Tammie J. Phillips, Complainant,v.Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 28, 2000
01990517 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 28, 2000)

01990517

03-28-2000

Tammie J. Phillips, Complainant, v. Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Tammie J. Phillips v. Department of the Army

01990517

March 28, 2000

Tammie J. Phillips, )

Complainant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01990517

Louis Caldera, ) Agency No. AOEWF09806I0140

Secretary, )

Department of the Army, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

On October 1, 1998, complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission

from a final agency decision (FAD), dated August 27, 1998, dismissing

her complaint for untimely counselor contact.<1> The Commission accepts

the appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

On June 11, 1997 complainant filed a formal EEO complaint (Agency

No. AOEWFO9705H0300) regarding sexual harassment. The complaint also

alleged denial of equal pay. The agency issued a FAD, dated October

17, 1997, dismissing the denial of equal pay claim for not being raised

during EEO counseling and for not being "like or related" to matters that

were counseled. Thereafter, on November 18, 1997, complainant contacted

the EEO counselor regarding the equal pay claim. Informal efforts

to resolve complainant's concerns were unsuccessful. Accordingly, on

February 2, 1998, complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that

she was discriminated against when she was told in January 1997 that she

would receive a performance award totaling 3% of her salary, while male

employees received 5% performance awards for the same performance period.

In a FAD dated August 27, 1998, the agency dismissed complainant's

complaint for untimely counselor contact. Specifically, the FAD indicated

that complainant was aware of the 3% award in January 1997, but did not

raise the issue until it was addressed in her prior complaint in June

1997. The agency contends that although complainant argues she did not

suspect her supervisor to be discriminatory until May 1997, the May 19,

1997 Counselor's Report for her prior complaint does not mention the

award issue. Further, the agency determined that complainant's equal

pay claim is not part of a continuing violation.

On appeal, complainant agrees that she was aware of the alleged

discrimination in January 1997. However, complainant argues that when she

questioned her immediate supervisor about the disparity in awards he told

her "there was nothing he could do" and "leave it alone." According to

complainant, these comments were meant to discourage her from pursuing a

discrimination claim. Complainant argues that, in light of the agency's

purported misconduct, the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to

the time limit. Complainant also seeks to have the basis of reprisal

added to her complaint.

In response, the agency reiterates that complainant suspected

discrimination in January 1997, and that the untimely incident is not

part of a continuing violation. Further, the agency argues that the

time limitation should not be tolled, as complainant had previously

demonstrated a willingness to contact the EEO office.

Volume 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37656 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(2)) requires that

complaints of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of

the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of

a personnel action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date

of the action. The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion"

standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine

when the forty-five (45) day limitation period is triggered. See Howard

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999).

Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until a complainant reasonably

suspects discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge

of discrimination have become apparent.

The Commission has held that the time requirements for contacting an

EEO Counselor may be waived as to certain claims within a complaint

when a continuing violation is demonstrated; that is, a series of

related discriminatory acts, one of which fell within the time period

for contacting an EEO Counselor. See Reid v. Department of Commerce,

EEOC Request No. 05970705 (April 22, 1999); McGivern v. U.S. Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05901150 (December 28, 1990).

A determination of whether a series of discrete acts constitutes a

continuing violation depends on the interrelatedness of the past and

present acts. See Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ.,

715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868 (1986).

It is necessary to determine whether the acts are interrelated by a

common nexus or theme. See Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC

Request No. 05890308 (June 13, 1989); Verkennes v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05900700 (September 21, 1990); Maldonado v. Department of

the Interior, EEOC Request No. 05900937 (October 31, 1990). Should such

a nexus exist, complainant will have established a continuing violation

and the agency would be obligated to "overlook the untimeliness of the

complaint with respect to some of the acts" challenged by complainant.

Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1978).

Relevant to the determination are whether the acts were recurring or were

more in the nature of isolated employment decisions; whether an untimely

discrete act had the degree of permanence which should have triggered an

employee's awareness and duty to assert his or her rights; and whether

the same agency officials were involved. See Woljan v. Environmental

Protection Agency, EEOC Request No. 05950361 (October 5, 1995).

In addition, EEO time limitations are "subject to waiver, estoppel, and

equitable tolling." 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified

and hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c)).

"Equitable tolling", which complainant has invoked on appeal, is the

doctrine under which courts have tolled certain requirements where, for

example, there was affirmative misconduct on the part of a defendant,

which lulled the plaintiff into inaction. However, one "who fails to

act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse his or her

lack of diligence." Hocker v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Petition

No. 05930112 (March 4, 1994).

In the instant case, complainant agrees that she was aware of the alleged

denial of equal pay in January 1997. Moreover, we find that it is a

discrete act that is not interrelated to complainant's prior claim of

sexual harassment. Therefore, complainant's claim is not part of a

continuing violation. With regard to complainant's tolling argument,

we do not find that her supervisor's remarks rise to the level of

discouraging utilization of the EEO process. Accordingly, the Commission

finds that complainant's arguments do not justify an extension of the

time limitation. The agency's dismissal of complainant's complaint was

proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 28, 2000

____________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify that

the decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________ _____________________________

Date Equal Employment Assistant

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www. eeoc.gov.