Summit Express, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 9, 2007

350 N.L.R.B. 592 (N.L.R.B. 2007)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
350 NLRB No. 51
592
Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc.,
and Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc., a Sin-
gle Integrated Enterprise and SG Construction,
LLC, an Alter Ego and/or Joint Employer and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Al-
lied Trades, Local 673,1 and National Amalga-
mated Workers Union, Local 711, Party-In-
Interest and Frank J. Caputo, Petitioner, S.G.
Construction Employee Association, Party-In-
Interest. Case 13–CA–41938–1
August 10, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On August 4, 2005, Administrative Law Judge David
L. Evans issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed an exception and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief.
The Respondent and the General Counsel each filed an
answering brief to the other party’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions,
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The judge concluded that Summit Express, Inc.
(Summit Express), Summit Truck Leasing, Inc. (Summit
Truck), and Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc. (Great
Lakes) (collectively Summit/Great Lakes) constitute a
“single employer.” No exception was filed to that find-
ing, which we adopt. The judge found that Respondents
Summit/Great Lakes and Respondent SG Construction,
LLC (SG Construction) were not “joint employers.” We

1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters from the AFL–CIO effective July
25, 2005.
2 In light of our reversal of the judge’s finding of an alter ego rela-
tionship between Respondents Summit/Great Lakes and Respondent
SG Construction, discussed herein, we deny the General Counsel’s
exception asserting that a broad order rather than the narrow order is
appropriate in this case. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
However, pursuant to the General Counsel’s request, we have included
in the Orders the revised records preservation provisions set forth in
Ferguson Electric Co., 335 NLRB 142 (2001). We shall also modify
the judge’s recommended Order in accordance with our decisions in
Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996), and Excel Container,
325 NLRB 17 (1997).
agree with the judge’s finding, for the reasons set forth in
his decision.3
The judge concluded also, however, that Respondents
Summit/Great Lakes and Respondent SG Construction
were “alter egos.” We disagree, for the reasons set forth
below, and reverse the judge’s finding.
The judge further found that the Respondents commit-
ted numerous 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) violations. No excep-
tions were filed to these findings of violations.4 Based
on his conclusion that the Respondents were “alter egos,”
he held that all the Respondents were jointly and sever-
ally liable for the violations. Because we reverse the
judge’s “alter ego” finding, the Respondents are not
jointly and severally liable for all violations. Further-
more, certain violations that the judge found had been
committed by Respondent SG Construction were predi-
cated on his finding that it was an “alter ego” of Sum-
mit/Great Lakes. Those violations are accordingly dis-
missed.5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Summit Express, Summit Truck, and Great Lakes
Richard Catrambone is the sole owner of the three
companies comprising Summit/Great Lakes. All three
companies operated out of the same combined office and
warehouse in Aurora, Illinois. Before June 7, 2004,
Great Lakes sold drywall to commercial and industrial
customers; Summit Truck leased trucking equipment to
Great Lakes for the delivery of the drywall, and Summit
Express supplied drivers and warehousemen to Great
Lakes to prepare and make those deliveries.
Kevin O’Connor was vice president of Summit Ex-
press and supervised the drivers and directed their work
for Great Lakes. Sam Catrambone, Richard Catram-

3 The General Counsel excepted to this finding by the judge. In the
exceptions brief, the General Counsel argues that the judge failed to
give sufficient weight to the control granted to Great Lakes by the
terms of the June 1 contract between Great Lakes and SG Construction.
The General Counsel also argues that SG Construction is referred to as
“agency” in the contract and that, Great Lakes was the principal and
retained the right to control the agent, SG Construction. In agreement
with the judge, we find that the contract terms, by themselves, do not
establish direct and immediate control over the terms and conditions of
employment by Summit/Great Lakes required to prove a joint employer
relationship with SG Construction. Similarly, the descriptive terms for
the parties to the contract do not suffice to show that control. Further-
more, the General Counsel did not argue this case on a “principal-
agent” theory at the hearing.
4 Neither were any exceptions filed to the judge’s dismissal of the al-
legations that SG Construction violated Sec. 8(a)(3) by constructively
discharging Shawn Decker and Troy Sharp on June 29, 2004, and by
discharging Daniel (Joey) Wright on July 14, 2004.
5 In light of these dismissals, we find it unnecessary to address the
General Counsel’s exception that the judge improperly limited backpay
to the period from June 7 to August 22, 2004.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 593
bone’s cousin, had some inventory-control responsibility
with Summit Express, but did not have any supervisory
responsibilities with Summit Express.
B. SG Construction
SG Construction is owned by Salvatore Gagliano. On
June 7, 2004, SG Construction took over handling and
delivering drywall for Great Lakes pursuant to a June 1,
2004 agreement between Great Lakes and SG Construc-
tion. There is no evidence about SG Construction’s prior
business. SG Construction’s only customer is Great
Lakes, and it admittedly had no employees before June 7,
2004.
On June 21, 2004, Sam Catrambone became the direc-
tor of operations and human resources for SG Construc-
tion and was in charge of supplying and scheduling em-
ployees on a day-to-day basis. No one other than Gagli-
ano and Sam Catrambone is alleged or has been found to
be a supervisor of SG Construction’s employees. Sam
Catrambone was not alleged or shown to have any own-
ership interest in SG Construction or Summit/Great
Lakes.
On February 1, 2003, Summit Express and Teamsters’
Local 7776 entered into a collective-bargaining agree-
ment covering Summit Express drivers and warehouse-
men. In February 2004,7 the secretary-treasurer of
Teamsters’ Local 673 (Charging Party) met with Richard
Catrambone and the president of Local 777. He told
them that he believed that, within the Teamsters organi-
zation, Local 673 had geographical jurisdiction for all
drywall deliveries in the Aurora area and that the labor
contract between Summit Express and Local 777 was
invalid. Catrambone responded that he would not recog-
nize Local 673 and stated he would seek out another un-
ion to deal with as the bargaining representative of the
Summit Express employees, if Local 777 was not going
to represent them.
Local 673 filed a jurisdictional-dispute grievance with
the Teamsters’ Chicago-area joint council and also began
organizing the Summit Express employees. In May, Lo-
cal 673 informed Richard Catrambone that Local 673
had won the jurisdictional grievance. Also in May, Lo-
cal 777 confirmed that Local 673 had won the grievance
and disclaimed interest in representing the Summit Ex-
press workers. Catrambone received Local 777’s letter
on June 1. On the same day, Great Lakes entered into a
contract with SG Construction to supply warehousemen
and drivers to Great Lakes.
The June 1 contract between Great Lakes and SG Con-
struction is for a 5-year term, beginning June 7. Services

6 Local 777 is not a party in this case.
7 All dates hereafter are 2004, unless otherwise specified.
are to be provided by “agency,” SG Construction, at
Great Lakes’ request, with the cost not to exceed the
limitation specified by Great Lakes. SG Construction is
to be paid the labor rates specified in the June 1 agree-
ment plus a 5-percent service fee. The contract specifies
that “[l]abor provided will be Union members with full
benefits.” Under the agreement, Great Lakes has “sole
discretion” to determine “minimum qualifications” of all
employees supplied by SG Construction and to deter-
mine whether their performance is satisfactory. SG Con-
struction agreed to “immediately withdraw” any em-
ployee whom Great Lakes deemed to be unsatisfactory.
On Monday, June 7, Richard Catrambone discharged
all but 1 of Summit Express’ 22 truckdrivers and ware-
housemen. The judge found, as the complaint alleged,
that Respondents Summit/Great Lakes violated Section
8(a)(3) by discharging 9 of the 21 employees. The com-
plaint did not allege that the discharge of the 12 other
Summit Express employees violated the Act. Those 12
Summit Express employees were immediately hired by
SG Construction and received the same rates of pay as
they had received as Summit Express employees. The
nine discriminatees were later hired by SG Construction
during the week of June 21 when Sam Catrambone be-
came its supervisor.
On June 7, Gagliano, on behalf of SG Construction,
entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the
National Amalgamated Workers Union, Local 711 (Lo-
cal 711), recognizing Local 711 as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of SG Construction’s truckdrivers and
warehousemen.8 The parties stipulated that, pursuant to
the collective-bargaining agreement’s checkoff clause,
SG Construction deducted dues and initiation fees from
employees who signed a checkoff authorization and
transmitted the dues and fees to Local 711.9
The judge found that Gagliano and Sam Catrambone
unlawfully threatened and coerced employees into sign-
ing authorization cards designating Local 711 as their
bargaining representative. Hence, Local 711 never rep-
resented an uncoerced majority of SG Construction em-
ployees, and SG Construction’s recognition of Local 711
and its execution of the collective-bargaining agreement
with Local 711 were unlawful.

8 Local 711 is listed as a party-in-interest in the caption but did not
participate in the proceedings. The record refers to a related CB charge
but does not indicate its status.
9 The June 7 contract between SG Construction and Local 711 was
not offered into evidence.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD594
III. DISCUSSION
Alter Egos
The judge found that SG Construction is an alter ego
of Summit/Great Lakes. He noted that the Board “gener-
ally has found alter ego status where the two enterprises
have ‘substantially identical’ management, business pur-
pose, operation, equipment, customers, and supervision,
as well as ownership.” Denzel S. Alkire, 259 NLRB
1323, 1324 (1982), enf. denied 716 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir.
1983). He also observed that consideration is given to
“whether the purpose behind the creation of the alleged
alter ego was legitimate or . . . was to evade responsibili-
ties under the Act.” Fugazy Continental Corp., 265
NLRB 1301 (1982), enfd. 725 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
In the present case, the judge specifically found that
the element of common supervision was missing in this
case. The judge also specifically found that there was no
evidence of common ownership between Summit/Great
Lakes and SG Construction but held that common own-
ership was not indispensable to an alter ego finding, cit-
ing American Pacific Concrete Pipe Co., 262 NLRB
1223 (1982). His conclusion that Summit/Great Lakes
and SG Construction are alter egos rests on his findings
of an unlawful motive on the part of Summit/Great
Lakes.10 The judge supported that finding by drawing the
“strongest possible adverse inference” against the Re-
spondents because of their unexplained failure to call
Gagliano.
In addition, the judge found that the Respondents of-
fered no proof of SG Construction’s corporate existence
before March or April 2004. Further, the only proof of-
fered was filings with the State of Illinois and the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, indicating merely that an entity
named “Advantage Wholesale, LLC” had changed its
name to “SG Construction, LLC.” No evidence was of-
fered that Gagliano ever made any capital investment in
the business.
SG Construction also had only one customer, Great
Lakes.11 Before June 7, it was otherwise an empty shell
of a corporation without any employees. The judge con-
sidered that the seemingly recent formation of SG Con-

10 The judge found that the Respondents’ intent to evade responsi-
bilities under the Act was evidenced by statements, some as early as
February, made by Richard Catrambone and by O’Connor that another
union would be found to represent Summit Express’ employees rather
than deal with Local 673.
11 As noted above, the June 1 contract designated SG Construction as
the “agency” for Great Lakes. The judge opined that “‘[a]gency’ of
course, is simply a layman’s term for alter ego, and that was plainly
what was intended. Therefore, the document itself proves the subter-
fuge.” We do not rely on this statement.
struction suggested it was a maneuver by Richard Ca-
trambone to avoid obligations under the Act which he
likened to the situation in Continental Radiator Corp.,
283 NLRB 234 (1987). In Continental Radiator, the
Board found a newly formed company to be an alter ego
where it previously had not employed any employees and
then hired employees principally from another company
whose owner wanted to get rid of the prounion work
force and avoid responsibilities under the Act. He found
that SG Construction similarly had no employees before
June 7, but on that day hired 12 Summit Express em-
ployees and later hired the 9 alleged discriminatees.12
The judge concluded that, even without evidence of
common ownership and supervision, Summit/Great
Lakes and SG Construction are alter egos. The Respon-
dents except to this finding.13
We find merit in the Respondents’ exception. The
General Counsel had the burden of proving the existence
of the alter ego relationship. Based on the record, we
conclude that there is insufficient evidence of common
ownership or control to establish that Summit Ex-
press/Great Lakes and SG Construction are alter egos.
As the judge correctly observed, the Board will find al-
ter-ego status where two entities have “substantially
identical” management, business purpose, operations,
equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.
Crawford Door Sales, 226 NLRB 1144 (1976). The
Board also looks to “whether the purpose behind the
creation of the alleged alter ego was legitimate or
whether, instead, its purpose was to evade responsibili-
ties under the Act.” Fugazy Continental Corp., supra at
1302.14 No single factor is determinative of alter ego
status, and not all the indicia need be present to conclude
that a finding of alter ego status is appropriate. See, e.g.,

12 The judge found added support for his alter ego finding from SG
Construction’s failure to have the Summit Express employees complete
new W-4 forms. He speculated that either Great Lakes and SG Con-
struction are filing joint income tax returns, or SG Construction does
not exist anywhere but on paper.
13 The Respondents also request reopening of the record to introduce
the Illinois Secretary of State LLC File Detail Report showing that
“Advantage Wholesale, LLC” (the prior name of SG Construction) was
formed on September 23, 2002. In light of our conclusion, we need not
pass on this request.
14 Under extant Board law, unlawful motivation is not a necessary
element of an alter ego finding. Johnstown Corp., 313 NLRB 170
(1993), enf. denied and remanded 41 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 1994), on re-
mand 322 NLRB 818 (1997). Chairman Battista has expressed agree-
ment with former Chairman Hurtgen’s view that the General Counsel
must show intent to avoid legal obligations under the Act to prove alter
ego status. Crossroads Electric, Inc., 343 NLRB 1502 fn. 2 (2004).
As discussed below, we find that the General Counsel has not estab-
lished alter ego status. Thus, in essence, Summit/Great Lakes effec-
tively subcontracted the delivery of drywall. We do not pass on the
issue of whether this action was improperly motivated.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 595
Fugazy, supra at 1301. Nevertheless, the Board generally
has not found an alter ego relationship in the absence of
common or related ownership between the two entities.
Superior Export Packing Co., 284 NLRB 1169, 1170
(1987), enfd. mem. 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
Significantly, although the Board has on occasion
found that two entities are alter egos despite the lack of
common ownership, on those occasions, “either the busi-
nesses in question were wholly owned by members of
the same family or nearly entirely owned by the same
individual, or the older business exerted substantial con-
trol over the business supposedly sold to the new com-
pany.” Hill Industries, 320 NLRB 1116 fn. 1 (1996).
Accord: Superior Export Packing Co., supra. See also
Reigel Electric & Central Electric Services, 341 NLRB
198, 201 (2004) (absent common ownership, old com-
pany must exercise “very substantial control” over new
company to support alter ego finding). Here, the judge
specifically found, and we agree, that the elements of
common ownership and substantial control are not pre-
sent.15 Those findings are inconsistent with a conclusion
that Summit/Great Lakes and SG Construction are alter
egos.
The judge’s reliance on American Pacific Concrete
Pipe Co., supra, for concluding that common ownership
was not indispensable, is misplaced. As the judge him-
self acknowledged, that case is distinguishable. In that
case, the respondent Ampac hired Dean to supply drivers
to evade its duty to recognize its employees’ union. The
Board found that, even though Ampac did not own Dean,
Ampac and Dean were alter egos. The Board relied in
part on contractual provisions in the agreement between
Ampac and Dean similar to those in this case,16 and on
the fact that drivers for Dean continued to use Ampac’s
equipment (SG Construction employees continued to use
Summit Truck’s equipment).
Critically, however, the Board in American Pacific
also found that Ampac’s supervisors hired and super-
vised Dean’s drivers and Ampac’s supervisors partici-
pated “in the actual day-to-day operations and labor rela-
tions of Dean Trucking.” Id. at 1226. Thus, Ampac “ex-
ercised a degree of control over Dean so as to obliterate
any separation between them.”17 Id. In contrast here, the

15 Neither is there evidence of common management. On the other
hand, there is no dispute that SG Construction has “substantially identi-
cal” business purpose, operations, equipment, and customers as Summit
Express.
16 Ampac, like Great Lakes, retained the right to reject drivers.
17 That Summit/Great Lakes was SG Construction’s only customer
does not establish that Summit/Great Lakes controlled SG Construc-
tion. Teamsters Local 776 (Pennsy Supply), 313 NLRB 1148 (1994)
(company with a symbiotic relationship with its sole customer was not
a single employer or alter ego).
judge noted that the General Counsel offered no evidence
that Summit/Great Lakes played any role in SG Con-
struction’s hiring process. As discussed above, the judge
expressly rejected the General Counsel’s evidence of
continuing supervision by Summit/Great Lakes over SG
Construction’s employees. The judge’s findings here,
unlike those in American Pacific, contradict any sugges-
tion that SG Construction was controlled by Sum-
mit/Great Lakes.
Likewise, in the other cases relied on by the judge
there were clear findings of either common ownership or
control by one entity over the other to support the “alter
ego” finding. In Fugazy, supra, the evidence showed that
Fugazy had a financial interest in the purchaser of its
service shop and that Fugazy continued an active role in
the purchaser’s business. Moreover, in Continental Ra-
diator, supra, unlike the present case, the Board found
that there was substantially identical ownership of the
two companies found to be alter egos and that the princi-
pal owner of both companies was the “dominant force”
in both companies.
The General Counsel had the burden of proving the ex-
istence of the alter ego relationship but did not present
direct evidence of common ownership or control of SG
Construction by Summit/Great Lakes to support that
finding.18 Accordingly, we conclude that the record does
not establish that Summit/Great Lakes and SG Construc-
tion are “alter egos.”
Our colleague makes much of the fact that Richard Ca-
trambone told the SG Construction employees that they
were hired. However, the fact that Catrambone con-
veyed the message that they were hired does not estab-
lish that he made the decision to hire the employees at
SG Construction.
Our colleague also says that the contract between
Summit/Great Lakes and SG Construction gives Sum-
mit/Great Lakes “sole discretion” over hiring. That is
not so. Summit/Great Lakes had the authority to set
minimum qualifications for hirees. However, given the
fact that SG Construction employees would be perform-

18 We disagree with the judge, and our colleague, that it is appropri-
ate to draw an adverse inference because the Respondents failed to call
SG Construction’s owner, Gagliano, to testify about the Company. The
General Counsel issued a subpoena duces tecum to Gagliano, or the
keeper of the records, to produce SG Construction corporate documents
and business records, although the scope of the subpoena is not clear.
The General Counsel did not assert that SG Construction failed to ade-
quately respond to the subpoena and did not seek to enforce it. At the
hearing, Sam Catrambone testified as keeper of the records for SG
Construction. The General Counsel reserved the right to call Gagliano,
if Sam Catrambone’s testimony was insufficient, but never called
Gagliano. It also does not appear that the General Counsel subpoenaed
Gagliano to testify. In these circumstances, we find drawing an adverse
inference because Gagliano did not testify is unwarranted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD596
ing delivery services for Summit/Great Lakes, this provi-
sion is not surprising or unusual. It certainly does not
show alter ego status.
Similarly, the fact that Summit/Great Lakes could in-
sist on the discharge of an unsatisfactory SG Construc-
tion employee simply reflects the point that Sum-
mit/Great Lakes wanted satisfactory delivery of its prod-
ucts.
Finally, our colleague suggests that Catrambone set the
starting pay for SG Construction employees because SG
Construction continued paying them the same rates.
Concededly, the contract between Summit/Great Lakes
and SG Construction refers to the labor rates that would
be paid. However, this does not establish that Catram-
bone dictated, or even sought, those rates.
In sum, as stated above, absent evidence of common
ownership and substantial control, the Board will not
find alter ego status. As to the former, there is no evi-
dence of common ownership, and no evidence that the
owner of Summit/Great Lakes even invested in SG Con-
struction. As to control, although Summit/Great Lakes
had some control, that control is not inconsistent with the
interest of a company that hires another company to per-
form services for it.
We recognize that Summit/Great Lakes may have had
an unlawful motive in ceasing to make its own deliveries
of drywall and hiring a contractor to do the work. How-
ever, that does not establish that Summit/Great Lakes
and the contractor are the same person. For all that the
record shows, SG Construction is independently owned,
and Summit/Great Lakes has no financial interest in it.
Because the Respondents are not “alter egos,” they are
not jointly and severally liable for all violations. Each of
the Respondents is liable only for the violations attribut-
able to the unlawful conduct of its own supervisors.
Accordingly, we find that Summit/Great Lakes has
committed the following 8(a)(1) violations: threatening
employees with discharge, plant closure, and unspecified
reprisals for supporting Local 673; interrogating employ-
ees about their union activities; and creating the impres-
sion of surveillance of its employees’ union activities.
Summit/Great Lakes has also violated Section 8(a)(3) by
discharging the nine employees on June 7, 2004.
SG Construction has violated Section 8(a)(1) as fol-
lows: threatening employees with discharge, loss of
health insurance benefits, and unspecified reprisals for
failing to support, or to sign bargaining authorizations for
Local 711; instructing employees to sign bargaining au-
thorizations for Local 711; and instructing employees to
sign checkoff authorizations for Local 711.
SG Construction has also violated Section 8(a)(2) by:
instructing employees to sign bargaining and checkoff
authorizations for Local 711; threatening employees with
discharge or other reprisals if they refused to sign such
authorizations for Local 711; and recognizing, bargain-
ing, and signing a collective-bargaining agreement with
Local 711 when it did not represent an uncoerced major-
ity of SG Construction’s employees. Finally, SG Con-
struction has violated Section 8(a)(3) by executing and
enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement requiring
employees to join and pay dues and fees to Local 711
even though that union did not represent an uncoerced
majority of SG construction’s employees.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order them to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the purposes and policies of the
Act. Specifically, in addition to the appropriate remedial
relief prescribed by the judge running against the Re-
spondents in accordance with the amended conclusions
of law, having found that the Respondent SG Construc-
tion is not an alter ego of Summit/Great Lakes, and that
Summit/Great Lakes alone has violated Section 8(a)(3)
by unlawfully discharging nine Summit Express employ-
ees, we shall also order Summit/Great Lakes alone to
offer full reinstatement to Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa,
Shawn Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John
Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis
Wright to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed. Further, we shall order the
Respondent Summit/Great Lakes to make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on
a quarterly basis from date of the discharge to the date of
a proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earn-
ings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons
for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondents, Summit Express, Inc., Summit
Truck Leasing, Inc., Great Lakes Building Materials,
Inc., and SG Construction, LLC, are employers that are
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Allied
Trades, Local 673, and National Amalgamated Workers
Union, Local 711 are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc.,
and Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc. constitute a
single employer under the Act, and each is therefore
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 597
jointly and severally responsible for the remedy for the
unfair labor practices of the others.
4. By the following acts and conduct, Respondents
Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc., and
Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc. have violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, plant clo-
sure, and unspecified reprisals because they were known
by the Respondents to support, or suspected by the Re-
spondents of supporting, Local 673.
(b) Interrogating employees about their union activi-
ties.
(c) Creating among their employees the impression
that their union activities were being kept under surveil-
lance.
5. By the following acts and conduct, Respondents
Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc., and
Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc. have violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act:
(a) Discharging the following named employees on
June 7, 2004: Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa, Shawn
Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John Mitchell, Troy
Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis Wright.
6. By the following acts and conduct, Respondent SG
Construction has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, loss of
health insurance benefits, and unspecified reprisals be-
cause they had failed to sign bargaining authorizations
for, or because they otherwise failed to support, Local
711.
(b) Instructing employees to sign authorizations that
designate Local 711 as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.
(c) Instructing employees to sign checkoff authoriza-
tions for Local 711.
7. By the following acts and conduct, Respondent SG
Construction has violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the
Act:
(a) Instructing employees to sign bargaining and
checkoff authorizations for Local 711.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge or other re-
prisals if they refused to sign bargaining and checkoff
authorizations for Local 711.
(c) Recognizing and bargaining with, and signing a
collective-bargaining agreement with, Local 711 at a
time when the labor organization did not represent an
uncoerced majority of any unit of the Respondent’s em-
ployees.
8. By the following acts and conduct, the Respondent
SG Construction has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act:
Executing and enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement
pursuant to which employees are required to join Local 711
and pay dues and fees through checkoff to that union, even
though that union has never represented an uncoerced major-
ity of any unit of the Respondent’s employees.
9. The Respondents have not otherwise violated the
Act as alleged in the complaint.
ORDER
A. The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leas-
ing, Inc., and Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc.,
Aurora, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, plant clo-
sure, or unspecified reprisals because they were known
by the Respondents to support, or suspected by the Re-
spondents of supporting, Local 673.
(b) Interrogating employees about their union activi-
ties.
(c) Creating among their employees the impression
that their union activities are being kept under surveil-
lance.
(d) Discharging employees because they have become
members of, or given assistance or support to, Local 673.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, insofar
as it has not already done so, offer Edwin Chapa, Fermin
Chapa, Shawn Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John
Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis
Wright full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those
jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make whole Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa, Shawn
Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John Mitchell, Troy
Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis Wright in the
manner prescribed in the “Remedy” section of this deci-
sion.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the June 7, 2004 dis-
charges of Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa, Shawn Decker,
Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John Mitchell, Troy Sharp,
Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis Wright and, within 3
days thereafter, notify them in writing that this has been
done and that the discharges will not be used against
them in any way.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD598
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(e) Post in conspicuous places at their Aurora, Illinois,
facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix.”19 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 13, after being signed by
the Respondents’ authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since May 31,
2004.
(f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Respon-
dents have taken to comply.
(g) Substitute the attached separate notice, appendix A,
for that of the administrative law judge.
B. The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, SG Construction, LLC, Aurora and Barring-
ton, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, unspecified
reprisals, loss of health insurance benefits, or other repri-
sals because they had failed to sign bargaining authoriza-
tions for, or because they otherwise failed to support,
Local 711.
(b) Instructing or requesting employees to sign bar-
gaining or checkoff authorizations for Local 711 or any
other labor organization.
(c) Recognizing and bargaining with, and signing a
collective-bargaining agreement with, Local 711, or any

19 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
other labor organization, as a collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of any of their employees at a time that Local
711, or such other labor organization, does not represent
an uncoerced majority of any unit of the Respondent’s
employees.
(d) Executing and enforcing a collective-bargaining
agreement pursuant to which employees are required to
join Local 711, or required to pay dues or fees through
checkoff to that union, even though that union has never
represented an uncoerced majority of any unit of the Re-
spondent’s employees.
(e) Recognizing and bargaining with Local 711, or any
successor thereto, as the collective-bargaining represen-
tative of their employees, unless and until that labor or-
ganization is certified by the National Labor Relations
Board as the exclusive representative of an appropriate
unit of the Respondent’s employees.
(f) Maintaining or giving any force or effect to their
June 7, 2004 collective-bargaining agreement with Local
711, or to any modifications, extensions, supplements, or
renewals thereof; or maintaining or giving any force or
effect to any Local 711 deduction-authorizations that
have been executed by their employees; or maintaining
or giving any force or effect to any other contract,
agreement, or understanding entered into with Local 711,
or any successor thereto, covering their employees with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other terms and conditions of employment; provided,
however, that nothing in this Order shall be construed to
require the Respondent to vary or abandon any wage
increase or other beneficial terms or conditions of em-
ployment that they have established in performance of
the agreement.
(g) Deducting union fees, dues, assessments, or other
moneys from the wages of their employees on behalf of
Local 711, or remitting the union fees, dues, assessments,
or other moneys to Local 711, unless and until Local 711
is certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent’s
employees, and the employees thereafter execute unco-
erced authorizations for the deduction of the union fees,
dues, assessments, or other moneys from their wages
pursuant to a valid collective-bargaining agreement.
(h) Rendering assistance and support to Local 711 by
soliciting their employees to execute Local 711 member-
ship or dues-checkoff authorization cards.
(i) Rendering assistance and support to Local 711 by
threatening their employees with discharge if they did
not sign Local 711 membership or dues-checkoff au-
thorization cards.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 599
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from Local
711, or any successor thereto, as the collective-
bargaining representative of their employees, unless and
until Local 711, or any successor thereto, is certified by
the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive rep-
resentative of an appropriate unit of the Respondent’s
employees.
(b) Reimburse, with interest, all of their present and
former employees for any dues, initiation fees, assess-
ments, or other moneys deducted from their wages on
behalf of Local 711.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Post in conspicuous places at its Aurora, Illinois
facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix.”20 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 13, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or, covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since June 7, 2004.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Respon-
dent has taken to comply.
(f) Substitute the attached separate notice, appendix B,
for that of the administrative law judge.
MEMBER LIEBMAN, dissenting in part.
Richard Catrambone and Kevin O’Connor, the sole
owner and vice president, respectively, of Respondents

20 See fn. 19.
Summit/Great Lakes, repeatedly threatened employees
that they would take any action necessary—including
discharging all employees and closing shop—to avoid
having to deal with Teamsters Local 673. Catrambone
said that he would “change the name of the company” to
avoid having to deal with Local 673. Catrambone made
good on his threats when he fired all but one of Summit
Express’s employees, and transferred their work to SG
Construction, a company which until then had no em-
ployees and no customers, and over which Catrambone
exercised substantial control. Unlike the majority, I
would draw the obvious inference that SG Construction
is the alter ego of Summit/Great Lakes, and I would
adopt the judge’s finding that Summit/Great Lakes is
therefore liable for the unfair labor practices committed
by SG Construction.
I.
A brief review of the facts is in order. They make
clear that SG Construction was simply a disguised con-
tinuance of Summit/Great Lakes.
As early as February 2004,1 Catrambone, responding
to a union-jurisdictional dispute, stated that he would not
recognize Local 673 in place of Teamsters Local 777, the
incumbent representative of the Summit Express ware-
house/delivery employees. He said that he would find a
third union to deal with instead. Later, through multiple
threats made during May and early June, Catrambone
and O’Connor made it clear to the employees that a third
union was coming in (National Amalgamated Workers
Union Local 711), and that, if the employees did not join
this union, they would all be fired and the ware-
house/delivery operation would close. In one of these
instances, Catrambone commented on the lengths to
which he would go to avoid recognizing Local 673: “I
have a lot of money and . . . I’ll shut these trucks down
before I go 673. . . . I will change the name of the com-
pany if I have to.” As the judge observed, Catrambone
and O’Connor were threatening a “package deal” pursu-
ant to which coerced membership in Local 711 would be
paired with employment by an alter ego company.
On June 1, Catrambone was informed that the jurisdic-
tional issue had been resolved, that Local 673 would
have undisputed jurisdiction to represent the employees,
and thus that Summit/Great Lakes would have to recog-
nize and bargain with Local 673. On the same day,
Summit/Great Lakes signed an employment-services
contract with SG Construction requiring it to supply
Summit/Great Lakes with drivers and warehousemen
beginning on June 7. Up until June 1, SG Constructions

1 All dates are in 2004.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD600
had been, as my colleague’s aptly describe it, “an empty
shell of a corporation” with no employees or customers.
Catrambone signed the contract on behalf of Sum-
mit/Great Lakes; signing for SG Construction was its
purported owner, Salvatore Gagliano. The contract pro-
vided Summit/Great Lakes with ultimate control, i.e.,
“sole discretion,” over hiring, termination, and evalua-
tion of the employees provided by SG Construction, and
it effectively gave Summit/Great Lakes authority to set
the starting pay for any such employee. Moreover, al-
though the contract was for a 5-year period, Sum-
mit/Great Lakes could effectively terminate the relation-
ship at will by declining to request employees. In that
event, SG Construction would have no customers, and no
cash flow. Finally, there was no contractual provision
requiring that Summit/Great Lakes use SG Construction
as its sole source of drivers and warehousemen.
On June 7, Catrambone discharged 21 Summit Express
employees—virtually the entire complement of drivers
and warehousemen. However, 12 of the 21 employees
were immediately hired by SG Construction. Thus, as of
June 7, these former Summit Express employees, now
working for SG Construction, performed what had been
Summit Express’s warehouse/delivery operation. Also
on that day, as part of the “package deal” threatened by
Catrambone and O’Connor, SG Construction recognized
Local 711 as the collective-bargaining representative of
its newly hired warehouse and delivery employees.
Later in June, the other nine Summit Express employ-
ees who were discharged on June 7 were invited to the
facility to discuss employment with SG Construction.
When they arrived, they were met not by purported
owner Gagliano, but by Catrambone. Although he osten-
sibly had no formal position with SG Construction, Ca-
trambone told employees that they could have their jobs
back. Unsure, the employees called Gagliano, who told
them to “do what Rich tells you and go back to work.”
They eventually agreed. When they started work the
next day, Catrambone, accompanied by his cousin Sam
Catrambone,2 met with them. They told the nine that
their employment conditions would be the same as be-
fore, and that they did not have to fill out job applications
or submit W-4 documents.
Subsequently, Catrambone and O’Connor, who also
claimed to have no formal position with SG Construc-
tion, twice threatened SG Construction employees with
discharge because of their support of Local 673. Ca-
trambone advised an employee that if Local 673 tried to
get into SG Construction he would “shut the doors

2 Earlier, Sam Catrambone had transferred from a position with
Summit Express to become SG Construction’s “director of operations
and human resources.”
down.” In another instance, O’Connor told an employee
that, if employee support for Local 673 at SG Construc-
tion continued, Catrambone would close the ware-
house/delivery operation, and that the employees “would
all be fired, again.” Obviously, as the judge put it, Ca-
trambone “did not want his alter ego to run the risk of
having to deal with Local 673 any more than he had
wanted Summit Express to.”
From late June on, both Catrambone and O’Connor
made deliveries themselves when SG Construction em-
ployees were unable to complete their assignments. On
one occasion, O’Connor appeared to be directly supervis-
ing SG Construction employees’ work at a jobsite.
II.
Each case alleging that companies are alter egos “must
turn on its own facts.”3 The Board considers multiple
factors in evaluating alter ego allegations,4 and the analy-
sis requires evaluation of “the sum total of the factors,
viewed together.”5 But the Board does not insist on the
presence of each factor to conclude that companies are
alter egos.6 Thus, common ownership, by itself, is not a
requirement. Rather, “the crucial element . . . is a finding
that the older company continued to maintain a substan-
tial degree of control” over the new company.7
Summit/Great Lakes’ “substantial degree of control”
over SG Construction turns on the following facts. Ca-
trambone signed the June 1 contract with SG Construc-
tion on the same day that he learned that the union he did
not want, Local 673, would be the employees’ represen-
tative at Summit/Great Lakes. The contract allowed Ca-
trambone to conduct the operations of Summit/Great

3 Advance Electric, 268 NLRB 1001, 1002 (1984) (quoting Denzil S.
Alkire, 259 NLRB 1323, 1324 (1982)).
4 The factors relevant for consideration are whether the companies
have substantially the same management, business purpose, operation,
equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership. The Board also
evaluates whether the purpose in creating the alleged alter ego was to
evade responsibilities under the Act. Id.
5 NLRB v. Omnitest Inspection Services, 937 F.2d 112, 118 (3d Cir.
1991), enfg. 297 NLRB 752 (1990).
6 See, e.g., Trafford Distribution Center v. NLRB, 478 F.3d 172, 179
(3d Cir. 2007), enfg. 344 NLRB 1127 (2005).
7 McAllister Bros., 278 NLRB 601, 616 (1986), enfd. 819 F.2d 439
(4th Cir. 1987) (quoting NLRB v. Scott Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783,
786 (3d Cir. 1979)). Accord: Hill Industries, 320 NLRB 1116 fn. 1
(1996); Hartman Mechanical, Inc., 316 NLRB 395, 401–402 (1995); Il
Progresso Italo Americano Publishing Co., 299 NLRB 270, 271
(1990); O’Neill, Ltd., 288 NLRB 1354, 1356, 1360 (1988), enfd. 965
F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 509 U.S. 904 (1993); Superior
Export Packing Co., 284 NLRB 1169, 1170 (1987), enfd. sub nom.
mem. Meadowland Hy-Pro Industries v. NLRB, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.
1988); Woodline Motor Freight, 278 NLRB 1141, 1143 (1986), enfd. in
relevant part 843 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1988); American Pacific Concrete
Pipe Co., 262 NLRB 1223, 1226 (1982), enfd. mem. 709 F.2d 1514
(9th Cir. 1983).
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 601
Lakes through another company, and to avoid dealing
with Local 673. In light of Catrambone’s and
O’Connor’s prior threats to discharge the employees and
engage in corporate manipulation in order to avoid Local
673, the timing of the contract raises a “strong suspicion”
that the transaction was not legitimate.8 Furthermore, the
terms and circumstances of the contract were over-
whelmingly favorable to Summit/Great Lakes: in effect,
it was in position to control both SG Construction’s hir-
ing and the employment terms and conditions of the em-
ployees SG Construction hired. Moreover, because it
was SG Construction’s sole customer, Summit was in
position to dominate SG Construction economically.
Accordingly, SG Construction existed virtually “at the
sufferance” of Summit/Great Lakes.9
With the contract providing a formal basis for Sum-
mit/Great Lakes, at its discretion, to exert control over
SG Construction’s operations, Catrambone and
O’Connor’s conduct after June 7 demonstrates substan-
tial control in fact. Thus, although Gagliano is ostensibly
the owner of SG Construction, he held out Catrambone
as the person in charge of hiring when the nine employ-
ees terminated on June 7 were rehired later in June.
Moreover, strikingly similar to their roles before June 7,
Catrambone and O’Connor presented themselves as de
facto managers of SG Construction, in terms of routine
operation of the new company, setting terms and condi-
tions of employment for the nine employees hired later in
June, and dictating which employment papers they
needed to complete. Imbued with the apparent authority
granted by Gagliano, Catrambone also threatened to ter-
minate the employment of the SG Construction employ-
ees.
The reality is that almost nothing of substance changed
after June 7 concerning Summit/Great Lake’s warehouse
and delivery operation, with one crucial exception: Local
673 had been removed as the potential representative of
the employees. The record confirms that Catrambone
successfully carried out his earlier threat: he shut down
the warehouse/delivery operation of Summit/Great
Lakes, terminated its employees, transferred the work to
another company, and avoided having to deal with Local
673.
In summary, there is overwhelming evidence of
unlawful motive in this case. There is also evidence of
continued substantial control, and commonality of busi-
ness purpose, operations, equipment, customers, and em-
ployees. Under the precedent cited above, this is more

8 Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 NLRB 1301, 1302 (1982), enfd.
725 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
9 Id., 1302–1303.
than sufficient evidence to find a prima facie case that
SG Construction is the alter ego of Summit/Great Lakes.
The evidentiary burden therefore shifted to the Re-
spondents to prove that SG Construction was not in fact
an alter ego of Summit/Great Lakes. Gagliano, SG Con-
struction’s purported owner, was a potential witness who
appeared to be in a prime position to rebut the General
Counsel’s case. He was uniquely in position to testify
regarding the ownership and control of the company he
allegedly owned. But the Respondent did not call Gagli-
ano as a witness and ask him to testify as to why the ar-
rangement between Summit/Great Lakes and SG Con-
struction was something other than what it appeared,
namely a transparent attempt to avoid having to deal with
Local 673. The judge drew an adverse inference from
the Respondents’ failure to call Gagliano; this was en-
tirely appropriate.10
In short, contrary to the majority’s view, the only rea-
sonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that
Catrambone created SG Construction as the alter ego of
Summit/Great Lakes. Accordingly, I dissent from the
majority’s reversal of the judge’s alter ego finding, and
its consequent failure to affirm the additional unfair labor
practices found by the judge.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge you, or otherwise discriminate
against you because of your membership in, sympathies
for, or activities on behalf of International Brotherhood
of Teamsters and Allied Trades, Local 673 (Local 673).
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, plant clo-
sure, or unspecified reprisals because you are known by

10 See generally Woodlands Health Center, 325 NLRB 351, 361
(1998).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD602
us to support, or are suspected by us of supporting, Local
673.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you about your union activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT create among you the impression that
your union activities are being kept under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed to you by Federal law.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, offer
Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa, Shawn Decker, Richard
Grethe, Joe Huerta, John Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel
(Joey) Wright, and Dennis Wright full reinstatement to
their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove
from our files any reference to the June 7 2004 dis-
charges of the following named employees, and WE WILL,
within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this
has been done and that the discharges will not be used
against them in any way: Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa,
Shawn Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John
Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis
Wright.
Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc., and
Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove
from our files any reference to the June 7 2004 dis-
charges of the following named employees, and WE WILL,
within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that this
has been done and that the discharges will not be used
against them in any way: Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa,
Shawn Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John
Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis
Wright.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC., SUMMIT TRUCK LEASING, INC.,
AND GREAT LAKES BUILDING MATERIALS, INC.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with discharge, loss of
health insurance benefits, or other reprisals because you
have failed to sign bargaining authorizations for, or be-
cause you have otherwise failed to support, National
Amalgamated Workers Union, Local 711 (Local 711).
WE WILL NOT request or instruct you to sign bargaining
or checkoff authorizations for Local 711 or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT render assistance or support to Local 711
by soliciting you to execute Local 711 membership or
dues-checkoff cards.
WE WILL NOT render assistance or support to Local 711
by threatening you with discharge or other reprisals if
you do not sign Local 711 bargaining or checkoff au-
thorizations.
WE WILL NOT recognize or bargain with Local 711, or
any successor thereto, as the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees, unless and until Local 711,
or any successor thereto, is certified by the National La-
bor Relations Board as the exclusive representative of an
appropriate unit of our employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give any force or effect to
our collective-bargaining agreement with Local 711, or
to any modifications, extensions, supplements, or renew-
als thereof; or to any Local 711 deduction-authorizations
that have been executed by our employees; or to any
other contract, agreement, or understanding entered into
with Local 711, or any successor thereto, covering our
employees with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, but WE WILL NOT seek to vary or abandon any
wage increases or other beneficial terms or conditions of
employment that we have established in performance of
the agreement.
WE WILL NOT deduct union fees, dues, assessments, or
other moneys from the wages of our employees on behalf
of Local 711, and WE WILL NOT remit the union fees,
dues, assessments, or other moneys to Local 711, unless
and until Local 711 is certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of our employees, and the employees thereafter exe-
cute uncoerced authorizations for the deduction of the
union fees, dues, assessments, or other moneys from
their wages pursuant to a valid collective-bargaining
agreement.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 603
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed to you by Federal law.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the Board’s Order, reim-
burse, with interest, all of our present and former em-
ployees for any dues, initiation fees, assessments, or
other moneys deducted from their wages on behalf of
Local 711.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from Lo-
cal 711, or any successor thereto, as the collective-
bargaining representative of our employees, unless and
until Local 711, or any successor thereto, is certified by
the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive rep-
resentative of an appropriate unit of the our employees.
SG CONSTRUCTION, LLC
Jessica Muth and Brigid Barnicle, Esqs., for the General Coun-
sel.
Dominick D. Faraci and Peter Faraci, Esqs., of Park Ridge,
Illinois, for the Respondents.
(Neither party-in-interest entered an appearance.)
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID L. EVANS, Administrative Law Judge. This case un-
der the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) was tried before
me in Chicago, Illinois, on March 28–29 and April 7–8, 2005.
On June 7, 2004,1 International Brotherhood of Teamsters and
Allied Trades, Local 673, AFL–CIO (Local 673 or the Union)
filed the charge in Case 13–CA–41938–1 alleging that Summit
Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc., Great Lakes Build-
ing Materials, Inc., and SG Construction, LLC (the Respon-
dents) had jointly and severally committed various violations of
the Act. On October 22, after administrative investigation of the
charges, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) issued a complaint under Section 10(b) of
the Act against the Respondents.2
The gravamen of the complaint is that Summit Express,
Great Lakes, and Summit Truck have been a single employer,
that SG Construction became a joint employer of that single-
employer entity, and that, after SG Construction became such,
it, Summit Express, Summit Truck, and Great Lakes became
joint employers of employees who had once been on Summit
Express’ payroll but were later placed on the payroll of SG
Construction. The complaint further alleges that SG Construc-
tion is the alter ego and a disguised continuance of the single-
employer entity of Summit Express, Great Lakes, and Summit

1 All dates subsequently mentioned are in 2004, unless otherwise in-
dicated.
2 I have amended the caption of this case to include “SG Construc-
tion, LLC,” not “S.G. Construction, LLC.” to be consistent with the
name that appears on company filings with the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and the Illinois Secretary of State. (I have not, however, used
“[sic]” each time that I quote the transcript, complaint or briefs where
“S.G.” is used.)
Truck.
The alleged unfair labor practices include: (a) violations of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with dis-
charge and other discrimination if they sought to become repre-
sented by Local 673, by interrogating employees about their
protected activities on behalf of Local 673, and by giving the
impression of surveillance of employees’ protected union ac-
tivities; (b) violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act by
instructing employees to sign bargaining and checkoff authori-
zations for National Amalgamated Workers Union, Local 711
(Local 711), by threatening employees with loss of benefits if
they refused to sign such cards, by recognizing and bargaining
with Local 711 even though that labor organization did not
represent an uncoerced majority of employees in any unit of the
Respondents’ employees, and by compelling employees to join
and pay dues to Local 711; and (c) violations of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by discharging nine of Summit Express’
employees and then, after rehiring the discharged employees as
SG Construction employees, discharging and constructively
discharging three of them, by forcing employees to sign bar-
gaining and checkoff authorizations, and by otherwise dis-
criminating against some or all of them in various ways (impos-
ing wage reductions, providing poorer work equipment, and the
like) because they had engaged in activities on behalf of Local
673. The Respondents duly filed an answer to the complaint
admitting that this matter is properly before the Board but de-
nying the commission of any unfair labor practices.
On the testimony and exhibits entered at trial, and after con-
sideration of the briefs that have been filed, I enter the follow-
ing
FINDINGS OF FACT3
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS’ STATUS
As the Respondents admit, during the year preceding the is-
suance of the complaint Respondent Summit Express, a corpo-
ration with an office and place of business in Aurora, Illinois,
was engaged in the business of hauling drywall and other
freight. In the course and conduct of those business operations,
Summit Express purchased and received goods and services
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from suppliers that were
located at points outside Illinois. Also during the year preced-
ing the issuance of the complaint, Respondent SG Construction,
a corporation with an office and place of business in Barring-
ton, Illinois, was engaged in the business of hauling drywall
and other freight. In the course and conduct of those business
operations, SG Construction provided services valued in excess
of $50,000 to customers located outside Illinois and purchased
and received goods and services valued in excess of $50,000
directly from suppliers that were located at points outside Illi-
nois. I therefore find and conclude that at all material times

3 Certain passages of the transcript have been electronically repro-
duced; some corrections to punctuation have been entered. Where I
quote a witness who restarts an answer, and that restarting is meaning-
less, I sometimes eliminate without ellipses words that have become
extraneous; e.g., “Doe said, I mean, he asked” becomes “Doe asked.”
All bracketed entries are mine. Credibility resolutions are based on
demeanor and any other factor that I may mention.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD604
Respondents Summit Express and SG Construction have been
employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. As the Respondents further admit,
at all material times Local 673 and Local 711 have been labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. FACTS
Richard Catrambone, who testified at trial, is the sole owner
of Summit Express, Summit Truck, and Great Lakes, all of
which were in existence well before the events of this case
began. Summit Express, Summit Truck, and Great Lakes oper-
ate out of the same combined office and warehouse on Plum
Street in Aurora (the Plum Street facility). Before the events of
this case, Great Lakes sold drywall to commercial and indus-
trial customers; Summit Truck leased trucking equipment to
Great Lakes for the delivery of the drywall that Great Lakes
had sold, and Summit Express supplied drivers and ware-
housemen to Great Lakes to make those deliveries. Summit
Truck has never employed any employees; Great Lakes and
Summit Express have. The trucks that the Summit Express
employees used had both the names of Summit Express and
Great Lakes on the doors. A sign at the entrance to the Plum
Street facility has the names of both Summit Express and Great
Lakes on it. Summit Express, Great Lakes, and Summit Truck
use the same office clerical staffs.
SG Construction, the fourth respondent, is owned by
Salvatore Gagliano (who did not testify). During the course of
the events described herein, SG Construction took over Summit
Express’ business of delivering drywall for Great Lakes (in
Summit Truck’s trucks). Paragraphs V and VI of the complaint
allege (with “Summit” indicating Great Lakes and Summit
Trucks, as well as Summit Express):
V. (a) Since on or about June 1, 2004, Summit,
through Great Lakes Building Materials, LLC [sic], and
S.G. Construction have been parties to a written agreement
pursuant to which S.G. Construction agreed to provide de-
livery and handling of drywall and related products for
Summit.
(b) At all material times, Summit has exercised control
over the labor relations policy of S.G. Construction and
has administered a common labor policy with S.G. Con-
struction for the employees of S.G. Construction.
(c) Based on the conduct described above in para-
graphs V(a) and (b), Summit and S.G. Construction are,
and have been at all material times, joint employers of the
employees of S.G. Construction.
VI. (a) On or about June 7, 2004, S.G. Construction
began providing labor services as a subordinate instrument
to and a disguised continuation of Summit.
(b) Based on the conduct described above in paragraph
VI(a), Summit and S.G. Construction are, and have been at
all material times, alter egos and a single employer within
the meaning of the Act.
The Respondents deny all of these allegations, although they do
admit that on June 1 Great Lakes and SG Construction entered
into a contract pursuant to which SG Construction agreed to
deliver drywall for Great Lakes.
Sam Catrambone is the cousin of Richard Catrambone. Be-
fore the events of this case, Sam Catrambone had something of
an inventory-control responsibility for Summit Express, but
there is no evidence that he had an official title with Summit
Express, and there is no allegation, evidence, or stipulation that
he had any supervisory responsibilities when he was employed
by Summit Express. (The complaint did not name Sam Ca-
trambone as a supervisor of Summit Express, Great Lakes, or
Summit Truck, although it does name him as a supervisor of
SG Construction, as discussed infra.)4
The complaint alleges that, at all material times, Kevin
O’Connor has been the vice president of Summit Express. The
answer admits that O’Connor was the vice president of Summit
Express “until June 4, 2004,” and the parties stipulated that,
“[p]rior to June 5, 2004, Kevin O’Connor, who was on Summit
Express’ payroll, supervised drivers and directed their work for
Great Lakes.” At trial, O’Connor identified himself as then
being “the vice president” of Great Lakes. When O’Connor
became the vice president of Great Lakes, it was not alleged or
stipulated to, but apparently it was on June 5 when his name
ceased appearing on Summit Express’ payroll records and be-
gan appearing on Great Lakes,’ as described infra.5
A. Summit Express’ relationship with Teamsters’ Local 777
On February 1, 2003, Summit Express and Teamsters’ Local
Union Local 777 (which is not a party to this proceeding) en-
tered into a collective-bargaining agreement that covered the
Plum Street drivers and warehousemen. By its terms, the 2003
agreement was to be effective until February 1, 2006. At some
point after (or possibly before) the 2003 agreement was en-
tered, however, agents of the Charging Party, Teamsters’ Local
Union 673, came to the opinion that their local union, and not
Local 777, had geographical jurisdiction within the Teamsters’
organization for all drywall delivery operations in the Aurora
area. James Glimco6 is the president of Local 777; Thomas L.
Custer is the secretary-treasurer of Local 673. In February
2004, Catrambone met with Glimco and Custer in Custer’s
office. Custer testified that at that meeting he informed Ca-
trambone and Glimco that, because his union had jurisdiction
of drywall deliveries in the Aurora area, Local 777’s 2003 con-
tract with Summit Express was not valid. Further, according to
Custer’s testimony, which Catrambone did not dispute, Ca-
trambone replied that Custer was attempting to “railroad” him.
He stated that Custer’s attempts to have Local 673 become the
bargaining agent of the Summit Express’ employees was “ex-
tortion and racketeering,” and stated that “if he couldn’t be
represented by Mr. Glimco, he was going to go to Local 707,
production workers union.” Local 707 was not mentioned
again in the transcript, nor is it mentioned in the exhibits, and it
is not clear that such a union exists. Custer apparently meant
that Catrambone referred to a desire to recognize Local 711

4 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent references to “Catram-
bone” are to Richard.
5 Kevin O’Connor’s brother Rory was an employee of Summit Ex-
press who will be mentioned infra, but unless otherwise indicated all
future references to “O’Connor” are to Kevin.
6 Glimco is misspelled “Glenco” in the transcript which is accord-
ingly corrected.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 605
because that is the way things turned out, as described infra. At
any rate, Custer was credible that Catrambone expressed an
adamant refusal to recognize Local 673 and that Catrambone
further expressed a determination to seek out another union to
deal with as the bargaining representative of Summit Express’
employees if Local 777 was not going to represent them.
Later in February 2004, Local 673 filed a jurisdictional-
dispute grievance with the Teamsters’ Chicago area joint coun-
cil. In that grievance, Local 673 claimed that it, and not Local
777, had the right to organize and represent employees who
handled drywall in the Aurora area. Also in February, Local
673 began attempting to organize the Summit Express employ-
ees.
By letter dated May 11, Local 673 submitted to Catrambone
a letter stating that Local 673 had won the jurisdictional griev-
ance, that it had therefore been established that Local 777 had
possessed no authority to enter into an agreement covering the
Plum Street truckdrivers and warehousemen, and that Local
673 was then requesting that Catrambone meet and bargain for
a contract that would validly cover those employees. By letter
dated May 17, Catrambone’s attorney responded that Summit
Express’ 2003 contract with Local 777 remained valid and
declined to recognize Local 673. By letter to Catrambone dated
May 26, Glimco confirmed that Local 673 had won the juris-
dictional grievance, and Glimco advised Catrambone that: “Ef-
fective today, Local 777 disclaims interest in representing the
workers at Summit Express.” (That is, Local 777 repudiated its
2003 contract with Summit Express.) Catrambone testified that
he received Glimco’s letter on June 1. Catrambone further
testified (and the complaint alleges, and the General Counsel
stipulated) that, also on June 1, Catrambone, as owner of Great
Lakes, entered into the above-mentioned contract pursuant to
which SG Construction agreed to take over the drywall-
delivery operations of Summit Express. (The details of the June
1 contract between Catrambone and SG Construction are dis-
cussed in a separate section below.)
B. Testimony of Threats in May
Former Summit Express truckdriver, and alleged discrimina-
tee, Daniel (Joey) Wright testified that in late May he told
O’Connor that he had received a letter that stated that Local
777 would no longer be representing the employees of Summit
Express, and Wright asked O’Connor what effect that would
have on the employees. According to Wright:
And he said that there was an independent union com-
ing in, that you did not have to be a Teamster to drive a
truck, and that they were going to bring a union in, and if
we knew what was good for ourselves, that we would sign
up with their union.7
Wright testified that he replied that he did not think that signing
up for an independent union would be the best thing for the
employees.
Former Summit Express truckdriver, and alleged discrimina-
tee, Dennis Wright (brother of Joey) testified that on May 29 he
also went to O’Connor and told O’Connor that he had received

7 Tr. 237, L. 12, is corrected to change “unit” to “union.”
a letter that stated that Local 777 no longer represented the
employees of Summit Express. Wright asked O’Connor how
that fact would affect the employees’ insurance and 401(k)
plans. According to Wright:
[O’Connor] said that they would be bringing in an independ-
ent union and that if I knew what was good for me and my
family that I would follow suit with that union because, if I
didn’t, I would be fired and that Rich Catrambone would
close the doors to the shop and no one would have a job.
Wright testified that he did not respond to O’Connor.
Based on this testimony by the Wrights, the complaint al-
leges that in violation of Section 8(a)(1) the Respondents, by
O’Connor, threatened employees with discharge if they chose
to be represented by Local 673 or if they refused to support
Local 711 (the “independent union”). That paragraph of the
complaint also alleges that by this conduct the Respondents
threatened employees with the closure of the Respondents’
business if they chose to be represented by Local 673 or refused
to support Local 711, impliedly threatened employees with
unspecified reprisals if they chose to be represented by Local
673 or refused to support Local 711, and instructed employees
to sign authorization cards in support of Local 711, all in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1). The complaint further alleges that by
the same conduct of O’Connor the Respondents rendered assis-
tance and support to Local 711 by instructing employees to sign
authorization cards for Local 711 and by threatening employees
with discharge if they refused to do so, both in violation of
Section 8(a)(2). Although O’Connor generally denied threaten-
ing any employees, he did not deny these specific remarks to
the Wrights, and I credit their testimony.
Former Summit Express truckdriver, and alleged discrimina-
tee, John Mitchell testified that in late May a new employee
named Neal (last name unknown to Mitchell) approached
Mitchell in the warehouse and asked if there was a union that
represented the employees. Mitchell replied to Neal that there
was supposed to be a union representing the employees (appar-
ently referring to Local 777) but that union was not effective.
Immediately thereafter O’Connor approached Mitchell and,
further according to Mitchell:
He told me not to talk about the Union in the shop, be-
cause if I did, the place would get closed down, and eve-
ryone would lose their jobs.
Later in the day, further according to Mitchell, O’Connor
called him into the office and:
He told me he did not want to hear any more talking
about the Union. Like he said earlier, if he did, I would
lose my job, and everyone else would too, and the place
will be closed.
Based on this testimony by Mitchell, the complaint alleges that,
in violation of Section 8(a)(1), in May, the Respondents, by
O’Connor, threatened employees with discharge if they dis-
cussed the possibility of being represented by a union and
threatened employees with the closure of the Respondents’
business because they discussed the possibility of being repre-
sented by a union. Again, O’Connor generally denied threaten-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD606
ing any employee, but he was not asked what, if anything, he
had said to Mitchell about unions, and he was not asked what
he said to Mitchell after he heard Mitchell’s exchange with
Neal. I found Mitchell’s specific testimony to be more credi-
ble, and I do credit it.
C. June 3—The Employees Meet O’Connor at Stoney’s Pizza
After work on June 3, Dennis and Joey Wright and employ-
ees Rory O’Connor (again, Kevin O’Connor’s brother), Troy
Sharp, Joe Huerta,8 and Shawn Decker met with Kevin
O’Connor at Stoney’s Pizza Pub (Stoney’s) in Aurora. Dennis
Wright testified that the men discussed the fact that Local 777
no longer represented the employees, and (again, in
O’Connor’s presence) Wright told the other employees about
his earlier meeting with O’Connor and what O’Connor had told
him, as detailed above. Further, according to Wright:
We were asking Kevin about the union that they were
going to bring in, the independent union. [O’Connor] was
telling us he didn’t know exactly who it was yet. But it
would be soon. I think he said the next Monday morning
they were going to come in. And we asked him if we were
going to have a contract and what kind of benefits we were
going to have. And he said that everything would be fine,
that Rich Catrambone was not going to have Local 673. So
whatever we were thinking about that, we might as well
get it out of our heads because he [Catrambone] would
close the shop doors before he would ever let them into his
company.
Sharp, Huerta, and Joey Wright corroborated Dennis Wright in
this testimony. Based on this testimony, the complaint alleges
that on June 3 the Respondents, by O’Connor, threatened em-
ployees with discharge and the closure of the Respondents’
business if they supported Local 673. O’Connor admitted meet-
ing with the employees at Stoney’s on June 3, but he denied the
statements that the employees attributed to him. I found the
employees’ testimony more credible, and I do credit it.
D. The Many Events of June 4—Including the Union Meeting at
Stoney’s and the Alleged Automobile Pursuit Thereafter
By letter dated June 4 (a Friday), John J. Toomey, an attor-
ney for Local 673, notified Alan M. Levin, an attorney for Ca-
trambone, that Toomey was confirming that “pursuant to our
telephone conversation of June 4,” Summit Express was refus-
ing to recognize Local 673 unless it was certified by the Board.
Toomey concluded: “My client will take such steps as permit-
ted by law to advise the public of your client’s position.” A fax
copy that was placed in evidence by the Respondents shows
that the letter was transmitted from Levin’s office to the Plum
Street facility on “June–04–04” at “10:55 AM.”
Sharp testified that, as he was working at a jobsite on that
Friday, Local 673 Agent Santiago Perez approached him and
presented him with an authorization card which he signed.9

8 “Huerta” is misspelled “Juarto” throughout the transcript which is
accordingly corrected.
9 The card authorized Local 673 to represent the employee in collec-
tive bargaining with Summit Express. All other Local 673 authorization
cards mentioned herein did the same.
Dennis Wright testified that also during the June 4 workday he
and employee Shawn Decker met with Union Representative
David Theodore at another jobsite. At the time, Wright and
Decker also signed authorization cards for Local 673. After
doing so, Dennis Wright contacted other employees by use of
their Nextel combination radio-telephones that the Respondent
had theretofore furnished to the Summit Express employees.
Dennis urged the other employees to meet with Theodore and
Perez at Stoney’s after work. The meeting did occur, and the
Wrights and employee Richard Grethe10 attended the meeting
in its entirety. Sharp also attended the meeting, but he arrived
later than the other employees, as discussed below. Rory
O’Connor attended the meeting, but he left it early, after declin-
ing to sign an authorization card for Local 673. (Rory
O’Connor, who is not an alleged discriminatee, did not testify.)
At the June 4 meeting at Stoney’s, Theodore further ex-
plained the purpose of Local 673’s authorization cards, and
Grethe and Joey Wright each signed one at that time. Joey
Wright testified (without objection) that, “a while” after Rory
O’Connor left the June 4 meeting at Stoney’s, he called some-
one in the group “and said that Kevin and Rich were on their
way to the bar to see who was partaking in the meeting.” At
that point, the meeting broke up.
Huerta did not attend the June 4 meeting at Stoney’s; instead,
he went home immediately after work. About 6 p.m., Dennis
Wright called Huerta from Stoney’s and asked if Huerta would
sign an authorization card for Local 673. Huerta said that he
would; Wright responded that he would then bring an authori-
zation card to Huerta’s home.
Employee Decker also did not attend the June 4 meeting at
Stoney’s. Decker testified, however, that as he was driving
home after work on that date he received a telephone call from
Catrambone. According to Decker:
And he asked me if I talked to anybody from the 673
earlier that day. He [said he] got wind of it, or something.
. . . . They were[11] nosing around, the 673.
And I told him, “Yeah, Dave Theodore stopped by the
job.”
And he asked me if I signed a card, and I said yeah.
And then that was it; that’s all he asked.
And then like a minute later, Kevin O’Connor came on
the phone. And [O’Connor] asked me what direction I was
going. I told him I was going home.
And he asked me again, what direction, come Monday,
which direction I was going to travel, and I said I wasn’t
sure, and what side I was going to take.
As the Wrights and Grethe were leaving Stoney’s on June 4,
they noticed Catrambone’s personal vehicle coming down the
street that ran in front of that establishment; Catrambone and
Kevin O’Connor were inside the vehicle, as the employees
could see. The three employees got into Joey Wright’s car and
then, with Joey driving, went in the direction opposite from that

10 “Grethe” is misspelled “Gaffee” at many points in the transcript
which is accordingly corrected.
11 The Tr. 180, L. 10, is corrected to change “There were” to “They
were.”
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 607
which they had seen Catrambone and O’Connor traveling.
Joey Wright then drove toward Huerta’s house, which is about
3 miles from Stoney’s.
Sharp had arrived at the June 4 meeting at Stoney’s later than
the others, and he remained there for a few minutes later than
the others. When Sharp did leave, he returned to the parking lot
of the Plum Street facility. (What reason Sharp had for return-
ing to the facility was not stated.) Sharp testified that Catram-
bone and O’Connor, who were in Catrambone’s personal vehi-
cle at the time, approached him in the parking lot. According to
Sharp:
Rich Catrambone asked me if I was one of the guys
that are willing to go 673, and I said, “I just want a pay-
check.”
And he said, “Either you’re with us or you’re against
us.”
I said, “I don’t want anything to do with this.”
Kevin O’Connor said, “I tried telling you guys the
other night that Rich is not going 673, and if anybody goes
673 you’re going to be fired.”
Then Rich Catrambone said . . . “I have a lot of money
and . . . I’ll shut these trucks down before I go 673 . . . . I
will change the name of the company if I have to.”
Then he [Catrambone] also said Kevin O’Connor is no
longer vice president, that he is an operator now. And then
he asked me if I was down at Stoney’s Tavern for the
meeting and I said, “Well, I went down there to eat, yes.”
And then he asked me, “Where are those guys at now.”
I said, “I don’t have a clue.”
He goes, “Well, if you talk to them, tell them I’m look-
ing for them.”
Sharp further testified that about one-half hour later Catram-
bone radioed him and asked if he had found “those guys.”
Sharp replied he had spoken to Dennis Wright “and that they
were at Rich Grethe’s house.”
Sharp was not asked if he had, in fact, talked to Dennis
Wright after leaving Stoney’s. And, actually, the Wrights and
Grethe were driving toward Huerta’s house (not Grethe’s), as
noted above. When the Wrights and Grethe arrived at Huerta’s
house, they spoke to Huerta outside. Huerta signed an authori-
zation card, and the four men continued to talk for about half an
hour. While they were doing so, Dennis received a Nextel mes-
sage from Kevin O’Connor. O’Connor’s message was, accord-
ing to Dennis:
Sorry to see that you attended the Last Supper at the bar.
Which way are you going to go when it comes time to go?
You’re going to turn right or are you going to turn left? Are
you with us? Are you against us?12
Wright testified that he, Joey, and Grethe got back in Joey’s
automobile, and Huerta got into his own vehicle which had
been parked on the street in front of Huerta’s house. The em-
ployees began driving on Huerta’s street, with Joey’s car in the

12 At Tr. 82, L. 11, the court reporting service did not capitalize
“Last Supper,” but it is clear that O’Connor was referring to a specific
event, and the transcript is corrected accordingly.
lead. Huerta testified that he noticed that Catrambone and
O’Connor were behind him in Catrambone’s vehicle. Huerta
caught up to Joey’s car and told the Wrights and Grethe what
he had seen. After about 6 blocks, Huerta turned off at an in-
tersection where Joey’s automobile continued going straight.
The Wrights and Grethe testified that shortly thereafter they
noticed Catrambone and O’Connor, still in Catrambone’s vehi-
cle, following Joey’s vehicle. For several minutes, sometimes at
elevated speeds, and through several turns, Catrambone’s vehi-
cle continued to follow Joey’s until Joey got on an interstate
highway. (As Joey Wright testified on cross-examination: “He
was staying behind my vehicle no matter where I went. . . . We
turned; he turned. We sped up; he sped up.”)
The Wrights and Grethe further testified that, shortly after
Catrambone quit following Joey’s vehicle, O’Connor radioed
Joey and asked if Grethe was in the car with him. Grethe told
Joey to respond affirmatively. Joey then handed the telephone
to Grethe who talked to O’Connor. O’Connor asked why Gre-
the had left his (Grethe’s) car in the lot at Summit Express (as
Grethe had, in fact, done that day); Grethe replied that it was
because the car needed some part and was not safe to drive at
that point.
Based on this testimony by the Wrights, Huerta, Sharp, Gre-
the, and Decker, the complaint alleges that on June 4, by Ca-
trambone and O’Connor, the Respondents interrogated employ-
ees about their union activities, threatened employees with
discharge if they supported Local 673, threatened employees
with closure of the Respondents’ business if they supported
Local 673, and created the impression that employees’ union
activities were under surveillance.
Catrambone and O’Connor admitted driving in Catram-
bone’s vehicle, in the areas of Stoney’s and Huerta’s house at
the time described by the employee witnesses. Specifically,
O’Connor testified that he and Catrambone had spent most of
June 4 “on the road.” When they returned to the Plum Street
facility about 5:30 p.m., the receptionist told them that some of
the employees were meeting at Stoney’s for beer. Upon hear-
ing that, Catrambone asked O’Connor if he would like to go to
Stoney’s for beer also. O’Connor agreed, and he and Catram-
bone went to Stoney’s in Catrambone’s vehicle. O’Connor
testified that, besides wanting beer, one of the reasons that he
and Catrambone chose that particular time to go to Stoney’s
was so that the supervisors could then “socialize” with the em-
ployees who were gathered at Stoney’s.13 When O’Connor and
Catrambone arrived at Stoney’s, however, they did not recog-
nize any of the cars that were in the parking lot as ones belong-
ing to any of the employees. Therefore, further, according to
O’Connor, he and Catrambone decided to drive to Murphy’s
Bar for drinks. The Plum Street facility was on the way to Mur-
phy’s, O’Connor testified, and when he and Catrambone drove
by the facility, they saw Sharp and stopped to talk to him.
O’Connor, however, did not deny the remarks that Sharp attrib-
uted to him at that time. O’Connor further testified that, as he
and Catrambone drove on toward Murphy’s, they saw the

13 The “socialize” answer, however, was the product of purest lead-
ing by the Respondents’ counsel.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD608
Wrights and Grethe in Joey’s car which was stopped in front of
Huerta’s house. When the employees saw O’Connor and Ca-
trambone, further according to O’Connor, “they looked like
they had spotted a ghost or something and just took off” in the
opposite direction. At that point, further according to
O’Connor, Catrambone told O’Connor that he would buy
O’Connor dinner at a restaurant; Catrambone then drove to a
restaurant. O’Connor denied “chasing” anybody. Catrambone
testified consistently with O’Connor, but he, in addition, denied
“following” the Wrights’ car. O’Connor did not deny radioing
Joey Wright, telling Wright that he was “sorry” to have seen
Wright at “the Last Supper” and questioning him. Finally, Ca-
trambone did not deny telling Decker that he had gotten “wind”
of the employees’ meeting with representatives of Local 673
and asking Decker if he had signed an authorization card for
Local 673, except for a general denial that he interrogated any
employee. Nor did Catrambone deny the remarks that Sharp
attributed to him as having been made in the parking lot of the
Plum Street facility on June 4. Specifically, Catrambone did not
deny telling Sharp: “I have a lot of money and . . . I’ll shut
these trucks down before I go 673. . . . I will change the name
of the company if I have to.”
Again, I credit the employees’ specific testimonies over the
general denials of the supervisors and over the supervisors’
palpably incredible account of the vehicular pursuit. That is, I
found particularly incredible the story of Catrambone and
O’Connor that: (a) they just happened to hear from the recep-
tionist (as opposed to Rory O’Connor) that the employees were
meeting at Stoney’s; (b) they did not find the employees there,
but (c) they did just happen to run across three of them in front
of Huerta’s house where (d) for no logical reason, the employ-
ees acted like they had “spotted a ghost” and sped away. Spe-
cifically, I find that Catrambone and O’Connor drove by the
June 4 union meeting at Stoney’s while the meeting was in
progress, or just breaking up, and it was not to “socialize” with
the employees. (Also, I do not believe the testimonies of
O’Connor and Catrambone that they did not recognize any of
the automobiles or persons outside Stoney’s.) I further find that
Catrambone and O’Connor saw the employees at Stoney’s and
thereafter followed Joey Wright’s and Grethe’s automobiles, as
the employees described.
E. June 5—The Cell Phones Go Dead
During the next day, Saturday, June 5, all of the employees’
radio-telephones would not work. The employees had not been
scheduled to work that day, but Dennis Wright testified without
dispute that the radios had worked for the employees on previ-
ous days off.
D. June 7—All Summit Express Employees (Except One)
are Discharged
At the close of business on Friday, June 4, Summit Express
had employed 22 truckdrivers and warehousemen. On Mon-
day, June 7, Catrambone met the Summit Express employees at
the gate and discharged all but one of them. (The exception was
one Thomas Marts whose usual assignment had been to deliver
paper to one particular customer of Great Lakes, Fleetwood
Papers; Marts also occasionally delivered to drywall custom-
ers.) The complaint alleges that, by 9 of the 21 discharges, the
Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3); the alleged unlawful
discharges are those of truckdrivers Edwin Chapa, Fermin
Chapa, Decker, Grethe, Huerta, Mitchell, Sharp, Dennis
Wright, and Joey Wright.14 The complaint does not allege that
the June 7 discharges of the 12 other Summit Express employ-
ees violated the Act.
Neither Edwin nor Fermin Chapa testified for the General
Counsel.15 The Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and
Mitchell testified that when they attempted to report to work at
the Plum Street facility on June 7 two pickup trucks were
blocking the gate. The trucks belonged to Catrambone and
employee Frank Caputo.16 Catrambone told the Wrights,
Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell that they were
fired, and he presented each of them with a letter stating that
“Your employment with Summit Express, Inc. is terminated as
of Saturday, June 5, 2004.” (Summit Express’ payroll periods
began Saturdays and ended on Fridays.) The Wrights, Huerta,
Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell testified that as Catram-
bone gave them their last paychecks he also handed them any
personal belongings that they had left behind on June 4. The
Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell testified
that they asked why they were being fired, but Catrambone
only replied that he did not have to give them a reason. The
Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell testified
that after being discharged they left the premises. None of this
testimony was disputed by Catrambone.
The 12 Summit Express employees whom Catrambone dis-
charged on June 7, but who are not named as alleged discrimi-
natees (the nonalleged discriminatees), are Caputo, Neal
Costello, William Coleman, Greg Donovan, Matthew Fryes,
Ruben Gonzalez, Randy Hanson, James McCarthy, Rory
O’Connor, Jason Ramsdell, Wayne Surgeon, and Anthony
Smith. Catrambone discharged the 12 nonalleged discrimina-
tees, and he discharged alleged discriminatees Fermin and
Edwin Chapa, with letters that had texts that are identical to
that of the discharge letters that he issued to the Wrights,
Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell, as quoted above.
Simultaneously upon being discharged by Summit Express,
however, the 12 nonalleged discriminatees were placed on SG
Construction’s payroll. None of the 9 alleged discriminatees
were simultaneously placed on SG Construction’s payroll, al-
though all of them (including the Chapas) were placed on SG
Construction’s payroll during the week of June 21, as described

14 Anthony Spencer is named in the complaint as a 10th individual
who was discharged in violation of Sec. 8(a)(3). Spencer, however, is
not mentioned in the transcript, exhibits, or briefs, and his name ap-
pears to have been included in the complaint in error.
15 The Respondents called Fermin Chapa to testify, and they offered
the testimony of Edwin Chapa, but in both cases only about topics that
were irrelevant.
16 The caption of this case lists Caputo as “petitioner” of “S.G. Con-
struction Employee Association.” This is solely because the caption of
the complaint lists Caputo as such. The General Counsel, however, did
not offer any petition that Caputo may have filed. Also, “S.G. Con-
struction Employee Association” is not mentioned in the testimony or
in any exhibits (except, of course, the formal exhibits). Caputo is the
son-in-law of Gagliano, the owner of SG Construction.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 609
infra.
As employees of SG Construction, the 12 nonalleged dis-
criminatees received the same rates of pay17 as they had re-
ceived as employees of Summit Express. There is no testimony
about who became the immediate supervisor of the 12 nonal-
leged discriminatees from June 7 through the week of June 21.
During that week, however, the immediate supervisor became
Catrambone’s cousin, Sam Catrambone. According to the posi-
tion of the Respondents, the ultimate supervisor of all employ-
ees of SG Construction at all times was Gagliano.
On June 7, Richard Catrambone transferred himself, Sam
Catrambone, and O’Connor to Great Lakes’ payroll. Thereaf-
ter, Richard Catrambone and O’Connor remained on Great
Lakes’s payroll, but Sam Catrambone was transferred to SG
Construction’s payroll during the week of June 21, when SG
Construction also hired the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker,
Sharp, and Mitchell, as described below. During that same
week, Sam Catrambone became the “Director of Operations
and Human Resources for S.G. Construction,” as he testified.
G. June 7—SG Construction Recognizes and Signs a Collec-
tive-Bargaining Agreement with Local 711
The complaint alleges that in violation of Section 8(a)(2), on
or about June 7, a time that Local 711 did not represent an un-
coerced majority of employees in any unit, the Respondents,
through SG Construction, entered into, and thereafter enforced,
a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 711, pursuant to
which agreement Local 711 received recognition as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the Plum Street truckdrivers
and warehousemen. As a separate violation of Section 8(a)(2),
the complaint alleges that the agreement between SG Construc-
tion and Local 711 contains a checkoff clause which requires
SG Construction to deduct and transmit Local 711 dues and
initiation fees from the Plum Street truckdrivers and ware-
housemen, provided that the employees had signed a proper
checkoff authorization. The Respondents have formally denied
those allegations of the complaint, and no copy of a contract
between SG Construction and Local 711 was offered into evi-
dence. The parties, however, entered into a written stipulation
that Gagliano, on June 7, on behalf of SG Construction, entered
into such a contract. The parties further stipulated that the June
7 contract (as I shall call it) is effective by its terms from that
date until June 1, 2009. The parties further stipulated that,
pursuant to the terms of the checkoff provisions of the June 7
contract, “Respondent deducted and remitted union dues and
fees to Local 711.”
Records that were offered by the General Counsel disclose
that, beginning with the payroll period that ended on August
22, dues for Local 711 were deducted from the paychecks of
many of the employees who were on SG Construction’s pay-
roll. Sam Catrambone testified that SG Construction had
ceased deducting 711’s dues at some point during the winter of
2004–2005, but he could not remember just when. When asked

17 See SG Construction’s payroll records (really, summaries of re-
cords) for the June 5–11 payroll period; each of these employees
worked at the rates that they had received as Summit Express employ-
ees.
during examination by the General Counsel why SG Construc-
tion stopped deducting 711 dues, Catrambone answered: “I
believe because of the 711 backing out of the situation, I guess.
That was my understanding.” Catrambone was not asked to
explain his “backing out” remark.
H. Week of June 21—SG Construction Hires the
Alleged Discriminatees
Dennis Wright testified that on June 21 Gagliano called him
at his home. Gagliano told Wright that he was the owner of SG
Construction, that SG Construction was taking over the busi-
ness of Summit Express, and that Gagliano “would like to hire
drivers back that know what they’re doing.” Gagliano asked
Wright if he was interested in employment. Wright replied that
he was, and Gagliano told him to report back to the Plum Street
facility the next day to discuss employment. Decker, Grethe,
Sharp, and Joey Wright testified to similar calls from Gagliano.
The Wrights, Decker, Grethe, Mitchell, and Sharp testified
that, when they reported on June 22 to the Plum Street facility,
they were met by Richard Catrambone who told them that, if
they wanted their jobs back, to go inside and get their work
assignments. Dennis Wright asked where Gagliano was; Ca-
trambone replied, “[T]here’s work. If you want to work, go
back to work.” Rather than doing so, Dennis Wright (who, on
his personal cell phone, had retained Gagliano’s telephone
number from Gagliano’s call to him during the previous day)
called Gagliano. Gagliano told Wright that he was busy and to
“[j]ust do what Rich tells you and go back to work.” Wright
refused, stating that he wanted to talk to Gagliano first. The
Wrights, Decker, Grethe, Mitchell, and Sharp then began wait-
ing for Gagliano who came to the Plum Street facility about 2
hours later.
When Gagliano arrived, he interviewed the Wrights, Huerta,
Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell individually. Dennis
Wright testified that Gagliano told him that “we can go back to
work as usual under the same terms.” Wright replied that he did
not want to return to work without a union contract. Gagliano
responded: “If you don’t like it, don’t let the door hit you on the
way out.” As Wright was leaving, Gagliano also told him that
he would call him that evening. Joey Wright, Decker, Grethe,
Mitchell, and Sharp testified to similar exchanges with Gagli-
ano. The Wrights, Decker, Grethe, Mitchell, and Sharp left the
Plum Street facility after their interviews with Gagliano, with-
out doing any work that day.
During the evening of June 22, Sam Catrambone called
Dennis Wright. Catrambone told Wright that Gagliano had
placed him in charge of the SG Construction operation and that
the employees would thereafter take orders from him. Wright
replied that that was agreeable with him and that he would re-
port for work at the Plum Street facility the next day.
The Wrights, Decker, Grethe, Mitchell, and Sharp testified
that on June 23 they reported for work at the Plum Street facil-
ity. Gagliano was not present. Richard and Sam Catrambone
met the employees and told them that, as SG Construction em-
ployees, their hours, wages and other economic terms and con-
ditions of employment remained the same as they had been
when they were employed as employees of Summit Express.
The employees then began working under those conditions,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD610
using (except in some cases, as mentioned below) the same
equipment, servicing the same customers under procedures
essentially identical to those existing when they were employed
by Summit Express, except that Sam Catrambone functioned as
their immediate supervisor, not O’Connor.18
Richard and Sam Catrambone told the Wrights, Huerta, Gre-
the, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell that they were not required to
fill out applications or new W-4s to work for SG Construction.
Sam Catrambone assigned the employees to trucks. Dennis
Wright testified that the truck to which he was thereafter as-
signed was older than the truck to which he had been assigned
when he was employed by Summit Express, and the truck was
not in as good condition as the trucks to which he had been
assigned before. Specifically, Wright testified that the truck to
which he was often assigned as an employee of SG Construc-
tion was older and sometimes had bald tires, broken steps to the
cab, an uncharged and unsecured fire extinguisher and leaking
axles. Once, when he complained about the safety of the truck,
Sam Catrambone told him to drive it or go home; Wright went
home.
The employees were paid, in part, by the amount of drywall
that their trucks delivered. Dennis Wright further testified that
he was, as an SG Construction employee, assigned to work
with two other employees, rather than just one other employee
as he had usually been assigned as an employee of Summit
Express. The effect of this, according to Wright, was that the
amount paid per sheet of drywall delivered was divided by
three instead of two, thus reducing his daily wage. Wright
testified that from the week of June 21 until he was terminated
late August he continued to be assigned to the three-man crew
with the resultant diminution of his wages.19 The truck to
which Wright was assigned as an employee of SG Construction
was marked with the insignia of both Great Lakes and Summit
Express, just as the trucks had been marked when he was em-
ployed as an employee of Summit Express. The building to
which the SG Construction employees reported at the Plum
Street address retained its markings, signs that it was the place
of business of Great Lakes and Summit Express.
Dennis Wright further testified that when he was employed
by Summit Express the first employees back from an early
assignment were assigned any loads that were then available.
Wright testified that on several occasions after he was made an
SG Construction employee he returned to the Plum Street facil-
ity from making deliveries and that, although there were pallets
of drywall that were ready to be delivered, Sam Catrambone
sent him home rather than giving him additional assignments.
Wright further testified that after being hired as an SG Con-
struction employee he was consistently sent on assignments
that were the furthest away from the Plum Street facility, thus
increasing his driving time and reducing his wages. Finally,

18 The records that the General Counsel placed in evidence show that
Huerta, Mitchell, Edwin Chapa, and Fermin Chapa were also hired as
SG Construction employees during the week of June 21, but it is not
clear which day of that week each was hired. The circumstances of
their being hired (or rehired) also were not described in the record.
19 The circumstances of Dennis Wright’s termination by SG Con-
struction are not in issue in this case. (The circumstances of Joey
Wright’s termination by SG Construction are.)
Dennis Wright testified that he was consistently given the
smaller loads, again having the impact of reducing his wages.
Joey Wright, Decker, Grethe, Mitchell, and Sharp gave similar
testimony. (I discuss in the immediately following section of
this decision the documentary evidence that shows the effects
on the alleged discriminatees’ wages that their employment by
SG Construction had.)
Joey Wright further testified that after being hired by SG
Construction:
We used to have like the—with an 18-volt—circular-
saw drill. He took all those away. They pretty much took
our tools away, gave us the worst equipment they had and
we had to make do with what we had. It was much more
difficult after being fired than it was prior to being fired.
Based on all of this testimony, and based on payroll records
which are discussed in the immediately following section, the
complaint alleges that, in violation of Section 8(a)(3):
Since on or about June 22, 2004, Respondent has re-
duced the wages and hours of [the nine alleged discrimina-
tees], taken away their tools, assigned them to drive older
trucks and work with larger crews than they had before be-
ing discharged, and failed to reissue them the cellular
phones they had prior to being discharged.
None of the alleged discriminatees testified that after being
hired by SG Construction they were denied the use of cellular
telephones; on the other hand, the Respondents’ witnesses did
not testify that the alleged discriminatees did receive cellular
telephones after they were hired by SG Construction. And on
cross-examination, Dennis Wright testified that he had returned
the cell phone that he had been issued as a Summit Express
employee to “the Company.”
When Sam Catrambone was called in the Respondents’ case,
he testified that when he was employed by Summit Express, “I
managed the warehouse and inventory control.” When asked if
his responsibilities for SG Construction were different, Ca-
trambone replied, “yes,” but no elaboration or explanation of
that answer was asked. When asked if he ever intentionally
assigned an SG Construction employee a job that would yield
lower wages, Catrambone testified that he did not. When asked
if he ever assigned any of the alleged discriminatees to older
trucks “as retaliation or punishment for union activities,” Ca-
trambone answered that he did not, and he added that Summit
Truck (again, the company that holds title to the trucks) did not
have any old trucks that SG Construction could assign to its
employees. Richard Catrambone also testified that, as owner of
Summit Truck, he did not have any old trucks to which the
alleged discriminatees could have been assigned. (If records of
which employees got assigned to which trucks ever existed,
they were not offered by either party.)
I. Documentary Evidence on Wage-Reduction Issue
The Wrights, Sharp, and Decker testified that their wages
were reduced when they became employed by SG Construc-
tion. The complaint alleges that all nine of the alleged discrimi-
natees suffered wage losses after being made SG Construction
employees. My review of the records discloses the following:
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 611
Dennis Wright, for the period of January 3 through June 4,20
earned as an employee of Summit Express $26,728.48, a
weekly average of $1214.93. For the eight full payroll periods
ending August 22 that Dennis Wright worked as an SG Con-
struction employee, his gross pay was $8005.56, a weekly av-
erage of $1000.69, which was a reduction of 21.5 percent.
Joey Wright, for the period of January 3 through June 4,
earned as an employee of Summit Express $31,479.61, a
weekly average of $1430.89. For the two full payroll periods
that Joey Wright worked as an employee of SG Construction,
those ending on July 2 and 9, he earned $996.29 and $910, a
weekly average of $953.145, which was a reduction of 33.4
percent.
Sharp, for the period of April 17 through June 4, earned as
an employee of Summit Express $7002.34, a weekly average of
$1000.33. The 1 full week that Sharp worked for SG Construc-
tion, June 19 through 25, Sharp earned $740.54, which was a
reduction of 26.0 percent.
Decker, for the period of January 3 through June 4, earned as
an employee of Summit Express $28,504.09, a weekly average
of $1,295.69, or a daily average of $259.13. As discussed be-
low, the complaint alleges that Decker was constructively dis-
charged in violation of Section 8(a)(3). Decker testified that he
worked for SG Construction only on three dates before he quit;
those 3 days fell in two payroll periods, those ending on June
25 and July 2. Decker’s gross pay for those weeks was $610.83
and $355.86, respectively. This was a daily average of
$322.23.
Grethe, for the period of January 3 through June 4, earned as
an employee of Summit Express $30,328.38, a weekly average
of $1378.56. For the eight payroll periods in which Grethe
worked for SG Construction, those ending June 25 through
August 22,21 he earned $7760.06, a weekly average of $970,
which was a reduction of 30.0 percent.
Huerta, for the period of January 3 through June 4, earned as
an employee of Summit Express $19,234.84, a weekly average
of $874.31. For the eight payroll periods in which Huerta
worked for SG Construction, those ending June 25 through
August 22,22 he earned $7204.46, a weekly average of
$900.50.23

20 For all employees discussed in this section, earnings mentioned
are the only ones for which records were placed in evidence (all ending
on August 22). I do not consider Summit Express’ records of earnings
for the day of January 2 because the earnings of the remainder of that
workweek (December 29–31, 2003) are not in evidence. Also, some of
the Summit Express employees received vacation pay in 2004, another
figure that I have subtracted from the totals that are indicated by Sum-
mit Express’ records.
21 Grethe appears not to have worked during the payroll period end-
ing July 25.
22 Huerta appears not to have worked during the payroll periods end-
ing July 2 and August 1.
23 What the General Counsel offered as “records” of SG Construc-
tion’s payroll from the period ending on June 11 to various dates in
July is actually a summary of records (as indicated by the “sorted by”
line on each page and by the format which is different from actual
payroll which the General Counsel offered). The summary and the
(real) records overlap for some employees. I have combined as one
payroll period’s pay the totals of the overlapping “weekly” payroll
Mitchell, for the period from February 7 through June 4,
earned as an employee of Summit Express $22,577.13, a
weekly average of $1326.89. For the eight payroll periods in
which Mitchell worked for SG Construction, those ending June
25 through August 15, he earned $8495.43, a weekly average of
$1061.92, which was a reduction of 20.0 percent.
Edwin Chapa, for the period of January 3 through June 4,
earned as an employee of Summit Express $20,049.44, a
weekly average of $911.33. For the nine payroll periods in
which Chapa worked for SG Construction from June 25
through August 22, he earned $8213.42, a weekly average of
$912.60.
Fermin Chapa, for the period from January 3 through June 4,
earned as an employee of Summit Express $28,920.45, a
weekly average of $2410.04. For the eight payroll periods in
which Chapa worked for SG Construction, those ending June
25 through August 22,24 he earned $12,665.58, a weekly aver-
age of $1583.19, which was a reduction of 34.3 percent.
The Respondents’ payroll records further disclose that Rory
O’Connor (who left the June 4 union meeting early, and with-
out signing a union authorization card, and who is not an al-
leged discriminatee), for the period of January 3 through June
4, earned as an employee of Summit Express $23,615.02, a
weekly average of $1073.41. As an employee who began work-
ing as an SG Construction employee on June 7 (again the day
that the alleged discriminatees were discharged but not rehired
by SG Construction), O’Connor earned by the payroll period
ending July 16 $13,484.52, a weekly average of $1348.52, or
an increase of 26.0 percent.
J. June 24—Alleged Threat by Catrambone
Decker testified that on June 2425 he overheard Richard Ca-
trambone telling a new employee that “if this 673 tried to get
in, he’d shut the doors down.” Based on this testimony by
Decker, the complaint alleges that about June 25, the Respon-
dents, by Catrambone, threatened employees with closure of
the Respondents’ business if they supported the Union and
informed employees that it would be futile for them to select
Local 673 as their collective-bargaining representative. Again,
Catrambone generally denied threatening any employee, but I
found Decker credible in this testimony.
K. June 27 (and thereafter)—Grethe and Dennis Wright are
Barred from Warehouse
Grethe testified that on June 27, as he was walking into the
Plum Street warehouse, he met Sam Catrambone who was at
the entrance talking to Dennis Wright. Catrambone stopped
Grethe and told him that he and Wright could not enter the
warehouse. Grethe asked why, and Catrambone replied that
“the man that runs the building” had said so. Grethe protested
that he needed to use the restroom, but Catrambone told him
that he could not do that either. Grethe told Catrambone he was

periods designated for some employees (such as Huerta, who, accord-
ing to what the General Counsel introduced, had one “weekly” payroll
period ending on July 16 and another ending July 18).
24 Chapa appears not to have worked during the payroll period end-
ing July 18.
25 Tr. 167, L. 23, is corrected to change “June 2th” to “June 24th.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD612
going to do so anyway, and he proceeded into the warehouse.
As Grethe proceeded, Catrambone told him that he was calling
the police. When Grethe came out of the restroom, he asked
Catrambone if he had really called the police. Catrambone re-
plied that he had and that the police were on the way. The po-
lice did come, and they talked to both Grethe and Catrambone,
but then they left without taking any further action. Grethe
further testified that, for a week thereafter, he and Wright were
not allowed into the warehouse, even to use the restroom. After
that week, Catrambone allowed them into the warehouse to use
the restroom but required them to leave immediately thereafter.
Based on this testimony by Grethe, the complaint alleges that
the Respondents, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), “barred em-
ployee Rich[ard] Grethe from the warehouse and using the
restroom at the Respondents’ facility.”
In the Respondents’ case, Sam Catrambone was asked why
he had barred Grethe from the warehouse. In his answer, Ca-
trambone lapsed between the singular and the plural, apparently
testifying, as had Grethe, that both Grethe and Dennis Wright
had been barred from the warehouse; to wit:
That had to do with, basically it was, it was a disrup-
tion case. It was, he was being very, very disruptive in the
warehouse. People were complaining to me about what
was going on. And the only way I could really take care of
it was not to have him have any contact.
We did that for several weeks and after a period of
time when the, they showed a different response and as-
sured me that they were not going to be disruptive they
were allowed back in the warehouse.
When asked what he had meant by “disruptive,” Catrambone
answered:
Disruptive, interfering with the loading and unloading
of trucks. Creating discussions and arguments with, with
people. These are the complaints I received. And the way,
the way we felt to handle is that “no contact” was the best
way to do it.
When asked on cross-examination to specify how Grethe and
Wright had been disruptive, Catrambone replied:
They were complaining about why am I am not being
loaded before this person. Why, why am I getting this load
and this person is getting that load. It became, it was, it
was a disruption.
Catrambone testified that Grethe and Wright voiced those com-
plaints to himself and to employees who, in turn, complained to
him about Grethe’s and Wright’s complaining. Catrambone
named Edwin Chapa and “possibly” Greg Donovan as the em-
ployees who complained about Grethe’s and Wright’s com-
plaining. The Respondents did not call Chapa or Donovan to
testify. Catrambone also testified that Grethe and Wright were
still able to do their jobs, even though they were barred from
the warehouse for a period of time, because he would make
sure that their trucks were loaded the night before and ready to
go when they arrived in the mornings.
L. June 29—Termination of Decker
The complaint alleges that on or about June 29, in violation
of Section 8(a)(3), Decker was constructively discharged by the
Respondents because of his known or suspected activities on
behalf of Local 673. Decker testified that he quit the employ-
ment of SG Construction on June 28. The General Counsel
asked Decker and he testified:
Q. And why did you quit?
A. I just was tired of the long hours, you know, not
getting paid what we should have been, and the benefits,
found a better job.
By June 28, Decker had worked only 3 full days for SG Con-
struction. Decker at first testified generally that while working
for SG Construction he was earning “like half” of what he had
earned with Summit Express. Decker testified that he was sent
out with a three-man crew, rather than a two-man crew, during
the 3 days that he worked for SG Construction, but he ac-
knowledged that the jobs to which he was assigned for SG
Construction were commercial jobs, which was normal to have
a 3-man crew. Decker further testified that his loads were
fewer, “were a little smaller” and “[s]eems like we were travel-
ing farther.” When asked if these factors affected his pay,
Decker replied, “A little bit.” (As shown in the immediately
preceding section, however, Decker actually earned more per
day as an employee of SG Construction than he had as an em-
ployee of Summit Express.) When Decker quit, he did not give
Sam Catrambone a reason.
M. June 29—Sharp’sTermination
The complaint also alleges that also on or about June 29 SG
Construction constructively discharged Sharp in violation of
Section 8(a)(3). Sharp testified that on June 29 he was teamed
with Dennis and Joey Wright, he in one truck and they in an-
other. (Sharp, however, did not testify that he met with or saw
the Wrights that morning.) Sharp testified that, although he
received his assignment from Sam Catrambone, Catrambone
could not tell him where the point of delivery was. According
to Sharp:
I asked Sam for directions; he couldn’t help me. I said
[to myself?], “Well, I know it’s [the jobsite is] towards
that direction,” so I started going towards that direction.
He was supposed to call me back for directions and never
did.
Sharp testified that he thereafter got stuck in traffic, and he
radioed back to Sam Catrambone. According to Sharp:
I just told him, “I’m frustrated, I’m shaking, I’m stuck
in traffic, I don’t even know where I’m going. I don’t even
know if we can get into this job.”
And then Rich [Catrambone] and Kevin [O’Connor]
told me to, “just park the truck and we’ll come get you.”
Sharp did park the truck on the side of a road, and shortly
thereafter the Catrambones and O’Connor came in Sam’s per-
sonal vehicle to the point where Sharp had parked the truck.
Richard and O’Connor took Sharp’s truck to meet the Wrights
at the scheduled delivery point, and Sam drove Sharp back to
the Plum Street facility. Sharp did not describe anything that
happened on the way to the facility or what happened when he
and Sam Catrambone got there. Sharp only testified that he and
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 613
Sam did return to the facility and “then I went home for the
day.”
On Tuesday, June 30, Sharp did not report to work (but the
General Counsel did not ask Sharp why). Sharp did testify that
on July 1: “I called Kevin O’Connor and asked him, ‘Am I
working or not?’ And he said no, we’ve got it taken care of.” If
Sharp made any further attempt to return to work, he did not so
testify. Sharp did not testify that he quit because his working
conditions as an employee of SG Construction had become
difficult or unpleasant, which, of course, is an indispensable
element of a constructive discharge allegation,26 in fact, Sharp
did not testify that he quit at all.27
On cross-examination, Sharp admitted that his leaving the
Plum Street facility on the morning of June 29 without knowing
where the job was located did not “make any sense” to him.
Sharp, however, testified that on some other occasions before
June 29 he had also received instructions to leave the facility
without knowing where his delivery point was. No other em-
ployee, however, testified that such a procedure (leaving the
plant without knowing where he was going, and expecting in-
structions to be radioed to him as he drove along in Chicago-
area traffic) had ever been followed before (or since).
Further on cross-examination, Sharp testified that when he
and Sam Catrambone returned to the Plum Street facility, he
got out of Catrambone’s vehicle, got into his own, and went
home “[b]ecause I was frustrated. I was upset for the day.”
When asked if Catrambone had not told him to wait in Catram-
bone’s vehicle while Catrambone went into the facility to get a
form for getting Sharp drug-tested, Sharp at first replied, “I
don’t recall.” Then Sharp flatly denied that Catrambone made
any indication that he was being asked to take a drug and alco-
hol test. Sharp admitted, however, that in his pretrial affidavit
he states: “When I was riding back to the shop with Sam, I
heard Kevin [O’Connor] call Sam on the radio and I heard
Kevin say “[d]rug test him when he gets back.” Sharp denied
drinking any alcohol during the 12-hour period immediately
preceding his reporting for work on June 29.
During the Respondents’ presentation, Sam Catrambone tes-
tified that Sharp was not sent out on the June 29 run without
directions. Catrambone testified that during that morning Sharp
radioed in that he was “upset” and could not drive. The Ca-
trambones and O’Connor did go to where Sharp had parked.
Sam Catrambone testified that when Sharp got into his (Ca-
trambone’s) car, he could smell alcohol on Sharp’s breath “very
easily.” O’Connor also testified that when he and the Catram-
bons arrived where Sharp was parked, Sharp “[w]alked right up
to me and he said he was sorry but that he was messed up,” and
“I definitely smelled alcohol on his breath.” Sam Catrambone
further testified that as he was driving Sharp back to the Plum
Street facility he told Sharp that he was first going to drive to
the Plum Street facility where he could secure papers necessary
for getting Sharp tested for drugs and alcohol, and then he was
going to drive Sharp to a facility where Sharp could be tested.
When they arrived at the Plum Street facility, and Catrambone
got out of his vehicle to go inside to get the papers, however,

26 See, for example, Manufacturing Services, 295 NLRB 254 (1989).
27 The General Counsel did not ask Sharp if he had quit, or why.
Sharp got out of the vehicle, got into his own vehicle, and
drove away. During the next day, Sharp called and asked if he
could come and get his last check. Catrambone replied that he
could, and Sharp did so. Catrambone further testified that he
heard nothing from Sharp thereafter. Catrambone and
O’Connor were credible in all of this testimony about Sharp’s
June 29 and 30 conduct.
N. June 29—Alleged Threat by O’Connor
Dennis Wright testified that, also on June 29, after O’Connor
and Richard Catrambone brought Sharp’s load to the job,
O’Connor helped the Wrights get the drywall to the designated
places at the jobsite. (Wright further testified that during that
day Richard Catrambone ordered more drywall for the job.)
Wright testified that while he was working with O’Connor, and
at a time that Catrambone was present:
Kevin O’Connor told me that I should really stop and
think about what we’re trying to do. That if I knew what
was good for my family, that I would give all this non-
sense up, trying to get into this other Union, 673. And to
follow suit with this Union that’s coming in, because Rich
[Catrambone] had told him that he would close the doors
on the shop, and that that Union was never going to get in
there, and that we would all be fired, again, if we contin-
ued this.
Based on this testimony by Dennis Wright, the complaint al-
leges that the Respondents, by O’Connor, threatened employees
with the closure of the Respondents’ business if employees
supported Local 673. Again, O’Connor generally denied threat-
ening any employees, but I found Wright credible.
O. July 14—Discharge of Joey Wright
On July 13, Sam Catrambone assigned an early run to the
Wrights. When they returned to the Plum Street facility, hoping
to get another run, the Wrights approached Catrambone in his
office. The office has a plate glass window to the warehouse
area. Catrambone told the Wrights that there was no more work
for them that day. Dennis Wright then left, but Joey remained
behind to argue with Catrambone. According to Joey Wright:
Yes, I told him that I didn’t think that that was the way
it should work, that the guys who had signed up with
Rich’s union got to stay and work and that we were getting
shit-on and had to go home.
. . . .
We kind of got into an oral argument and he told me to
“get the f—ck out of his office” and that he was going to
call the police. So, I exited his office.
. . . .
I had a bottle of Gatorade in my hand and he had me
so frustrated and pissed off that I went like that and the
Gatorade splashed on his window. . . .[F]rom the speed of
my hand moving and stopping, the inertia threw the liquid
out of the bottle.
. . . .
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD614
And then he [Sam Catrambone] came out [of the of-
fice] all kinds of mad, told me that I threw the bottle at
him. And I told him that I didn’t throw the bottle at him.
And he said he was calling the police, [and said] “You bet-
ter leave.” So, I left immediately. . . . In no way, shape or
form did the bottle ever leave my hand.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE EVANS: Just a
minute. I want to describe for the record your motion [as it
appeared] to me. The witness held [out] his arms, raised
each hand so his [right] elbow was at a right angle. And
then he jerked up and back down with his right hand to de-
scribe how the Gatorade left the bottle.
(As Wright further described the setting and his motion, the
office window was to his right as his right hand jerked the bot-
tle and the fluid was ejected.) Wright testified that the bottle
was plastic and had about 2 inches of fluid in it, about half of
which landed on the window. When Wright reported to work
the next day, Catrambone told him that he was terminated “for
cause.” The complaint alleges that Catrambone discharged
Wright in violation of Section 8(a)(3). On cross-examination,
Wright testified that he threw the Gatorade bottle on the floor in
the warehouse as he left the premises on July 13, but he again
denied throwing the bottle at the office window. Grethe testi-
fied that he was present during a July 13 “conversation” be-
tween Wright and Catrambone. Grethe denied seeing Wright
throw anything at the office window, but he also denied seeing
a bottle during the conversation, and he denied seeing any liq-
uid on the window or on the floor after the “conversation”
which he witnessed.
Sam Catrambone, however, testified that Wright threw the
bottle at the office window and that that action was the sole
reason that he discharged Wright.
I credit Catrambone’s testimony that Joey Wright threw the
bottle of Gatorade at the office window. Wright’s testimony
sounded wholly manufactured and unrealistic. Moreover,
Wright’s testimony that he threw down the bottle, but only
later, somewhere else in the warehouse, was essentially a con-
cession that he threw the bottle somewhere, the only questions
being where and when. Finally, Grethe’s testimony appears to
be completely unreliable. Even by Wright’s account, there was
fluid on the window, which would have been on the floor, and
it came from Wright’s bottle of Gatorade. Grethe’s testimony
indicates that, at best, he was testifying about some other “con-
versation” between Joey and Catrambone.
P. August 13, 17, and 20—Gagliano’s Distribution of Local
711’s Authorization Cards and Alleged Threats by
Sam Catrambone and Gagliano
Dennis Wright testified that on Friday, August 13, Gagliano
came to the Plum Street facility to bring the employees’ (SG
Construction) paychecks. When Gagliano presented paychecks
to Wright and Grethe, he also presented Local 711 authoriza-
tion cards for them to sign. As well as revoking any prior des-
ignations of bargaining authority and naming Local 711 as a
subscribing employee’s new bargaining agent, the tendered
authorization cards further authorized deductions of Local
711’s membership dues from the employee’s paychecks. Ac-
cording to Wright:
[Gagliano] told myself and my partner, Grethe, that in
order for us to stay working for S & G, that we had to sign
Union cards, for Local 711. And, in order to have insur-
ance, that we would also have to, another reason being,
why we would have to sign the cards.
And I told him that I didn’t really think that it would
be such a good idea to sign the cards at this time, with eve-
rything going on. I wanted to, to ask some questions, to
people, before I signed the cards, the card.
He said that he would be back, I believe on a Monday,
which was a week from then, and if the cards weren’t
signed, that we were out of a job.
On Tuesday, August 17, Wright returned the Local 711 card to
Sam Catrambone. Wright had signed the card, but he placed
above his signature, “under protest.” Further, according to
Wright:
He [Catrambone] said that wasn’t going to work. That
I’d have to fill out a new card. . . . That if we didn’t fill out
a new card, we wouldn’t have a job.
Wright then signed the Local 711 card without “under protest”
written on it, and he returned it to Sam Catrambone.
Grethe testified that on Friday, August 20, Gagliano spoke to
Dennis Wright and himself in the warehouse office. Gagliano
told Grethe and Wright that he wanted them to sign authoriza-
tion cards for Local 711 and that, if they did so, they could
receive six holidays per year, a 401(k) plan, and insurance cov-
erage; Gagliano also promised that Grethe would receive vaca-
tion pay that he had previously been denied. Grethe further
testified, “And he also told Dennis Wright that he would also
talk to whoever he needed to, to see if he could get his brother
rehired back if we signed them.” Later in the day, Sam Catram-
bone approached Grethe and Wright to give them their pay-
checks. Additionally, Catrambone gave Wright and Grethe
blank authorization cards for Local 711. Grethe further testi-
fied, “And he told us that we should fill these out and hand
them back to them or not bother coming in to work the follow-
ing Monday.”
On August 23, Grethe handed Sam Catrambone the Local
711 authorization card, signed but with “signed under duress”
written just below his signature. Catrambone took the card, but
he returned in a few minutes with another authorization card
stating that the previous one would not do. Catrambone gave
Grethe another Local 711 authorization card which Grethe
signed without further notation.
Based on this testimony by Grethe and Dennis Wright, the
complaint alleges that, in violation of Section 8(a)(2), the Re-
spondents, by Gagliano and Sam Catrambone, “rendered assis-
tance and support to [Local 711] by threatening employees with
discharge and cessation of their health insurance and other
benefits if they refused to sign authorization cards supporting
[Local 711].” The complaint also alleges these actions as sepa-
rate violations of Section 8(a)(1).
As noted above, the parties stipulated that on June 7, Gagli-
ano, on behalf of SG Construction, entered a contract with Lo-
cal 711 whereby SG Construction agreed to deduct from em-
ployees’ paychecks the dues and initiation fees of Local 711.
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 615
On direct examination, Sam Catrambone was referred to the
Local 711 authorization cards; he was asked and he testified:
Q. Explain the circumstances surrounding the signing
of these cards if you will. Tell me why would you be sign-
ing, in your mind why would they have to be signed by
employees?
A. Because S.G. Construction had entered into a col-
lective bargaining agreement with Local 711 and it was a
union shop. Any employee had to join the union within 30
days to be able to work there.
Q. And that was your understanding of an employee
that [it] was his responsibility to join the union?
A. Yes.
Q. And what if he didn’t?
A. If he didn’t, he couldn’t work in a union shop.
Q. And that was because of the contract between
Amalgamated and SG?
A. That’s correct.
. . . .
Q. It just was your understanding that, if an employee
came to work [he or she] . . . had to sign these cards in or-
der to work for the company because of the union agree-
ment. That was your understanding?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would tell that to the new employee?
A. Yes.
Catrambone denied, however, threatening any employees
with discharge or loss of benefits if they refused to sign au-
thorization cards for Local 711. As previously noted, Gagliano
did not testify. To the extent that they differ, I credit Grethe and
Wright over the denials of Catrambone and further credit their
unrebutted testimony of Gagliano’s conduct. (Neither party
offered into evidence the “union shop” agreement to which
Catrambone referred in his testimony.)
Q. The June 1 Contract Between Great Lakes and SG Con-
struction and Catrambone’s Alleged Actions on
Behalf of SG Construction
As previously noted, Richard Catrambone testified during
examination by the General Counsel that it was on June 1 that
he received Local 777’s May 26 letter which repudiated that
union’s contract with Summit Express. Also on June 1, accord-
ing to a stipulation of the parties: “Great Lakes Building Mate-
rials entered into a contract with S.G. Construction to supply
drivers to distribute drywall to customers of Great Lakes Build-
ing Materials.”
In the June 1 contract, SG Construction is referred to as
“agency,” and Great Lakes is referred to as “company.” The
contract recites that the agency agrees to provide “labor in the
general fields of delivery and handling of drywall and related
products” for the company. That is, pursuant to the June 1
contract between Catrambone and SG Construction, SG Con-
struction agreed to provide warehousemen and truckdrivers to
deliver the drywall that Great Lakes had sold, just as Summit
Express’ employees had done theretofore. The agreement re-
cites that it is “effective as of June 1, 2004,” but it provides
that: “Agency agrees to begin providing services as of June 7,
2004.” The June 1 contract further recites that it is effective for
a period of 5 years, that any modification of the contract must
be agreed to, in writing, by authorized representatives of both
parties, that services are to be provided on Great Lakes’ re-
quest, and that “the cost of such services shall not exceed the
limitation of cost[s] set forth by the company’s request.” Labor
rates were to be as specified in an attachment.28 Under the June
1 contract, SG Construction is to be compensated by payment
of the labor rates plus a 5-percent service fee. Great Lakes, in
its “sole discretion,” has the right under the agreement to de-
termine “minimum qualifications” of all employees that SG
Construction was to hire, and Great Lakes further has the “sole
discretion” to determine whether any employee’s performance
is satisfactory. SG Construction agrees to “immediately with-
draw” any employee whom Great Lakes deems to be unsatis-
factory. Also, the June 1 agreement specifies: “Labor provided
will be Union members with full benefits.”29
In what business SG Construction may have engaged in be-
fore Gagliano signed the June 1 agreement is not known.
(Again, Gagliano did not testify.) Sam Catrambone testified
(and the parties stipulated) that Great Lakes is SG Construc-
tion’s only customer. Sam Catrambone, who is alleged and
admitted to be a supervisor of SG Construction, further admit-
ted that SG Construction employed no employees before June
5.
As previously noted, the Respondents’ payroll records show
that Sam Catrambone was employed by Summit Express
through the payroll period ending June 4. He was then trans-
ferred to the payroll of Great Lakes for the payroll periods of
June 5–11 and June 12–18. He thereafter appears on the pay-
roll records of SG Construction. Sam Catrambone, according
to his own testimony, is “Director of Operations and Human
Resources for S.G. Construction.” When asked what he did in
such a position, he replied:
I’m in charge of supplying employees for both boom
trucks and for the warehouse. Also in charge of schedul-
ing those employees as far as the day to day basis. Keep-
ing up personnel records, also health records. And dealing
with insurance matters.
The complaint alleges, and the Respondents admit, that
Gagliano and Sam Catrambone are supervisors of SG Construc-
tion within Section 2(11) of the Act. No other individual is
alleged to be a supervisor of SG Construction. Sam Catram-
bone described Gagliano as the “owner” of SG Construction.
Sam Catrambone was not shown to have any ownership interest
in SG Construction.30
In support of her argument that SG Construction is a joint
employer of the single-employer entity of Summit Express,
Great Lakes, and Summit Truck, the General Counsel contends

28 If there ever was such an attachment, a copy of it was not included
with the copy of the contract that the General Counsel offered in evi-
dence.
29 Capitalization is original, but of what union the employees were to
be members was not specified.
30 Again, the complaint does not allege that Sam Catrambone had
any supervisory authorities over the employees of Summit Express.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD616
that, even after SG Construction became the nominal employer
of the employees, and Sam Catrambone became the nominal
supervisor of the employees, the supervisors of Summit Ex-
press continued to supervise them. The General Counsel points
to three circumstances in support of this contention. The first
circumstance involves the use of Richard Catrambone’s per-
sonal credit card. Grethe testified that during the week of June
21, on his first day working as an SG Construction employee,
the truck to which he was assigned was low on fuel. There was,
however, no fuel card in the truck that could be used for fuel
purchases (as had been the practice when the drivers were em-
ployed by Summit Express). Grethe testified that he asked
Richard Catrambone for a fuel card, and Catrambone handed
Grethe his own personal credit card. On June 29, Grethe also
used Catrambone’s credit card to purchase a small tool that
Grethe needed for his assigned work. On July 1, Sam Catram-
bone asked Grethe to return to him Richard Catrambone’s
credit card, and Grethe did so.
The second circumstance to which the General Counsel re-
fers as one that reflects continued management of the alleged
discriminatees by the Summit Express supervisors after they
were hired by SG Construction revolves around what happened
at the worksite on June 29 after Richard Catrambone and
O’Connor delivered to that site the drywall that Sharp had
originally been scheduled to deliver. The General Counsel
asked Dennis Wright if, after O’Connor and Richard Catram-
bone arrived at the site, O’Connor had supervised his work at
the jobsite; Wright replied affirmatively. Without any such
leading, but with no further explanation, Joey Wright testified
that at the site on that date, “Kevin loaded the carts, but he was
more or less supervising us working for him.” Also, Dennis
Wright testified that during that same afternoon he heard the
customer tell O’Connor that more drywall was needed.
O’Connor called the receptionist who was employed by Great
Lakes and told her to dispatch SG Construction employee An-
thony Smith to the job with the drywall. The General Counsel,
however, did not ask Wright if Smith ultimately did bring the
drywall.
The third circumstance to which the General Counsel refers
in her argument that the supervisors of Summit Express super-
vised the employees of SG Construction revolves around cer-
tain of SG Construction’s records that the Respondents placed
in evidence. The records of July 16 reflect that on that date
Richard Catrambone and O’Connor, together, made deliveries
of drywall to two jobsites. Also, on August 17, O’Connor and
an SG Construction employee named “Dean” (last name not
indicated) made deliveries to two other jobsites. On cross-
examination, Sam Catrambone testified that he made the as-
signments that are reflected by those records.
When called by the Respondent, Richard Catrambone testi-
fied that he was, at the time of trial, president of Great Lakes,
Summit Express, and Summit Truck, as well as the owner of
those firms. At time of trial, further according to Catrambone,
Summit Express had only one employee (again, Marts, who
delivers paper for one specific customer of Great Lakes, Fleet-
wood Papers). When asked what he did after receiving Local
777’s letter repudiating the 2001 contract, Catrambone an-
swered:
Actually, after I received the letter, I would have hon-
ored the contract that I had with 777 for its entirety. And
when it was rejected, I was looking to ease my burden
with being involved with the personnel every day, and I
decided to outsource the personnel to another company.
I’m getting older, my wife had double knee replace-
ment surgery in August, so, I was trying to limit some of
my involvement in day-to-day stuff. And, bothering with
personnel is a big headache.
I entered into a contract with S.G. Construction, and
they provide me with personnel.
When asked on cross-examination how his “burden” was light-
ened by hiring SG Construction, Catrambone replied: “[T]hey
send me a bill. I send them a check. I have nothing to do with
the day-to-day people.”
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Single and Joint Employers
The first issue raised by the complaint is whether Great
Lakes, Summit Express, and Summit Truck constitute a “single
employer” under the Act. If they do, each would be jointly and
severally responsible for the remedies for any of the unfair
labor practices that the others have committed. As discussed
below, I find and conclude that Great Lakes, Summit Express,
and Summit Truck do constitute a single employer. The second
critical issue is whether SG Construction is a joint employer of
the single-employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Express,
and Summit Truck; if so, Great Lakes, Summit Express, and
Summit Truck are jointly and severally responsible, along with
SG Construction itself, for the remedies for any of the unfair
labor practices that SG Construction has committed. The third
issue is whether SG Construction, if it is not a joint employer
with the single-employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Truck,
and Summit Express, is an alter ego and disguised continuance
of Summit Express, as further alleged in the complaint. If so,
Summit Express (along with Great Lakes and Summit Truck) is
also responsible for the unfair labor practices that SG Construc-
tion may have committed.
As noted, Richard Catrambone established Great Lakes,
Summit Express, and Summit Truck as nominally separate
entities well before the events of this case began. Nominal
separation, however, is not sufficient to bar a finding of a sin-
gle-employer status. As stated in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris
Industries, 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982):
A “single employer” relationship exists where two
nominally separate entities are actually part of a single in-
tegrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there is in fact
only a “single employer.” The question in the “single em-
ployer” situation, then, is whether the two nominally inde-
pendent enterprises, in reality, constitute only one inte-
grated enterprise.
. . . .
In answering questions of this type, the Board consid-
ers the four factors approved by the [Supreme Court in
Radio Union v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, 380 U.S.
255, 256 (1965)]: (1) functional integration of operations;
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 617
(2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common
management; and (4) common ownership. Thus, the “sin-
gle employer” standard is relevant to the determination
that “separate corporations are not what they appear to be,
that in truth they are but divisions or departments of a sin-
gle enterprise.” NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S.
398, 402 (1960). “Single employer” status ultimately de-
pends on all the circumstances of the case and is character-
ized as an absence of an “arm’s length relationship found
among unintegrated companies.” [Citations omitted.]
In this case, before the advent of SG Construction, there was
complete functional interrelation of the operations of Great
Lakes, Summit Express, and Summit Truck. Great Lakes sold
the drywall, and Summit Express’ employees delivered it in
trucks that were supplied by Summit Truck. Summit Truck had
no employees, but the labor relations of Summit Express and
Great Lakes were determined by one individual, Richard Ca-
trambone. Catrambone, along with O’Connor, also managed
all three firms, and Catrambone owned all three firms. There-
fore, the conclusion that Great Lakes, Summit Express, and
Summit Truck constitute a single employer, at least until June
7, is compelled.
The status of SG Construction as a joint employer of the sin-
gle-employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Express, and
Summit Truck after June 7 is not such an easy question. In
NLRB v. Browning Ferris, supra at 1122 and 1123, the court,
contrasting the single- and joint-employer situations, stated:
In “joint employer” situations no finding of a lack of
arm’s length transaction or unity of control or ownership is
required, as in “single employer” cases. As this Circuit has
maintained since 1942, “[i]t is rather a matter of determin-
ing which of two, or whether both, respondents control, in
the capacity of employer, the labor relations of a given
group of workers.” NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America,
supra, 128 F.2d [67] at 72 citations omitted. The basis of
the finding is simply that one employer[,] while contract-
ing in good faith with an otherwise independent company,
has retained for itself sufficient control of the terms and
conditions of employment of the employees who are em-
ployed by the other employer. Walter B. Cooke, 262
NLRB [626, 642 (1982)]. Thus, the “joint employer” con-
cept recognizes that the business entities involved are in
fact separate but that they share or co-determine those
matters governing the essential terms and conditions of
employment. [Citations omitted.]
The three circumstances that the General Counsel alleges
demonstrate joint employer status of SG Construction with
Summit Express (or with the single-employer entity of Great
Lakes, Summit Express, and Summit Truck) do not indicate
such status under this statement of the law. Catrambone let
Grethe use his personal credit card to fill a truck’s tank, but
only on one occasion. But even if it had been on several occa-
sions that Catrambone had done this, such acts would not have
been acts of “control of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of,” or supervision of, SG Construction’s employees by
Catrambone. Such action did not affect Grethe’s terms and
conditions of employment; it would have been irrelevant to
Grethe whose credit card he used (as long as he was not using
his own). Also, Catrambone, through Summit Truck, still
owned the truck that needed fuel; presumably he did not want
his truck running out of gas on the highway, no matter who was
driving it. Grethe also bought a work-related tool with the
credit card, but there is no evidence of Catrambone’s or Gagli-
ano’s foreknowledge (or even knowing acquiescence) in that
one act. For a second circumstance that reflects joint employer
status, the General Counsel relies on conclusionary testimony
that was the product of purest leading. The General Counsel
led Dennis Wright to testify that one time, on June 29,
O’Connor “supervised” his work. Joey Wright testified without
such leading, but he only offered the conclusion that O’Connor
was “more or less supervising” the work of employees on that
date. Just what O’Connor did on that (one) day to be “supervis-
ing” the employees is unknown. O’Connor may also have
called the receptionist of Great Lakes on that date and in-
structed her to have Anthony Smith bring more drywall to the
job, as Dennis Wright testified. This, however, was only on one
occasion, and, even then, the General Counsel offered no evi-
dence that O’Connor’s (single) instruction was, of itself, effec-
tive.31 Finally, the third circumstance, the fact that Richard
Catrambone and O’Connor made deliveries of drywall on two
or three occasions, did not affect the terms and conditions of
employment of any SG Construction employees (except, per-
haps, most indirectly by reducing the amount of work available
for other drivers on those occasions). In summary, none of
these three circumstances indicate that the owner of Great
Lakes, Summit Express, and Summit Truck controls the labor
relations of SG Construction.
It is true, as the General Counsel further argues, that Ca-
trambone had determined what the initial wages of the SG Con-
struction employees were going to be because SG Construction
continued paying employees at the same rate that Catrambone
established when they were employees of Summit Express.
Each case that finds joint employer status, however, relies on
continuing elements of supervision of employees and control of
labor relations, not an initial establishment of terms and condi-
tions of employment that simply continue what has gone on
before. For example, in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris (BFI), on
which the General Counsel so heavily relies, BFI employed
brokerages to haul trash. BFI exercised (not just possessed) the
right to hire and fire employees of the brokers; BFI’s supervisor
considered himself to be the supervisor of the brokers’ employ-
ees; BFI established the shift hours of the brokers’ employees;
BFI provided the brokers’ employees with uniforms identical to
the ones that it required its own employees to wear; BFI super-
visors directed drivers where they were to work and what
routes they were to drive; and BFI maintained all of the em-
ployment records of the brokers’ employees. In D&F Indus-
tries, 339 NLRB 618 (2003), which the General Counsel also
cites, Olsten supplied employees to D&F. The Board found a
joint employer status noting at fn. 5, “D&F assigned the [Ols-

31 The General Counsel, after all, had the burden of proving that
O’Connor’s instruction was obeyed by the receptionist and Smith with-
out action by others such as Smith and Sam Catrambone. The General
Counsel offered no such evidence.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD618
ten] employees to their daily jobs and monitored their perform-
ance of their duties and their compliance with D&F’s work
rules.” And in the third case upon which the General Counsel
relies, G. Heileman Brewing Co., 290 NLRB 991 (1988), Low-
ery supplied employees to Heileman, but Heileman negotiated
with the Union for almost all of the terms and conditions of
employment of the Lowery employees, the Lowery employees
retained their seniority with Heileman while they were suppos-
edly Lowery employees, and, as the administrative law judge
found supra at 999: “In practice, only the Company [Heileman]
exercised meaningful supervision over the day-to-day work of
the employees.” Here, under the June 1 agreement, Great Lakes
could determine the “minimum qualifications” of referred em-
ployees, and subsequent adjustments of wages of the SG Con-
struction employees are to be co-determined by negotiations
between SG Construction and Great Lakes (Catrambone), but
the General Counsel has shown no day-to-day supervision of,
or control of other ongoing aspects of the employment of, SG
Construction’s employees by Catrambone. And I find no case
that indicates that the ability to reject employees, or a procedure
of codetermination of future wages, without more, suffices to
establish a joint employer relationship.32 I therefore find and
conclude that the General Counsel has failed to prove that a
joint employer relationship exists between SG Construction and
the single-employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Express,
and Summit Truck.
Whether SG Construction is an alter ego of the single-
employer entity of Summit Express, Summit Truck, and Great
Lakes is an issue that will be discussed below.
B. The Discharges of June 7
The complaint alleges that the Respondents violated Section
8(a)(3) by discharging nine employees on June 7 with the ob-
ject of discouraging the union activities of its employees. There
are two categories of alleged discriminatees—those whose
cases fall within, and those whose cases fall outside of, the
theory of Wright Line.33 In order to establish a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination under Wright Line, the General
Counsel must persuade the Board that antiunion sentiment, or
animus, was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged
employer decision. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the
employer to prove its affirmative defense that it would have
taken the same action even if the employee had not engaged in
protected activity.
Even before the events of June 4, O’Connor made plain to
the employees Catrambone’s animus toward any activities on
behalf of Local 673. In May, O’Connor told the Wrights that
the employees did not need to join the Teamsters because Ca-
trambone was bringing in an “independent” union, that if the
employees knew what was good for them they would sign up
with that union instead of the Teamsters, and that if they did

32 Certainly, the General Counsel cites no such case on brief. (In
fact, the General Counsel offers no analysis of this agreement upon
which the Respondents so heavily rely in defense of the joint employer
allegation.)
33 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
not, they would be fired and that Catrambone “would close the
doors to the shop and no one would have a job.” As alleged in
the complaint, these statements were threats within Section
8(a)(1) and acts of assistance to Local 711 were in violation of
Section 8(a)(2), as I further find and conclude. Also in May,
O’Connor told Mitchell not to talk about Local 673 with other
employees and that, if he did so, he and other employees would
lose their jobs because “the place will be closed.” The instruc-
tion not to discuss the Union, as well as the threat of plant clo-
sure, of course, further violated Section 8(a)(1). And on June 3
(at the first Stoney’s meeting) O’Connor told the employees
that Catrambone “was not going to have Local 673,” that an
“independent” union was going to come in “next Monday” (i.e.,
June 7), and that whatever else the employees had been think-
ing, “we might as well get it out of our heads because he [Ca-
trambone] would close the shop doors before he would ever let
them into his company.” These statements were also threats in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and further evidence of animus
within Wright Line.
At 10:55 a.m. on Friday, June 4, Catrambone was notified by
fax that the Union was threatening to “advise the public” (i.e.,
picket or handbill or both) that he was refusing to recognize
Local 673 as the statutory representative of the Plum Street
truckdrivers and warehousemen.34 During that workday, and
then after work, several of the employees met with union or-
ganizers. Employee Decker did not go to the after-work meet-
ing at Stoney’s, but on the way home after work he was tele-
phoned by Catrambone and O’Connor. Catrambone told
Decker that he had “got wind” of Local 673’s agents having
talked to the employees on the job that day. Catrambone asked
Decker if he had talked to the union agents and if he had signed
an authorization card for Local 673. Telling Decker that he had
“gotten wind” of the employees’ speaking to an agent of the
Union, without telling Decker how that knowledge could have
come to him lawfully,35 was an act of creating the impression
that the employees’ union activities were under surveillance in
violation of Section 8(a)(1), and that conduct further is evi-
dence of animus within Wright Line, as I find and conclude.
Moreover, Catrambone’s interrogating Decker about whether
he had talked to a union agent and whether Decker had signed
an authorization card for Local 673 was a separate violation of
Section 8(a)(1), as well as another act that revealed antiunion
animus that would have motivated the discharges. Also, when
O’Connor got on the phone with Decker immediately thereaf-
ter, he asked Decker which way he was going to go “come
Monday.” This could have only been another unlawful interro-
gation; certainly, O’Connor did not ask Decker what Decker
meant when he replied that he “wasn’t sure which side [he] was
going to take.” As well as another unlawful interrogation,
O’Connor’s interrogation was more evidence of animus within
Wright Line, and it was a pointed statement that something
profound was going to happen “on Monday” because the em-

34 Of course, at that point Catrambone did not have a duty to comply
with Local 673’s demand, but he did have a duty not to discriminate
against his employees, in whole or in part, because Local 673 was
seeking recognition.
35 Schrementi Bros., 179 NLRB 853 (1969).
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 619
ployees were considering affiliating with Local 673.
Also on June 4, Catrambone and O’Connor drove by
Stoney’s while the employees were still there, drove by
Huerta’s house where Joey and Dennis Wright were soliciting
Huerta’s signature on a Local 673 authorization card, and then
followed Joey Wright’s car, with Joey, Dennis, and Grethe in it,
for at least several minutes through several turns. Catrambone
and O’Connor testified that they only wanted to “socialize”
when they drove by Stoney’s, and that they just happened to
drive by Huerta’s house where the employees were subse-
quently gathering, but I found none of that testimony credible.
I believe, and find and conclude, that O’Connor and Catram-
bone were intending to convey the impression of surveillance
of the employees’ union activities, and that they did so by their
vehicular pursuit after the meeting, as well as by the act of driv-
ing by the meeting itself. Any doubt that Catrambone and
O’Connor wished to convey the impression of surveillance is
utterly destroyed by the evidence of O’Connor’s telephoning
Joey Wright after he and Catrambone had disengaged from the
pursuit, asking Wright to put Grethe on the telephone, and then
gratuitously asking Grethe if his car, which was then parked
back at the Plum Street lot, was safe; O’Connor obviously
wanted Grethe to know that he had seen Grethe leaving the
union meeting at Stoney’s in the company of the Wrights.
Further compelling evidence that Catrambone and O’Connor
intended to convey the impression of surveillance is found in
Sharp’s undenied testimony about June 4. It was well after
working time when Catrambone, in the Plum Street parking lot,
asked Sharp if he had been to Stoney’s, asked where the other
employees were, and said, “Well, if you talk to them, tell them
I’m looking for them.” As well, after Catrambone and
O’Connor had surveilled the union activities at Stoney’s, but
before they found the Wrights and Grethe at Huerta’s house,
O’Connor sent Dennis Wright the message:
Sorry to see that you attended the Last Supper at the
bar. Which way are you going to go when it comes time to
go? You’re going to turn right or are you going to turn
left? Are you with us? Are you against us?
This threatening, interrogating message could have only
been intended to impress upon the employees that they were
engaging in an activity of potentially catastrophic impact, at
least as far as their employment was concerned. The threat and
interrogation, as well as the impression of surveillance itself,
violated Section 8(a)(1), as I find and conclude. And under
Wright Line, such actions are the plainest evidence of Catram-
bone’s unlawful animus toward the statutorily protected union
activities of his employees.
Also on June 4, apparently before their vehicular pursuit of
three of those who went to the union meeting and then to
Huerta’s house,36 Catrambone and O’Connor chanced on Sharp
at the Plum Street facility’s parking lot. They asked Sharp if he
was one of the employees who was “willing to go 673.” This
was another interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1), as I

36 The exact sequence of such events is impossible to determine, but
on the whole, the employees’ accounts were far more credible than
those of the supervisors.
find and conclude. When Sharp demurred, Catrambone issued a
threat of unspecified reprisals by stating that Sharp was either
“with us or against us,” and O’Connor warned: “I tried telling
you guys the other night that Rich is not going 673 and if any-
body goes 673 you’re going to be fired.” And Catrambone
added to that: “I have a lot of money and . . . I’ll shut these
trucks down before I go 673. . . . I will change the name of the
company if I have to.” All of these threats violated Section
8(a)(1), as I find and conclude.
After those threats and interrogations, Catrambone asked if
Sharp had been to Stoney’s; this was another violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1). Then Catrambone asked Sharp if he knew where
the other employees who had been at Stoney’s went, still an-
other violative interrogation, as I find and conclude. Then,
shortly after Catrambone and O’Connor parted company with
Sharp at the Plum Street lot, Catrambone again interrogated
Sharp in violation of Section 8(a)(1) by telephoning him and
asking him if he then knew where the other employees who had
attended the union meeting at Stoney’s had gone. All of these
threats and interrogations also are, of course, further evidence
of animus within Wright Line, as well as separate violations of
Section 8(a)(1).
Catrambone continued to display his animus even after the
discharges of June 7. As Decker credibly testified, on June 24
Catrambone told a new employee that “if this 673 tried to get
in, he’d shut the doors down.” As alleged, this additional threat
to close the business was a further violation of Section 8(a)(1),
as I find and conclude. And O’Connor, on June 29, in the pres-
ence of Catrambone, again told Dennis Wright that he should
stop and think before he went any further in pursuit of securing
representation by Local 673, and should support Local 711,
because “Rich had told him that he would close the doors on
the shop, and that that Union was never going to get in there,
and that we would all be fired, again, if we continued this.”
This was another blatant threat in violation of Section 8(a)(1),
as well as post hoc evidence of animus under Wright Line, that
supports the allegation of unlawful discharges of employees
who were known or suspected by Catrambone of supporting
Local 673, as I further find and conclude.
The relevant timing, the threats, the interrogations and the
impression of surveillance having established the element of
animus, the next issue under Wright Line is whether the union
activities or sympathies of the alleged discriminatees were
known to, or suspected by, Catrambone. Of the 21 discharges
of June 7, the complaint lists nine as having violated Section
8(a)(3)—those of the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp,
and Mitchell, and those of Edwin and Fermin Chapa. Before
their discharges, the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp,
and Mitchell were either threatened or interrogated, or followed
from the June 4 union meeting at Stoney’s, as discussed above.
This is more than ample evidence upon which to find that the
element of knowledge has been established under Wright Line
for the discharges of those seven employees. There is, however,
no evidence that the Chapas engaged in any activities on behalf
of Local 673, and there is no evidence that Catrambone or
O’Connor suspected that they had. Further analysis of the Cha-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD620
pas’ cases under Wright Line is therefore not warranted.37
Knowledge of, and animus toward, the protected union ac-
tivities of the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and
Mitchell having been established, under Wright Line the burden
of going forward with evidence that Catrambone would have
discharged those seven employees even absent those activities
has shifted to the Respondents. The defense is that Catrambone
was tired of supervising and that he had, even before he knew
of the union meeting of June 4, entered a contract to turn all of
the supervisory problems over to SG Construction. As the Re-
spondents put it: “By the time that the alleged unfair labor prac-
tices were going on, Great Lakes Building Materials and S.G.
Construction had already entered into a binding agreement for
S.G. Construction to supply personnel to Great Lakes Building
Materials.”38
The parties stipulated that on June 1 Catrambone entered a
contract with SG Construction whereby SG Construction would
provide truckdrivers and warehousemen to Great Lakes. Also,
it has been shown that no union authorization cards were signed
for the Union until June 4. In May, however, O’Connor had
threatened the Wrights and Mitchell not to engage in activities
on behalf of Local 673 because Catrambone was bringing in an
“independent union” and, if the employees knew what was
good for them, they would sign up with it; O’Connor then fur-
ther told them that if the employees did not “follow suit” with
the independent union, Catrambone would close the plant and
all the current employees would lose their jobs. And as late as
June 3, at the first Stoney’s meeting, O’Connor told the em-
ployees explicitly that Catrambone was not “going to have
Local 673, and that on Monday, June 7, a union which Catram-
bone did want would be in place. Therefore, the Respondents’
premise, that no unfair labor practices had occurred before June
4 is factually incorrect.39
On June 7, Catrambone discharged all of the Summit Ex-
press employees (except one), and did, at least nominally, turn
the management over to SG Construction. SG Construction
immediately hired 12 of the Summit Express employees as its
own, immediately recognized Local 711, and immediately be-
gan operating in Summit Express’ place as the employer of the
personnel that delivered drywall for Great Lakes. The com-
plaint alleges that SG Construction did so as the alter ego of the
single-employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Express, and
Summit Truck. I agree.
C. SG Construction as an Alter Ego of Great Lakes,
Summit Express, and Summit Truck
The alter ego doctrine is an extension of the concept of sin-
gle employer. Thus, two nominally separate business entities
may be regarded as a single employer if one is the alter ego or
“disguised continuance” of the other. Southport Petroleum Co.
v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942). As summarized in Ad-
vance Electric, Inc., 268 NLRB 1001, 1002 (1984):

37 On theory other than that of Wright Line, however, I conclude be-
low that the Chapas’ discharges violated Sec. 8(a)(3).
38 Br., p. 12.
39 Also, as early as February 1, Catrambone had accused Local 673’s
Custer of “extortion and racketeering” simply because he sought to
represent Summit Express’ employees.
The legal principles to be applied in determining
whether two factually separate employees [sic] are in fact
alter egos are well settled. Although each case must turn
on its own facts, we generally have found alter ego status
where the two enterprises have “substantially identical”
management, business purpose, operation, equipment, cus-
tomers, and supervision, as well as ownership.
Denzil S. Alkire, 259 NLRB 1323, 1324 (1982). [Foot-
note omitted.] Accord: NLRB v. Campbell-Harris Electric,
719 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1983). Other factors which must be
considered in determining whether an alter ego status is
present in a given case include “whether the purpose be-
hind the creation of the alleged alter ego was legitimate or
whether, instead, its purpose was to evade responsibilities
under the Act.” Fugazy Continental Corp., 265 NLRB
1301 (1982).
In this case, the element of common ownership between the
three companies that Catrambone owned and SG Construction
is missing. Nevertheless, common ownership, despite the “as
well as” language of Advance Electric, is not indispensable to a
finding of an alter ego status. In American Pacific Concrete
Pipe Co., 262 NLRB 1223 (1982), Ampac (as the respondent
there was called) did not own Dean, but, in order to evade its
duties to recognize its employees’ union, Ampac hired Dean to
supply drivers. The Board found an alter ego status between
Ampac and Dean, and it did so partially because of contract
terms that were similar to those found here (i.e., giving Ampac
the right to reject Dean’s drivers), and it did so because the
Dean drivers continued to use Ampac’s equipment (just as SG
Construction employees continued to use Summit Truck’s,
which is to say Catrambone’s, equipment).
It must be acknowledged, however, that American Pacific
also relied on the facts that Ampac’s supervisors hired and
supervised Dean’s drivers and Ampac’s supervisors partici-
pated “in the actual day-to-day operations and labor relations of
Dean Trucking.” And it must further be acknowledged that the
other cases that I have found that have concluded that an alter
ego status had been established have included elements of su-
pervision of an alter ego by the entity that was seeking to avoid
statutory obligations, as Catrambone is alleged to have done
here. In this case, however, instead of offering evidence of facts
that Catrambone played a role in the hiring of SG Construction
employees, the General Counsel offers only such rhetorical
statements as “No evidence was presented to show that SG’s
hiring process and selection of drivers was independent from
the influence of Richard Catrambone’s wishes.”40 Again, the
General Counsel had the burden of proof; the burden was on
the General Counsel to show that Catrambone had such a role;
the burden was not on the Respondents to show that he did not.
And, again, the General Counsel offers only the three circum-
stances described above to show continuing supervision of SG
Construction employees by Catrambone’s supervisors,41 but

40 Br., p. 26.
41 When the Wrights, Decker, Grethe, and Sharp first reported to the
Plum Street facility as employees of SG Construction, Catrambone told
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 621
those circumstances are not probative evidence of such supervi-
sion.42
Even absent evidence of the elements of common ownership
and supervision, however, I find that an alter ego status exists
between SG Construction and the single-employer entity of
Great Lakes, Summit Express, and Summit Truck, and I find
that SG Construction is nothing more than a disguised continu-
ance of that entity (or, at least, an alter ego and disguised con-
tinuance of Summit Express). As early as February, Catram-
bone had declared to Glimco of Local 777, and to Custer of
Local 673, that he would seek out another union to represent
Summit Express’ employees rather than deal with Local 673.
Even more significantly, Catrambone told the employees that
he would engage in corporate manipulations to avoid any pos-
sibility of having to deal with Local 673, even if the employees
wanted that union. Specifically, Catrambone told Sharp:
I have a lot of money and . . . I’ll shut these trucks
down before I go 673. . . . I will change the name of the
company if I have to.
And even before that, O’Connor told the employees (on June 3)
that the new “independent” union was coming in on Monday,
June 7, and that the employees should get the idea of being
represented by any other union out of their heads. SG Construc-
tion’s June 7 recognition of Local 711 proves that O’Connor
knew that the “independent” union was part of a package-deal;
Local 711 was packaged with a company that Catrambone was
going to use to avoid any possibility of his having to deal with
Local 673. Also, even after SG Construction was in place as the
putative employer of the Plum Street truckdrivers and ware-
housemen, Catrambone continued to threaten the employees
because of their attempt to secure recognition of Local 673. As
Dennis Wright testified, on June 29, after Catrambone and
O’Connor had brought Sharp’s load to a jobsite, when Catram-
bone was present:
Kevin O’Connor told me that I should really stop and
think about what we’re trying to do. That if I knew what
was good for my family, that I would give all this non-
sense up, trying to get into this other Union, 673. And to
follow suit with this Union that’s coming in, because Rich
[Catrambone] had told him that he would close the doors
on the shop, and that that Union was never going to get in
there, and that we would all be fired, again, if we contin-
ued this.
That is, Catrambone, through O’Connor, made it plain to the
Union (Custer) and to the employees before and after the fact
that he would do whatever it took, including corporate manipu-
lations, to avoid having to deal with Local 673.
Under the Board and court precedent, the Board needs to ex-
amine the Company that Catrambone imported in order to de-
termine if he did so only in order to avoid the effect of his em-

them to get to work, but they ignored him and demanded to meet with
Gagliano as their new supervisor.
42 The General Counsel argues that Sam Catrambone was a supervi-
sor of both Summit Express and SG Construction, but the complaint did
not allege that Catrambone had been a supervisor of Summit Express
and no proof to that effect was offered.
ployees’ potential free choice of Local 673 as their collective-
bargaining representative. SG Construction, however, cannot be
examined closely because the owner, Gagliano, did not testify.
The Respondents offered no proof of SG Construction’s corpo-
rate existence before March or April 2004.43 More importantly,
SG Construction had no employees before June 7 and, if Gagli-
ano ever made any capital investment in the business, there is
no way to tell it from this record. Moreover, SG Construction’s
only customer is the single-employer entity of Great Lakes,
Summit Express, and Summit Truck. That is, SG Construction
is, at most, an empty shell of a corporation. I fully appreciate
that the General Counsel had the burden of proof, but the ap-
parent recent creation of SG Construction is as obvious an arti-
fice as that found by the Board in Continental Radiator Corp.,
283 NLRB 234 (1987). In that case, an alter ego status was
found where a company that had previously employed no em-
ployees was staffed principally by another company whose
owner was motivated by a desire “to rid the Company of its
prounion work force and avoid any responsibilities arising un-
der the Act.” Here, SG Construction hired 12 of Summit Ex-
press’ 22 employees immediately, and it hired 9 more (the al-
leged discriminatees) during the week of June 21, but it hired
only 5 employees who had not previously been employees of
Summit Express. I accordingly find that Catrambone’s motiva-
tion was the same motivation that was found in Continental
Radiator.44
Moreover, Catrambone’s and O’Connor’s statements to the
employees show that managerial fatigue was not a motivating
factor in the entry into the June 1 contract. Instead of telling the
employees that he was tired of managing and was turning
things over to SG Construction, he told them that “I don’t have
to give you a reason.” Catrambone, of course, did not have to
give a reason, but his refusal to do so left intact the conclusions
that are to be logically drawn from what he, and O’Connor, had
said before. Catrambone had said before that he had “a lot of
money” and would use that money to engage in corporate ma-
neuvers, if he had to, in order to avoid the possibility of having
to deal with Local 673; and O’Connor had stated in various
ways that Catrambone was “not going to have Local 673.”
Those statements, I find, are more reflective of the real reason
that Catrambone brought in SG Construction, which had not
even been an employer, when he did. Finally, on the face of the
June 1 contract itself, SG Construction is designated as the
“agency” of Great Lakes, which is to say an “agency” of Ca-
trambone. “Agency” of course, is simply a layman’s term for
alter ego, and that was plainly what was intended. Therefore,

43 The Respondents’ proof that SG Construction existed even then
was only a filing with the State of Illinois and a filing with the Internal
Revenue Service, each of which indicates no more than that a certain
“Advantage Wholesale, LLC” had changed its name to “SG Construc-
tion, LLC.”
44 The strongest possible adverse inference is to be drawn against the
Respondents because of their failure to call Gagliano or explain why
they did not do so. Woodlands Health Center, 325 NLRB 351, 361
(1998) (a party’s failure to call a witness who may reasonably be as-
sumed to be favorably disposed to the party justifies an adverse infer-
ence as to any factual question on which the witness is likely to have
knowledge).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD622
the document itself proves the subterfuge. That is, Catrambone
brought SG Construction in when Local 673 began its organiza-
tional drive among Summit Express’ employees, and the evi-
dence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that he did so
because of that organizational drive. I therefore conclude that,
even though there are not present in this case the elements of
common ownership and continuing supervision that are found
in other such cases, SG Construction is the alter ego of the sin-
gle-employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Express, and
Summit Truck.45
D. Conclusions about the June 7 Discharges
I agree with the Respondents that, because he had signed the
agreement with SG Construction on June 1, Catrambone neces-
sarily had decided to discharge all of the Summit Express em-
ployees before some of them signed authorization cards on June
4. But apparently until that date, Catrambone had decided to
have his alter ego, SG Construction, rehire all of the Summit
Express employees. Otherwise he would not have continued to
surveil, interrogate, and threaten the Summit Express employ-
ees even after he had executed the June 1 agreement. That is,
after June 1, according to the Respondents’ theory, Catrambone
would not have cared whether the employees selected Local
673 as their collective-bargaining representative because, under
the terms of the June 1 agreement with SG Construction, his
management burdens supposedly were gone and his labor costs
were fixed. But Catrambone’s unfair labor practices did con-
tinue after June 1—on June 4 and as late as June 24 when
Decker overheard him threaten a new employee that “if this
673 tried to get in, he’d shut the doors down.” Those unfair
labor practices after June 1 showed that Catrambone did care.
He did not want his alter ego to run the risk of having to deal
with Local 673 any more than he had wanted Summit Express
to.
Again, the complaint does not allege that all 21 of the June 7
discharges violated Section 8(a)(3),46 and it does not allege that
SG Construction’s delays until the week of June 21 to hire the
Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and Mitchell violated
Section 8(a)(3).47 The complaint, however, does allege that the
discharges of the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp, and

45 A factor that fortifies my conclusion that SG Construction is an al-
ter ego is that the rehired employees were told that they did not need to
complete new W-4 forms. If it were a legitimate business, SG Con-
struction, like any other employer, would want those forms filled out so
that it could deduct the employees’ wages as business expenses. Either
Great Lakes and SG Construction are filing joint income tax returns, or
SG Construction does not exist anywhere but on paper.
46 Any such allegation would have been worthy of the most serious
consideration by the Board. (This is so, even though the 12 nonalleged
discriminatees were immediately rehired by SG Construction and they
suffered no economic losses. See, for example Cambridge Dairy, 169
NLRB 718 (1968) (enf. denied on other grounds 404 F.2d 866 (10th
Cir. 1968) (violation found where entire unit unlawfully discharged
even though employees were immediately hired by successor).)
47 Any such allegation would have been worthy of the most serious
consideration by the Board. (See, for example, Glenn’s Trucking, 332
NLRB 880 (2000), enfd. 298 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (“blatant dispar-
ity” in number of prounion applicants whose employment was delayed
is, alone, evidence of animus.)
Mitchell violated the Act. And I find that that allegation is valid
because those seven discharges were obviously part of a first
step, in a two-step scheme, to thwart any attempt by the Sum-
mit Express employees to achieve representation by Local 673.
The first step was to discharge all of the Summit Express em-
ployees, and the second step was have SG Construction hire all
of them with Local 711 already in place as the putative collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees (or in place as
soon as the employees could be coerced into signing authoriza-
tion cards for Local 711, as described infra). The second step
was delayed, in part, because of the participation, or suspected
participation, of the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp,
and Mitchell in the June 4 union meeting, but the fact remains
that none of the Summit Express employees would have been
discharged in the first place but for Catrambone’s animus to-
ward Local 673 and his desire to evade any possibility of hav-
ing to deal with that labor organization. Accordingly, I find that
the Respondents have not shown that Summit Express would
have discharged the Wrights, Huerta, Grethe, Decker, Sharp,
and Mitchell even absent their known or suspected activities on
behalf of, or sympathies with, Local 673. I therefore conclude,
under Wright Line, that by discharging those seven employees
on June 7 the Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(3).
As noted above, the General Counsel has shown no union ac-
tivities in which Fermin or Edwin Chapa engaged, and the
General Counsel has not shown that Catrambone may have
suspected that those two employees possessed prounion sympa-
thies. Nevertheless, the General Counsel did name the Chapas
in the complaint as alleged discriminatees and, as I have found
above, the discharges of June 7, which would include the dis-
charges of the Chapas, were just one step in a two-step process.
And Catrambone undertook that process in an attempt to escape
any possibility of having to deal with Local 673. The law con-
trolling the Chapas’ case is concisely articulated by Judge
Richard Miserendino, and adopted by the Board, in Delchamps,
Inc., 330 NLRB 1310, 1317 (2000):
[A] showing of knowledge of each individual’s union or pro-
tected activity is not required because the theory of Dilling-
ham Marine, supra [Dillingham Marine & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
610 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1980)], focuses upon the em-
ployer’s motive in ordering mass discharges, rather than the
prounion or antiunion status of particular employees. Id. at
321; accord: Birch Run Welding & Fabricating, Inc., supra,
761 F.2d [1175] at 1180 [6th Cir. 1985)]. The rationale is that
a general action by an employer to discourage union activity
or retaliate against the work force because of the union sup-
port of some impedes the exercise of Section 7 rights just as
effectively as adverse action taken against known union sup-
porters. The theory is viable even though neutral or antiunion
employees are also discharged in the process. Merchants
Truck Line, Inc., supra, 577 F.2d [1011] at 1016 [(5th Cir.
1978].
That is, even if they had been antiunion (which was not shown),
the Chapas were protected by the Act from being discharged as
part of Catrambone’s unlawful scheme. Accordingly, I find and
conclude that by discharging Fermin and Edwin Chapa on June
7, the Respondents also violated Section 8(a)(3).
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 623
E. Recognizing and Bargaining with Local 711 and Enforcing
the June 7 Contract
The parties stipulated that on June 7 Gagliano, on behalf of
SG Construction, entered into a contract pursuant to which SG
Construction recognized Local 711 as the collective-bargaining
representative of the Plum Street facility truckdrivers and
warehousemen. The parties further stipulated that the June 7
agreement contains a checkoff clause in favor of Local 711,
which clause SG Construction thereafter enforced. The com-
plaint alleges that by entry into the June 7 contract, and by its
enforcement, the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(2) and (3)
because Local 711 has never represented an uncoerced majority
of any bargaining unit of the Respondents’ employees. I agree.
O’Connor had threatened the employees with discharge or
plant closure if they failed to “follow suit” with the “independ-
ent” union that Catrambone was bringing in on June 7. This
would put a taint on any employee’s subsequent signing of a
checkoff or membership authorization for such an “independ-
ent” union. Moreover, Sam Catrambone freely admitted that he
told all potential SG Construction employees that, because of
the “union shop” agreement that Gagliano had signed, they
were required to join Local 711 and sign checkoff authoriza-
tions. As well as all employees who were hired during and after
the week of June 21 (when Sam Catrambone was placed on SG
Construction’s payroll, made “Director of Operations and Hu-
man Resources,” and began hiring employees himself), the
employees who were similarly coerced would have presumably
also included those who were hired by Gagliano before June
21. This is so because Catrambone could have received his
information about what the June 7 agreement required only
from Gagliano. Therefore, every one of the checkoff and mem-
bership authorizations that were signed by SG Construction
employees was the product of unlawful coercion.
Of course, forcing employee-applicants to join a union and
forcing them to sign checkoff authorizations are violations, and
separate violations, of Section 8(a)(2) and (3).48 Moreover,
because of O’Connor’s threats, and because Catrambone and
Gagliano told all prospective employees that they were required
to join Local 711 and sign its checkoff authorization cards, at
no time could that labor organization have represented an unco-
erced majority of any bargaining unit of SG Construction’s
employees. The Respondents, through SG Construction, have
therefore violated Section 8(a)(2) and (3) by executing and
enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement pursuant to which
employees are required to join Local 711 and pay dues and fees
through checkoff to that union, even though Local 711 has
never represented an uncoerced majority of any unit of the
Respondents’ employees, as I find and conclude.
Additionally, as is undenied, Gagliano told Dennis Wright
and Grethe in August that in order for them to remain employed
by SG Construction they had to sign Local 711 authorization

48 A.M.A. Leasing, 283 NLRB 1017 (1987); Grocery Haulers, Inc.,
315 NLRB 1312 (1995). See generally Ladies Garment Workers v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
and checkoff cards.49 When Wright and Grethe later attempted
to give Sam Catrambone the demanded authorization cards, but
with “under protest” written on them, Catrambone told them
that that was not acceptable. Duly coerced, Wright and Grethe
signed other authorization cards for Local 711 without the lan-
guage of protest. These blatant acts of coercion were further
violations of Section 8(a)(2) and (3), as I find and conclude.50
F. Alleged Constructive Discharge of Decker
The complaint alleges that Decker was constructively dis-
charged, or forced to quit, because of his sympathies for, or
activities on behalf of, Local 673. I agree with the General
Counsel that she has proved that Decker was a known union
adherent and that the Respondent had expressed its animus
directly toward him. That is, Decker was one of the employees
who was threatened at Stoney’s by O’Connor on June 3, and on
June 4 he was interrogated (by telephone) by Catrambone about
whether he had signed an authorization card for Local 673.
Decker replied to Catrambone that he had done so. And, of
course, Decker was one of the employees who had been unlaw-
fully discharged on June 7.
Although the General Counsel has proved animus and rele-
vant knowledge in Decker’s case, she has not proved a con-
structive discharge. As stated by the Board in Manufacturing
Services, 295 NLRB 254 (1989), to prove an unlawful con-
structive discharge: “First, the burdens imposed upon the em-
ployee must cause, and be intended to cause, a change in work-
ing conditions so difficult or unpleasant as to force him to re-
sign.” When asked why he quit on June 29, however, Decker
replied, “I just was tired of the long hours, you know, not get-
ting paid what we should have been, and the benefits, found a
better job.” For obvious reasons, on brief the General Counsel
leaves out the last four words of this quote.51 Decker’s real
reason for quitting, I find, was the last one that he stated; he had
found a better job.52 I shall therefore recommend dismissal of
this allegation of the complaint.
G. Alleged Unlawful Constructive Discharge of Sharp
The complaint further alleges the constructive discharge of
Sharp. Sharp was interrogated by Catrambone and he was on
the receiving end of one of the most brutal threats that Catram-
bone uttered; again, Catrambone told Sharp “I have a lot of
money and . . . I’ll shut these trucks down before I go 673
. . . . I will change the name of the company if I have to.” And
Sharp was, as I have found above, one of the Summit Express
employees whom Catrambone unlawfully discharged on June
7. Therefore, had Sharp been discharged, I would have found
that the General Counsel has presented a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination. But Sharp was not discharged. He

49 This undenied action toward Wright and Grethe fortifies my find-
ing that Gagliano had told the same thing to all employees whom he
had previously hired.
50 A.M.A. Leasing and Grocery Haulers, Inc., supra.
51 This was no accident; General Counsel shows no ellipsis between
“benefits” and the period that ends the sentence.
52 It is to be further noted that, as discussed above, Decker’s average
daily wage as an SG Construction employee was not lower than that
which he had received as a Summit Express employee.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD624
quit.
An employee’s quitting, however, is only a part of the predi-
cate for a constructive-discharge case. The Board cannot just
hypothecate that an employee (even a severely threatened em-
ployee such as Sharp) has quit his employment because his
employer has, for antiunion motivations, made his work unac-
ceptably difficult or unpleasant. But in this case, Sharp did not
testify that he quit because of any onerous conditions to which
he may have been subjected.53 Moreover, I have found that, as
Sam Catrambone testified, on June 29 Sharp walked to his own
car and drove away when Catrambone told him to wait for a
drug test. Sharp did not show up for work the next day; he just
called Catrambone and just asked for his check. That was a
quitting of his employment, of course, but, especially in light of
Sharp’s failure to so testify, the Board cannot find that Sharp
quit because his conditions of employment had become “so
difficult or unpleasant as to force him to resign.”54 That is,
although he did not so testify, the condition of employment that
apparently caused Sharp to quit was his being required to take a
drug test; such requirement, however, was not so difficult or
unpleasant as to cause a reasonable employee to quit (and the
General Counsel does not contend that it was). I shall therefore
recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint.
H. Alleged Unlawful Discharge of Joey Wright
Joey Wright was directly threatened by O’Connor, and it was
his automobile that Catrambone pursued after the June 4 union
meeting at Stoney’s, and, in view of the demonstrated animus
toward the prounion sympathies of such employees, the Gen-
eral Counsel has stated a very strong prima facie case under
Wright Line that Wright’s July 14 discharge was unlawful.
Nevertheless, I have credited Sam Catrambone’s testimony
that, after an argument, Wright threw a Gatorade bottle at the
window of the office in which Catrambone was working. There
is no evidence of disparate treatment; that is, no employee was
shown to have engaged in such conduct without being dis-
charged for insubordination. I therefore find that the Respon-
dents have shown that, even absent Wright’s union activities,
they would have discharged him. Accordingly, I shall also
recommend dismissal of this allegation of the complaint.
(The General Counsel does not alternatively contend that
Wright remained within the protection of the Act when he
threw the bottle in exasperated protest of the Respondents’
unfair labor practices of reducing the wages of the Local 673
adherents. Compare Stanford Hotel, 344 NLRB 558 (2005)
(nonviolent cursing of supervisor in private office in protest of
unfair labor practices protected). Even if she had, I would find
that by his violence in a work area Wright removed himself
from the protection of the Act. Compare Little Egypt Coal Co.,
272 NLRB 1258 (1984) (exasperated throwing of a check on a
desk that was inside of a supervisor’s private office held not to
be outside the protection of the Act). This is so, even though I

53 Although the General Counsel asked Decker why he had quit, she
did not ask Sharp why he had quit. (On brief, as evidence of the reason
for Sharp’s quitting, the General Counsel cites only the page of the
transcript that contains Decker’s testimony about why he quit, as
quoted above.)
54 Manufacturing Services, supra.
realize that Wright’s throwing of the bottle was not only part of
the res gestae of his protest of the unfair labor practices of the
Respondents, it was part of course of generally protected activ-
ity because Wright had been protesting on behalf of other em-
ployees as well as himself. Compare Enterprise Products, 264
NLRB 946, 950 (1982) (citing NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co.,
351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965)).
I. Assignment of Older Trucks and Other Alleged
Discrimination
The Catrambones testified that there were no older trucks to
which the employees could have been assigned, but no accurate
records (as opposed to general summaries) of just which trucks
the Respondents owned at that time were offered. I therefore
effectively have only the word of Richard and Sam Catrambone
against that of Dennis Wright that he was assigned to older
trucks, and trucks that were in poor states of repair, when he
was rehired by SG Construction. The employee’s testimony
was more credible, and I do find that Wright was assigned to
inferior equipment upon his being rehired by SG Construction.
The complaint alleges that after the alleged discriminatees
were rehired by SG Construction they were paid lower wages
because of their demonstrated prounion sympathies. As de-
tailed above, two of the seven alleged discriminatees who were
known or suspected of being prounion, Huerta and Decker,
actually received greater wages as SG Construction employees.
The Wrights, Grethe, Sharp, and Mitchell, however, were
shown to have made substantially less weekly wages as em-
ployees of SG Construction (Joey Wright being the worst case
of those known to be prounion, by having suffered a 33.4-
percent average weekly reduction in wages as an employee of
SG Construction). The Respondents do not deny that these five
employees, and alleged discriminatee Fermin Chapa who suf-
fered a wage reduction of 34.3 percent, earned less as SG Con-
struction employees than they did when they were employed by
Summit Express. (And, of course, they do not deny that the
nonunion Rory O’Connor increased his wages by 26.0 percent
as an employee of SG Construction.) The only defense to the
allegation that the wages of Fermin Chapa, the Wrights, Grethe,
Sharp, and Mitchell were reduced because of their prounion
sympathies is found in the testimony of Sam Catrambone that
he did not intentionally assign any employees to lesser paying
jobs because of their union sympathies. Under Wright Line,
this bare, self-serving testimony is far short of the probative
evidence necessary to show that Fermin Chapa, the Wrights,
Grethe, Sharp, and Mitchell would have been paid the same
even absent their known or suspected union activities against
which the Respondents were shown to bear such egregious
antiunion animus. I therefore find and conclude that by reduc-
ing the wages of these six employees after they were rehired by
SG Construction the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3).
I further credit Joey Wright’s undisputed testimony that after
the employees were rehired by SG Construction, tools such as a
circular-saw drill were taken away from them and they were
assigned tools that were inferior to those which the employees
had been provided as Summit Express employees. And I find
that the employees, after they were rehired by SG Construction,
were not provided with the cell telephones that had been issued
SUMMIT EXPRESS, INC. 625
to them as Summit Express employees. Although the employ-
ees were not asked by the General Counsel if they were reis-
sued telephones when they were rehired, at least Dennis Wright
testified (on cross-examination) that he returned his cell phone
to “the Company,” and presumably the other employees who
were discharged on June 7 without being immediately rehired
by SG Construction did also. And the Respondents did not offer
testimony that the alleged discriminatees were reissued cell
phones when they were rehired as SG Construction employees.
I therefore find that, as alleged, the Respondents failed to issue
to the alleged discriminatees the cell phones that they had been
supplied as Summit Express employees when they were rehired
as SG Construction employees. And I further conclude that, by
such withholding of cell phones and other tools from the al-
leged discriminatees who were shown to have been known to
support the Union, or shown to have been suspected of support-
ing the Union, the Respondents have violated Section 8(a)(3).
Finally, the complaint alleges that the Respondent unlaw-
fully barred Grethe from the warehouse and restroom. Sam
Catrambone admitted that he did bar Grethe from the ware-
house “for several weeks” because “they” (apparently Dennis
Wright, as well as Grethe) were “disruptive.” When asked what
he meant by that comment, Catrambone included the employ-
ees’ complaints about “I am getting this load and this person is
getting that load.” As demonstrated above, however, Grethe
and Wright were among those prounion employees whose
wages were unlawfully reduced when they were rehired by SG
Construction. Sam Catrambone’s testimony therefore stands as
an admission that Wright and Grethe were complaining that
manipulation of the load assignments was a method that was
being employed by the Respondents to accomplish those unfair
labor practices. And the employees’ complaints about the Re-
spondents’ unfair labor practices were therefore themselves
protected concerted activities. Under these circumstances, I
find and conclude, the Respondents’ barring Grethe from the
warehouse violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3), as alleged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondents, Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck
Leasing, Inc., Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc., and SG
Construction, LLC, are employers that are engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Allied Trades,
Local 673, AFL–CIO, and National Amalgamated Workers
Union, Local 711, are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Summit Express, Inc., Summit Truck Leasing, Inc., and
Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc. constitute a single em-
ployer under the Act, and each is therefore jointly and severally
responsible for the remedy for the unfair labor practices of the
others.
4. SG Construction, LLC has acted as, and is, the alter ego of
the single-employer entity of Summit Express, Inc., Summit
Truck Leasing, Inc., and Great Lakes Building Materials, Inc.,
and SG Construction is therefore jointly and severally respon-
sible for remedy of their unfair labor practices, and they are
jointly and severally responsible for remedy of SG Construc-
tion’s unfair labor practices.
5. By the following acts and conduct, the Respondents have
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) Threatening employees with discharge, plant closure, and
unspecified reprisals because they were known by the Respon-
dents to support, or suspected by the Respondents of support-
ing, Local 673.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge, plant closure, loss
of health insurance benefits, and unspecified reprisals because
they had failed to sign bargaining authorizations for, or because
they otherwise failed to support, Local 711.
(c) Instructing employees to sign authorizations that desig-
nate Local 711 as their collective-bargaining representative.
(d) Instructing employees to sign checkoff authorizations for
Local 711.
(e) Interrogating employees about their union activities.
(f) Creating among their employees the impression that their
union activities were being kept under surveillance.
6. By the following acts and conduct, the Respondents have
violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act:
(a) Instructing employees to sign bargaining and checkoff
authorizations for Local 711.
(b) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals
if they refused to sign bargaining and checkoff authorizations
for Local 711.
(c) Recognizing and bargaining with, and signing a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with, Local 711 at a time when the
labor organization did not represent an uncoerced majority of
any unit of the Respondents’ employees.
7. By the following acts and conduct, the Respondents have
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act:
(a) Discharging the following-named employees on June 7,
2004: Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa, Shawn Decker, Richard
Grethe, Joe Huerta, John Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey)
Wright, and Dennis Wright.
(b) By reducing the wages of the following-named employ-
ees from the week of June 21, 2004, until on or about August
22, 2004: Fermin Chapa, Richard Grethe, John Mitchell, Troy
Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis Wright.
(c) Failing to provide Daniel (Joey) Wright with tools that
were necessary for his work.
(d) Assigning Dennis Wright to trucks that were older than,
and not in as good a state of repair as, trucks to which he had
been assigned before engaging in activities on behalf of Local
673.
(e) Failing to reissue cellular telephones to employees after
they had been reinstated from unlawful discharges.
(f) Barring Richard Grethe from the warehouse and rest-
room.
(g) Executing and enforcing a collective-bargaining agree-
ment pursuant to which employees are required to join Local
711 and pay dues and fees through checkoff to that union, even
though that union has never represented an uncoerced majority
of any unit of the Respondents’ employees.
8. The Respondents have not otherwise violated the Act as
alleged in the complaint.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD626
THE REMEDY
As well as issuing the appropriate orders that the Respon-
dents cease and desist from their unfair labor practices, I shall
affirmatively order the Respondents to post a notice to the em-
ployees assuring the cessation of such unfair labor practices,
and I shall also order the Respondents to take certain other
additional affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act. I have concluded that the Respondents unlawfully
discharged Edwin Chapa, Fermin Chapa, Shawn Decker, Rich-
ard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel
(Joey) Wright, and Dennis Wright on June 7. On brief, page 80,
the General Counsel specifically concedes that the rehiring of
these nine discriminatees by SG Construction during the week
of June 21 constituted “reinstatement.” No order of reinstate-
ment is therefore appropriate as a remedy for those dis-
charges.55 Backpay for the nine discriminatees for the periods
from June 7 until the dates of their reinstatements shall be or-

55 If upon review it is decided that the nine alleged discriminatees
were unlawfully discharged on June 7, but it is further decided that SG
Construction is not the alter ego (or joint employer) of the single-
employer entity of Great Lakes, Summit Express, and Summit Truck, a
reinstatement order, and a further backpay order, against that entity
would be considered by the Board. This is so because, if they were
unlawfully discharged, and SG Construction is not an alter ego (or joint
employer), their employment with SG Construction was not reinstate-
ment but only interim employment that followed their unlawful dis-
charges.
dered, and backpay for all wages lost because of the Respon-
dents’ unlawful reduction of the wages of Fermin Chapa, Rich-
ard Grethe, John Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright,
and Dennis Wright shall also be ordered. Interest on such obli-
gations shall be determined as prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The Respondents shall
also be required to remove from their files any and all refer-
ences to the June 7, 2004, discharges of Edwin Chapa, Fermin
Chapa, Shawn Decker, Richard Grethe, Joe Huerta, John
Mitchell, Troy Sharp, Daniel (Joey) Wright, and Dennis
Wright, and the Respondents shall be required to notify those
employees in writing that this has been done.
The Respondents shall also be affirmatively ordered to with-
draw and withhold recognition from Local 711, or any succes-
sor thereto, as the collective-bargaining representative of their
employees, unless and until that labor organization is certified
by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive repre-
sentative of an appropriate unit of the Respondents’ employees.
Finally, the Respondents shall affirmatively be ordered to reim-
burse all of their present and former employees for any dues,
initiation fees, assessments, or other moneys deducted from
their wages on behalf of Local 711, together with interest
thereon as provided in the manner prescribed in New Horizons
for the Retarded, supra.56
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

56 A.M.A Leasing and Grocery Haulers, Inc., supra.