Taracorp Industries

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 31, 1981

257 N.L.R.B. 463 (N.L.R.B. 1981)

TARACORP INDUSTRIES
Taracorp Industries, A Division of Taracorp, Inc.
and Fred Elmore. Case 14-CA-13551
July 31, 1981
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 28, 1980, Administrative Law
Judge Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, I and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order, as modified
herein. 3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Taracorp Industries, A Division of Taracorp, Inc.,
Granite City, Illinois, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Insert the following at the end of paragraph
2(b):
"(See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716 (1962).)"
2. Insert the following as paragraph 2(c) and re-
letter the following paragraphs accordingly:
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant e idence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr) Wall ProducIs.
Inc.., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 For the reasons stated in his dissent in Kraft Fods, Inc.. 251 NLRB
598 (1980), Member Jenkins joins his colleagues in granting a full make-
whole remedy.
I The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent, prior to dis-
charging employee Elmore, conducted an unlawful investigatory inter-
view. Thereafter, he consistently denominated the interview as "investi-
gatory" except in one part of the Decision. In the first Conclusion of
Law the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently refers to a "disciplin-
ary" interview. We hereby correct this inadvertent error and insert "in-
vestigatory" in place of "disciplinary."
In addition, the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently failed to in-
clude in his recommended Order the citation of case authority for the
rationale on interest payments and the Board's customary records-preser-
vation language. We shall modify the recommended Order accordingly.
Finally, we find it unnecessary to rely on certain findings by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge as support for his ultimate conclusion that Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)Xl) of the Act by denying employee Elmore a
union representative at an investigatory interview. We do not rely on the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent developed a "nev"
theory at the hearing to explain its actions. Nor do we draw an) adverse
inference from Respondent's failure to call Manager Harper as a witness
at the hearing. Moreover. we do not adopt his reference to possible "bar-
gaining" during the interview. since no such issue was presented here
257 NLRB No. 49
"(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and re-
ports, and all other records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order."
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. RIccI, Administrative Law Judge: A hear-
ing in this proceeding was held on July 16 and Septem-
ber 22, 1980, at St. Louis, Missouri, on complaint of the
General Counsel against Taracorp Industries, A Division
of Taracorp, Inc., herein called the Respondent or the
Company. The complaint issued on May 7, 1980, based
upon a charge filed on March 3, 1980, by Fred Elmore,
an individual, herein called the Charging Party. The
issue presented is whether the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging the Charg-
ing Party. Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and
the Respondent.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of
the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a State of Missouri corporation, is
engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of fab-
ricated lead products and related products; one of its
plants is located in Granite City, Illinois, the only one in-
volved in this proceeding. During the calendar year
ending December 31, 1979, a representative period, the
Respondent, in the course of its business at this location,
sold products valued in excess of $50,000 which were
shipped from said plant directly to out-of-state locations.
I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE lABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Local 6496, United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor orga-
nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Fred Elmore. who filed the charge in this case,
worked as a feeder for the Respondent from November
1978 to September 1979. His job was to place used bat-
teries, hich arrived in large quantities, on an upward
moving belt which took them into the next operational
part of the plant. Occasionally, the belt would become
jammed, and stop. It was then the duty of the feeders-
there were more than one on every shift-to get the belt
moving, and one of the ways to do this was to pull on
the belt so it would get going again. If their efforts
failed, someone would be called from the maintenance
department and that person then took over and did
463
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
whatever was necessary to start the belt operating prop-
erly.
Early in the morning of September 12, 1979, when
Elmore was on duty, the belt stopped. Gregg Vaughn,
the department supervisor, tried to get it going again; an-
other feeder, Mark Donithan, helped Vaughn pull on the
belt, but without results. At this point Vaughn called to
Elmore, who was just standing by and watching, and
told him to help pull on the belt. Elmore refused-plain
and simple. About 30 minutes later, perhaps 8 o'clock, on
complaint of Vaughn, Charles Harper, the manager, in
his office fired Elmore.
The complaint lists a number of unfair labor practices
said to have been committed by the Respondent, all as
part and parcel of this single incident. When Elmore dis-
obeyed Vaughn's order to work, the supervisor told him
he was then and there suspended and that he should
present himself in the manager's office at 8 o'clock.
When Elmore appeared there, the first thing he said was
that he wanted George Siler, president of the union local
and also an employee, to be present. Harper refused his
request. At one point the complaint very precisely al-
leges that the reason why the Respondent discharged the
man was because he asked to have his union agent in at-
tendance at the investigatory interview. And in support,
the General Counsel relies upon N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingar-
ten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
The complaint also alleges that the reason why the
Company discharged this man was "in order to discour-
age employees from engaging in . . . union and/or con-
certed protected activities...." These words state no
more than a conclusion of law, indeed in the very words
of the statute. Somewhat belatedly, the General Counsel,
in her post-hearing brief, for the first time sets out what
belonged in the complaint; i.e., the alleged conduct
which, it is argued, constituted the illegal acts committed
by the Respondent-and it is a double-barreled assertion.
The first is that the Company discharged Elmore be-
cause he sought to enforce the terms and conditions of
the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect. For
this allegation the General Counsel relies upon Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 157 NLRB 1295 (1966), and H. C.
Smith Construction Co., 174 NLRB 1173 (1969). The
second allegation now is that Elmore was discharged for
having raised an issue of safety-like the employee who
seeks to go to OSHA, or some other governmental, reg-
ulatory agency having to do with his employment. Now
the governing precedent is quoted as Alleluia Cushion
Co., Inc., 221 NLRB 999 (1975), and its progeny.
In such circumstances, I think it best to consider the
evidence, decide what the facts of record are, and apply
current applicable law.
What Happened When the Belt Got Stuck?
There is a conflict in testimony between Vaughn and
Elmore as to what was said between them at that critical
moment. According to Vaughn, when he asked Elmore
to help pull on the belt, the employee answered "it's not
my job." When he ordered the man to pull a second
time, again he got no more than the same words: "It's
not my job." With this, as Vaughn continued to testify,
he told the man he was suspended and should report in
the manager's office. Vaughn said Elmore never once
spoke of safety during the incident.
As Elmore recalled it, when Vaughn "yelled for me to
come down and pull on the belt," he (Elmore) "told him
I couldn't pull on the belt, that it was unsafe and that it
wasn't my job. They should get maintenance over to fix
it." When Vaughn repeated "Get down there and help
pull on the belt," Elmore again said, "I can't. It's
unsafe." With this, still according to the employee,
Vaughn "came up to me" and three times accused him
of "refusing to work," and each time he responded that
he was "not refusing." Finally, with the supervisor insist-
ing that he was refusing, Elmore said: "Take it which-
ever way you want to but I am not refusing." It was at
this point that Vaughn told him he was suspended and to
be in Harper's office at 8 o'clock.
On this precise issue of what was said at that time of
friction, I credit Vaughn against Elmore. In the heat of
the moment, with Vaughn tensed at being unable to pull
the belt with only one helper and yelling for assistance, I
doubt Elmore even had the time to articulate four rea-
sons for flouting his supervisor's authority-that he
could not do it, that it was not safe, that it was not his
job, and that maintenance should be called. As a witness
speaking 10 months after the events, and after extended
opportunity to reflect upon his conduct, he was spelling
out virtually the totality of the legal arguments now said
to support his complaint. There are other reasons for this
credibility resolution.
It is plainly not true that pulling the belt was not "his
job." As he himself conceded, Elmore had always pulled
the runner throughtout his employment. How can one
credit a plain lie? And certainly "he could do it," be-
cause he always had done it. Moreover, it does not
appear he had any reasonable basis for saying it was not
"safe." No one had ever been hurt on that moving belt
as long as he worked there. Someone had once hurt his
hand on another belt, but I do not know for a fact that
all the belts in the department are alike. The union con-
tract that covered his employment recognized the fact
there might sometimes be an element of risk in the job he
was paid to do and, when necessary, maintenance was
called and did fix the belt. But there is no evidence in
the least indicating any particular danger in this situation
at that particular moment.'
But what in my considered judgment serves more than
anything else to deprive Elmore of all credibility on this
one precise question is his repeated statement that he did
not "refuse" to do the work he was ordered to do. It is
one thing to discourse obliquely, evasively, about reasons
for doing or not doing something; it is something else
again to call black white, to distort the meaning of plain
words to the point of incoherence. It was not possible
even at the hearing to get the witness to admit he did in
fact refuse to do what Vaughn ordered him to do. The
A generally applicable phrase in the Steelvorkers contract in effect
at the time recognizes that there may be a "normal hazard inherent" in
some of the jobs cosered. The fact that the contract also says no man is
required to swork under "unsafe" conditions hardly serves to prose, as
the prosecution side seems to contend, that there in fact existed such an
unsafe condition that particular mornling
464
TARACORP INDUSTRIES
only rational explanation for such blatantly artificial testi-
mony is that, conscious of the impact which his straight
refusal to perform an allotted task must of necessity have
upon the decision in this case, the witness was seeking a
way out, however hollow his words sounded.
Donithan, the other employee, who was pulling the
belt with the supervisor, testified he heard Elmore say
"it wasn't safe or similar words." Again, from this man's
testimony about when Vaughn asked was Elmore willing
to work: ". . . I am not refusing to do work but it's not
safe, something like that." This "something like that"
kind of testimony will not do. I still credit Vaughn, in-
stead, and find that Elmore did not speak of safety then.
There is something else in Donithan's testimony
strongly indicating that all that happened was an out-
right refusal by Elmore to obey a plain work order. "I
remember Gregg saying, 'You are terminated,' and that
scared me right there because I knew what that meant
because I was pulling on the belt too." This was the wit-
ness saying he very well appreciated his fellow employee
had done nothing more than flout a proper order and
could expect nothing short of dismissal.2
The basic question in this case is: Why was Elmore
fired? When he and Vaughn appeared in the manager's
office, Harper asked them what had happened, and each
of them, as they testified, gave the same version of the
incident that they related at this hearing--Vaughn saying
the man had simply refused a work order and Elmore
saying that he had not refused to do what he was told.
Harper believed Vaughn. Now, while it is true, as will
appear below, that Elmore asked to have the union presi-
dent present and that Harper denied his request, there is
no evidence in the least indicating that the manager's
reason for discharging him was his reference to the
union agent. It is purely a conclusionary statement ap-
pearing in the complaint and nothing more. Indeed, the
affirmative proof of the employe's outright insubordina-
tion is so clear that there can be no finding other than
that Elmore was discharged for perfectly lawful, just
cause. This is not a case calling for lengthy analysis of
pretext, dual motives, mixed causes, or other such analyt-
ical introspection. Compare Wright Line, a Division of
Wright Line Inc,, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). "Union" activi-
ty, "concerted" activity, or "protected" activity-how-
ever multiple the complaint allegations may be-had
nothing to do with the Respondent's reaction to this
man's outright improper insubordination. 3
2 On this reality that Elmore refused to do what he was told to do. the
testimony of the Charging Party was not enhanced by the General Coun-
sel's evasive tactics on the rcord Immediately following Donithan's tes-
timony set out above, came the following
JUDXE RC: Is it your position. Ms. General Counsel, that meant
that he refused to do what he was told to do that days
Ms. THURROrt: It is our position that Mr. Donithan overheard
the conversation.
JULrxiE RccI: It will be better if you answer m question Is it
your contention that Elmore that day did not refuse an order of his
supervisor to do what he was told to do?
Ms. THURROI-I: we are saying he kept saying that he wasn't re-
fusing but he wouldn't do the job because it was unsafe.
a A reasonable argument could be made that in one ay or another
Elmore did mention the word "safet," at some point in his running dia-
logue with the supervisor for the record other. ise shows no reason whN
he disobeyed the way he did. But eern rwere I to assume he did passingly
As to the further allegation-first appearing in the
General Counsel's brief-that Elmore was fired because
of his "assertion of a contract right," the brief concedes
the man's "not articulating chapter and verse" re the
contract. A more correct statement as to that is that the
entire record contains not a scintilla of proof.
I find it a fact Elmore was discharged for refusing to
perform a duty falling squarely within his employment,
and I shall therefore recommend dismissal of the com-
plaint allegation of a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
What Happened in the Manager's Office?
The only other substantive allegation of wrongdoing
that I see in this complaint is that Harper's refusal to
permit Local President Siler to be present at the 8
o'clock interview was a violation of Section 8(a)(l).
There is a very significant connection between the two
questions-why the discharge and did Harper in fact
refuse a request? When Vaughn, offended by Elmore's
misbehavior, reacted by ordering him to the office, his
first outburst was that Elmore was "terminated." As
Elmore recalled it, the supervisor said: "You are termi-
nated. No, hold it, I take it back. You are suspended ter-
mination [sic]." If there is one thing Elmore knew at that
moment, it is that his job was hanging by a thread. This
is the same impression Donithan, the other belt feeder,
formed in his mind. It was to be expected, therefore, that
Elmore would seek help from somebody to try to save
himself. In fact, in a matter of minutes he was looking
for union assistance of one kind or another. Vaughn saw
him talking to Ricky Epperson, a union committeeman,
and told him not to disturb others at work and to get out
of the work area as he had been ordered.4 Vaughn saw
him again in the yard a few minutes later, and asked
what was he doing there. Elmore said he was "looking
for George Siler." This is from Vaughn's testimony.
Elmore put it more explicitly, and there is no reason for
not believing his version, "I told him I was going to get
George Siler because I wanted George Siler to go with
me to Charlie Harper's office."
We come to the disagreement between Vaughn and
Elmore as to what was said later in the manager's office.
Harper himself did not testify. Elmore said he entered
the office first and was immediately followed by
Vaughn. His testimony is that the first thing he said was
"I want George Siler up here," and that Harper an-
swered, "You don't need George Siler up here. This is
just to determine whether you are fired or not." In con-
trast, Vaughn testified it was not until after Harper had
refer to safety, I would nevertheless find he was not fired for such
reason. The test always is "causal relationship." and there is absolutel no
basis for connecting that idea with the discharge in this case
4 This passing remark by Vaughn-that Elmore should stay out of the
work area as a suspended employee and not interfere with the duties of
others who were on the clock-is listed as a separate unfair labor prac-
tice chargeable to the Respondent. Elmore had accoted Epperoll to ask
that he help find the union president. I make no finding of misconduct hb
anyone in that little byplay. for I am at a loss to nderstand how El-
more's ery passing talk with his fellows emploee hbeclllc, "meeting"
of employee and "union representative." illegally "illerrlpTid h naiin-
agement, to quote the words of the complaint.
465
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
asked each of them what had happened, and even said,
"You are terminated," that Elmore "asked if George
Sier had been notified." It ended, as Vaughn would
have it, with the manager saying, "You don't need
George Siler. You have already been terminated. It's too
late for George Siler."
Despite my finding that Elmore told a made-up story
about his quarrel with the supervisor at the belt machine
a half hour earlier, I must believe he asked for, and was
denied, the presence of his union agent at the start of the
investigatory interview. He had reason to be, and in fact
was scared for his job. He had gone looking for the
union agents, both Epperson and Siler, in the interval be-
tween refusal to work and confrontation with the big
boss. The logical thing for him to do, in the circum-
stances, was to try to get help from his union before he
was fired, not after. After the final decision adverse to
him was made, what good would it have done him
whether Siler knew, or did not know, what happened?
Credibility resolutions following conflicting stories told
by human beings rest essentially on what appears as the
more likely, rational behavior of the disputing witnesses
based on general experience.
Vaughn said Elmore was sitting outside Harper's
office when he arrived, but that he left him out there and
went in to talk to the manager alone. Why should he do
that, if the very purpose of sending the employee there
was for Harper to learn both stories? The tidbit fitted the
Respondent's new theory of defense perfectly. Vaughn
tried to add that after he told Harper what had hap-
pened, Harper articulated his decision to fire the man.
With this, it is now argued that this was not an investiga-
tory or a disciplinary interview at all, but just an occa-
sion to inform the employee of a final discharge decision
already made. Why was Harper not called as a witness?
Like Elmore, the Respondent's witness also had had 10
months between the events and the hearing to ponder
upon what his testimony would be. I find that the em-
ployee did ask, at the start of the interview, to have Siler
present and that Harper refused his request.
Vaughn had no power to discharge anybody. In fact,
that is why he was careful to tell Elmore, when the re-
fusal to work took place, he was not fired. This means,
of course, Harper had to make the decision. Vaughn tes-
tified that he spoke to Harper on the phone before going
to the office to tell him "what had happened." All
Harper said then, if in fact Vaughn did call him, was
". . if Fred Elmore refuses to do the job, that's termi-
nation." This is the beginning evidence that Harper did
not decide what to do before the interview with the em-
ployee. For him to say "if," means he intended first to
find out "what had happened."
Again, still from Vaughn's testimony, after entering
the office he "repeated to Charlie Harper what had
taken place earlier," and again the manager's stated re-
sponse was: "If he refuses to do the job, that's termina-
tion." (Emphasis supplied.) When, after Elmore was let
into the office, Vaughn again told Harper "what had
taken place," the manager asked Elmore "i]f this was
true." If this was not the deciding authority inquiring of
the two contestants just what their conflicting stories
might be, I do not know what phrase "investigatory in-
terview" means.
All this is consistent with Elmore's testimony. He said
that upon entering the office, just before Vaughn came
in, Harper asked him "[w]hy I was there .... I told him
Greg Vaughn had put me on suspended termination."
And when Vaughn came in Harper asked the same ques-
tion of him. "I waited until he got done with his story
and then Charlie Harper asked me mine. I told Charlie
Harper exactly what had happened." At this juncture,
there is no point in repeating what Vaughn and Elmore
told the boss; each gave the same version related at the
hearing later. Without further ado, Harper told Elmore
he was discharged.
I find that by the manager's rejection of Elmore's re-
quest to have his union agent present at the start of this
interview, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
As to the separate allegation that the reason why the
Company decided to discharge Elmore was the fact he
asked for the union agent, or, however phrased, sought
to engage in union activity, I find there is no supporting
proof at all. Motivation means a state of mind. The one
subject Harper for sure did not care about at all at that
moment was the fact Elmore was thinking union. He was
simply indifferent to that subject then.
What Happens Now?
The Respondent must be ordered not only to stop
committing the kind of unfair labor practice here
found,-i.e., refusing an employee's request for union
representation at the start of an investigatory interview-
but it must also be ordered to reinstate Elmore to his old
job and make him whole for lost earnings. This is cur-
rent Board law. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
251 NLRB 612 (1980).
I can understand counsel for the Respondent saying, in
his brief, that the Board's policy of ordering reinstate-
ment in cases of this kind "is wrong." He knows this em-
ployee was discharged for misbehavior and deserved to
be dismissed. But what he conveniently overlooks is the
purpose of union representation, which goes to the heart
of the Act. Had Siler been present at the investigation in-
terview, he would have made some attempt to soften the
blow, to persuade Harper, if not to complete forgiveness,
at least to a lesser form of discipline. He never had the
chance. It would be pointless for me to speculate what
the result of bargaining-to use a phrase from the stat-
ute-might have had. I do not know; I cannot know.
Neither can anyone else.
And this is precisely what the Supreme Court said in
Weingarten in sustaining the Board's policy which the
Respondent now seeks to avoid. "A knowledgeable
union representative could assist the employer by elicit-
ing favorable facts .... After the employee has been
discharged or otherwise disciplined .... It becomes in-
creasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself,
and the value of representation is correspondingly dimin-
ished." And the Board's recent decision in Coyne Cylin-
der Company, 251 NLRB 1503 (1980), does not help the
Respondent here. In that case, during the Weingarten in-
466
TARACORP INDUSTRIES
terview, the employer learned nothing it did not know
before. In the case at bar, the manager, who alone had
authority to discharge, knew nothing of what had hap-
pened and only learned of what then in his judgment
became grounds for discharge after the start of the inter-
view.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACIICE
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with its operations
described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. By requiring an employee to participate in a disci-
plinary interview without union representation, where
such union representation was requested by the employ-
ee, and where the employee has reasonable grounds to
believe that the matters to be discussed may result in his
being the subject of disciplinary action, the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor
practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 5
The Respondent, Taracorp Industries, A Division of
Taracorp, Inc., Granite City, Illinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Depriving any employee of his right to union rep-
resentation at an investigatory interview which the em-
ployee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary
action.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Fred Elmore immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
sIn the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall, as provided ill
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted h the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously
enjoyed.
(b) Make whole Fred Elmore for any loss of earnings
he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's dis-
crimination against him. The amount of backpay due
shall be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
as prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651
(1977)
(c) Post at its place of business in Granite City, Illi-
nois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix. " 6
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted
by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereaf-
ter, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTH ER RECOMMENDED that in all other re-
spects the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
h In the event that this Order is enforced b a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the Words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labr Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the Natioinal Labor Relations Board
APPENDIX
NoiICE To EMPOYEES
POSI I BY ORDI)R OF: THE
NArTIONAl. LABOR REI.A IIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE Wil 1. NOTi deprive any employee of his right
to union representation at an investigatory interview
which the employee reasonably believes may result
in disciplinary action.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in-
terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Fred Elmore immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed; and WE:
Wt.I. make him whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him, plus interest.
TAR\CORIP INI)USI RIS, A DIVISION OF
TARACORP, INC.
467