Susan L. Bermanv.Securities and Exchange Commission 01975726 09-18-00 . Susan L. Berman, Complainant, v. Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 18, 2000
01975726 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 18, 2000)

01975726

09-18-2000

Susan L. Berman v. Securities and Exchange Commission 01975726 09-18-00 . Susan L. Berman, Complainant, v. Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Agency.


Susan L. Berman v. Securities and Exchange Commission

01975726

09-18-00

.

Susan L. Berman,

Complainant,

v.

Arthur Levitt, Jr.,

Chairman,

Securities and Exchange Commission,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01975726

Agency Nos. 46-94 & 07-96

Hearing Nos. 100-95-7390X & 100-96-7791X

DECISION

On July 15, 1997, Susan L. Berman (hereinafter referred to as complainant)

initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(Commission) from a final decision of the agency concerning her complaint

of discrimination in violation of �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq.<1> The final agency decision

was dated June 16, 1997. Accordingly, the appeal is timely filed,

and is accepted in accordance with 64 Fed.Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �1614.405).

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues on appeal are whether complainant proved, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that she was discriminated against on the basis of her

disability (depression), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when:

1. on May 13, 1994, her request for a transfer from the agency's EEO

Office was denied; 2. from April 1993 through August 1994, her requests

for an altered work schedule to accommodate her disability were denied;

3. she was held to more rigid time and attendance standards than other

employees, including being charged as absent-without-leave (AWOL) on

December 8, 1993; 4. she was harassed by the former Director of the EEO

Office (Responsible Official 1; RO1); she was subjected to more severe

harassment and retaliation after requesting EEO counseling in June 1994;

6. she received a �fully successful� performance rating in August 1994,

with a rating of �minimally satisfactory� in two elements; 7. her request

that someone other than RO1 conduct her performance evaluation was denied;

8. a co-worker was present during an August 29, 1994 meeting concerning

her performance evaluation; and 9. the former Acting EEO Director

(Responsible Official 2; RO2) initiated an Inspector General investigation

in February 1995, based upon her handling of an EEO investigation.

BACKGROUND

Complainant filed formal EEO complaints in August 1994 and December 1995,

raising the above-referenced issues of discrimination. The complainant

began working for the agency as an Attorney, GS-14, in September 1992.

The complainant served as the Chief of the Investigative Branch in

the agency's EEO Office. During a discussion with RO1 in April 1993

concerning time and attendance issues, complainant asked to change her

work hours, stating that pressure at work was aggravating her depression.

Complainant stated that she offered to provide RO1 with a copy of her

prescription for Prozac, but refused to provide further documentation

because of concerns that the information would not be kept confidential.

RO1, who also has been diagnosed with depression, recommended that

complainant speak with the Disabilities Coordinator in the Personnel

Office. RO1 also offered to allow the complainant to come in to work

later, but complainant declined the offer, stating that she only needed

occasional flexibility. The complainant stated that other employees in

the EEO Office were allowed to work alternate or compressed work schedules

without providing documentation. Nevertheless, the record indicates

that RO1 allowed the complainant considerable flexibility with regard to

her arrival time. RO1 stated that she charged complainant with AWOL

in December 1993, because she failed to request leave in advance after

repeatedly disregarding office rules regarding time and attendance.

Complainant stated that, after she informed RO1 of her depression,

RO1 became more critical of her work, and undermined her supervisory

authority. The complainant cited one incident in which RO1 used profanity

during an argument; however, she acknowledged also using profanity at

that time. Complainant stated that RO1 also removed her from her Branch

Chief position. RO1 noted that the complainant agreed with the decision

to remove those duties after she expressed a desire to no longer perform

supervisory functions. The complainant's personnel records reflect that

she continued to serve in the Branch Chief position.

RO1 wrote a memorandum in April 1994 in response to a management study

which was critical of the Office. In the memorandum, RO1 made negative

comments concerning several employees, including the complainant and

another Branch Chief. Shortly thereafter, the complainant requested that

the Executive Director transfer her to another office. The complainant

also made such a request of the Chairman and an individual in the

Inspector General's office. In her May 1994 letter to the Executive

Director, complainant noted that she had clinical depression and that

her job was taking an emotional toll on her. In her subsequent undated

memorandum to the Chairman, complainant stated that the stress of her

work environment was seriously affecting her health, and aggravating

her depression. According to the record, the agency was in the process

of removing RO1 from the EEO Office at that time, and actually did so

in August 1994.

With regard to complainant's performance evaluation, the record shows

that the agency set aside the �fully successful� rating she initially

received for the 1993 to 1994 rating period. The complainant's personnel

records reflect that she received a rating of �exceeds fully successful�

for that period. RO1 stated that she asked a third party to be present

during a meeting concerning complainant's evaluation because she had

been advised to do so by her supervisor, and that a third party was

present during all employee evaluations.

The testimony of record shows that RO1 was not a good manager, treated

everyone poorly, and did not adequately address personnel problems.

These findings were essentially confirmed during the management study

of the EEO Office conducted in 1993. Specifically, RO1 was told that

she needed to comply with agency policies regarding alternate work

schedules and time and attendance. In response to the management study,

RO1 required that all employees requesting alternate work schedules do

so in writing and adhere to time and attendance policies.

In January 1995, RO2 contacted the Inspector General's office because

of concerns raised regarding the complainant's handling of an EEO

investigation and the release of confidential information. According to

the testimony of the Inspector General and an attorney in his office, RO2

expressed concern about whether to make the referral. The complainant

also asserted that RO2 had a surveillance camera installed in the EEO

Office to monitor her arrival and departure. RO2, however, testified

that the camera was installed on the advice of security staff, who found

the EEO Office door open late at night on several occasions.

The agency complied with all procedural and regulatory prerequisites, and

on April 18, 1997, an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a recommended

decision finding that complainant had not been subjected to disability

or reprisal discrimination with regard to issues 2 through 9. The AJ,

however, concluded that the agency failed to reasonably accommodate the

complainant's request for a transfer. Thereafter, the agency issued

a final decision dated June 16, 1997, rejecting the AJ's finding with

regard to the latter issue of accommodation. The agency adopted the

AJ's determinations regarding the remaining issues. It is from this

decision that complainant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.� Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,

340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding

whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ correctly determined that complainant was not subjected to reprisal

discrimination with regard to any of the matters alleged. The AJ found

that the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

actions at issue, and that complainant failed to prove that the stated

reasons were a pretext for prohibited discrimination. Specifically,

the AJ concluded that the record contained no evidence of retaliatory

motive on the part of RO1 or RO2. We therefore discern no basis to

disturb the AJ's finding that complainant was not discriminated against

in reprisal for prior EEO activity.

With regard to the complainant's issue that she was denied reasonable

accommodation, the Commission agrees with the AJ that complainant was not

subjected to discrimination with regard to the denial of an alternate work

schedule. Complainant did not submit any medical documentation to the

agency until November 1994. Further, that brief report, dated September

24, 1994, only addressed complainant's condition after July 18, 1994.

While complainant asserted that she was diagnosed with depression at an

early age, she failed to submit any medical documentation concerning her

condition at the time she requested an alternate work schedule. In so

finding, we note that RO1's refusal to accept a copy of a prescription

for Prozac was not unreasonable. Further, the record clearly shows that

RO1 afforded complainant considerable flexibility with regard to her

arrival, frequently allowing complainant to come in after her scheduled

starting time, and the complainant had advised RO1 that she did not

need an alternate work schedule and that she believed the issue had been

resolved. Finally, while other employees' requests for an alternate work

schedule were granted by RO1, those individuals submitted their requests

in writing, as required by agency policy, while complainant did not.

The Commission further finds that the AJ correctly determined that the

agency failed to properly act on complainant's May 1994 request for

reasonable accommodation. At the time of her request, we find that the

complainant was a qualified individual with a disability. See Prewitt

v. USPS, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). A disabled individual is one who:

1. has an impairment which substantially limits one or more major life

activities; 2. has a record of such an impairment; or 3. is regarded

as having such an impairment. 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(g).<2> Major life

activities include caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(i).

Complainant made several requests for reasonable accommodation, in the

form of a transfer and working at home, from May 1994 through July 1994.

At that time, the record shows that she was being treated for depression,

which her doctor indicated caused her to experience �low self esteem,

loss of confidence in her work capabilities, despair, social withdrawal,

impaired concentration, insomnia, headaches, gastrointestinal problems,

inability to experience pleasure in anything, and fatigue.� (Report of

Investigation, Volume 1, p. 235).<3> As noted by the AJ, complainant

advised several agency officials of her depression, and indicated that

she was requesting a transfer because the situation in the EEO Office

was �taking a serious toll on [her] health.� (Report of Investigation,

Volume 1, p. 249). Complainant's doctor also indicated that her symptoms

were made worse by adverse working conditions.

The Supreme Court recently held that whether measures mitigate an

individual's impairment should be taken into account in determining

if the individual is disabled. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,

527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527

U.S. 516 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).

Complainant's doctor noted that, even while being treated with medication,

complainant's symptoms worsened significantly after May 1994, due to the

stress she experienced. Thus, we find that complainant's depression, even

in the medicated state, substantially limits her cognitive functioning

and ability to interact with others. Further, the record shows that

complainant was able to perform the essential functions of her job

in a more than satisfactory manner, as evidenced by her performance

evaluations.

As noted by the AJ, the agency failed to take any action with regard to

complainant's request for a transfer, and, in fact, did not treat her

memoranda as requests for accommodation. While complainant discussed

the matter with at least two individuals, the agency did not request

information concerning her disability or limitations, and did not refer

the matter to the Personnel Office. The agency asserted that it did not

act because it was in the process of removing RO1 from the EEO Office;

however, that action did not occur until approximately three months after

complainant made her first request for accommodation. While the agency

was not required to provide complainant with a transfer, the agency

was required to explore effective accommodation for complainant, such

as allowing complainant to work at home for a portion of her work week,

allowing her to use leave without pay, or providing her with a temporary

detail assignment, during the period of time prior to RO1's removal

from the Office. Thus, we find that the AJ correctly found that the

agency failed to meet its burden of providing reasonable accommodation

to complainant from May 1994 until August 1994.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons, it is

the decision of the Commission to affirm the agency's final decision of no

discrimination based on disability and prior EEO activity with regard to

issues 2 through 9. The Commission hereby reverses the agency's final

decision with regard to issue 1.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

1. The agency is to conduct training for the Executive Director and

former Executive Assistant and Assistant to the Chairman addressing these

employees' responsibilities under equal employment opportunity law. The

training shall place special emphasis on the appropriate response to

requests for reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act.

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the corrective action has been implemented.

2. The issues of compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs are

REMANDED to the Hearings Unit of the appropriate EEOC field office.

Thereafter, the administrative judge shall issue a decision on these

issues in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109, and the agency shall issue

a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.110 within forty (40)

days of receipt of the administrative judge's decision. The agency shall

submit copies of the decision of the Administrative Judge and the final

agency action to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its Headquarters facility copies of

the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the

agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the agency

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days, in conspicuous

places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily

posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said

notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(a). The complainant also has

the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the

Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition

for enforcement. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be

codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. ��1614.407, 1614.408),

and 29 C.F.R. �1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the

right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance

with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action."

29 C.F.R. ��1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or

a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline

stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant

files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint,

including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.409).

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0400)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision/action in part, but it

also requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action in

an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. In the alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER

ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you filed your

complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the Commission, until

such time as the agency issues its final decision on your complaint.

If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE

COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD,

IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

__________________________________

Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

____09-18-00______________________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days of mailing. I certify

that the decision was mailed to claimant, claimant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

_________________________

Date

_________________________

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. The ADA regulations

set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints of disability

discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's website:

www.eeoc.gov.

3The doctor's report, which was dated September 24, 1994, discussed

complainant's condition as of July 1994. Nevertheless, the agency does

not assert that it was unaware of complainant's disability at the time

of her May 1994 request or that it asked for, and complainant failed to

provide documentation at that time.