Tammy J. Furr, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 26, 2005
01a53502 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 26, 2005)

01a53502

09-26-2005

Tammy J. Furr, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Tammy J. Furr v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A53502

September 26, 2005

.

Tammy J. Furr,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A53502

Agency No. 200J-0553-2004103584

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a Utility System

Repair Operator, WG-10, at the agency's Medical Center in Detroit

Michigan. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a

formal complaint on August 26, 2004, alleging that she was discriminated

against on the bases of national origin (American Indian) and sex

(female) when:

on June 8, 2004, she learned that she was not found to be qualified for

referral for the position of Supervisor, Utility Systems Repair Operator,

WS-10, pursuant to Merit Promotion Announcement #04-418, dated March

19, 2004.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency found no discrimination. The agency concluded that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex or national

origin discrimination. The agency further found that even assuming that

complainant established a prima facie case of sex and national origin

discrimination, management articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its action. Specifically, the agency found that the selectee

for the Supervisor, Utility Systems Repair Operator was better qualified

than complainant. Further, the agency found that complainant failed to

present any evidence which demonstrated that management's articulated

reason for its actions was a pretext for discrimination.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

The Commission finds that the agency articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its employment action. The agency found

that five candidates, including complainant, applied for the position

of Supervisor, Utility Systems Repair Operator, WS-4742-10. The record

contains an affidavit from the Subject Matter Expert (Expert). Therein,

the Expert stated that he was asked by the Human Resources Service to

review the application packages of the five candidates. The Expert

further stated that out of the five candidates, two candidates were

identified as being qualified for the subject position. The Expert stated

that the two candidates were rated as qualified "per the screen-out

element for the referenced vacancy had adequate written documentation

in their KSAO's and Personnel Folders to indicate objective performance

items satisfactory to the Crediting Plan guidelines." The Expert stated

that complainant did not qualify for the subject position because she

"did not meet the minimum required score for the KSAO "Element #73,

Ability to supervise (screenout)." Specifically, the Expert stated

that neither complainant's KSAO nor her Personnel Folder "had adequate

documentation and written evidence of prior supervisory experience that

would qualify for the minimum points needs to be acceptable on this

screenout element." The Expert stated that the Crediting Plan criteria

included the following elements: ordering materials; scheduling jobs;

assigning work loads to co-workers or subordinates on a daily, weekly,

monthly, semi-annual or annual basis; planning work for other employees;

interviewing prospective job applicants; reviewing and inspecting work

of peers, contractors or subordinates; coaching; mentoring or assisting

co-workers or subordinates when appropriate; completing time cards;

and approving leave. The Expert stated that he did not make the final

selection for the subject position. Furthermore, the Expert stated

that complainant's sex and national origin were not factors in his

determination that she was not qualified for the subject position.

Finally, we find that complainant has not demonstrated that the agency's

articulated reasons for its employment actions were a pretext for

discrimination.

Accordingly, the agency's final decision finding no discrimination

is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 26, 2005

__________________

Date