Taylor Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 1986

279 N.L.R.B. 28 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

28 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Taylor Hospital and Local 1319 , Laborers Interna-
tional Union of North America , AFL-CIO.
Case 4-CA-13614
31 March 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
By MEMBERS JOHANSEN , BABSON, AND
STEPHENS
On 16 July 1985 Administrative Law Judge
James J. O'Meara, Jr. issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the General Counsel filed a reply brief.'
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge' s rulings, findings, and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.
We agree with the judge that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withdrawing
recognition from the Union in the context of its un-
remedied unlawful discharge of employee Leola
Brown . We find it difficult to imagine a stronger
statement of the futility of collective bargaining
than the message conveyed by the Respondent's
conduct during its 12-year history with the Union.
The Union filed a representation petition in 1973.
It was certified the following year. The Respond-
ent litigated the certification in state and Federal
court, culminating in an order to bargain with the
Union in January 1981. Employee Brown, a lead-
ing union supporter since 1973, was selected by her
fellow employees to be the employee representa-
tive on the Union's bargaining team . On the second
day of negotiations, the Respondent suspended and
later discharged Brown. The Board found that
Brown's discharge was motivated by her union ac-
tivities and the Respondent's desire to remove her
from the bargaining team, thus violating Section
8(a)(3). The Board 's decision was enforced by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.2
We find that the Respondent's discharge of a
long-time leading union supporter and member of
the Union's bargaining team at the outset of long-
delayed contract negotiations was a most serious
' The Respondent filed a reply brief to the General Counsel's beef in
response to the Respondent 's exceptions . The Board 's Executive Secre-
tary's office refused to accept the Respondent 's brief, noting that the
Board 's Rules and Regulations do not provide for the filing of a reply
beef to a reply brief, and that the Respondent did not advance sufficient
reasons to warrant a departure from the Board's longstanding policy not
to permit such filings We subsequently received from the General Coun-
sel a motion to strike the Respondent 's reply brief In view of the action
of the Executive Secretary's office, the General Counsel's motion is
moot
2 Taylor Hospital v NLRB, 770 F 2d 1075 (1985)
unfair labor practice. This unfair labor practice re-
mained unremedied at the time the Respondent
withdrew recognition from the Union. We there-
fore find that, in this context, the Respondent is
precluded from effectively relying on its asserted
doubt of the Union's majority status.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Taylor Hos-
pital, Ridgley Park, Pennsylvania, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Order.
William Slack, Esq., and Rudi Grueneberg, Esq., for the
General Counsel.
James Castagnera, Esq., and James R. Redeker, Esq., for
the Respondent.
William T. Josem, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES J. O'MEARA JR., Administrative Law Judge.
The complaint in this case was issued on 22 June 1983
and is based on a charge filed on 29 March 1983 by the
Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO (the Union) against Taylor Hospital (the Respond-
ent). The complaint charges that about March 14, 1983,
and continuing thereafter, the Respondent has failed and
refused to bargain collectively with a representative of
its employees, the Union, by withdrawing its recognition
of the Union as the exclusive representative of Respond-
ent's employees numbered within a specific bargaining
unit in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
The Respondent denies that it is guilty of any violation
of any part of the Act and affirmatively alleges that it
withdrew recognition of the Union based on objective
good-faith doubt concerning the Union's continued ma-
jority status.
This case was heard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on
17 December 1984 and on 25-26 February 1985. The
parties were given an opportunity to present evidence
and argue their respective positions. At the termination
of the hearing, the parties waived oral arguments and
have filed briefs which have been received and duly con-
sidered.
Based on the evidence of record, including the testi-
mony and demeanor of the witness, and in consideration
of briefs filed by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, Taylor Hospital, is and has been at
all times material herein a nonprofit corporation duly or-
ganized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and for some time prior
hereto has been engaged in providing medical and hospi-
279 NLRB No. 6
TAYLOR HOSPITAL 29
tal care to patients at its facility known as its Chester
Pike Division located at Ridgley Park, Pennsylvania.
During the past year Respondent has, in the course and
conduct of its business operations , had gross revenues
valued in excess of $100,000 and purchased and received
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, I find that Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act, and further that Respondent is a
health care institution within the meaning of Section
2(14) of the Act.
I further find that it will effectuate the policies of the
Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.
II. THE UNION
The Union is, and has been at all times material, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE RESPONDENT'S REFUSAL TO BARGAIN AND
ITS WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION
A. Background
Prior to the exercise of jurisdiction by the National
Labor Relations Board in matters involving hospitals, the
Union on 15 October 1973 filed a petition for representa-
tion with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
(PLRB). During the course of the procedures conducted
under this petition, an election was held on 17 January
1974, which resulted in 48 votes being cast for the
Union, 42 votes for no representative, and 17 challenged
ballots. A resolution of the 17 challenged ballots by the
PLRB resulted in the counting of 16 of the 17 chal-
lenged ballots. Thus the result of the final tally of the
election was 63 votes for the Union and 43 votes for no
union representation. On 27 June 1974 the PLRB issued
a "Nisi Order of Certification" certifying the Union as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit.
Subsequently, the PLRB, after considering the excep-
tions filed by Respondent, made the Nisi Order of Certi-
fication absolute and final. On 18 September 1974 the
Respondent filed its petition to set aside the order of the
PLRB with the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County, Pennsylvania. On 12 January 1976 the Court of
Common Pleas of Delaware County dismissed the Re-
spondent's petition to set aside the final order of the
PLRB and ordered that the parties comply with the pro-
visions of that order.
On 9 February 1976 Respondent appealed this decision
to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court where on 27
December 1977 the court affirmed the order of the Dela-
ware County Court of Common Pleas. On 28 January
1978 the Respondent filed a petition for the allowance of
appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This peti-
tion was denied on 14 July 1978. During the pendency of
the Pennsylvania State Court proceedings in this case,
the Union, on 23 September 1974, filed a charge asking
the NLRB to grant comity to the certification of the
PLRB. The NLRB deferred action on the Union's
charge until the final decision by the Pennsylvania State
Court. On 14 July 1978 the NLRB extended comity to
the certification by the PLRB and entered a bargaining
order against Respondent on 29 April 1980.1 The Re-
spondent petitioned the U.S. District Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit to review the order of the Board.
The Board, in the same proceeding, petitioned for en-
forcement. On 15 January 1981 Respondent's petition for
review was denied and an order enforcing the Order of
the NLRB was entered.2
Thus, after the disposition of the several appeals taken
by Respondent, Union Business Agent Bernard Jackson,
on 16 February 1981, requested bargaining negotiations
with Respondent to commence immediately. The Re-
spondent recognized the Union as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees in the
unit and requested the Union to present its specific de-
mands after which the Respondent would contact the
Union in order to set up dates for face-to-face negotia-
tions. On 27 April the Union provided the Respondent
with its proposals and advised that Respondent's employ-
ee Leola Brown would be the employee representative at
the face-to-face negotiations. On 12 June 1981 Respond-
ent's attorney spoke to the Union confirming that negoti-
ations would commence with sessions on 16 and 17 July
1981.
B. The Unlawful Labor Practices
Thus, after 7 years and 3 months of litigation, the par-
ties sat at the negotiation table . The union team was
comprised of Business Agent Jackson, Wilburn, and em-
ployee Leola Brown. Brown had been employed by Re-
spondent since 1966 and was an avid union supporter.
During the early union efforts, Brown solicited other
employees to sign authorization cards. She distributed
union literature and exerted efforts to pursuade other em-
ployees to vote union. During this time she was called
on to testify in support of the Union in various pieces of
litigation. She continued to act as a spokesperson for
other employees and, in April 1981, she was elected as
their representative at the negotiating table. Thus, Brown
was an informed, knowledgeable, and effective member
of the union bargaining team at the face -to-face negotiat-
ing session of 16 July.
Since Brown was to be away from her station of em-
ployment while participating in these negotiations, it was
necessary that she be excused from her place of employ-
ment at these times . At the end of the day of the 16 July
session, the parties had discussion about Brown's attend-
ance at the negotiating meeting which was scheduled for
the following day, 17 July. She was assured by Respond-
ent's negotiating team which was comprised of Respond-
ent's officers and attorney that she would not be required
to report to work on the morning of 17 July and was au-
thorized to attend the negotiating session to commerce at
10 a.m. on 17 July. On the following day, Brown was
terminated from her employment when she failed to
report for work at the normal starting time and did not
appear at the hospital until the commencement of the
bargaining session of 17 July. Brown 's discharge was al-
' Taylor Hospital, 249 NLRB 137 (1980).
2 Taylor Hospital Y. NLRB, 642 F 2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981)
30 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
leged to be a violation of the Act. A complaint was filed
alleging violation and seeking an appropriate remedy.
Taylor Hospital, 272 NLRB 697 (1984). Word of Brown's
discharge spread quickly through the hospital . Brown re-
ceived telephone calls regarding the incident from at
least 50 employees who questioned Brown about the
reason for her discharge and the action being taken by
the Union to remedy it. The Respondent distributed to
its employees a document which described the hospital
version of the occurrence leading up to and resulting in
the discharge of Brown . In addition to filling a complaint
with the Board, the Union held a meeting of the unit em-
ployees to explore the possibility of a strike in protest of
Brown's discharge . The meeting held on 31 July was at-
tended by approximately 90 employees . Business Agent
Jackson was publically questioned about the action the
Union intended to take regarding Brown 's discharge.
Other propagation to its employees of Brown's dis-
charge occurred when the Board's Regional Director re-
fused to file a complaint on the Union's charge and dis-
missed the charge . The dismissal letter was immediately
posted by Respondent including a notice informing the
employees of the dismissal of the charge . The Regional
Director's decision was appealed to the Board 's General
Counsel and the Regional Office was reversed. This
notice of reversal of the original decision in the Brown
case was also notice to Respondent 's employees by the
posting of the General Counsel's decision The complaint
against Respondent was reissued in September 1982.
After a hearing on the complaint it was recommended
that the Board enter an order against Respondent requir-
ing it to reinstate Brown, compensate her for back
wages , and cease and desist from undertaking similar
conduct in regard to Brown and other employees. In ad-
dition to the positive acts required by the remedy against
Respondent fashioned by the Board, the Respondent was
required to post notice of the remedial actions required
by the Board 's Order . Respondent has appealed the
Board's decision and that appeal is now pending before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The Respondent has not taken any of the action required
by the Board 's Order nor has it informed its employees
of the Board's decision.
Notwithstanding the lack of finality in regard to the
unfair labor practice case of Leola Brown , the discharge
of Brown remained a topic of conversation in the hospi-
tal for some time thereafter . Negotiations between the
Union and Respondent continued during the pendency of
Brown's litigation . Twelve negotiating sessions were
held between 4 August 1981 and 24 January 1982 but no
agreement had been reached as of 24 January 1982.
On 21 January 1982 employee Richard Wheeler filed a
petition seeking to decertify the Union as the collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent's employees. Al-
though Wheeler withdrew his petition shortly after it
was filed, he filed a second decertification petition on 12
March 1982 . A hearing regarding the second petition
was held on 7 April 1982 and Respondent informed the
hearing that it had declined to bargain with the Union
during the pendency of the petition. Even though Re-
spondent had refused to bargain with the Union, it did
contact the Union before granting a wage increase in
July 1982 .$ On 30 September 1982 the Board issued its
decision in Dresser Industries , 264 NLRB 1088 (1982),
holding that the mere existence of a decertification peti-
tion did not suspend an employer's obligation to bargain
with an incoming union. In view of this recent holding,
Respondent and the Union agreed to resume negotiation
sessions and set the session for 15 March 1983.
On 7 March 1983 employee Wheeler presented Re-
spondent 's president , W. Scot Murray, with a petition
signed by 60 of the 135 employees in the unit represent-
ed by the Union which petition indicated that the em-
ployees no longer wished to be represented by the
Union . Murray, on receipt of this petition , indicated to
Wheeler that the 60 signatures to the petition did not
comprise an majority of the unit employees. A week
later, on 14 March 1983 , Wheeler presented Murray with
another petition similar to that which he had previously
delivered to Murray but signed by 75 of the 135 employ-
ees in the unit . On receipt of that petition by Murray, the
Respondent informed the Union that it no longer repre-
sented a majority of its employees in the bargaining unit
and that Respondent was withdrawing recognition of the
Union as the bargaining representative of the employees.
Since that time, 14 March 1983, Respondent has refused
to recognize and bargain with the Union as the repre-
sentative of the unit employees.
IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Withdrawal of Recognition
The complaint charges that about 14 March 1983 Re-
spondent withdrew its recognition of the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in a
certain described unit . By such withdrawal the General
Counsel contends that the Respondent has failed and re-
fused, and continues to fail and to refuse , to bargain col-
lectively with the Union and that such action comprises
an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) of the Act.
The Respondent, in answer to the complaint, affirma-
tively alleges that it withdrew recognition of the Union
as the exclusive representative of the employees based on
an objective good-faith doubt as to the Union's contin-
ued majority status and, therefore , is not violative of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
The issue , thus drawn, is whether or not the Respond-
ent was legally justified in its withdrawal of recognition
and the attendant refusal to bargain with the Union.
The long-established principle applicable to such issue
was set forth in Viking Lithographers , 184 NLRB 139,
139 (1970), where the Board held that:
After the certification year has run, an employer
may lawfully withdraw recognition from an incum-
bent union because of an asserted doubt of the
union 's continued majority if its assertion of doubt
is raised in a context free of unfair labor practices
3 The Union agreed to the Respondent 's granting a wage increase to
its employees and informed the employees of this fact The Respondent
accused the Union of taking credit for the wage increase when in fact it
played no part
TAYLOR HOSPITAL
and supported by a showing of objective consider-
ations providing reasonable grounds for a belief that
a majority of the employees no longer desire union
representation.
The Board clarified and delineated the basic principles
under which an employer could question a union's ma-
jority status. The Board in Celanese Corp. of America, 95
NLRB 664, 673 (1951), held:
[T]he majority issue must not have been raised by
the employer in a context of illegal antiunion activi-
ties , or other conduct by the employer aimed at
causing dissatisfaction from the union.
It is clear that the unfair labor practice was not of such a
character to affect either the union status , cause employ-
ee dissatisfaction, or improperly affect the bargaining re-
lationship itself, then the Respondent is not precluded
from questioning the union 's majority status . However,
the Respondent in this case has been found guilty of vio-
lations of the Act and ordered to take certain remedial
steps designed to overcome the effects of its conduct. A
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act has been
found and the action ordered by the Board, in the form
of a remedy, has not been executed by the Respondent.
It must be determined whether the unfair labor practice
is of such a character to affect the union's status, cause
employee dissatisfaction, or improperly affect the bar-
gaining relationship itself. I conclude that the nature and
effect, both patent and latent, of this unfair labor practice
creates an aura which permeates the employee-employer
relationship in an insidious manner and as such precludes
the Respondent from withdrawing recognition of the
Union while this unfair labor practice remains unreme-
died.
C. The Unlawful Labor Practice
The Board has found that the Respondent has commit-
ted an unfair labor practice in that it unlawfully disci-
plined and discharged Leola Brown in July 1981, in vio-
lation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. The dis-
charge of Brown was prior to the circulation of any em-
ployee petition. The Board ordered the Respondent to
take certain remedial steps in order to overcome the ef-
fects of the unfair labor practice. The Respondent chose
to appeal the order of the Board and the unfair labor
practice has not been remedied in full or in any part.
Thus, it is necessary to address the issue of the character
and potential effect of the unlawful labor practice on the
employee/employer relationship and to determine if it
has caused employee disaffection which underlies the ob-
jective indicia of the aura of antiunionism which is re-
flected by the petition authored by the several employees
of Respondent. The discharge of a visible union support-
er when unlawful goes to the "heart of the Act," is one
of the most flagrant means by which an employer can
dissuade employees from engaging in prounion activity.
Penn Color, 261 NLRB 395 (1982), and Apple Tree Chev-
rolet, 237 NLRB 867 (1978). Brown was a visible and
viable prounion employee. She was the leading union ad-
herent in the bargaining unit . She was a vocal supporter
of the union organizing effort since its inception . She had
31
testified in early proceedings in support of the Union and
throughout the 8-year campaign has stood out as the
most prominent employee lending support to the union
organizing effort. She was often the informal contact em-
ployees in the unit had with the Union. She was fre-
quently questioned by other employees about the status
of the Union's campaign. Such a posture was the reason
the employees of the unit selected Brown as their repre-
sentative on the union bargaining team which participat-
ed in the negotiations of 15 and 17 July 1981. Brown's
participation in this face-to-face negotiation with the Re-
spondent preceded the day on which she was disciplined
and subsequently discharged. The Board held that the
discharge of Brown under the circumstances existing was
evidence of union animus and was inherently distructive
of Leola Brown's rights under Section 7 of the Act. Spe-
cifically, the Board found that the Respondent's dis-
charge of Leola Brown was an interference with the ex-
ercise of her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act
and was an act of discrimination in regard to tenure of
employment accomplished to discourage membership in the
Union and had the clear tendency to discourage other em-
ployees from union participation. As the Board found in
that case, Leola Brown was an employee with tenure in
excess of 15 years. She was a better-than-satisfactory em-
ployee who had earned good evaluations and advance-
ment with the Respondent. The Respondent's discharge
of Brown was also complemented by the distribution of
notice to employees giving the hospital's pretext for her
discharge but also clearly disclosing that the discharge of
Brown came as a result of her efforts to represent the
unit employees at the bargaining session of 17 July 1981.
Having deemed that this discharge was an unfair labor
practice, the Board tailored a course of action that was
designed to remedy the unfair, unbalancing effects of the
unfair labor practice. Among other things, it ordered the
reinstatement and payment of backpay to Leola Brown.
The Respondent, true to its course of conduct for 7
years, chose to appeal the Board's Order to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, where this matter is now pend-
ing. Thus the effect on the employee/employer relation-
ship sired by the unfair labor practice comprising the dis-
cipline and discharge of Leola Brown remains unreme-
died and unabated and precludes the Respondent's with-
drawal or recognition of the Union while both objective
and subjective criteria are conditioned by the unlawful
conduct of the Respondent. An employer may not avoid
the duty to bargain by demonstrating a loss of majority
status arising from its own unfair labor practices.
D. The Respondent's Case
The Respondent claims to have had a good-faith doubt
of the Union's majority status at the time it withdrew
recognition. The Respondent bases this good-faith doubt
on its perception of five events which it contends sup-
port its allegation of a good-faith doubt about the contin-
ued majority among the employees of the unit. Those
factors are:
(1) Report from Respondent supervisor indicating that
five or six employees had expressed dissatisfaction with
the Union.
32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(2) The decertification petition filed in March 1982.
(3) Statements made at the 7 April 1982 representation
hearing indicating that a majority of the unit employees
supported the petition.
(4) The Union's failure to request negotiations between
March 1982 and January 1983.
(5) The March 1983 petition indicating that over half
of the unit employees no longer desired union represen-
tation.
The event labeled as No. 1 above is insufficient to sup-
port the Respondent's conclusion that the Union had lost
its majority. A minority of the unit employees who ex-
pressed a dissatisfaction with the Union is not sufficient
to support the alleged good-faith doubt. The lack of zeal
for the Union allegedly expressed to the Respondent's
president, Murry, by his supervisors falls far short of the
number considered necessary for significance. Saloon,
Inc., 247 NLRB 1105, 1108 (1980).
The decertification petition filed in March 1982 does
not in itself destroy the presumption of continued majori-
ty that the Union enjoys. Its relationship to the unreme-
died unfair labor practice will be discussed below.
The event labeled No. 3 above refers to a stipulation
made for limited purposes in a collateral hearing. It is
argued that President Murry of the Respondent heard
such a stipulation and concluded therefrom that it sup-
ported his doubt about the continued majority among the
employees in the unit for the Union. The misinterpreta-
tion of the legal effect of such a stipulation cannot be the
grounds or basis to justify his later action.
The Respondent argues that the Union's failure to re-
quest negotiations between March 1982 and January
1983 supports its good-faith doubt of a loss of majority
by the Union. A decertification petition filed on 21 Janu-
ary 1982, by a "substantial" number of employees of
Taylor Hospital, prompted the parties to abandon negoti-
ations while that petition was pending. In January 1983
the parties agreed that under the Board's rulings a mere
filing of a decertification petition would not permit an
employer to withdraw from bargaining . See Dresser In-
dustries, 264 NLRB 1088 (1982). Thus the Union's failure
to request negotiations from January 1982 to January
1983 is not support for the Respondent's allegedly good-
faith or continued union majority.
The fifth and final event allegedly supporting the Re-
spondent's good-faith doubt comprises a petition filed in
March 1983 indicating that slightly over half of the em-
ployees in the unit who signed the petition no longer de-
sired union representation. This event, and the evidence
establishing its factuality, gives rise to the principal issue
in this case and begs the question. A further detailed dis-
cussion of this phase appears in the following section.
E. Respondent 's Offer of Proof
As both parties agree , the issue of whether an employ-
er has questioned a union's majority in good faith cannot
be resolved by resorting to any simple formula. It can
only be entered in the light of the totality of all the cir-
cumstances involved in a particular case. Celanese Corp.
of America , 95 NLRB 664 (1951 ). As above stated, the
issue before me is whether or not the Respondent had
discharged its burden of going forward with the evi-
dence to establish that it had a good -faith doubt about
the continued existence of the union majority among its
unit employees . However , when an unremedied , unlaw-
ful labor practice tends to interfere with the employee/-
employer relationship by creating an attitude of dissatis-
faction among its employees , evidence of that dissatisfac-
tion is not probative of the issue and not admissible in
evidence . The Respondent proffered such evidence from
a majority of the employees within the unit . No purpose
is served by establishing a negative union attitude among
a majority of Respondent 's employees when it is deemed
that the unfair labor practice is of such character to have
the tendency to infect the employee with dissatisfaction
with the Union and from union participation . This tend-
ency to infect the employee with union dissatisfaction
which tendency arose from the unfair labor practice en-
gaged in by the Respondent is reflected in the testimony
which the Respondent proffered . The insidious immeas-
urable impact on the employee colors the reasoning un-
derlying the employee testimony regarding his state of
mind . Not only is the subjective state of mind of the em-
ployee so affected , but the objective results of such state
of mind also is subject to distortion from the effects of
the unfair labor practice . As stated in Celanese Corp. of
America , supra at 673:
By its very nature the issue of whether an em-
ployer has questioned a union's majority in good
faith cannot be resolved by resorting to any simple
formula. It can only be answered in light of the totali-
ty of all the circumstances involved in a particular
case. But among such circumstances, two factors
would seem to be essential prequisites to any find-
ing that the employer raise majority issues in good
faith in cases in which a union had been certified.
There must, first of all, have been some reasonable
grounds for believing that the union had lost its ma-
jority status since its certification. And secondly,
the majority issue must not have been raised by the
employer in a context of illegal antiunion activities, or
other conduct by the employer aimed at causing disaf-
fection from the union or indicating that in raising the
majority issue the employer was merely seeking to
gain time in which to undermine the union. [Em-
phasis added.]
The second essential prerequisite required by Board
policy in such cases is absent in the case at bar. The
Board has found the Respondent had committed an
unfair labor act in the discharge and discipline of Leola
Brown. The Board ordered the Respondent to take cer-
tain remedial steps which it has failed to do as of this
date. The nature and character of the unlawful labor act
perpetrated by the Respondent has the immeasurable
effect of causing disaffection from the Union among Re-
spondent's employees. The effect of the unfair labor
practice can be expected to surface in both objective and
subjective reflections. I am thus compelled to find that
the Respondent had not raised the issue of majority
status of the Union in good faith and that its withdrawal
of recognition of the Union and the attendant refusal to
bargain constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5).
TAYLOR HOSPITAL 33
V. REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent withdrew its recog-
nition of the Union as the exclusive collective -bargaining
representative of its employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit and has thus refused to bargain with that
Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act,
I shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from
interfering with , restraining , or coercing its employees in
any like or related manner with respect to the rights
guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent
shall be further ordered to affirmatively recognize and,
on request , bargain collectively with the Union as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit and , if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding within a signed agreement
and to post at its Reading Park , Pennsylvania facility
copies of the attached notice all pursuant to the order
following.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Taylor Hospital is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
and, further , is a health care institution within the mean-
ing of Section 2(14) of the Act.
2. Local 1319, Laborers International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Taylor Hospital has withdrawn recognition of the
Union as the exclusive representative of certain bargain-
ing unit employees and has refused to bargain with the
Union on and since 14 March 1983 in violation of Sec-
tion 8 (a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed4
ORDER
The Respondent, Taylor Hospital, Ridgley Park, Penn-
sylvania , its officers, agents , successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain with Local 1319,
Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its em-
ployees within the appropriate bargaining unit described
below with regard to wages, hours, working conditions,
and other terms and conditions of employment:
All employees of the dietary department, mainte-
nance department, housekeeping department, cen-
tral supply department, which is now known as the
materials management department, including the
cart technicians and messengers , orderly depart-
ment, nurses aides and transporters but excluding
management level employees , supervisors, first level
supervisors , confidential employees and guards as
defined in the Act.
* If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings , conclusions , and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec . 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and, on request , bargain collectively
with Local 1319, Laborers' International Union of North
America, AFL-CIO, as described above, with regard to
employees ' wages , hours , working conditions , and other
terms and conditions of their employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached , embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
(b) Post at its Ridley Park, Pennsylvania facility copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative , shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by
any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights.
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protec-
tion
To choose not to engage in any of these protect-
ed concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively on request
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other terms and conditions of employment with Local
1319, Laborers' International Union of North America,
AFL-CIO the exclusive representative of its employees
in the following appropriate unit:
34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All employees of the dietary department, mainte-
nance department , housekeeping department, cen-
tral supply department, which is now known as the
materials management department , including the
cart technicians and messengers , orderly depart-
ment, nurses aides and transporters but excluding
management level employees , supervisors , first level
supervisors , confidential employees and guards as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and bargain collectively, on re-
quest, with Local 1319, Laborers' International Union of
North America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining
representative of our employees within the appropriate
bargaining unit described above, with regard to their
wages, hours , working conditions , and other terms and
conditions of their employment and, if an understanding
is reached , we will embody such understanding in a
signed agreement.
TAYLOR HOSPITAL