Suzuki Motor Corporation

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 23, 2019

87826302 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 23, 2019)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB
Mailed: August 23, 2019

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Suzuki Motor Corp.
_____

Serial No. 87826302
_____

Terrence T. Huang of Suzuki Legal,
for Suzuki Motor Corp.

Heather Schubert, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 103,
Stacy Wahlberg, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Cataldo, Ritchie, and Heasley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Cataldo, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Applicant, Suzuki Motor Corp., seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark , identifying “motorcycles and component parts
and structural parts therefor, all of the foregoing sold exclusively through authorized
dealers and authorized service outlets” in International Class 12.1

1 Application Serial No. 87826302 was filed on March 8, 2018, based upon Applicant’s
assertion of use of the mark in commerce under Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(a), asserting March 8, 2018 as a date of first use of the mark anywhere and in
Serial No. 87826302
- 2 -
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with the cited registered mark INTRUDER (in standard
characters) identifying, “bicycles” in International Class 12.2
After the Trademark Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant
appealed to this Board. We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Evidentiary Matter
Applicant submitted numerous pages of evidence as exhibits to its appeal brief.3
To the extent Applicant submitted with its appeal brief evidence that is duplicative
of evidence previously submitted during prosecution, we need not and do not give this
redundant evidence any consideration. Further, any of the evidence submitted with
Applicant’s appeal brief that was not previously submitted during prosecution is
untimely and will not be considered.4 See Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R.

commerce. The application includes the following description of the mark: “The mark consists
of the stylized ‘S’ in red, followed by block characters ‘SUZUKI INTRUDER’ in black.”

Page references to the application record are to the downloadable .pdf version of the USPTO’s
Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) system. References to the briefs, motions
and orders on appeal are to the Board’s TTABVUE docket system.

2 Registration No. 3420756 issued on the Principal Register on April 29, 2008. Section 8 and
15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged. First Renewal.
3 9 TTABVUE 20-48.
4 The proper procedure for an applicant or examining attorney to introduce evidence after an
appeal has been filed is to submit a written request with the Board to suspend the appeal
and remand the application for further examination. See Trademark Rule 2.142(d), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.142(d). See also TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE
(TBMP) § 1207.02 (June 2019) and authorities cited therein.
Serial No. 87826302
- 3 -
§ 2.142(d); TBMP § 1203.02(e) and § 1207.01 (June 2019) and authorities cited
therein.
II. Likelihood of Confusion

We base our determination of likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section
2(d) on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the
factors enunciated in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ
563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”), cited in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 113 USPQ2d 2045, 049 (2015); see also In re Guild Mortg.
Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1161-62 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
We have considered each DuPont factor that is relevant, and have treated other
factors as neutral. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797,
1800 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d
1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant to every case,
and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”));
ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015)
(“While we have considered each factor for which we have evidence, we focus our
analysis on those factors we find to be relevant.”).
Varying weights may be assigned to each DuPont factor depending on the evidence
presented. See Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98
USPQ2d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 26 USPQ2d
1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“the various evidentiary factors may play more or less
weighty roles in any particular determination”). Two key considerations are the
Serial No. 87826302
- 4 -
similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods. See Federated Foods,
Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (the
“fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); In re
FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670, 1672 (TTAB 2018).
A. The Goods, Channels of Trade, and Classes of Customers

The second DuPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration,” Stone Lion
Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1159
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62
USPQ2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput. Servs. Inc., 918
F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “This factor considers whether ‘the
consuming public may perceive [the respective goods or services of the parties] as
related enough to cause confusion about the source or origin of the goods and
services.’” In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1086 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (quoting Hewlett-Packard, 62 USPQ2d at 1004).
Therefore, to support a finding of likelihood of confusion, it is not necessary that
the goods be identical or even competitive. It is sufficient that the goods are related
in some manner, or that the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such
that they would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would give
rise, because of the marks, to a mistaken belief that they originate from the same
Serial No. 87826302
- 5 -
source or that there is an association or connection between the sources of the goods.
In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1635 (TTAB 2009).
In support of the refusal of registration, the Examining Attorney introduced with
her May 25, 2018 first Office Action,5 August 20, 2018 second Office Action,6 and
November 15, 2018 final Office Action7 printouts from third-party websites offering,
under the same mark, bicycles and motorcycles. These include: KTM, Yamaha, Audi,
BMW, Kawasaki and Ducati. This evidence demonstrates that at least six third
parties offer both Applicant’s goods and the goods identified in the cited registration
under the same mark.
The Examining Attorney further introduced with her August 20, 2018 second
Office Action8 copies of three registrations owned by Applicant that identify both
motorcycles and bicycles. These include Reg. Nos. 4482900 for the mark ALTO
(standard characters); Reg. No. 3181121 for the mark SGP (stylized); and S SUZUKI
WAY OF LIFE! (stylized).
The Examining Attorney also introduced into the record with her May 25, 2018
first Office Action,9 August 20, 2018 second Office Action,10 and November 15, 2018
final Office Action11 copies of over twenty use-based, third-party registrations for

5 At .pdf 14-17.
6 At .pdf 8-20.
7 At .pdf 9-10.
8 At .pdf 51-58.
9 At .pdf 18-29.
10 At .pdf 21-58.
11 At .pdf 11-42.
Serial No. 87826302
- 6 -
marks identifying, inter alia, bicycles and motorcycles. The following examples are
illustrative:
Reg. No. 4111008 for the mark BILTWELL and design;

Reg. No. 2291496 for the mark ZIPSTER (standard characters); and

Reg. No. 2574325 for the mark BIKEHARD (standard characters).

As a general proposition, although use-based, third-party registrations alone are not
evidence that the marks shown therein are in use or that the public is familiar with
them, they nonetheless may have some probative value to the extent they may serve
to suggest that the goods are of a kind that emanate from a single source. See In re
Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel &
Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard, 6
USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988). In this case, the totality of the website and
third-party registration evidence demonstrates that consumers would readily expect
that bicycles and motorcycles could emanate from the same sources. The evidence of
Applicant’s three prior registrations identifying, inter alia, bicycles and motorcycles
further demonstrates that consumers would readily expect Applicant to be the source
of both goods.
Applicant introduced into the record evidence from Registrant’s website with its
July 2, 2018 Response to Office Action, in support of its argument that the “bicycles”
in the cited registration are limited to children’s bikes and ride-on toy vehicles,
distributed through retailers such as Walmart, Target, Dick’s Sporting Goods and
Serial No. 87826302
- 7 -
Kohl’s.12 This argument is unavailing. An applicant may not restrict the scope of the
goods covered in the pleaded registration by argument or extrinsic evidence. See, e.g.,
In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ 763, 764 (TTAB 1986). Rather, we must
base our likelihood of confusion determination on the basis of the goods as they are
identified in the application and registration at issue. In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639,
640 (TTAB 1981); In re William Hodges & Co., Inc., 190 USPQ 47, 48 (TTAB 1976).
See also Octocom, 16 USPQ2d at 1787 (“The authority is legion that the question of
registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification
of goods set forth in the application regardless of what the record may reveal as to
the particular nature of an applicant’s goods, the particular channels of trade or the
class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed”).
As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor of our primary
reviewing court, explained in Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc.,
648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981):
Here, appellant seeks to register the word MONOPOLY as
its mark without any restrictions reflecting the facts in its
actual use which it argues on this appeal prevent likelihood
of confusion. We cannot take such facts into consideration
unless set forth in its application.

Likewise, in this case, we must analyze the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods based on the description of the goods set forth in the application and
registration at issue. In other words, we may not limit or restrict the bicycles listed
in the cited registration as urged by Applicant. Therefore, we must construe

12 At .pdf 15-16.
Serial No. 87826302
- 8 -
Registrant’s broadly identified bicycles as encompassing bicycles of all types and price
points, for all ages.
Evidence of record demonstrates that both Applicant’s goods and Registrant’s
goods may be encountered by the same classes of consumers under the same marks
in at least one common trade channel, i.e., the physical locations and corresponding
websites of bicycle and motorcycle dealers. In addition, the identification of goods in
the cited registration does not recite any limitations as to the channels of trade in
which the goods are or will be offered. In the absence of trade channel limitations on
the goods offered under the registered mark, we must presume that these goods are
offered in all customary trade channels. See Citigroup v. Capital City Bank Grp., 98
USPQ2d at 1261; In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006).
Applicant’s goods are identified as being “sold exclusively through authorized
dealers and authorized service outlets.” However, because the goods in the cited
registration are not restricted, they must be presumed to move in any common trade
channel therefor, including some of the same authorized dealerships and service
outlets. Cf. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing Hewlett-Packard v. Packard Press, 62 USPQ2d at 1005). In addition,
Applicant’s prior registrations identify both bicycles and motorcycles presumably
offered through its authorized dealers and service outlets.
We find that the DuPont factors of the relatedness of the goods, channels of trade
and consumers weigh in favor of likelihood of confusion.

Serial No. 87826302
- 9 -
B. Strength of the Cited Mark / Number and Nature of Similar Marks
We next evaluate the strength of the registered mark and the scope of protection
to which it is entitled. The fifth DuPont factor is the “fame” or strength of the prior
mark, and the sixth factor is the number and nature of similar marks in use for
similar goods or services. DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. In determining strength of a
mark, we consider both inherent strength, based on the nature of the mark itself, and
commercial strength or recognition. In re Chippendales USA Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96
USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its
conceptual strength (distinctiveness) and its marketplace strength (secondary
meaning).”).
Turning first to inherent strength, there is no evidence in the record to suggest
that the term “intruder” possesses any meaning in relation to bicycles. Thus, we find
on this record that INTRUDER appears to be arbitrary. See Nautilus Grp., Inc. v.
Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 372 F.3d 1330, 71 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining
an arbitrary mark as a “known word used in an unexpected or uncommon way” and
observing that such marks are typically strong); see also Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (arbitrary terms are conceptually strong trademarks). There is no
evidence regarding the mark’s commercial or marketplace strength.
Serial No. 87826302
- 10 -
Applicant submitted eleven third-party registrations of marks that consist of or
include INTRUDER,13 but most involve goods and services quite different from the
bicycles identified in the cited registrations,14 and therefore have little, if any, bearing
on the weakness of the registered mark. See Omaha Steaks Int’l v. Greater Omaha
Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 128 USPQ2d 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (error to rely on third-
party evidence of similar marks for dissimilar goods, as Board must focus “on goods
shown to be similar”); In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party registrations for goods in other classes
where the proffering party “has neither introduced evidence, nor provided adequate
explanation to support a determination that the existence of I AM marks for goods in
other classes, … support a finding that registrants’ marks are weak with respect to
the goods identified in their registrations”). Cf. In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d at
1674 n.11 (TTAB 2018).
In addition, Applicant submitted a list of 39 third-party applications and
registrations which consist of or include the word INTRUDER[S]15 retrieved from a
search of the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS). However, a
mere listing of third-party marks, without any accompanying indication of the goods
and/or services associated therewith, has little, if any, probative value. See TBMP §

13 July 2, 2018 Response to first Office Action at .pdf 18-19; October 11, 2018 first Request
for Reconsideration at .pdf 21-36; 4 TTABVUE 24-36.
14 For example, Applicant submitted registrations for INTRUDER identifying entertainment
services in the nature of online computer games, various clothing items, parachute canopies,
holsters, insecticide, hoists, booms and winches, safety glasses, motorhomes and ladders. Id.
15 Id.; Id. at 21-22; Id. at 24-25.
Serial No. 87826302
- 11 -
1208.02 and the authorities cited therein. Further, pending applications and expired
registrations are of no value, inasmuch as they only show that they have been filed.
See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 129 USPQ2d 1148, 1159 (TTAB 2019) (cancelled
registrations, abandoned applications, and pending applications are not probative
support for applicant’s argument of “consumer perceptions [of the subject marks] in
the marketplace”).
As noted above, we find that the registered mark is arbitrary as applied to the
identified goods. There is no evidence of third-party use; moreover, the evidence of
third-party registrations of identical marks is limited and concerns only unrelated
products and services. Cf. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters LLC, 794 F.3d 1334,
115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674-75 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen
GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d
1129, 1135-36 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We therefore find that the registered mark is entitled
to the broad scope of protection to which arbitrary and conceptually strong marks are
entitled. See Joseph Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d
1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733, 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (stating that likelihood of confusion
fame varies along a spectrum from very strong to very weak).
C. The Marks

Under the first DuPont factor, we determine the similarity or dissimilarity of
Applicant’s and Registrant’s marks in their entireties, taking into account their
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. DuPont, 177 USPQ at
567; Stone Lion Capital v. Lion Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1160; Palm Bay Imps., Inc.
Serial No. 87826302
- 12 -
v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 73 USPQ2d at 1692.
“‘Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.’ In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014); accord Krim-
Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ 523, 526 (CCPA 1968)
(“It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or sound alone is likely to
cause confusion.”) (citation omitted).” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742,
1746 (TTAB 2018). “The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks,
but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the parties.” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668
F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See also Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1470
(TTAB 2016); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1089 (TTAB 2016).
Consumers may not necessarily encounter the marks in proximity to one another and
must rely upon their recollections thereof over time. In re Mucky Duck Mustard, 6
USPQ2d at 1468.
Applicant’s applied-for mark adopts the sole term in
the registered mark, INTRUDER, in its entirety, adding its house mark “S SUZUKI.”
“Marks have frequently been found to be similar where one mark incorporates the
entirety of another mark, as is the case here.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram and Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (CCPA 1975) (BENGAL
is similar to BENGAL LANCER); Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Int’l Dev. Ltd., 221 USPQ
Serial No. 87826302
- 13 -
155, 156 (TTAB 1982) (EBONY is similar to EBONY DRUM); In re S. Bend Toy Mfg.
Co., 218 USPQ 479, 480 (TTAB 1983) (LIL’ LADY BUG is similar to LITTLE LADY).”
TiVo Brands LLC v. Tivoli, LLC, 129 USPQ2d 1097, 1115 (TTAB 2019). The fact that
the applied-for mark is stylized is of little consequence here, inasmuch as the mark
in the cited registration is in standard characters and could be depicted in a
stylization approximating that found in Applicant’s mark. See Cunningham v. Laser
Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1847-48 (Fed. Cir. 2000); (“Registrations
with typed drawings are not limited to any particular rendition of the mark and,
in particular, are not limited to the mark as it is used in commerce”); In re Cox
Enterprises Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1040, 1044 (TTAB 2007) (“We must also consider that
applicant’s mark, presented in typed or standard character form, is not limited to
any special form or style as displayed on its goods.”).
As discussed above, on this record “intruder” is arbitrary as applied to Registrant’s
goods. There is no evidence to suggest INTRUDER would have a separate connotation
as applied to the related goods in the involved application and cited registration. The
wording “S SUZUKI” in the involved application is Applicant’s house mark. Applicant
acknowledges in its brief that “S SUZUKI” is its house mark, but argues that its
addition to the mark creates a separate commercial impression from that engendered
by the registered mark.16
We acknowledge that the presence of “S SUZUKI” as the first term in Applicant’s
mark differentiates it visually and aurally from the registered mark. This point of

16 9 TTABVUE 18-19.
Serial No. 87826302
- 14 -
distinction, however, does not significantly diminish the strong similarities in
connotation and overall commercial impression engendered by these two marks.
Based upon the above analysis, we find that is more
similar to the arbitrary and strong mark INTRUDER than dissimilar in terms of
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. As a result, consumers
encountering and INTRUDER could mistakenly believe
the latter is a shortened variation on the applied-for mark used to identify related
goods emanating from a common source. See In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117
USPQ2d 1958, 1961, 1964 (TTAB 2016) (“In general, use of a house mark does not
obviate confusion.”) (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811 , 200 USPQ 215,
219 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring) (“the users of language have a universal habit
of shortening full names—from haste or laziness or just economy of words”)). This is
reinforced by the fact that Applicant owns three registrations for marks identifying
both motorcycles and bicycles. As a result, the marks are similar in connotation or
meaning, notwithstanding Applicant’s addition of its house mark to the mark in its
involved application.
For these reasons, we find that the marks are similar. The first DuPont factor
thus also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
D. Conditions of Purchase

Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
Serial No. 87826302
- 15 -
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. Applicant introduced into the record the affidavit of Mr.
Bryan Malyszek, a Manager in Applicant’s Service Division, averring that
The goods produced by Applicant are [sic] cater to a niche, race inspired
clientele base and the same do not come under inexpensive bicycles
produced by Registrant. The typical consumer of Applicant’s motorcycles
are sophisticated and devoted to the motorcycle racing scene.17

However, as discussed above Mr. Malyszek’s affidavit relies upon limitations to
the goods that are not present in their respective identifications. Further, Mr.
Malyszek fails to establish his asserted expertise in the marketing of Registrant’s
goods or their customer base. There is nothing in the nature of the goods, namely,
bicycles and motorcycles without any limitation as to their type, price point or
intended uses, to suggest their purchasers are particularly sophisticated or careful.
See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1739 (TTAB 2018). In fact, the standard of
care is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. Stone Lion Capital v. Lion
Capital, 110 USPQ2d at 1163 cited in In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222
(TTAB 2018) (“Board precedent requires our decision to be based on the least
sophisticated potential purchasers.”). In the absence of further evidence relating to
the degree of care purchasers exercise, the similarity of the marks and relatedness of
the goods outweigh Applicant’s assertion that purchasers are sophisticated or careful
in their purchases. See HRL Assocs., Inc. v. Weiss Assocs., Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819, 1823
(TTAB 1989), aff’d, 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (similarities of

17 Affidavit ¶¶ 9-10, Applicant’s October 11, 2018 Request for Reconsideration at .pdf 38-41.
4 TTABVUE 38-41. The affidavit of Mr. Stephen Holl, also a Services Division Manager of
Applicant, includes these same averments among others. Id. at 27-28.
Serial No. 87826302
- 16 -
goods and marks outweigh sophisticated purchasers, careful purchasing decision, and
expensive goods).
All in all, we have insufficient basis to find that ordinary consumers would
exercise more than an ordinary degree of care. The fourth DuPont factor is neutral.
E. Conclusion
When we consider the record and the relevant likelihood of confusion factors, and
all of Applicant’s arguments relating thereto, including those arguments and
evidence not specifically addressed herein, we conclude that consumers familiar with
Registrant’s goods offered under its mark would be likely to believe, upon
encountering Applicant’s mark, that the goods originated with or are associated with
or sponsored by the same entity.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s proposed mark is affirmed under
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.