Sulema B.,1 Complainant,v.Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 20, 20180120170401 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 20, 2018) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Sulema B.,1 Complainant, v. Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary, Department of the Treasury (Internal Revenue Service), Agency. Appeal No. 0120170401 Agency No. IRS-15-1573-F DECISION On October 31, 2016, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 16, 2016 decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s decision. ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Is Complainant’s appeal timely? 2. Was the Agency’s dismissal of one of the claims of the complaint for failure to contact an EEO Counselor proper? 3. Has Complainant proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency unlawfully discriminated against her when it did not select her for one detail, declined to release her for a detail for which she was selected, and did not select her for two vacant positions? 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120170401 2 BACKGROUND At the time of the complaint, Complainant worked as a Human Resources Assistant (HRA), GS-7, at the Agency’s Human Capital Office in Chicago, Illinois. Complainant no longer works for the Agency. Complainant initiated EEO Counselor contact on August 19, 2015. On November 19, 2015, she filed a discrimination complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (White), age (62), and retaliation for prior protected activity when: 1. In February 2015, the Agency did not detail her to a newly created Human Resources Assistant position in the Executive Misconduct Unit (EMU); 2. In the summer of 2015, Complainant was selected for a detail to Leadership, Education, and Diversity Services (LEADS) but management declined to release her for the detail; and 3. On October 20, 2015, Complainant became aware that the Agency did not select her for two Human Resources Specialist positions advertised under Vacancy Announcement No. 15CE3-HCN0009-201-7-11-KD. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation, consisting of four volumes, and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). When Complainant did not request a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued its decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The Agency concluded in its decision that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency had subjected her to discrimination as alleged. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant argues that her appeal is timely. She continues to challenge the Agency’s articulated reasons for its actions and the credibility of Agency officials. Complainant also argues that the investigation was inadequate. The Agency asserts that Complainant’s appeal is untimely and, also, that Complainant failed to contact an EEO Counselor in a timely fashion regarding claim 1. The Agency urges that even if the Commission declines to dismiss Complainant’s appeal as untimely or claim 1 for untimely EEO Counselor contact, its decision should be affirmed. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). 0120170401 3 See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD- 110), at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Timeliness of Appeal EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.402(a) requires that an appeal be filed within 30 days of receipt of the Agency decision. If a complainant fails to file within the 30 days, the appeal can be dismissed. The Agency argues that the appeal must be dismissed because it was untimely. In this regard, it asserts that the decision should be presumed to have been received by Complainant within five days after it was mailed by the Agency to her address of record. The Agency also argues that Complainant failed to keep the Agency informed of her change of address, although she was required to do so and the Agency had also informed her of the requirement as evidenced by her signature on the Notice of Rights and Responsibilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(b)(1). In her appeal, Complainant, who moved from Illinois to Hawaii, stated that she received the Agency’s September 16, 2016 decision on October 13, 2016. Complainant’s appeal was filed on October 31, 2016. Complainant’s appeal was therefore filed within 30 days of her receipt of the Agency decision. The five-day mailing presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Delayed receipt can therefore be considered. An envelope from the Agency to Complainant to her address of record in Illinois is contained in the Agency’s “Administrative File” which was submitted by the Agency on appeal. The envelope had the Illinois address crossed out. Affixed on the envelope was a U.S. Postal Service forwarding label which is dated October 8, 2016, and which has Complainant’s address in Hawaii. Accordingly, we find, under the circumstances of this case, that the appeal is timely. Complainant is reminded that she is required to notify the Agency and the Commission of her current address. Failure to do so can result in the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of untimeliness where correspondence is sent to the address of record and there is a failure to provide a current address. Preliminary Matter Complainant has argued that the investigation was not adequate. We reject Complainant’s argument. The record establishes that the complaint was appropriately investigated in a manner consistent with EEOC MD-110, Chap. 6. There exists an appropriate factual record that allows a reasonable fact finder to draw conclusions as to whether discrimination occurred. 0120170401 4 Untimely EEO Counselor Contact The Agency urges that claim 1 be dismissed because Complainant failed to contact an EEO Counselor within the requisite 45 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2). The Agency raises this matter for the first time on appeal. The Agency had the opportunity to dismiss the complaint on these grounds in its final decision but did not do so. Therefore, we will not entertain the dismissal for the first time on appeal. Renee P. v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Request No. 0520160217 (June 17, 2016)(Commission declined dismissing complaint on grounds of untimely EEO Counselor contact, noting that the agency had opportunity to dismiss in its final decision but failed to do so and raised the issue for first time on appeal). Claims Addressed on Merits To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Upon review, we conclude that the Agency did not discriminate Complainant on any basis or subject her to disparate treatment. The Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which Complainant has failed to show were pretext for discrimination. Regarding claim 1, not having been selected for a detail to an HRA position in the EMU, Complainant stated that she was more qualified than the selectee chosen for the detail. The selectee was Black, younger than 40 years of age, and had had no prior protected activity. The responsible management officials were Black. Complainant stated in her affidavit that the Agency had made a concerted effort to recruit millennials. She also stated that most of the Labor Relations staff in Chicago were Black. The Agency’s articulated reason for not selecting Complainant for the detail was so that it could share detail opportunities among HRAs in a fair manner. The detailee was one of four HRAs in the Chicago/Detroit section who had not yet received a temporary promotion. Complainant, on the other hand, had received a noncompetitive, temporary promotion to a GS-9 Labor Relations Specialist position and also had a Management and Program Analyst detail in LEADS in 2015. 0120170401 5 The Supervisory HRS, who was Complainant’s supervisor, stated that though the position was not posted, management had the option of announcing non-competitive positions which were not to exceed 120 days. Complainant has not shown that the Agency’s reasons for the selection and why the position was not announced were pretextual. We next address claim 2, the detail to LEADS. Complainant was selected for the detail but her Manager did not release her for operational reasons. The Agency’s articulated reason for not releasing Complainant was that staff attrition had reduced the section’s ability to keep up with the workload. While there were two other HRAs, one was already on a part-time, temporary assignment and the other was on leave. Losing Complainant would negatively impact the workgroup’s ability to provide customer service. Complainant had also previously completed another detail. Also, the Workforce Relations Division (WRD) requested that all details end and no new details begin because of increased workload and low staff. We find Complainant did not show that there was discriminatory animus on the part of the Agency when it did not release Complainant to go on a detail. Claim 3 concerns Complainant’s nonselection to two of five positions advertised by the Agency. Complainant applied for the position and was among the best qualified candidates for the GS-07 and GS-09 grade levels. The position announcement was for a Human Resources Specialist, Employee and Labor Relations, in five states. In applying for the position, Complainant’s chosen locations were Atlanta, Georgia and Austin, Texas. Complainant was referred to the selecting officials at both sites for consideration. We first address the Atlanta nonselection. The Atlanta selectee was Black, under 40, and with no known participation in protected EEO activity. The selecting official explained that she made the selection based on the criteria identified in the vacancy announcement which is contained in the record. She considered the applicant’s managerial experience, knowledge of the union contract and the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), and written and verbal communication skills. The selecting official also found it beneficial if the applicant had been in management to draw from that experience as a manager. In addition, prior experience of being a union steward was also deemed beneficial in that it demonstrated the applicant’s experience in contract interpretation and facilitating grievance meetings and oral replies. The selectee was chosen, not for discriminatory reasons, but based on her experience and skills, including four years of experience as a supervisor and six years as a union steward. On the other hand, Complainant did not have the qualifications that the selecting official was seeking in the person who would occupy the position in Employee and Labor Relations. One way to prove pretext in a nonselection is for a complainant to show that her qualifications were “plainly superior” to those of the selectee. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981); Complainant v. Dep’t of Labor, EEOC Request No. 0520120381 (June 25, 2015); Complainant v. Soc. Sec. Admn., EEOC Appeal No. 0120132398 (Sept. 11, 2015). Complainant has not done so. Absent discriminatory animus, we have consistently held that we will not second- guess an agency’s personnel decisions or substitute our judgment for that of an agency. See Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admn., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996). 0120170401 6 Pretext inquiry is not concerned with bad judgment, impeccability, dislike, or a mistake. Tyra F. v. General Svcs. Admn., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170252 (Apr. 4, 2018); Jamar F. v. Dep’t of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 0120170013 (Feb. 22, 2018). The focus of pretext inquiry is whether an agency’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. We find none. Regarding the application for the position in Texas, the Agency’s articulated reason was that Complainant declined attending the interview and therefore removed herself from consideration for selection. Complainant acknowledges that she failed to attend the interview. The articulated reason was not shown to be pretextual. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, the Agency’s decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. 0120170401 7 The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations November 20, 2018 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation