that the charge
was time-barred. 343 NLRB at 1128–1129.
However, unlike the employer in St. Barnabas, Respondent
did not clearly and unequivocally repudiate the Agreement,
successor agreement, or MOA before the limitations period
began on February 26, 2104. Instead, Respondent sent mixed
signals by submitting contribution reports through November
2013, and its use of qualifying language in its letters and tele-
phone calls with the Union prior to April 2014. Thus, I do not
find this case analogous to the situation in St. Barnabas, and
find that the complaint here is not time-barred.
Respondent’s reliance on Moeller Bros. Body Shop, 306
NLRB 191 (1992), to argue that the Union had constructive
knowledge of its repudiation of the Agreement and successor
agreement is similarly misplaced. In Moeller Bros., the Board
stated that a union must use reasonable diligence to learn of an
employer’s noncompliance with a contract, but also made clear
that a union is not required to police its agreements aggressive-
ly to meet the reasonable diligence standard. 306 NLRB at 193.
Instead, the Board found that the union in Moeller Bros. needed
only to visit the employer’s single shop and could have deter-
mined that the employer was not complying with minimal ef-
fort and mere observation. 306 NLRB at 192. There is no evi-
dence that Respondent here operated at only one location which
could easily be observed by the Union. Therefore, I find
Moeller Bros. Body Shop distinguishable from the instant case.
Respondent admits that it is engaged in the construction in-
dustry and Respondent’s crews have been observed operating
in both Iowa and Illinois by the Union. Additionally, the Un-
ion’s jurisdiction spans a large area in both Illinois and Iowa.
In other cases involving construction industry employers and
multiemployer 8(f) agreements, the Board has found that a
union did not have constructive notice of an employer’s repudi-
ation merely because the employer performed jobs within the
union’s jurisdiction. See Baker Electric, 317 NLRB 335, 336
(1995) enfd. 105 F.3d 647 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding no construc-
tive notice of repudiation where during 17-year period where
employer operated nonunion because the employer’s noncom-
pliance was not sufficiently bald as to put the union on notice
of its intent to repudiate the agreements); Neosho Construction
Co., Inc., 305 NLRB 100, 102 (1991) (finding no constructive
notice of construction contractor’s repudiation despite 14-year
period of noncompliance). Similarly, in this case, I do not find
Respondent’s actions, over a period of less than 2 years, to be
so bald as to have created constructive notice on the part of the
Union.
Additionally, A & L Underground, 302 NLRB 467 (1991), is
factually distinguishable from the instant case. In A & L Un-
derground, the Board found clear and unequivocal notice of
contract repudiation where the employer always maintained
that it signed an agreement with the union for only a single
project. 302 NRB at 467. Furthermore, in A & L Underground,
the employer sent a letter to the union that it was repudiating
any agreements with the union “effective immediately” prior to
the commencement of the 10(b) period. Id. The facts in this
case are distinguishable. As I have set forth in detail above,
Respondent did not provide clear and unequivocal notice to the
Union of its repudiation outside the 10(b) period. Respondent
did not clearly and unequivocally repudiate the contract with
the Union until its letter of April 29, 2014. Instead, Respondent
provided less than clear communications, indicated that it in-
tended to terminate its relationship with the Union in the future,
and submitted contribution reports, the last of which was not
received by the Union until January 2014, prior to the com-
mencement of the 10(b) limitations period. Thus, Respondent’s
actions in this case are not equivalent to those of the employer
in A & L Underground and I find that case distinguishable from
the instant case.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
I also find Respondent’s reliance on Ducane Heating Corp.,
273 NLRB 1389 (1985), enfd. mem. 785 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.
1986), in support of its limitations defense misplaced. Ducane
Heating involved application of the 10(b) statute of limitations
to suspensions of an employee. 273 NLRB at 1390. In that
case, a Regional Director’s resurrected of a long-dismissed
charge, allegedly based on the discovery of new evidence. Id. at
1391. The Board restated its adherence to the longstanding rule
that a charge, dismissed or otherwise disposed of, may not be
reinstated outside the 6-month limitations period of Section
10(b) absent special circumstances in which a respondent
fraudulently conceals the operative facts underlying the alleged
violation. Id. at 1390. Circumstances similar to those in Du-
cane Heating Corp. simply do not exist in this case. Thus, I
find that Ducane Heating has no application to the instant case
and does not support Respondent’s 10(b) argument.
The case of James Luterbach Construction Co., 315 NLRB
976 (1994), does not support Respondent’s argument that upon
the expiration of the Agreement, Respondent was no longer
bound by any successor agreement. (R. Br. pp. 27–28.) Initial-
ly, I note that the Board recognized in that case that an employ-
er may obligate itself to successor agreements, as Respondent
did here by operation of the MOA. 315 NLRB at 978. By
contrast, employers who have an 8(f) relationship with a union
do not have an obligation to bargain for a successor contract.
Id. However, unlike in James Luterbach Construction, Re-
spondent here agreed to bind itself to successor agreements by
the operation of the MOA. Therefore, I find James Luterbach
Construction distinguishable from this case.
Respondent cites E.S.P. Concrete Pumping, Inc., 327 NLRB
711 (1999), for the proposition that an employer has no obliga-
tion to maintain the status quo after the expiration of an 8(f)
agreement. (R. Br. p. 28.) In that case, the Board found an
employer’s repudiation of an 8(f) contract, which was not re-
duced to writing, unlawful. 437 NLRB at 713. The respondent
had been a sole proprietorship when it signed an 8(f) agreement
with a union. 327 NLRB at 711. The sole proprietorship was
later dissolved and the respondent incorporated. Id. The re-
spondent in that case did not sign any agreements with the un-
ion after incorporating. Id. The Board held that the respondent
in that case adopted the same 8(f) agreement it had signed when
it was a sole proprietorship by its conduct, including holding
itself out as a union contractor, and found its later repudiation
of that agreement unlawful. 327 NLRB at 714. Thus, Re-
spondent’s reliance on this case in support of its argument that
it had no obligations to the Union after the Agreement expired
is misplaced.
Respondent further cites Garman Construction Co., 287
NLRB 88 (1987), in support of its argument that it was not
bound by any successor agreement with the union after the
Agreement expired. (R. Br. 28.) Initially, it is worth noting
that, to the extent it was inconsistent with E.S.P. Concrete
Pumping, discussed supra, Garman Construction Co., was
overruled. 327 NLRB at 712. Secondly, the Garman Construc-
tion case is distinguishable from the instant case. In Garman
Construction, the employer never had more than one employee
during the 3-year period prior to its repudiation of the contract.
287 NLRB at 89. However, in the instant case, I have found
that Respondent employed more than one laborer at various
times during the 2 years prior to its contract repudiation and,
more importantly, Respondent was observed during 2014 using
more than one employee to perform laborers’ work. Addition-
ally, in Garman Construction, the employer gave timely notice
of its withdrawal from a multiemployer bargaining association
at the time that the association’s contracts with three unions
were expiring. 287 NLRB at 88. In this case, however, Re-
spondent did not provide timely notice of its intent to terminate
either the Agreement or MOA and became bound to the succes-
sor agreement. Thus, I find the Garman Construction case
distinguishable from the instant case.
On April 10, 2015, Respondent submitted a document enti-
tled, “Notice of Supplemental Authority,” in which it cited
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 18 (Don-
ley’s, Inc.), 2015 WL 1619963 (2015) for the proposition that
the agreement herein rolled over from year-to-year. Initially, I
would note that the cited case is an Administrative Law Judge’s
decision, which remains before the Board on exceptions and is
not precedential. Additionally, in agreement with the General
Counsel, I find that the case is factually distinguishable from
the instant case in that it dealt with violations of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(D). Instead, as I have found above, Respondent
bound itself to the successor agreement between the Union and
the Associated Contractors by operation of the MOA.
Therefore, for the reasons cited herein, I find that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
adhere to the Agreement and the successor agreement, and that
Respondent’s defenses to the violation are without merit.
As I have found merit to the complaint, Respondent’s re-
quest for attorney’s fees from the Board, under the Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and Section 102.143 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, is denied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By repudiating the collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween Local Union No. 309, Laborers’ International Union of
North America and the Associated Contractors of the Quad-
Cities, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. I recommend that the Respondent be or-
dered to honor and comply with the terms of the collective-
bargaining agreement between the Union and Associated Con-
tractors of the Quad-Cities, effective for the period January 1,
2013, through December 31, 2015.
Respondent shall also make whole the unit employees for
any loss of earnings or other benefits suffered as a result of
Respondent’s unlawful repudiation of the collective-bargaining
TAYLOR RIDGE PAVING & CONSTRUCTION CO. 21
agreement with the Union. The make-whole remedy shall be
computed in accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183
NLRB 682 (1970), with interest at the rate prescribed in New
Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as pre-
scribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
Respondent shall make all contractually required contribu-
tions to the Union’s fringe benefit funds it has failed to make
since April 29, 2014, including any additional amounts due the
funds in accordance with Merryweather Optical Co., 240
NLRB 1213, 1216 fn. 7 (1979). Moreover, Respondent shall
reimburse the unit employees for any expenses resulting from
its failure to make the required contributions, as set forth in
Kraft Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 252 NLRB 891, 891 fn. 2
(1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). Such
amounts shall be computed in accordance with Ogle Protection
Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), with interest at the rate pre-
scribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded
daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356
NLRB 6 (2010).
Finally, Respondent shall compensate the unit employees for
any adverse income tax consequences of receiving their back-
pay in one lump sum and file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay to the appropriate calen-
dar quarters for each employee, in accordance with Don Cha-
vas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB 101 (2014).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended23
ORDER
The Respondent, Taylor Ridge Paving & Construction, Tay-
lor Ridge, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
Failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union,
Local Union No. 309, Laborers’ International Union of North
America, as the collective-bargaining representative of all em-
ployees performing work as set forth in article 2 of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Associat-
ed Contractors of the Quad-Cities, which is effective from Jan-
uary 1, 2013 through December 31, 2015.
In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Honor and comply with the terms and conditions of the cur-
rent collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and
the Associated Contractors of the Quad-Cities, effective from
January 1, 2013, through December 31, 2015, and, absent time-
ly written notice to the Union, any automatic renewal or exten-
sion of it.
Make whole all affected bargaining unit employees for any

23 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of Re-
spondent’s failure to honor the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, in the manner prescribed in the remedy section of this
decision.
Make all contractually-required contributions to the Union’s
fringe benefit funds that Respondent has failed to make since
April 29, 2014, and reimburse the unit employees, with interest,
for any expenses resulting from its failure to make the required
payments under the collective-bargaining agreement, in the
manner prescribed in the remedy section of this decision.
Compensate the unit employees for any adverse tax conse-
quences of receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file a
report with the Social Security Administration allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters for each
employee.
Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional
time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown,
provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its
agents, all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records,
including an electronic copy of such records if stored in elec-
tronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility
in Taylor Ridge, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”10 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 25, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since April 29, 2014.
Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Re-
gional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on
a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. September 21, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

24 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain in good faith with the
Union, Local Union No. 309, Laborers’ International Union of
North America, as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of all employees performing work as set forth in arti-
cle 2, of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Un-
ion and the Associated Contractors of the Quad-Cities (Associ-
ated Contractors), which is effective from January 1, 2013,
through December 31, 2015.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL honor and comply with the terms and conditions of
the 2013–2015 collective-bargaining agreement between the
Union and the Associated Contractors, and, absent timely writ-
ten notice to the Union, any automatic renewal or extension of
it.
WE WILL make whole all bargaining unit employees for any
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of our
failure to honor the collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL make all contractually required contributions to the
Union’s fringe benefit funds that we have failed to make since
April 29, 2014, and reimburse our employees, with interest, for
any expenses resulting from its failure to make the required
payments under the collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL compensate all unit employees adversely affect-
ed for any adverse income tax consequences of receiving a
lump-sum backpay award, and WE WILL file a report with the
Social Security Administration allocating the backpay award to
the appropriate calendar quarters for each employee.
taylor ridge paving & construction co.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/25–CA–135372 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.