T. F. E. Industies

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 24, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 612 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
T. F. E. Industries, a Division of Dayco, Inc. and
Local No. 64, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America and Patrick O'Connor. Cases I-CA-
11881 and 1-CA-11885
August 24, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENELLO
On May 10, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Jerry
B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the General
Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and
Respondent filed a reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, T. F. E.
Industries, a Division of Dayco, Inc., Warwick,
Rhode Island, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc.. 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, was heard pursuant to due
notice on January 12 and 13, 1977, at Providence, Rhode
Island.
I A stipulation by the parties relating to jurisdictional facts is marked as
ALJ Exh. I and is received into the record.
231 NLRB No. 111
The charge in Case I-CA-I 1881 was filed on June 14,
1976, and an amended charge was filed on July 19, 1976.
The charge in Case I-CA-11885 was filed on June 14,
1976. Case 1-CA-I 1881 and Case I-CA-I 11885 were duly
consolidated by order on August 16, 1976. The complaint
in this matter was issued on August 16, 1976. The issues
concern (1) whether Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by conduct of interrogation and promises
of benefits, and (2) whether Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging
three employees on June 11, 1976, and suspending one
employee on said date because of union or protected
concerted activities.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding. Briefs have been filed by the General
Counsel and the Respondent and have been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my
observation of witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
2
T. F. E. Industries is a trade name and division fully
owned by Dayco, Inc., an Ohio corporation, and is the
Respondent herein.
At all times material herein T. F. E., has maintained its
principal office and place of business at 100 Gilbane Street,
in the city of Warwick, State of Rhode Island (herein called
the Warwick plant), and is now and continuously has been
engaged at said plant in the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of plastic industrial components and related
products.
Respondent in the course and conduct of its business
causes, and continuously has caused at all times material
herein, large quantities of plastics used by it in the
manufacture of industrial components to be purchased and
transported in interstate commerce from and through
various States of the United States other than the State of
Rhode Island, and causes, and continuously has caused at
all times herein mentioned, substantial quantities of
industrial components to be sold and transported from said
plant in interstate commerce to States of the United States
other than the State of Rhode Island. Annually Respon-
dent received materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points located outside the State of Rhode Island.
As conceded by Respondent, and based upon the
foregoing, it is concluded and found that Respondent is,
and has been at all times material herein, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED 3
Local No. 64, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is,
and has been at all times material herein, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2 The facts herein are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
3 The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions therein.
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T. F. E. INDUSTRIES
Ill. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ISSUES
A. Preliminary Issues4
1. Supervisory status
At all times material herein, the following named persons
occupied positions set forth with their respective names,
and have been and are now agents of Respondent, acting
on its behalf, and are supervisors within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act: William Kelly, plant manager;
Charles Orr, quality control foreman; Steve Moss, mainte-
nance foreman; Walter Chapman, foreman; John Par-
quette, foreman; and Joseph Merrill, extrusion department
foreman.
2. The discharge and suspension of employees
On or about June 11, 1976, Respondent did discharge or
suspend those employees at its Warwick plant whose
names appear below:
Michael Groff - discharge
Patrick O'Connor - discharge
David Mozley - discharge
Stanley Johnson - suspension
Respondent has, since June 11, 1976, failed and refused
to and continues to refuse to reinstate Michael Groff,
Patrick O'Connor, and David Mozley to their former or
substantially equivalent positions of employment.
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
1. The General Counsel alleged and Respondent
denied that "On or about May 1, 1976, Respondent, by its
supervisor and agent Walter Chapman on Respondent's
premises, promised its employee economic benefit in the
form of a wage increase to induce him to refrain from
becoming or remaining a member of the Union or
engaging in union or other concerted activities."
The only witness presented with respect to this issue was
O'Connor. O'Connor credibly testified to facts which
support a finding of violative conduct as alleged.
Thus, O'Connor credibly testified to the effect that
Chapman made such unlawful promise in May 1976. What
occurred is revealed by the following credited excerpts
from O'Connor's testimony.
A. Not the exact date, but sometime, I would say
around May; sometime in May.
Q. Where were you when he discussed it with you?
A. Inside the plant, right outside my department.
Q. Tell us, if you can, what he said and what you
said?
A. Well, he approached me and said that he was
going to try to get me a fifteen cent raise, if the Union
didn't tie his hands, and that I was doing a very good
job and that I was one of the best workers they had in
the pressure sensitive department.
Considering the foregoing, I find and conclude, as
alleged, that Respondent, by its supervisor and agent,
Chapman, promised its employee economic benefits in the
form of a wage increase to induce him to refrain from
becoming or remaining a member of the Union or
engaging in union or other concerted activities. Such
conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(X) of the Act. It is so
concluded and found.
2. The General Counsel alleged and Respondent
denied that "On or about May 1, 1976, and at various times
thereafter, Respondent by its supervisor and agent Steve
Moss on Respondent's premises, interrogated its employees
concerning their membership in/or activities on behalf of
the Union."
The only witness presented with respect to this issue was
O'Connor. O'Connor credibly testified to facts which
support a finding of violative conduct as alleged.
Thus, O'Connor credibly testified to the effect that Moss
interrogated him a few times during a period of time of
April through June 1977. What occurred is revealed by the
following credited excerpts from O'Connor's testimony.
Q. Did anyone else from management of T. F. E.
ever speak to you about the Union?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. Steve Moss.
Q. When?
A. Oh, a few times.
Q. During what period?
A. April through June.
Q. Tell us what he said to you about the Union?
A. Well, he just wanted to know how I felt about it,
and how my friends in the plant felt about it.
Q. And he asked you this on more than one
occasion?
A. Yes.
Considering the foregoing, I conclude and find that
Respondent, by its agent and supervisor, Moss, in April,
May, or June, unlawfully interrogated an employee about
his and other employees' feelings about the Union. There is
no evidence of legitimate need for such interrogation. Nor
is there evidence that assurances of nonreprisals were
made. Accordingly, it is concluded that such interrogation
was coercive and unlawful and therefore violative of
Section 8(aX I) of the Act.
3(a). The General Counsel alleged and Respondent
denied that "On or about June 8, 1976, Respondent by its
supervisor and agent Charles Orr on Respondent's premis-
es, offered its employee economic benefit to induce him to
refrain from becoming or remaining a member of the
Union or engaging in Union or other concerted activities."
(b). The General Counsel alleged and Respondent
denied that "On or about June 8, 1976, Respondent, by its
supervisor and agent William Kelly on Respondent's
premises, promised its employees economic benefit to
induce them to refrain from becoming or remaining
The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions herein.
613
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
members of the Union or engaging in Union or other
concerted activities."
The facts relating to the issues set forth above are
interrelated and are based upon a composite of the credited
aspects of the testimony of Mozley and Kelly.
As background, the facts reveal that in the past Mozley,
while at work, had been attending school. Knowing that
the Company had some program relating to reimbursement
for expenses concerning school courses taken by employ-
ees, Mozley in 1975 had tried to receive reimbursement for
expenses connected with courses he was taking. Mozley's
request for reimbursement had been rejected because his
major was a science major and the Company's plan
involved reimbursement for courses leading to a major in a
job-related field of engineering or business.
On June 8, 1976, the day before the NLRB representa-
tion election, Supervisor Orr spoke to Mozley. What
occurred is revealed by the following credited excerpts of
Mozley's testimony.
A. Charles Orr spoke to me on June the 8th,
around five o'clock in the afternoon.
Q. Could you tell us what he said, and what you
said?
A. I was standing outside in front of the sheet
molding room, that was the job I had at that particular
day; and he came up to me, we're on friendly terms, he
was my boss when I was back in Quality Control, and
he came over for a little chat. He said to me, "Are you
still going to school?" and at that time, that semester I
had dropped out. This was school, college, Rhode
Island Junior College, and he said, did I - he asked me
if I had ever tried to get any of my courses paid for
there, because the company, Dayco Corporation had a
policy of reimbursing employees who, as I understood
it, I was told if they were in the right program, if they
were in a business related program, the company would
reimburse for different courses taken in that particular
major.
I told him that I had tried to, but I was rejected on -
for the fact that I wasn't going into a business related
major, and he said, "Well, you know, Bill Kelly sent me
out here to ask you that", and I said, "Oh", and that
was that.
Later on the same date, Supervisor Kelly spoke to
Mozley. What occurred is revealed by the following
credited excerpts from Mozley's testimony.
Q. What about Kelly? Did you have any conversa-
tion with Kelly during that same period of time?
A. Yes, I did, the same day, June 8th at night,
approximately nine o'clock.
Q. More than one?
A. Yes; twice he came to talk to me.
Q. All right, would you tell us what he said, and
what you said, please, the first time?
A. Mr. Kelly came into my sheet molding room. I
had just taken a sheet out from under pressure, and I
was pulling it out, taking apart the mold and bringing
the sheet up, see what kind of condition it was in, and
he came over to me and we were both looking at the
sheet, looking for whatever imperfections might be in it.
He asked me, "You know, Dave, we're thinking of
moving Richard Piscopio, who was an inspector, into
another job; so there might be an opening for an
inspector", and I said, - he asked me, would I want to
be one, and I said, "Well, I'd like to go back to that,
yes." I said, "I'd rather stay on second shift like I was,
previous, and working at this time, also." He said,
"Well, yes", I could stay on second shift, I'd be the
second shift Inspector.
I was kind of curious; at the time I said, "Well Bill,
you know I haven't had such a good attendance record
lately" and he said, "Well, I'm aware of that, but you
know, what's been the problem?" I said "Well, it's been
a little alcohol related, drinking over the weekend, and
maybe on Monday I don't feel much like coming into
work; or seeing how I do work second shift, the warm
weather was coming in and I'd go out for a day at the
beach and get into a little drinking, and come three
o'clock I just didn't feel like I should show up."
So he says to me, "Well, you know, if we give you
this new position, do you think this is going to be a
problem?" I said, "No, because I realize that when
you're an inspector, that is definitely something you
have to show up every day for, because it's a small
department, to have someone cover for you would be a
very inconvenient situation, as opposed to when you're
in production." I said, "No, I didn't think that I would
have any problem in my new capacity, with drinking.",
and then he left.
Q. All right, was there a second conversation?
A. Approximately fifteen minutes later he came
back, and he asked me, he says, "You've been going to
school lately, haven't you?", and I was little embar-
rassed because I hadn't been doing too good in school,
and I kind of, I says, "Well, you know, I kind of
dropped out this semester, I wasn't doing too good."
So he says, "Have you ever tried to be reimbursed
for these courses?", and I says, "Well yes, I talked to
Carl Wishart, who was the Auditor at the time, around
December of '75, and I asked him if I could possibly be
reimbursed for any of my courses, because like I said, I
understood that that program did exist." "I was
rejected by Mr. Wishart, I had a conversation with him
and I told him that I was heading into a Science major,
and he said, 'Well, really, this program, we're trying
to-if you're going into engineering or business, that
this is the kind of reimbursement we want to be
involved with', and so therefore he said, 'I'm sorry, I
can't do anything for you.' "
So Mr. Kelly said, "Well, you know, Dave, there's
been a little bit of a reorganization here in the plant,
and now I'm head of this program in this plant", and he
said, "Are you planning to go back to school at all?" I
said, "Well, not next semester, but perhaps the semester
afterwards," and he said, "Well, like I said, I'm head of
the program now, and if you do go back to school,
maybe we just won't have to mention your major, and
we can reimburse you on a course by course basis." I
614
T. F. E. INDUSTRIES
said, "Well, I'll consider it when it comes up again." He
shook his head and left.
Considering all of the foregoing, I am not persuaded that
the facts reveal that Respondent, by Orr, offered Mozley
economic benefit to induce him to refrain from becoming
or remaining a member of the Union or engaging in union
or other concerted activities. The facts reveal that the
Company did have a program concerning reimbursement
for certain school courses taken by employees. Orr's
questioning of and remarks to Mozley were directed to
whether Mozley was still going to school and whether he
had tried to get reimbursement for such courses. Consider-
ing the facts, I am not persuaded that Orr was aware that
Mozley had unsuccessfully tried to get reimbursement for
the courses Mozley had taken. Nothing in Orr's remarks
suggested that Mozley was entitled to get anything other
than that which he would rightfully be entitled to.
Accordingly, the allegation of unlawful conduct by Orr will
be recommended to be dismissed.
Considering all of the foregoing I am persuaded, and
conclude and find, that Respondent, by the conduct of
Plant Manager Kelly on June 8, 1976, promised its
employees economic benefit to induce them to refrain from
becoming or remaining members of the Union or engaging
in union or other concerted activities. Considering the
timing of events, the pendency of the NLRB representation
election to be held on June 9, 1976, the facts preponderate
for a finding that Kelly's discussion with Mozley involved
promises of benefits to Mozley, to wit being made an
inspector and being allowed reimbursement for school
expenses not normally allowed; and the facts preponderate
for a finding that such benefits were offered as inducement
to persuade Mozley to vote against union representation.
In sum, the facts reveal that Respondent, by Kelly, on June
8, 1976, engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act as alleged. It is so concluded and found.
C. Alleged Discrimination
The discrimination issues concern whether Respondent
(a) retaliated against employees because its employees had
voted for union representation, or (b) took disciplinary
action for nondiscriminatory reasons, by (1) firing
O'Connor and Groff on June II, 1976, for violation of rules
in leaving company premises without permission and
reporting back to work late from breaktime, (2) firing
Mozley on June 11, 1976, for using vulgar language to
management and not following supervisors' instructions,
and (3) suspending Stanley Johnson for 3 days on June 11,
1976, for being late.
The relevant facts concerning these issues and the
contentions of the parties may be summarized as follows:
I. Respondent has had published rules concerning
employee conduct and discipline since early 1974. Such
' The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Kelly. Chapman, Merrill, O'Connor, Walker, Mozley, and the
exhibits in the record.
' Kelly credibly testified to such effect. Mozley's testimony reveals that
he had argued against such interpretation of progressive discipline as
regards a discipline issued to him before the critical events herein.
7 The General Counsel, utilizing in large part habitual lateness or
habitual absence as an example, questioned Kelly as to the question of
rules set forth certain violations deemed sufficient grounds
for disciplinary action, ranging from reprimand to suspen-
sion or discharge. Some of the published rules have
indicated discipline alongside of such rules that suggest
progressive steps of discipline from warning or warnings to
suspension to discharge. Some of the rules have indicated
progressive discipline from suspension to discharge. Some
of the rules have indicated discipline of discharge only.5
Despite the suggestion that the way the rules were
written that discipline was progressive only as to the
specific rules related to, the facts clearly reveal that
Respondent has interpreted and applied the rules on a
basis that discipline was progressive on a combined basis.
Thus, a warning for violation of one rule might set in effect
a discipline of suspension for a subsequent violation of
another rule.6
As to most of the rules, Respondent utilized oral
warnings before the issuance of written warnings. As to
some of the rules, those for which discharge was the set
discipline, investigation or ascertainment of facts is utilized
and oral warnings are not issued. After written warnings
have been issued oral warnings are not used if discipline is
warranted. Foremen or supervisors, however, use judgment
in determining whether discipline is warranted. If discipline
is warranted, written warning, suspension, or discharge is
utilized as the progression may call for.7
In February 1976, Plant Manager Kelly found reason to
remind his foremen and supervisors to enforce the rules
equally. At such time Respondent had in its employment
an employee named Karg, who was on parole. Apparently
Respondent bent its rules to help keep Karg as an
employee and out on parole. Around this time employee
Walker wanted a wage increase ahead of the time
scheduled, complained about disparate application of the
rules, complained about Groff s and O'Connor's atten-
dance, and threatened to go to EEOC with a complaint. As
a result, Plant Manager Kelly told his supervisors that the
rules were the same for everyone.
The evidence relating to discharges of employees
covering a period of time prior to the advent of the Union's
organizing efforts reflects discharges on a number of
occasions consistent with reasons set forth for discipline of
warnings, suspension, or discharge in the published rules.
Such is also true for the period of time after the event of the
Union's organizing efforts. The evidence relating to
warnings and suspensions, including the specific evidence
concerning warnings and suspensions of Mozley, Groff,
O'Connor, and Johnson reflects warnings and suspensions
consistent with the purport of the published rules.
The evidence relating to whether or not Respondent
ignored its rules prior to June 11, 1976, is limited to
testimony concerning the enforcement of rules concerning
lateness or return to work, and to the rule concerning
leaving from Respondent's premises without permission.
flexibility in determining discipline. Kelly appeared a very frank, forthright
and truthful witness, and answered such questions relating to discipline,
habitual absences, and habitual lateness. The difference between consider-
ation of lateness and habitual lateness, absence and habitual absences, at
first blush present a confusing picture. I am persuaded that Kelly was an
honest and truthful witness and that, considering his testimony as a whole
and the logical consistency of facts, the facts are as set forth.
615
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As to the enforcement of the rule concerning leaving
Respondent's premises without permission, Walker testi-
fied to having left Respondent's premises without permis-
sion, that on such occasion he was seen by his immediate
supervisor. As to such testimony, however, no attempt was
made to establish the date or approximate date that Walker
left the premises without permission and when the same
was observed by a supervisor. In view of Respondent's
actions in reemphasizing the implementation of its rules in
February 1976, such testimony is of inconsequential value
in resolving the issues in this case. Further testimony by
Walker was to the effect that he had seen a supervisor, Orr,
leave the premises on Walker's bike during breaktime in
1974. Again, in view of Respondent's actions in February
1976, of reemphasizing its rules and since Orr was a
supervisor, such evidence is of inconsequential value in
resolving the issues in this case.
The General Counsel also presented testimonial evidence
by O'Connor to the effect that he had left the plant quite a
few times on coffeebreaks, that he had taken his bike off
the premises on breaks, and that he was never warned
about taking his bike off the premises on breaks. Such
testimony, however, did not refer to whether or not
O'Connor had received permission to leave on such
occasions. Nor did such testimony reveal the date or dates
of such occurrences. Considering this and the evidence
revealing Respondent's emphasizing its rules in February
1976, such evidence is of inconsequential value in resolving
the issues in this case.
The credited testimony of Chapman and the exhibits in
the record relating to discipline imposed on Groff and
O'Connor support a finding that Chapman did impose
discipline on Groff and O'Connor after February and to
the date of their discharge. The credited testimony of
Chapman reveals Chapman to be a person who tried to be
reasonable, who, on occasion when Groff and O'Connor
drove up at the time for reporting to work, allowed them to
punch in and then to park their car; who was aware of
Groffs and O'Connor's tendency to overstay breaks and
who warned them about such incidents; who was aware
that Groff and O'Connor left the premises without
permission; and warned them about such actions and that
they should not do so unless in an emergency. 8 Chapman
also gave Groff and O'Connor permission at times to leave
the premises at lunchtime to go home, apparently for
lunch. Considering, however, the imposition of discipline
by Chapman in March and April 1976, on O'Connor, and
in February, March, and April 1976, on Groff, it is clear
that Chapman, although somewhat lenient and reasonable,
did not ignore the rules in his supervision of Groff and
O'Connor.
2. The facts reveal that the Union commenced its
organizational activities directed at Respondent's employ-
ees on or about April 20, 1976. As to the alleged
discriminatees, the facts reveal that O'Connor and Groff
signed union cards on April 22, 1976, that Johnson signed a
union card on April 21, 1976, and that Mozley did not sign
a union card. The facts also reveal that O'Connor, in
addition to signing a union card, talked to Dave Walker
8 I credit Chapman's testimony over O'Connor's to this point as to any
conflict thereto.
and other employees about the Union. Mozley was not at
the plant on the day that union cards were signed. Mozley,
however, talked to other employees about the Union and
did pass out some union leaflets on his shift.
The bargaining unit involved in the representation
election was small in number, consisting of 37 employees.
The plant's work layout, however, is rather large. No
contention and no evidence was submitted to support a
basis of inference of company knowledge of specific
employee union activity. Thus, no evidence was presented
to reveal closeness of work stations, assembly line, or other
factors normally considered with respect to the question of
possible inference of company knowledge of union activity
on the part of specific individuals.
The evidence relating to Respondent's conduct violative
of Section 8(aXl) does not reveal a basis of direct evidence
of or supportive of an inference of specific company
knowledge of union activity or beliefs by individuals.
Rather such conduct revealed itself to be an unlawful
campaign activity of the persuasion type excepting for
Moss' interrogation of O'Connor. O'Connor's testimony as
to such interrogation was presented in such a general
manner that there are no details to suggest company
knowledge, or that O'Connor revealed his own or other
employees' preference for the Union.
Although I set forth the above discussion and consider-
ation of the question of company knowledge of employee
union activity, the General Counsel's clear position as to
the theory of his case excludes a contention that Respon-
dent had specific knowledge of individual employee union
activity or beliefs. Further, the General Counsel's theory is
of such a nature that actual union activity or beliefs of the
individual employees who were discharged is essentially
irrelevant. Rather, the General Counsel's theory is broad
based and simply that Respondent was irritated at its
whole complement of employees for having selected the
Union. Thus, the General Counsel contends that Respon-
dent retaliated in a general effect by enforcement of rules
because the employees selected the Union.
3. The evidence as to when Respondent first became
aware of union activity is not precise. Kelly credibly
testified to the effect that he first became aware of the
Union when he received a petition for a representation
election about a month before June 9, 1976. The testimony
of O'Connor and Mozley placed the timing of some of
Respondent's promises of benefits and interrogation in
April, May, and June. O'Connor's testimony to the effect
that Moss engaged in unlawful interrogation about union
activities and beliefs set such as occurring during April
through June. Such testimony was general in effect. In sum
the evidence has probative value to reveal that Respondent
acquired knowledge and commenced a campaign against
the Union in May 1976.
Respondent's campaign did not include any threats of
reprisals but was rather geared to the promise of benefits to
persuade individual employees to vote against the Union in
the pending election.
On the day before the election, Plant Manager Kelly
made a speech to employees to present Respondent's
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T. F. E. INDUSTRIES
arguments against having a union. Kelly argued in effect
that he had made beneficial changes for the employees and
that if the employees voted for the union, they were in
effect saying that he had not done a good job and were
voting against him. Kelly told the employees in effect that
he considered that if they voted for the Union it was a
personal vote against him. 9
4. On June 9, 1976, the NLRB representation election
was held for Respondent's employees and the employees
voted 23 for, and 12 against, the selection of the Union as
collective-bargaining representative.
The Discharge of Mozley
5. On June 9, 1976, an incident occurred between
David Mozley and one of Respondent's supervisors,
Alfano. The details of such incident are set forth later
herein. On June 9, 1976, Supervisor McCormick told
Mozley that he was being suspended until further notice. It
is clear that Mozley knew that such action related to his
conduct toward Alfano. On June 10, 1976, Mozley had a
discussion with Plant Manager Kelly. It is clear that
Mozley knew at this time that Kelly was considering
whether Mozley should be discharged. On June 10, 1976,
Respondent decided to discharge Mozley effective as of
June 9, 1976. Thereafter, on Monday, June 14, 1976,
Mozley telephoned Foreman Chapman,t 0 told Chapman
that he understood that he had been fired and that he had
not been notified of it, and asked if it were true that he had
been fired. Chapman told Mozley that it was true and
asked Mozley to come down and talk it over a little bit.
Prior to the events leading to Mozley's discharge on June
9, 1976, the following may be summarized as to Respon-
dent's file record of warnings and discipline for Mozley. On
September 11, 1975, Respondent noted a written warning
for Mozley's failure to give notice of not reporting to work.
On March 30, 1976, Respondent noted a written warning
for Mozley's not showing up for work after having called
and saying he would be late." On April 21, 1976, the
records reveal that Respondent suspended Mozley for 3
days "for not calling up."
The Events of June 9, 197612
On June 9, 1976, Mozley had lunch around 2 to 2:30
p.m. Mozley had a couple of beers with his lunch. Mozley
then went to the plant at 3 p.m. and voted in the NLRB
representation election. Afterwards, Mozley reported to his
work station. Jack Covill, a person whose duties seem to be
related to Respondent's production processes, told Mozley
that Respondent had another job for him to do, that
Mozley was being put on the flattening machine. Mozley
went to the flattening machine. The day was a "hot" day
and apparently the flattening machine work is "hot."
Mozley asked Covill what it was that he was going to do.
Covill told Mozley in effect that there was a problem with
9 1 am not persuaded that Kelly intended such remarks as a threat of
retaliatory conduct if the employees selected the Union. The evidence
reveals that Kelly's remarks were in effect answers to contentions made by
the Union.
'o The pleadings establish that Chapman was a foreman. Chapman
described himself as plant supervisor.
" Whether Respondent gave Mozley a copy of such warnings is not
the material, that there had been quite a few runs, that the
material was thick and would not lay down flat, that they
would have to try something new with the material, that
Process Engineering Manager Alfano would tell him what
to do, and that in the meantime he should set the machine
up as he normally would.
Mozley started setting the machine up and putting the
material (a roll) on a spindle ready to thread through.
Covill told Mozley in effect that he would get Alfano to tell
him what to do.
Covill left and later returned with Alfano. Covill told
Alfano to tell Mozley what he had to do to get the material
to lay down correctly. Alfano made some remarks to the
effect that the material was too wide, that something was
wrong with it, that maybe they could shrink the material.
Alfano started to work on trying to thread the machine.
Mozley considered that Alfano should be giving him
instructions. Mozley also considered that Alfano was not
setting the machine up properly. Mozley became angry,
yelled at Alfano, called Alfano a "horse's ass" and an "ass
hole." Mozley pushed Alfano aside and told him that he
could do the job himself, that he knew what he was doing,
that he worked on this machine. Alfano told Mozley,
"Okay, that's it."
Mozley's remarks to Alfano were loud and boisterous
and were overheard by "Engineering Technician" McCor-
mick. McCormick came up while Mozley and Alfano were
talking and told Mozley to calm down, to knock off the
cussing. Mozley did not immediately cease his talking but
as a result of McCormick's remarks did finally cease his
remarks.
Alfano and McCormick left Mozley and went into the
office to see Plant Manager Kelly. Alfano and McCormick
reported the incident with Mozley to Kelly. Present with
Kelly was a Mr. Cortjohn, director of labor relations of
Respondent's parent company. Kelly asked Cortjohn how
he should handle the matter. Cortjohn told Kelly to handle
the matter the way he would normally handle it. Kelly told
McCormick to suspend Mozley until further notice, until
someone contacted him.
In the meantime Mozley had tried to run some material
through the flattener without much success. McCormick
returned from the office to where Mozley was working and
told Mozley that Kelly had told him to tell Mozley that he
was suspended, that he should go home until further notice,
until someone got in touch with him. Mozley asked
McCormick when he thought Kelly would call him.
McCormick told Mozley that he did not know. McCormick
told Mozley to shut the machine down. Mozley refused to
shut the machine down and told McCormick to shut the
machine down himself.
On June 10, 1976, Mozley contacted Plant Manager
Kelly about the June 9, 1976, incident. What occurred is
revealed by the following credited excerpts from Mozley's
testimony.
clear. The exhibits reveal that Morley signed a "Pay Roll Change Notice"
with remarks to the effect of such warrungs. It appears that Respondent
utilized such "Pay Roll Change Notice" as a record of warnings and
construed the filing a recording of such warnings as a written warning.
12 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Mozley, Alfano, McCornuck, and Kelly.
617
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Yes, I did. The next morning, June 10th I called
up the office and asked for an appointment with Bill
Kelly, at an hour that was convenient with him. It was
set up for eleven-thirty that morning.
Q. Did you see him?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Would you tell us what he said, and what you
said?
A. I came in, and I said, "Bill, how can you have
one day offered me these benefits, and then the next
day suspend me without even talking to me, and
hearing my side of the story. He said, "Well, Dave, I
had my hands full with the Union that day. I just went
by what people told me. They came in, they said you
were yelling and there was alcohol on your breath,"
and I said, "Bill, I had a couple of beers before I came
in, there's the alcohol on my breath." He said, "Well,
when did you have these beers?" and I said, "Well, I
had them around two, two-thirty." He said, "Well, you
know, you're not supposed to drink. I'd say it wouldn't
be proper to drink anytime after twelve o'clock if you
have to be in here at three o'clock." He went on in
length about how alcohol has no place in the plant, and
I said, "Well, Bill, I told you last night that I don't - I
do have a little problem with alcohol, but like I never
come in here when I'm drunk, because I realize you've
got very expensive equipment around here, and I can't
be coming in here drunk and working with this kind of
expensive equipment. I realize that." So he said, "Well,
let's call in Steve Alfano and Jim McCormick and let's
see what they have to say." So Jim McCormick came in
first. Steve Alfano didn't come in until later. So we got
into a discussion and Bill Kelly - I remember one
question he asked Jim, he says; about the alcohol, he
says, "Well, would you say Dave was drunk at the
time?" and Jim said, "No, I wouldn't say he was drunk.
He wasn't staggering or anything like that, but he did
have alcohol on his breath."
Then Steve Alfano came in, and Bill Kelly went
through what I had told him was my side of the story,
and he capsulated whatever Steve said was his side of
the story. Steve and I got into a discussion about how I
can't be treating supervisors in this kind of way. That
was no way to act. Previous to him coming in, I did tell
Bill Kelly that I wouldn't object to apologizing to Steve.
I really thought this incident was just a quick flare-up,
and nothing more serious than that. So, then when they
came back in, Steve and I had a discussion and then
Steve left cause it was getting on towards lunchtime. So
I asked Bill, I said, "Well, Bill," - Bill offered, he said,
"Well, I'm still mulling this over in my mind. I'm still
keeping in mind the idea of discharge."
Then we go into another discussion about the way
that the Union rules - not the Union; the plant rules
works. I asked him why -I said the last suspension, I
'1 Some of the questions directed to Kelly related to whether Kelly on
June 9. 1976. directed McCormick to prepare the paperwork. This point
seems to have been confused in the dialogue of the testimony and the
questions that followed. Initially. witness Alfano was questioned as to
several events. At one point, in a conclusionary manner, Alfano testified to
the effect that McCormick prepared the paperwork. Later, apparently
assuming this answer to be related to the events of June 9, 1976, witness
had protested the suspension that John Parquette, he
was the one who gave it to me; and I said, "Really, I
think I should have had a warning, because in that
particular offense, which was coming to work - not
coming to work and not calling, I had had one warning
already; but the rules say for a warning, a warning, and
then a suspension, and then a dismissal. But I had only
had one written warning for that particular thing, but I
also had a written warning in absences." So he said, he
applied the warning in absences, also into the same -
up to the category of not coming into work and not
calling in; and therefore, that the second time when I
didn't come in and didn't call in, that was punishable
by a suspension.
Now I was in a position that I had used up one in
suspensions, and that I could be liable for a dismissal;
and he was going to keep that in mind. He didn't want
to make a snap decision. I asked him when he thought
he might make up his mind, and he said, "Well, this
being a Thursday," he said, "If I don't call you before
Monday, then you can consider yourself - that you
can come back to work.", and I said, "All right,", and I
left the meeting.
On June 10, 1976, Plant Manager Kelly decided to
discharge Mozley. Such decision was made after consulta-
tion with the Company's attorney and with the parent
company's labor relations director. Such decision was
based upon a consideration of what Kelly would have done
under normal circumstances. Thereafter, Supervisor
McCormick was instructed to complete the paperwork
concerning Mozley's discharge.
On June 14, 1976, Mozley telephoned the plant, spoke to
Foreman Chapman, told Chapman that he understood he
had been fired and that he had not been officially notified
of his discharge, and asked Chapman if it were true that he
(Mozley) had been fired. Chapman told Mozley that it was
true that he had been fired.
6. Michael Groff and Patrick O'Connor were fired on
June 11, 1976, with the assigned reason that they were fired
for leaving the premises on a coffeebreak and reporting
back late.
In addition to all of the foregoing facts, the following
facts relevant to the issues involved may be noted.
Respondent's records of warnings and discipline for Groff
reveals the following: On February 10, 1975, Groff
received a written warning for being late on February 3, 4,
and 7; on November 7, 1975, Groff received a written
warning for "damage done to the new slitter blade due to
carelessness"; on February 6, 1976, Groff received a
written warning for "coming in late" on February 2, 3, and
5; on March 15, 1976, Groff received a written warning for
coming in late; and on April 2, 1976, Groff received a
suspension of 3 days for coming in late.
Kelly was asked if he had not testified to having instructed McCormick on
June 9, 1976, to prepare the paperwork. Considering the events of June 10.
1976, 1 am persuaded that Kelly truthfully denied having given such
instructions. Considering the exhibit as to the effective day of discharge. I
am persuaded that McCormick was told on June 10, 1976. to prepare the
paperwork, and did so, dating the same as June 9, 1976.
618
T. F. E. INDUSTRIES
Respondent's records for Patrick O'Connor reveal the
following: On March 4, 1976, O'Connor received a written
warning for coming in late; on March 22, 1976, O'Connor
received a second written warning for coming in late; and
on April 22, 1976, O'Connor received a 3-day suspension
for coming in late.
The Respondent's employees have a break period each
morning.14 The commencement of the break period is
flexible and depends upon the arrival time of a coffee
truck. The normal practice is that Foreman Chapman
announces the break period upon the arrival of the coffee
truck and, after the last employee has visited the coffee
truck, allows the break to continue for about 10 minutes.
Most of the employees are free to take their break
immediately after Chapman has announced the break. A
few of the employees assigned to jobs in the pressure
sensitive room have to wait to be relieved by a leadman or
someone else to take their break. Such employees in the
pressure sensitive room on certain jobs take breaks one at a
time.
Much testimony was presented as to the determination
of how long the break periods really were. The sum of the
evidence persuades that the break periods averaged around
15 minutes in length.
The facts reveal that Foreman Chapman had, in the past,
been somewhat lenient with employees Groff and
O'Connor as to attendance, as to overstaying breaks, and
as to leaving the premises without permission. The facts
reveal, however, that Chapman had tightened up with
respect to the issuance of discipline to O'Connor and
Groff, and had warned O'Connor and Groff about
adhering to the rules concerning overstaying breaks and
leaving Respondent's premises without permission. The
facts are clear that O'Connor, at least, had agreed to abide
by the 10-minute breaktime.
Foreman Chapman had in the past, when he was going
to be absent, alerted Foreman Merrill to the problem of
locating O'Connor and Groff, apparently at the end of
break periods and other times. Chapman had told Merrill
of a place in the bushes near the plant where O'Connor and
Groff liked to take their breaks.
On June 10, 1976, Chapman apparently had to be away
from the plant because of illness. On such date Foreman
Merrill was executing the responsibilities of supervision
normally carried out by Chapman.
On June 10, 1976, the morning break period commenced
around 10 minutes to 9 a.m. Sometime after the break
period started, an office clerical called Foreman Merrill
and asked for Groffs and O'Connor's labor tickets. Merrill
apparently took a fast look for Groff and O'Connor and
then left a note for Calabro, their leadman, that he was
looking for Groff and O'Connor and could not find them.
After Calabro had timed or estimated that O'Connor,
whom he had relieved for break, had been gone for 10
minutes, Calabro looked for Groff and O'Connor and was
unable to find them. Calabro then saw Merrill and told him
in effect that the two were probably on break but he could
14 The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of the
testimony of Walker. Chapman, Kelly. Calabro. O'Connor, and Merrill.
1, I credit Merrill's timing of events. O'Connor testified to the effect that
he and Groff returned to work from the break approximately 5 minutes late.
not find them. Merrill and Calabro then both looked
unsuccessfully for Groff and O'Connor. Later Groff and
O'Connor, who had left the plant premises on their
motorcycles without permission, returned to the plant
around 9:30 a.m.15 Calabro told Groff and O'Connor that
Foreman Merrill wanted to see them. Groff and O'Connor
went to see Merrill. Merrill told Groff and O'Connor that
the break period was for 10 minutes, that he knew they
took more than 10-minute breaks, that, however, as long as
he was foreman they should not let it happen again, that
the next time they did they would go out the door, and that
he had to tell his boss where they had been. Groff and
O'Connor apologized and said that it would not happen
again. Groff and O'Connor then returned to work.
In the meantime, while Merrill was looking for Groff and
O'Connor, Merrill had reported to Plant Manager Kelly
that he could not find Groff and O'Connor. Later, after
Groff and O'Connor had returned to work after breaktime,
Merrill reported, about 20 minutes later, to Kelly that the
two had returned to work.
On June 11, 1976, Foreman Chapman and Plant
Manager Kelly discussed Groffs and O'Connor's leaving
the plant without permission during breaktime and
returning late from said break. At this time Plant Manager
Kelly decided to fire Groff and O'Connor for extending
their break period and for leaving the plant premises
during such time without permission. Merrill was present
and had been called in apparently for the discussion
concerning Groff and O'Connor and in connection with
the issuance of discipline to Johnson for being late.
Chapman then went out to see Groff and O'Connor and
asked them if they had taken their motorcycles out on
break the day before. Upon receiving an affirmative reply,
Chapman told Groff and O'Connor that they were
dismissed.
7. Stanly Johnson was given a 3-day suspension on
June 11, 1976, for being late. Respondent's records and the
testimony of witnesses reveal that on December 4, 1974,
Johnson received a written warning for being absent and
for being late for work; on December 9, 1974, Johnson
received a second written warning for being late; and on
March 31, 1976, Johnson was demoted as department
leader because he punched a man working under him.
In addition to all of the facts previously set forth, the
following facts are relevant to the issue as to whether
Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by
the issuance of the 3-day suspension to Johnson on June
11, 1976.
Around 2 or 3 weeks before June I 11, 1976, Johnson
apparently had car trouble, was absent from work, and
explained the basis of his absence as having to have his car
worked on. For some reason Respondent checked the place
it thought Johnson was having his car fixed and from such
check did not believe Johnson's explanation. Respondent
did not discipline Johnson for this event. Whether the
failure to discipline Johnson arose from uncertainty as to
Considenng the total testimony of Memill and Calabro as to the timing of
events, I am persuaded that such testimony of Merrill's is more credible
than that of O'Connor's as to the timing of events.
619
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
where Johnson had related or had his car fixed is not
revealed by the evidence.
On or about June 8, 1976, because of car trouble,
Johnson was riding to work with his sister or a fellow
employee named Oakley. On June 8, 1976, Johnson
tho'ght he had asked Oakley for a ride to work, apparently
had not made such a request, discovered he would be late
for work, called Foreman Merrill, and told Merrill that he
would be late and was told by Merrill in effect, "All right."
Johnson thereafter reported to work late on June 8, 1976.
On June 9, 1976, Johnson reported late for work. On June 8
and 9, 1976, Johnson spoke to Foreman Merrill and
indicated in effect that part of his problem about getting to
work on time was because he had a problem with his car
battery. Merrill told Johnson he should get the battery
fixed. On June 10, 1976, Johnson had apparently made
arrangements with employee Oakley to ride to work.
Oakley overslept on June 10, 1976, and called in and
reported to Foreman Merrill that he and Johnson would be
late. Oakley and Johnson reported late to work on June 10,
1976.
On June 10, 1976, Foreman Merrill gave Johnson a
verbal warning for reporting to work late. Merrill told
Johnson that Kelly had said he was upset that the Union
was voted in, that the men would try to get away with
everything they could, and that this was why he was giving
him the verbal warning.
On June 11, 1976, Plant Manager Kelly consulted with
Foreman Merrill about the imposition of discipline on
Johnson. Kelly decided that Johnson had been habitually
late and because of this and his past record that Johnson
should receive a 3-day suspension. Kelly instructed Merrill
to give Johnson a 3-day suspension for being late and to
give Oakley a written warning for being late. Merrill then
gave Johnson the 3-day suspension for being late and
apparently gave Oakley a written warning for being late.
Contentions and Conclusions
The General Counsel contends that the discharges of
Groff, O'Connor, and Mozley on or about June 11, 1976,
and the suspension of Johnson on June II, 1976, for 3 days,
were discriminatory and in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(I) of the Act because Respondent retaliated against
employees by enforcement of rules because the employees
had selected the Union. Respondent contends that the
discharge of Groff, O'Connor, and Mozley, and the
suspension of Johnson were not for discriminatory or
retaliatory reasons but were simply because the employees
had violated plant rules or engaged in conduct warranting
discipline.
Considering all of the evidence, I am persuaded and
conclude and find that the evidence is insufficient to reveal
that Respondent retaliated against employees because they
selected the Union on June 9, 1976, by enforcement of
plant rules or discipline.
First, I note that the General Counsel does not contend
or argue a theory that Respondent had knowledge of the
individual employees' union activities or desires or that
such employees were singled out for discriminatory
treatment on such basis. Nor would the facts support such
theory.
The evidence of violative conduct on Respondent's part
is limited to unlawful promise of benefits and to unlawful
interrogation. There is no evidence of threats of reprisals or
other evidence to reveal a propensity to discriminate.
There is evidence that Plant Manager Kelly indicated to
employees before the election that a vote for the Union was
a vote against him. This evidence, however, was in the
context of campaign argument wherein the Union had
argued that the employees were deficient in benefits, and
Kelly was arguing to employees that he had secured
benefits for them. The issue was posed by Kelly to the
employees that if they voted for the Union, they were
saying in effect that he had failed in securing benefits for
them. It would be speculative to infer that this constituted
a message of threat or reprisal if the employees voted for
the Union or to assume from this that Kelly would be
inclined to retaliate against employees if they voted for the
Union.
There is also evidence that Kelly was concerned that the
employees, having selected the Union, might abuse
violations of plant rules. This, coupled with enforcement of
rules, does not mean, however, that rules are enforced in a
discriminatory manner or as a means of retaliation.
Much litigation occurred concerning Respondent's rules,
enforcement thereof, and whether Respondent was lenient
in the enforcement of rules. The overall evidence reveals
that Respondent did enforce its rules, and did follow an
across-the-board progressive discipline factor. The evi-
dence revealed some leniency in the application of rules as
regards O'Connor and Groff. It is clear, however, that
Foreman Chapman had tightened up in the enforcement of
rules with O'Connor and Groff and had warned the two
employees about their conduct.
The facts are also clear that Respondent was lenient as
regards some violations of lateness and absences. The
record of discipline clearly reveals that the rules were,
however, generally enforced.
As to the discharge of Groff and O'Connor, the
background facts as to Chapman's tightening up of rules
enforcement indicate the probability that Chapman would
have instituted discharges for Groff and O'Connor under
circumstances wherein Plant Manager Kelly was aware of
their violations of the rules. The events leading to Groffs
and O'Connor's discharges occurred while Chapman was
away from work. The facts reveal that Kelly believed in
enforcement of the plant rules, that Foreman Merrill was
unhappy about not being able to find Groff and O'Connor
on June 10, 1976, and that Kelly was aware of all the facts.
Under these circumstances, I am persuaded that Chapman
would not try to protect Groff and O'Connor, and I am
persuaded that Respondent simply discharged Groff and
O'Connor for violation of plant rules.
I have considered the fact that the discharges of Groff,
O'Connor, and Mozley, and the suspension of Johnson
followed closely the date of the election on June 9, 1976.
The facts are clear that the employees violated rules and
engaged in conduct otherwise warranting discipline. Union
activity does not insulate an employee from discharge for
reasons unrelated to union activity.
As to Mozley, the facts are clear that he engaged in name
calling and acted insubordinately toward both Alfano and
620
T. F. E. INDUSTRIES
McCormick on June 9, 1976. Although the facts reveal that
vulgar and profane language was commonplace, the facts
do not reveal that personally directed or personally
insulting language was condoned. Mozley's calling Alfano
a "horse's ass" and an "ass hole" was personally directed,
insulting, and insubordinate in the context of the receipt of
instructions. Similarly, Mozley's telling McCormick to shut
the machine down himself was an act of insubordination.
As to the contention that Respondent's June 8, 1976,
offer of benefits insulated Mozley in effect from discharge,
I note the following. The fact that promises of benefits are
made in an election campaign does not necessarily reveal
that such promises are sincerely meant or intended to be
kept. In this case, I am persuaded that Respondent was
trying to persuade Mozley to vote against the Union. I am
not persuaded that Respondent intended to make him an
inspector or to ignore his problem with alcohol. Even the
dialogue between Mozley and Respondent's supervisors
relating to the possibility of Mozley's getting the inspector's
job was postulated upon the fact that Mozley's problem
was one that he could control.
The sum of the evidence reveals that Mozley had had a
couple of beers shortly before being at work, became angry
and insubordinate to a person, part of management, was
insulting, and was fired because of this in connection with
a background of warnings and suspension discipline.
As to Johnson, Johnson was late for 3 days in a row.
Under the circumstances, Respondent cannot be said to be
without justification in giving a 3-day suspension for
lateness. Oakley, the other employee late on June 10, 1976,
was given a written warning.
Considering all of the evidence, I conclude and find that
the facts are insufficient to reveal that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by the discharges of
Groff, O'Connor, and Mozley, or the suspension of
Johnson. Accordingly, it will be recommended that the
allegations of conduct violative of Section 8(a)3) and (I) of
the Act be dismissed.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. T. F. E. Industries, a Division of Dayco, Inc.,
Respondent herein, is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local No. 64, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8(aX 1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusins of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 16
The Respondent, T. F. E. Industries, a Division of
Dayco, Inc., Warwick, Rhode Island, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their or
other employees' union activities or desires.
(b) Promising or offering employees benefits to dissuade
them from supporting the Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act except to the
extent that such rights may be affected by lawful agree-
ments in accord with Section 8(aX3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at Respondent's plant at Warwick, Rhode
Island, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representatives, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by Respon-
dent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region I, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
I6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
i? In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Lahor Relations Board."
621
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of unlawful
conduct not specifically found to be violative herein be
dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our employees
about their or other employees' union activities or
desires.
WE WILL NOT promise or offer our employees
benefits to dissuade them from supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act except to
the extent that such rights may be affected by lawful
agreements in accordance with Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
T. F. E. INDUSTRIES, A
DIVISION OF DAYCO, INC.
622