SugarCRM Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 2, 2020

14686765 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/686,765 04/14/2015 Charles Godewyn 1301-060U 7059
112025 7590 03/02/2020
Shutts & Bowen LLP
Steven M. Greenberg, Esq.
525 Okeechobee Blvd
# 1100
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
EXAMINER
ROTARU, OCTAVIAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
patents@shutts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHARLES GODEWYN, ING-MARIE JONSSON, KATHRIN
KOHLHAUFL, RILEY MCLOED, and MARIA ZOLOTOVA
____________

Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies SugarCRM, Inc. as the real party in interest.
(Appeal Br. 2).

Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

2

THE INVENTION
Appellant claims a method for optimal sales opportunity visualization
in a customer relationship management application (“CRM”). (Spec. ¶ 5,
Title).
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A method for visualizing optimal sales opportunity
strategy in a customer relationship management (CRM)
application, comprising:
storing in a data store of the CRM application different
data for different business opportunities previously closed and
won;
loading from the data store business opportunity data for
a potential sale in the CRM application in association with a
sales representative end user of the CRM application;
generating a visualization for an aggregation of the
different data representative of an optimal sales opportunity and
also generating a visualization from the business opportunity
data for the potential sale;
displaying a comparison of the visualizations in a user
interface to the CRM application; and,
providing in the user interface an alert responsive to a
determination that the visualization from the business
opportunity data for the potential sale varies by a threshold
amount from the visualization for the aggregation of the
different data representative of the optimal sales opportunity.

THE REJECTIONS
Claims 1–18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 6, 12 and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite.
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

3

Claims 1–5, 7–11, and 13–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as
being anticipated over Meggs (US 2004/0064360 A1, published Apr. 1,
2004).
Claims 6, 12, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over Meggs in view of Stephens (US 2015/0073865 A1, published
Mar. 12, 2015).

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those
patent-ineligible concepts. If so, . . . then ask, “[w]hat else is
there in the claims before us?” To answer that question, . . .
consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an
ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–218 (citing
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73
(2012)) (citations omitted).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

4

considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the
focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or
on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing, we apply a “directed to” two-prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to optimal sales
opportunity visualization and determines that this is the judicial exception of
a fundamental economic practice (Final Act. 16). The Examiner also
determines that the character as a whole of the claimed invention is not
meaningfully different than collecting, analyzing, comparing, manipulating,
and displaying or announcing information. (Final Act. 18). The Examiner
finds the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the
additional elements or combination of elements in the claims amounts to no
more than recitation of generic, ubiquitous, computer structure, which is
recited at a high level of generality. (Final Act. 19).
The Specification discloses that “CRM” refers to the interaction that a
business entity enjoys with its customers, whether the business entity
provides sales or services to the customer. (Specification ¶2). CRM is
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

5

thought of as a business strategy that enables business managers to
understand the customer, to retain customers through better customer
experience, to attract new customers, increase profitability, and to decrease
customer management costs. The invention is disclosed as a method,
system, and computer product for optimal sales opportunity visualization in
a CRM application. (Spec. ¶ 3).
Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites “storing . . . different
data for different business opportunities previously closed and won,”
“loading . . . data for potential sale,” “generating a visualization for an
aggregation of different data representative of an optimal sales opportunity .
. . and also. . . generating a visualization from the business opportunity
data,” and “displaying a comparison of the visualizations.”
We thus agree with the Examiner that the invention is directed to a
method for optimal sales opportunity visualization. As disclosed by the
Specification, the claimed invention is directed to a business strategy that
enables business managers to understand customers, retain customers, attract
new customers, increase profitability, and decrease customer management
costs. The invention of claim 1 is primarily related to business relations
which is a fundamental economic practice, which is a certain method of
organizing humans, which is a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52.
Also, we find the steps of “storing data,” “loading data,” generating a
visualization of data and displaying a comparison,” constitute “analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

6

1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765
F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to certain arrangements
involving contractual relations are directed to abstract ideas). Thus, we find
that claim 1 recites the judicial exception of a method of organizing human
activity and, in the alternative, a mental process.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to test”, claim 1 requires
a “CRM application,” a “data store of the CRM application” and a “user
interface.” The recitation of these computer components does not impose “a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We find no indication in the Specification, nor do
Appellant directs us to any indication, that the operations recited in
independent claim 1 invoke any inventive programming, require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation
of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

7

as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
In this regard, the recitations do not affect an improvement in the
functioning of the data store or user interface or other technology, do not
recite a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, and
does not transform or reduce a particular article to a different state or thing.
Id. Thus, claim 1 recites judicial exceptions that are not integrated into a
practical application and as such, claim 1 is directed to an “abstract ideas.”
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas, the claims must include an “inventive
concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must be an element or
combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice
amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
The introduction of computer components such as a CRM application,
a data store, and a user interface into the claims does not alter the analysis at
Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not
enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
“on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern
that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

8

computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not
generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any
“practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Instead, “the relevant question is whether claim 1 does more than
simply instructing the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Id. at 225. It does not.
As the Federal Circuit has held, “the use of conventional computer
components operating in a conventional manner” “do[es] not confer patent
eligibility.” Intellectual Ventures, 792 F.3d at 1371; CyberSource, 654 F.3d
at 1375 (merely claiming a software implementation of a purely mental
process that could otherwise be performed without the use of a computer
does not alter the method's unpatentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101). This is
because “mere automation of manual processes using generic computers
does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”
Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
Taking the claim elements separately, the functions performed by the
data store and the user interface at each step of the process are purely
conventional. Using a data store and a CRM application to retrieve, select,
and apply decision criteria to data and modify the data as a result amounts to
electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a
computer. All of these computer functions are well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the trading industry. See Elec.
Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354; see also In re Katz Interactive Call
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

9

possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming”). In short, each step does no more
than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As
to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing
information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.”
SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
access/display is equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be
abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display,
allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor
Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification,
generation, display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was
abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
Claim 1 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. As we stated above, claim 1 does not affect an
improvement in any other technology or technical field. The Specification
spells out different generic equipment and parameters that might be applied
using this concept and the particular steps, such conventional processing
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

10

would entail based on the concept of information access under different
scenarios. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 29-32). Thus, claim 1 amounts to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea of information
access using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents,
that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 6–20; Reply Br. 2–
5) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address various
arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues that claim 1 recites a process driven improvement to
computer-related technology by providing a particular solution to a
particular problem. In making this argument, Appellant relies on several
court cases. Specifically, Appellant argues that the claimed process is
eligible under the binding law of McRO, Inc. dba Planet Blue v. Bandai
Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal
Br. 14).
This argument is not persuasive because Appellant has not applied the
law and facts in the various cases cited to the recitations in the instant
claims. In regard McRO, we note that in McRO the claims were directed to a
specific asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use
of rules of a particular type. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313. By contrast, claim 1
recites only a data processing system that receives, transmits, and processes
information using a program code or algorithm. Unlike McRO, claim 1 is
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

11

not directed to an improvement to a computer process. In this regard, the
problem solved by the instant invention is not a technical problem but rather
the proper management of a business opportunity so as to ensure that all
business opportunities are most likely to result in closed and won sales.
(Spec. ¶6).
Appellant argues, relying on Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 890 F.3d 1369,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018), that the Examiner has not provided evidence that the
elements in addition to the abstract idea represent well-understood, routine,
and conventional activity engaged in by those in the relevant art. As we
discussed above, the computer elements recited in claim 1 in addition to the
abstract idea are the software application, the data store, and the user
interface which are disclosed in the Specification as generic elements.
Appellant cannot reasonably contend that there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the operation of the computer components
recited in addition to the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, or
conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate
that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or
inventive computer components or that the claimed invention is
implemented using other than generic computer components to perform
generic computer functions, e.g., receiving, transmitting, and processing
information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has
“repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility”
where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based
“merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out
conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.”
Berkheimer, 890 F.3d at 1373 (Moore, J., concurring); see also BSG Tech,
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

12

899 F.3d at 1291 (“BSG Tech does not argue that other, non-abstract
features of the claimed inventions, alone or in combination, are not well-
understood, routine and conventional database structures and activities.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the asserted
claims lack an inventive concept.”).
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument, relying on DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), that the claims provide for specific
technological modification aimed at solving a particular problems or at
improving the functioning of a known system. (Appeal Br. 18).
In DDR, the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims “address[ing] the
problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine,
conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be
instantly transported away from a host’s website after ‘clicking’ on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. There,
the Court found that the claims were patent eligible because they
transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to
resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The
Court cautioned, however, “that not all claims purporting to address
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. For example, in
DDR Holdings, the Court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue
from claims found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See DDR, 773 at
1258–59 (citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 7 0 9 , 715–16 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
As noted there, the Ultramercial claims were “directed to a specific
method of advertising and content distribution that was previously
unknown and never employed on the Internet before.” Id. at 1258
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

13

(quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16). Nevertheless, those claims
were patent ineligible because they “merely recite[d] the abstract idea of
‘offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,’ along
with ‘routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a
request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and
use of the Internet.’” Id.
Appellants’ asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible
in Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR. The
ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] media product for
sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to said
media product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a]
sponsor message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query.” Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant’s asserted
claims recite receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data. This
is precisely the type of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims do not foreclose or preempt all possible
methodologies for achieving the abstract concept. (Appeal Br. 18). While
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 701, 193 (2015) (“[T]hat the claims do
not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

14

the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). And,
“[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible
subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d
at 1379.
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We will also sustain the rejection as it is
directed to the remaining claims because Appellant has not argued the
separate eligibility of these claims.

35 U.S.C. §112, SECOND PARAGRAPH REJECTION
Appellant provides no response to this rejection and therefore the
rejection is summarily sustained.

35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 REJECTIONS
We will not sustain the rejection of claim 1 as rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102 because we agree with Appellant that the prior art does not
disclose or render obvious “displaying a comparison of the visualizations” as
required by claim 1.
The Specification discloses that the visualization of the sales cycle
stages depicted in Figure 1 are compared. The visualizations can reflect the
averaging of data for all the business opportunities or for selected groupings
of the business opportunities. (Spec. ¶22). A visualization for a
contemporaneous business opportunity is generated and compared to one or
more of the previously generated visualization. (Spec. ¶ 23).
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

15

The Examiner relies on paragraphs 42–47, 53, 54, and 62, and
Figures 2 and 4 of Meggs for teaching this subject matter. We have
reviewed these paragraphs and figures, and we find no disclosure of
displaying a comparison. Figure 2, as explained in paragraphs 42–47 depicts
a chart that details all the leads and/or opportunities within a pipeline. While
Figure 2 depicts a visualization of leads and opportunities, there is no
comparison of visualizations depicted or discussed in the accompanying
disclosure at paragraphs 42–47. Figure 4, as explained in paragraphs 53,54,
and 62 depicts a chart that illustrates a scenario of a regional pipeline
calculator but does not disclose a comparison of visualization.
In view of the foregoing, we will not sustain the rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and claims 2–5 dependent therefrom. We will also
not sustain the rejection as it is directed to claims 7–11 and 13–17 for the
same reason.
We will not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 6,
12, and 18 for the same reason.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–18 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 6, 12
and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
We conclude that the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 1–5, 7–11
and 13–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
We conclude that the Examiner did err in rejecting claims 6, 12 and
18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appeal 2019-002474
Application 14/686,765

16

DECISION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–5, 7–11,
13–17
101 1–18
1–5, 7–11,
13–17
102 Meggs 1–5, 7–11,
13–17
6, 12, 18 103 Meggs,
Stephens
6, 12, 18
6, 12, 18 112,(b) 6, 12, 18
Overall
Outcome
1–18

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED