Sun World, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 21, 1987

282 N.L.R.B. 785 (N.L.R.B. 1987)

SUN WORLD , INC. 785
Sun World, Inc. and Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Work-
ers Local P-78-B , United Food and Commer-
cial Workers International Union , AFL-CIO,
CLC. Cases 21-CA-19904, 21-CA-20052, and
21-CA-201 10
21 January 1987
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN AND CRACRAFF
On 9 September 1986 Administrative Law Judge
Michael D . Stevenson' issued the attached supple-
mental decision . The Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.,
The National Labor Relations , Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge 's rulings, fmdings, I and
conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Sun World,
Inc., Thermal, California, its officers , agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Order.
i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge 's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect .' Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F .2d 362 (3d Cit . 1951).
We' have carefully examined the record and ford no basis for reversing
the findings.
2 In adopting the judge's decision , Chairman Dotson and Member Jo-
hansen find it unnecessary to rely on his alternative finding that, even if
the Respondent had unconditionally offered to reinstate the unfair labor
practice strikers on 23 March 1982, effective in the fall of 1982, this offer
was void as a matter of law They agree with the judge's primary fording
that the Respondent did not make an unequivocal , specific, or uncondi-
tional offer of reinstatement on 23 March 1982 . Member Cracraft agrees
with the judge's primary and alternative findings.
Joel B. Martinez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David E. Smith, Esq., of Palm Desert , California, and
Jordan L. Bloom, Esq., of San Francisco , California,
for the Respondent.
Byron S. Georgiou, Esq., of San Diego, California, for the
Charging Party.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL D. STEVENSON , Administrative Law Judge.
On 23 February 1982, Administrative Law Judge Russell
L. Stevens issued his decision in the above -captioned
case, fording that Respondent had violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to bar-
gain in good faith with the Union over any and all man-
datory subjects of bargaining affecting the unit , including
the terms and conditions for a collective-bargaining
agreement to replace the one that expired 18 January
1981. The Administrative Law Judge also found that Re-
spondent had violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by failing and refusing to reinstate employees engaged in
an unfair labor practice strike (strikers) against Respond-
ent on their unconditional offer to return to work, by
subsequently discharging the strikers , and by refusing to
pay certain of Respondent's employees a retroactive
wage increase for work performed on and after 2 Febru-
ary 1981,
On 29 June 1984 , the Board affirmed Judge Stevens on
all aspects of his decision that are relevant to the instant
case (271 NLRB 49). The relevant portion of Judge Ste-
vens' Order, adopted and affirmed by the Board, direct-
ed Respondent to
Offer immediate and full reinstatement to the indi-
viduals listed in General Counsel 's Exhibit 15 ...
to their former jobs . . . discharging if necessary
any replacements for these employees, and making
said discharged employees whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered, by payment to
each of them the moneys which each of them
would have earned during the period from' March
4, 1981 to the date of Respondent's offer of rein-
statement ....
Judge Stevens subsequently modified his Order by pro-
viding that if the strikers had not been reinstated due to
the seasonal nature of Respondent's business , then rein-
statement was to occur immediately on resumption of
Respondent's business.
It should be noted that neither in Judge Stevens' deci-
sion nor in the Board's Order was a list of names of the
strikers specifically made. Rather, as noted above., the
strikers were described as listed on General Counsel's
Exhibit 15 . There is no present dispute about the identi-
ties of the strikers . They are listed in the amendment to
backpay specification and notice of hearing (G.C. Exh.
2g). I will list the strikers and the amounts found due
and owing to them by Respondent in the Appendix to
this decision.
It should further be noted that there is no dispute
about the formula used by the General Counsel to com-
pute the amounts due and owing (stipulation of parties,
Tr. 6-7). What is in dispute and what constitutes the
single issue in this case is when Respondent effectively
offered reinstatement to the employees in question for
the purpose of tolling its backpay obligations.
1. CONTENTIONS , OF THE PARTIES
Respondent contends that its backpay obligation
ceased as of 23 March 19821 when its attorneys partici-
i Unless otherwise specified , all dates refer to 1982.
282 NLRB No. 118
786 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pated in a luncheon meeting with the attorney for the
Union. The General Counsel and the Charging Party
Union contend that backpay continued until sometime
after 17 October 1984 when Respondent sent individual
letters to the strikers offering full reinstatement to them
(C.P. Exh. 1). Because the backpay will differ by thou-
sands of dollars depending on who is correct, I turn to
examine carefully the evidence supporting each theory.
II. THE FACTS
All agree that a few days after Judge Stevens' opinion
issued, Attorney David Smith, who at hearing both rep-
resented Respondent and testified for it, contacted Attor-
ney H. Ronald Domnitz, then representing the Union.
Now a judge of the San Diego municipal court, Domnitz
testified in rebuttal for the General Counsel. Smith and
Domnitz agreed to meet for lunch at a San Diego restau-
rant on 23 March. The third person to attend the lunch-
eon meeting was Attorney Jordan L. Bloom, a manage-
ment attorney with the San Francisco labor law firm of
Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy. Bloom had no prior
nor significant subsequent involvement in this case.
Rather he was retained for the sole purpose of attempt-
ing to settle the case before the time for filing exceptions
to Judge Stevens' opinion expired. As matters turned
out, exceptions, were filed on 3 May, after two extensions
of time for filing exceptions had expired.
During the 60- to 90-minute lunch meeting, no notes
were taken, no written proposals were made, and no sub-
sequent written confirmations were exchanged between
the parties. For these reasons, the passage of time, and
possibly for other reasons as well, there are sharp differ-
ences in testimony between Respondent's representatives
and the Union's representative about what occurred.
Moreover, the two Respondent representatives even con-
tradicted each other on several key points. To detail this
confusion and to resolve it, I turn to the record.
According to Bloom, an experienced labor attorney,
he met with Respondent's board of directors a few days
prior to the luncheon meeting. The board gave Bloom
certain unspecified directions and told him to attempt to
settle the case. Bloom accepted the commission and he
was then formally retained. At the restaurant, Bloom,
presented a threefold proposal to Domnitz, each leg of
which was allegedly independent of the other:
A. Reinstatement of Striking Employees, as Ordered
by Judge Stevens
Bloom proposed that the strikers be reinstated some-
time in the fall because the carrot season for which they
had been employed was then winding down. Respondent
felt it would be too disruptive to reinstate employees im-
mediately, as replacement workers would have to be ter-
minated. Although Bloom did not elaborate on 23 March
concerning exactly when employees would return, he at-
tempted to do so on cross-examination. He testified,
"The fall of 1982 would be around September or Octo-
ber. I did not specify, a date. Your definition of fall is as
good as mine." (Tr. 39.)
According to undisputed evidence, the carrot season in
the area in question usually began in December and con-
tinned through March or April. Thereafter, the corn
season begins and some or all the strikers would be ex-
pected to work on the picking and packing of corn
through May.
B. Payment of Backpay, a Question Raised by
Domnitz
All agree that no one at lunch knew exactly how
much was due and owing to the strikers. Bloom suggest-
ed that a lump sum be paid to union representatives, who
would then decide the specific amounts to be paid the
strikers. Domnitz thought this was a bad idea. Instead,
he suggested that an arbitrator be retained to hear evi-
dence concerning such matters as striker interim employ-
ment, availability for employment, and other questions
affecting striker obligations to mitigate damages. The
parties did agree that the Union would select an arbitra-
tor and Respondent would pay his expenses.
Regarding the amount of money the arbitrator would
be working with, Bloom was extremely vague to say the
least. Bloom testified (Tr. 45):
Only-only to the extent that $40,000 sticks in my
mind and I honestly can't tell you why, but-if-in
a very haphazard way, people were trying to figure
out how many months so many people would have
worked if they didn't have any interim employment
and then assume that they might have had interim
employment. But neither-neither Dave nor I knew
that number. That's why we came up with this-
this scheme of determining an amount and then let-
ting an arbitrator decide how much each employee
gets . That way the-both Company and the Union
would be off the hook. [Tr. 45.]
Bloom admitted that he had not been authorized by the
board of directors to agree to any specific amount of
backpay because no one knew how much it would be
(Tr. 46). Bloom thought someone mentioned $40,000 but
he could not recall who. The amount of money deter-
mined by the arbitrator to be due and owing would be
subject to approval by the board of directors (Tr. 59).
All the above testimony left the question of whether
the arbitrator would be working from a predetermined
maximum sum to be approved by the board of directors
sometime in the future, or whether the arbitrator would
be working without a preset cap and simply award em-
ployees backpay as found appropriate, again subject to
approval by the board in the future. Here is exactly how
Bloom "clarified" this point (Tr. 63):
Okay. From a business standpoint obviously there's
a certain amount of money to be spent. Okay? Now
the lump sum as you phrase it,, would be something
in between those two alternatives. Because obvious-
ly the Company has to determine how much money
it's going to have to spend . And an arbitrator is
going to determine how that money is going to be
divided.
A business decision needs to , be made as to
whether it's worth the risk of an appeal, whether
SUN WORLD , INC. 787
the likelihood of success and as can be demonstrat-
ed by this hearing, whether it's worth the risk of
another two years of liability. And so that is why
the first part of this subject, that is the offer of rein-
statement, to these people for the Fall of 1982 was
made. Not conditioned on the second- [Tr. 63.]
Because the answer quoted above was not responsive,
Bloom was questioned further on cross-examination by
Attorney Georgiou (Tr. 64-65):
Q. But you're not suggesting are you, that the
Company was prepared to authorize a blank check
to this arbitrator? That is, that the Company would
agree to be bound by whatever determination the
arbitrator made as to the sums due each employee
and the-obviously the sum-the total sum with re-
spect to all of the employees? That certainly
wouldn't comport to your business decision-
A. Well, no. To the extent you use the phrase
blank check. No, I don't think any company would
write a blank check but within certain parameters
uh, the Company need-this Company needed to
make that determination as to whether the offer
should be made.
Q. Okay. Entirely reasonable and I agree with
you there. Now, the question is, what parameters if
any, were established at that time, if you recall. Or
if they were established at that time.
A. No parameters were established at that time
because we did not know-we didn't have-not
have the basis upon which to suggest realistic or
meaningful parameters. [Tr. 64-65.]
At the proper time, I also attempted to clarify what
Bloom claims he offered to Domnitz on 23 March. For
example , I did ascertain that the arbitration would be
binding (Tr. 72), that the $40,000 figure, referred to
above, was only a "ball-park" figure and the real sum
owed by Respondent in backpay may have been double
or half that (Tr. 75-76), and that, regarding the question
of who would ascertain the relevant information regard-
ing mitigation of employees' damages , either the arbitra-
tor or a company representative, Bloom replied that
"someone" would have to do this (Tr. 75).
C. Commencement of Good-Faith Bargaining on a
New Collective-Bargaining Agreement
All witnesses agreed that no one at lunch was author-
ized to negotiate for his respective client, but that negoti-
ations would occur in'the near future. In fact,,negotia-
tions did begin after the Board's decision, and have con-
tinued, but agreement has not been reached.
All witnesses also agree that Smith raised the question
of the Union withdrawing its charges as part of a settle-
ment agreement. Domnitz said this might be difficult at
that stage of the proceedings because the Board would
be reluctant to permit this. Withdrawal of charges re-
mained an open question.
At the conclusion of the lunch, according to Bloom,
Domnitz remarked favorably on Respondent's "offer"
and indicated he would recommend approval to his
client. Thereafter, Bloom ceased involvement in the case.
_„ Respondent's second witness was Attorney David
Smith. To question him, Bloom filed an appearance.
Smith began his testimony by stating that he had heard
Bloom's testimony on direct examination and cross-exam-
ination concerning the 23 March meeting and that his
recollection was the same as Bloom's (Tr. 85). In fact,
Smith's recollection differed significantly from Bloom's.
For example, Smith characterized the 23 March meet-
ing as merely an attempt "to reach a framework for set-
tlement" (Tr. 122). Also, Smith did not recall anyone
mentioning the sum of $40,000 at that meeting (Tr. 122).
Finally, Smith testified to an agreement reached with
Domnitz at the end of the 23 March lunch to have Smith
meet subsequently with then Union Business Agent Mi-
chael Lyons for the purpose of negotiating the lump-sum
amount to be paid into a trust account. According to
Smith, this amount would then be divided up by the ar-
bitrator between the competing claims of the strikers. If
not sufficient to pay 100-percent backpay found to be
due and owing, then it would be divided up on a pro
rata basis.
In his testimony, Bloom made no reference to an
agreement for subsequent meetings. Bloom and Smith
did agree, however, that regarding reinstatement, the
strikers were to return in the "fall."
Concerning the meetings between Smith and Lyons,
all agree that three occurred . Beginning in early April
and continuing during that month with a few days inter-
vening between each, the meetings concerned only the
backpay. Smith first offered $30,000, which was rejected
by Lyons. Prior to another meeting, Smith was author-
ized to and did in fact offer $40,000. This too was reject-
ed by Lyons as inadequate.
In his testimony, Lyons agreed with Smith on most
matters. There was some disagreement about the exact
amounts offered, what was said, and the alleged exist-
ence of union politics. None of this is relevant or materi-
al, however, so I turn now to the testimony of Union
Representative Domnitz.
Domnitz denied that Bloom had presented a bona fide
offer on either reinstatement, backpay, or good-faith bar-
gaining . To the extent that Bloom made any concrete
proposals, they were all, according to Domnitz, part of a
"package deal." Domnitz agreed with Bloom about the
suggested procedure for an arbitrator to handle backpay
and that someone mentioned a $40,000 figure during
lunch.
Concerning reinstatement, Domnitz testified to the fol-
lowing (Tr. 146-147):
When we talked about reinstatement as a part
and parcel of the package, I'm sure that that subject
was broached . [Reinstatement in the fall rather than
immediately.] I've heard that and I'm sure it came
from Mr. Bloom or Mr. Smith and my recollection
is they asked me whether or not that would be a
problem. I told them I didn't know but I was hope-
ful that we could negotiate a full settlement.
After the 23 March meeting had terminated, Domnitz
called Lyons to tell him what had occurred. Domnitz
then wrote a letter about the meeting. For reasons that
788 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
are not important to this case, Lyons asked Domnitz to
write the letter to a person named Adelaida Romero
with a copy to Lyons. The letter reads as follows (G.C.
Exh. 3):
March 23, 1982
Ms. Adelaida Romero
P.O. Box 808
Coachella, CA 92236
Re: Sun World
Dear Ms. Romero:
Sun World representatives met with me today in
an effort to determine whether or not the Sun
World situation could be settled. I told them that
we would listen to any of their proposals. Basically,
after much discussion the following parameters
have been set:
1. Negotiate a new collective bargaining agree-
ment for a time period less than three years.
2. Reinstate all striking employees with full se-
niority.
3. Settle the outstanding grievance regarding the
discharge of Maria Castillo with reinstatement.
4. Arrive at a lump sum figure to be paid by the
company for back wages not taking into consider-
ation interim earnings , strike benefits and unemploy-
ment benefits. This sum would be placed in a trust
account and divided among the employees pursuant
to a decision of a neutral arbitrator, with the Union
and the Company remaining neutral.
If we have a chance to settle this case, it must be
within the next two weeks since the briefs on appeal
are due relatively soon. If this case is not settled, it
will drag on for at least three years since it will
wind its way into the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Please take the existing Sun World contract and
send me your demands. Since this contract will be
for less than the normal three year period of time,
we will not be able to change much of the language
but should concern ourselves with the economics.
Please respond as quickly as possible. '
Very truly yours,
H. Ronald Domnitz
Subsequent to writing the above letter, Smith and Lyons
participated in the three meetings referred to above and
Domnitz, like Bloom, did not play a significant role in
later events.
Ill. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS2
I begin with relevant legal principles. "In backpay
proceedings, the initial burden is on the General Counsel
2 Both Bloom and Smith acted both as advocates and witnesses in this
case. Attorneys having a dual role in the same case have been criticized
by the Federal courts. U.S. v. Johnston, 690 F.24t 638, 642 (7th Cir 1982).
Rosen v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 564, 569-570 (D.C Cir. 1984). However, the
Board has taken the position that it should not have to police attorney
ethics. Airports Service Lines, 231 NLRB 1272, 1279 (1977), enfd. 589 F.2d
to establish a respondent's gross backpay liability. Once
the gross backpay liability is established, the burden then
shifts to respondent, who must prove the amount by
which the gross backpay should be diminished. Any un-
certainties in the record regarding deductions from the
gross backpay figure are to be resolved against respond-
ent, because . . . it is the backpay claimant, rather than
the wrongdoer, who is to receive the benefit of any
doubt regarding such deductions."3
In this case, Respondent stipulated to the backpay for-
mula and presented no evidence that the computations
were erroneous. Accordingly, I find these matters are
not contested.
Furthermore, concerning Respondent's claim that on
23 March it presented an effective offer to reinstate strik-
ers, I find that Respondent has the burden of proof on
this issue, and that Respondent has failed to present suffi-
cient credible evidence to meet its burden. There was no
effective offer to reinstate strikers because I do not credit
Respondent's witnesses, except to the extent their testi-
mony is consistent with that provided by Domnitz. The
basis for this credibility finding is the vague and contra-
dictory nature of Respondent's witnesses , particularly
Bloom. Moreover, the contention that experienced labor
lawyers such as Bloom and Smith would attempt to
make an oral unconditional offer to reinstate strikers and
then fail to confirm the alleged offer in writing is too
absurd to deserve further comment. In this respect, I
contrast Smith's letter of October 1984 properly making
an unconditional offer of reinstatement to strikers (C.P.
Exh. 1) with the alleged oral offer that occurred on 23
March. The contrast is striking. I also note Domnitz'
written letter to union officials giving his view of what
occurred. Nowhere in that letter does it state that Re-
spondent offered unconditionally to reinstate strikers in
the fali:4 In sum based on this critical credibility finding,
I fund. no convincing evidence that' Respondent made an
unequivocal,, specific, and unconditional offer to reinstate
strikers.5
However, even if I were to credit Bloom's testimony
that he made an offer of reinstatement for the "fall,"
while replacement workers continued to finish the carrot
season, and the corn season had not yet begun, this offer
did not comport with the Order of Judge Stevens and
was otherwise ineffective as a matter of law. Assuming
also, for the sake of argument, that Bloom's offer was in-
dependent of the two other issues involving settlement of
backpay and good-faith negotiations on the new con-
tract, Respondent would have had to offer immediate re-
instatement to the strikers so long as there was work to
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Accordingly, I note only for the record the dual
role played by Bloom and Smith.
2 Eartgate IGA Foodliner, 253 NLRB 735, 736 (1980) See also The
Mandarin v NLRB, 621 F,2d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1980), and NLRB v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447, 454 (8th Cir 1963).
4 If an otherwise valid offer had been made, the mere fact that it was
conveyed to Domnitz rather than to the discriminatees personally'would
not necessarily be fatal. O.K. Machine & Tool Corp., 279 NLRB 474, 478
(1986); Reeves Rubber, 252 NLRB 134 fn. 2 (1980).
5 See Seligman & Associates, 273 NLRB 1216, 1217 ( 1984); Tri-State
Truck Service, 241 NLRB 225 (1979), enf. denied on other grounds 616
F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1980); Brooks Inc., 228 NLRB 1365, 1368 (1977); John
Cuneo, Inc. v. NLRB, 792 F.2d 1181, 1183 (D.C. Cir 1986).
SUN WORLD, INC.
be done.6 In the present case , even under Respondent's'
theory, there was work for the strikers to do as of 23
March, and the offer was therefore void as a matter of
law. Because Respondent's "offer " was legally inad-
equate without regard to conflicting evidence, Domnitz
was under no duty to relay it to the discriminatees and
the discriminatees had no duty to respond. In conclusion
nothing that Bloom testified he said on 23 March at
lunch tolled Respondent's backpay.7
ORDER
Respondent, Sun World, Inc., Thermal, California, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall make the
persons listed in the Appendix to this decision whole for
wages and benefits lost, and expenses incurred, in ac-
cordance with the Board Order by paying to the persons
listed in the Appendix the net backpay indicated for
them, together with interest computed thereon in the
manner prescribed in the Board's Order, published at 271
NLRB 49, making the appropriate deductions from the
amounts of any tax withholding required by state and
Federal laws.
6 Compare NLRB v. United Contractors, 614 F.2d 134, 138 (7th Cir.
1980), in which respondent claimed its work was , seasonal . The court
held that the extent to which this was so was unclear. In remanding the
case to the Board for clarification of this point, the court held-
[Aln employer may, without incurring backpay liability, refrain
from reinstating a discrimmatoraly discharged employee during a
period when employment would not have been available for him
even absent the discrimination [NLRB Y. Sterling Furniture Co., 227
F.2d 521, 522 (9th Car. 1955).]
7 W. C. McQuaide Inc., 239 NLRB 671 (1978), enfd. 617 F.2d 349 (3d
Car 1980).
APPENDIX
Aceves, Maria de
Jesus $14,810.70
Alvarado, Eduvijes 14,096.90
Alvarez, Blanca 14,407.83
Cabrera, Guadalupe 23,109.50
Camacho,
Esperanza 5,241.09
Campos, Jesus 27,042.60
Carrasco, Julio 29,677.21
Castillo, Aurora 17,275.19
Castillo, Maria E. 8,254.74
Castro, Emigdia 9,571.23
Contreras,
Guadalupe 4,972.97
Diaz, Dominguez 9,349.17
Diaz, Raul Chavez 29,677.21
Dominguez , Alma 4,680.49
789
Encinas,-Miguel 899.74
Estrada, Belen 17,831.14
Fajardo,
Guillermina 17,831.14
Fernandez, Rosa 15, 874.49
Fletez, Celia 17,701.77
Gallegos, Angelina 12,061.76
Gallegos , Consuelo 15,146.95
Garcia, Maria del
Carmen 11,379.79
Garcia, Eduvijes F. 6,633.75
Garcia, Maria Elena 11,980.92
Garcia, Olivia 3,215.69
Garza, Socorro 12,265.20
Gonzalez, Avelina 5,341.58
Gonzalez, Maria de 6,998.23
Gonzalez, Martha 3,875.62
Guzman, Sara 17,831.14
Hernandez, Diego 25,720.15
Hernandez, Donna
S. 17,831.14
Hernandez, Maria
L. 12,126.00
Hernandez, 'San ,
Juana 13,323.93
Juarez, Teresita
Angulo 3,230.11
Lerma, Gloria E. 8,144.01
Lopez , Maria L. 17,831.14
Mejia, Virginia 3,519.41
Mejorado, Maria N. 17,831.14
Melendez,
Guadalupe 17,376.87
Mendoza, Roberto 29,671'.21
Navarette , Dolores 15,53].29
Navarette, Maria
Luz 6,641.34
Ochoa,. Bartola 16, 332.73
Pineda, Elida 12,324.76
Pineda, Felicitas 17,474.56
Preciado, Maria de
Jesus 9,447.21
Ramirez, Francisca 7,727.38
Ramirez, Rachel 17,414.22
Razo, Agripina 9,579.97
Rodriguez, Martha 17,831.14
Rodriguez, Pascal 29,677.21
Salazar, Imelda 11,196.42
Sanchez, Antonia 13,745.22
Sanchez, Regino 29,655.09
Vasquez, Jorge 29,777.21
Williams, Maria R. 13,102.97
Zamorez, Maria C. 10,829.98