03a00054
08-30-2000
Sylvester Blaze, Petitioner, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Sylvester Blaze v. United States Postal Service
03A00054
08-30-00
.
Sylvester Blaze,
Petitioner,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Petition No. 03A00054
MSPB No. DA-0752-98-0497-I-2
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
On February 9, 2000, petitioner filed a timely petition with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the Commission) asking for review
of a Final Order issued by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
concerning his claim of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et
seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1> Petitioner,
a Group Leader Mail Handler, PS-5, at an agency facility in Shreveport,
Louisiana, claimed that he was discriminated against on the bases of
race (Black), age (over 40 years old), disability (job related stress),
and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when the agency removed him, effective
June 8, 1996, based on a charge of improper conduct: striking a coworker.
On January 28, 1999, petitioner filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB.
After a hearing, the Administrative Judge (AJ) found that the agency's
removal of petitioner was reasonable. In a decision dated January 13,
2000, the Board denied petitioner's petition for review. This appeal
followed.
BACKGROUND
With respect to petitioner's claims of age and racial discrimination,
the AJ found that petitioner did not demonstrate that the agency's
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for removing him was a pretext
for discrimination. The agency's reason for removing petitioner was his
physical assault of a fellow employee. Petitioner did not demonstrate
pretext. For instance, he did not show that employees outside his
protected bases of age and race were treated differently under similar
circumstances.
With respect to petitioner's claim of reprisal discrimination, the AJ
found that petitioner did not demonstrate a prima facie case of reprisal.
He did not show a nexus between the protected activity and the agency's
action because the prior EEO activity was an EEO complaint that petitioner
had filed ten (10) years earlier. The AJ found that this prior activity
had no bearing on the agency's decision to remove petitioner.
With respect to petitioner's claim of disability discrimination, the AJ
found that petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination because he did not show that he was an individual with
a disability. Petitioner did not show how his impairment of job related
stress substantially limited a major life activity, nor did he show
that the agency perceived him as disabled. The AJ found further that,
even assuming petitioner was an individual with a disability, the agency
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the removal,
namely petitioner's behavior towards his coworker, and petitioner did
not show pretext. Petitioner failed to show that the job related stress
caused him to physically assault his coworker. In addition, petitioner
did not show that his alleged disability prevented him from following
the agency's directive against violence in the workplace.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission has jurisdiction over
mixed case appeals on which the MSPB has issued a decision that makes
determinations on allegations of discrimination. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.303
et seq. The Commission must determine whether the decision of the
MSPB with respect to the allegation of discrimination constitutes an
incorrect interpretation of any applicable law, rule, regulation or policy
directive, or is not supported by the evidence in the record as a whole.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.305(c).
Race, Age, Reprisal
Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,
the Commission finds that the MSPB's decision, concerning the bases of
race, age, and reprisal, constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws,
rules, regulations, and policies governing this matter and is supported
by the evidence in the record as a whole.
Disability
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For petitioner to prevail, he must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a
prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency
has met its burden, the petitioner bears the ultimate responsibility to
persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which
the first step normally consists of determining the existence of
a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the
agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to
the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
Assuming arguendo that petitioner is a qualified individual with a
disability, 29 C.F.R.
� 1630.2, the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions, namely that petitioner struck a fellow employee, injuring
him severely. Petitioner has not shown that the agency's reason was
pretext for discrimination. He has not shown that a similarly situated
employee outside of his protected group was treated differently, nor does
the record reveal any other evidence of pretext. We find, therefore,
that petitioner failed to prove that he was discriminated against on
the basis of disability.
CONCLUSION
Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,
it is the decision of the Commission to CONCUR with the final decision
of the MSPB finding no discrimination.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W0400)
This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of
administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right
to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,
based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, WITHIN
THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date that you receive this decision.
If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE
COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD,
IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
__08-30-00________________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to petitioner, petitioner's representative
(if applicable), the agency, and the MSPB on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.