Stuart Silverman

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 14, 2021

2020006707 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 14, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/569,343 08/08/2012 Stuart Silverman 12223 1534
22922 7590 04/14/2021
REINHART BOERNER VAN DEUREN S.C.
ATTN: TRAVIS MCDONNELL, PARALEGAL
1000 NORTH WATER STREET
SUITE 2100
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202
EXAMINER
SHARVIN, DAVID P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/14/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPAdmin@reinhartlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte STUART SILVERMAN
____________

Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,3431
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
ALYSSA A. FINAMORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–34. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s “invention relates generally to retirement funds that
provide periodic payments to participants.” (Spec. ¶ 1.) In particular,

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Milliman,
Inc. (Appeal Br. 2.)
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

2
Appellant’s invention relates to “operating a longevity retirement protection
fund that provides payments to fund participants based upon the
participants’ contributions to the fund, the projected longevity of the
participants, and the investment performance of the fund.” (Id.)
Claims 1 and 20–22 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative. It recites:
1. A method of automatically calculating periodic financial
payments to participants using an electronic longevity retirement
protection system to automatically provide periodic payments for
the duration of the participants’ lifetimes, the method
comprising:
receiving a financial investment from each participant and
associating such financial investment with an account for such
financial participant with an account maintenance processor;
determining a projected longevity for each participant with
a projected longevity processor;
investing the financial investments from the-participants
[sic] with an investment management processor;
using a risk assessment database to calculate a risk
assessment for the participants;
calculating projected cumulative assets and projected
periodic redemption payments for the system;
monitoring periodic redemption payments and actual
cumulative assets of the system;
determining the difference between the periodic
redemption payments and the projected periodic redemption
payments;
calculating the difference between actual cumulative
assets of the system and projected cumulative assets of the
system;
using a periodic redemption recalculation processor to
adjust the periodic redemption payments if the difference
between the periodic redemption payments and the projected
periodic redemption payments is greater than a first
predetermined difference or if the difference between actual
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

3
cumulative assets of the system and projected cumulative assets
of the system is greater than a second predetermined difference;
automatically providing periodic redemption payments
with a redemption payment processor to each participant in an
amount that is based upon at least that participant’s financial
investment and the projected longevity of that participant;
ceasing to make the periodic redemption payments to
participants upon their death; and
calculating a surplus remaining from the financial
investments from participants who die prior to the expiration of
their projected longevity to automatically provide the periodic
redemption payments made to participants who live longer than
their projected longevity.

REJECTION
Claims 1–34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.

ANALYSIS
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101, however,
“contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

4
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. at 218. If the
claims are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an
abstract idea, then the second step of the framework is applied to determine
if “the elements of the claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–
73, 79).
With regard to step one of the Alice framework, we apply a “directed
to” two-prong test to: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception, and 2) if the claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether
the claim “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception,” i.e., whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a
practical application. See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 54 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019
Guidance”).
Here, the Examiner determines that claim 1 recites “certain methods
of organizing human activity, specifically a fundamental economic principle,
commercial or legal interactions, and managing relationships between
people,” i.e., “processing a financial transaction, particularly . . . providing a
periodic payment from an investment fund without significantly more.”
(Final Action 4.)
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

5
Appellant argues that “the claims are not directed to method of
organizing human activity or to a fundamental economic principle, but to a
specific application for calculating financial payments designed to last the
lifetime of the participant, and, as such, are limited to a particular practical
application.” (Appeal Br. 14.) Appellant argues that “Appellant has
invented a system and a method for pooling longevity risk in such a way as
to allow program participants to obtain lifetime payments while maintaining
a state of actuarial equivalence.” (Id. at 19.)
Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.
DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products
and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon
. . . . Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter
to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on
whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded
subject matter.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In
other words, the first step of the Alice framework “asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in [the relevant
technology] or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at 1335–36; see also
2019 Guidance at 54–55.
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

6
The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention
is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that the “invention
relates generally to retirement funds that provide periodic payments to
participants.” (Spec. ¶ 1.) Claim 1 provides further evidence. Claim 1
recites “[a] method of automatically calculating periodic financial payments
. . . the method comprising: receiving a financial investment from each
participant and associating such financial investment with an account,”
“determining a projected longevity for each participant,” “investing the
financial investments,” “calculat[ing] a risk assessment for the participants,”
“calculating projected cumulative assets and projected periodic redemption
payments,” “monitoring periodic redemption payments and actual
cumulative assets,” “determining the difference between the periodic
redemption payments and the projected periodic redemption payments,”
“calculating the difference between actual cumulative assets . . . and
projected cumulative assets,” “adjust[ing] the periodic redemption
payments” under specified conditions, “automatically providing periodic
redemption payments,” “ceasing to make the periodic redemption payments
to participants upon their death,” “and calculating a surplus remaining.”
The intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites receiving data,
analyzing data (determining projected longevity), issuing instructions
(investing the financial investments), analyzing data (calculating a risk
assessment), analyzing data (calculating projected cumulative assets and
projected periodic redemption payments), monitoring data, analyzing data
(determining the difference between periodic redemption payments and
projected periodic redemption payments), analyzing data (calculating the
difference between actual and projected cumulative assets), analyzing data
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

7
(adjusting periodic redemption payments under specified conditions),
analyzing data and issuing instructions (providing periodic redemption
payments based at least on the participant’s financial investment and
projected longevity, and ceasing payments upon death of participant), and
analyzing data (calculating a surplus).
Receiving data, analyzing data, monitoring data, and issuing
instructions have been determined to be directed to an abstract idea. See,
e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (using a computer-implemented system “to
obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue instructions” did not result in
claim being non-abstract); see also Content Extraction & Transmission LLC
v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(treating as an abstract idea “1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data
within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data”), Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (managing an account by performing calculations and
manipulating the results determined to be directed to an abstract idea). And
“[a]s many cases make clear, even if a process of collecting and analyzing
information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that
limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.”
SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The
“character of [the] information simply invokes a separate category of
abstract ideas.” Id.
Claim 1 does not recite, e.g., how the account maintenance processor
receives the financial investment information and associates it with an
account, how the projected longevity processor determines a projected
longevity, how the investment management processor invests the financial
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

8
investments, how the risk assessment database is used to calculate a risk
assessment for the participants, how the periodic redemption recalculation
processor adjusts the periodic redemption payments, or how the redemption
payment processor automatically provides periodic redemption payments.
Nor does claim 1 recite how the projected cumulative assets and projected
periodic redemption payments are calculated, how the periodic redemption
payments and actual cumulative assets are monitored, how the difference
between the periodic redemption payments and the projected periodic
redemption payments is determined, how the difference between the actual
cumulative assets and projected cumulative assets is calculated, how the
periodic redemption payments are ceased upon the death of participants, or
how the surplus remaining is calculated.
Moreover, the recitations in claim 1 of investing participants’
financial investments, calculating a risk assessment, calculating projected
cumulative assets and projected periodic redemption payments, determining
the difference between periodic redemption payments and projected periodic
redemption payments, calculating the difference between actual and
projected cumulative assets, adjusting periodic redemption payments,
providing periodic redemption payments, ceasing payments upon death of
participant, and calculating a surplus, clearly recite at least economic
principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, and mitigating risk) as
well as commercial or legal interactions (including agreement in the form of
contracts, and legal obligations). Indeed, the Specification discloses that
“the longevity retirement protection fund system and method of the present
invention may be thought of as a self-insured socializing of the longevity
and mortality experiences among all of the fund members.” (Spec. ¶ 15.) In
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

9
view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
determining that claim 1 recites elements of certain methods of organizing
human activity. (See 2019 Guidance at 52.)
With regard to our analysis under prong two, we note that the
limitations of claim 1 do not recite technological implementation details for
any of the elements. As discussed above, claim 1 does not, e.g., recite how
the generically recited account maintenance processor, projected longevity
processor, investment manager processor, periodic redemption recalculation
processor, redemption payment processor, and risk assessment database
receive data, analyze data, monitor data, or issue instructions. “Indeed, the
claim language here provides only a result-oriented solution, with
insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it. Our law demands
more.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Claim 1 is “focused on providing information to [the user] . . . , not on
improving computers or technology.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC,
921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “Like Electric Power, the purported
advance ‘is a process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified
content, then displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly
inventive technology for performing those functions.’ We thus conclude
that the claim[ is] directed to an abstract idea.” Id. at 1385 (citation
omitted).
In cases involving software innovations, such as we have here, the
inquiry as to whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea “often turns
on whether the claims focus on ‘the specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

10
“abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.’” Finjan,
Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36). Here, the recited processors (e.g., account
maintenance processor, projected longevity processor, investment manager
processor, periodic redemption recalculation processor, and redemption
payment processor) and database (risk assessment database) are invoked
merely as tools. The asserted improvement is to the data calculated and the
instructions issued.
“[T]he focus of the claims is not a physical-realm improvement but an
improvement in wholly abstract ideas––the selection and mathematical
analysis of information, followed by reporting or display of the results.”
SAP Am., Inc., 898 F.3d at 1168 (“Moreover, the ‘investment’ character of
this information simply invokes a separate category of abstract ideas
involved in Alice and many of our cases—‘the creation and manipulation of
legal obligations such as contracts involved in fundamental economic
practices.’” (quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354)).
Nonetheless, Appellant argues that “the claimed components are not
generic computer components, but rather specialized components that must
be specifically configured to carry out the steps of the claimed method.”
(Appeal Br. 14.) “For example, the rejected claims require a projected
longevity processor that has been programmed to determine a projected
longevity or lifespan for each participant based on information provided by
the participant and gathered by the projected longevity processor.” (Id.
at 15.) We do not find this argument persuasive.
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

11
The Specification discloses that
[t]he longevity retirement protection fund system of FIG. 2
includes a main processor unit 70 which coordinates the various
other components of the longevity retirement protection fund
system. A number of other components of the longevity
retirement protection fund system are connected to the main
processor unit 70 to provide inputs thereto or to exchange
information therewith. A number of these other components are
also processors, which may be implemented either as separate
components or as virtual components integrated in the main
processor unit 70.

(Spec. ¶ 36 (emphasis added).) But, as discussed above, claim 1 does not
recite any technological implementation details for the recited processors
and database, i.e., claim 1 recites “insufficient detail for how a computer
accomplishes it.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1342 (emphasis
added); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“But what petitioner characterizes as
specific hardware––a ‘data processing system’ with a ‘communications
controller’ and ‘data storage unit,’ for example, ––is purely functional and
generic.” (citation omitted)).
Appellant seeks to analogize claim 1 to the claims in DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appellant argues
“that the Examiner has not shown that the functions performed by the
claimed processors are merely generic.” (Appeal Br. 10.) We disagree. As
discussed above, the claimed functions performed, i.e., receiving data,
analyzing data, monitoring data, and issuing instructions are generic
computer functions. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1356 (The claims
“do not include any requirement for performing the claimed functions of
gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real time by use of anything but
entirely conventional, generic technology. The claims therefore do not state
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

12
an arguably inventive concept.”); see also In re Katz Interactive Call
Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a
possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and
‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose
computer without special programming.”).
Unlike claim 1, the claims in DDR Holdings “specify how interactions
with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result –– a result that
overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily
triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258.
Appellant does not persuasively argue that the steps of claim 1 override or
vary some routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered
by the click of a hyperlink. Nor does Appellant explain how the claimed
method allegedly improves the function of the processors or the database.
See, e.g., BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1288 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“[A]n improvement to the information stored by a database is not
equivalent to an improvement in the database’s functionality.”).
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s attempt to analogize
claim 1 to the claims in Enfish. (See Appeal Br. 10–11.) The claims in
Enfish were “specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer
database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337. That is, “the plain focus of the claims
[was] on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic
or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id.
at 1336. Appellant does not persuasively argue how claim 1 improves
computer functionality.
We also do not find persuasive Appellant’s attempt to analogize
claim 1 to the claims in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

13
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal Br. 9–10.) In
BASCOM, the court determined that “an inventive concept can be found in
the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
pieces.” BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc., 827 F.3d at 1350. Here,
claim 1 does not specify that the recited processors and database must be
arranged in a non-conventional manner.
Appellant argues that “[w]hen subject matter has been reduced to a
particular practical application having a real world use, the claimed practical
application is evidence that the subject matter is not abstract.” (Reply Br. 10
(citing Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)); see also Appeal Br. 14.) Appellant fails to note that that
judgment was vacated. See WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 566
U.S. 1007 (2012). However, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit determined that the claimed
“process of receiving copyrighted media, selecting an ad, offering the media
in exchange for watching the selected ad, displaying the ad, allowing the
consumer access to the media, and receiving payment from the sponsor of
the ad all describe an abstract idea.” In other words, even if the claimed
invention has a real world use, indeed, even if the claimed techniques are
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,” that is not enough for
patent eligibility. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 591.
Regardless, Appellant argues that “prior to the claimed invention,
there was no known available means for investment funds to pool longevity
risk.” (Appeal Br. 18.) But this merely affirms that “the innovative aspect
of the claimed invention is an entrepreneurial rather than a technological
one.” See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 722.
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

14
Additionally, we do not find any indication in the Specification that
the claimed invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular
article to a different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that
attributes an improvement in computer technology or functionality to the
claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention
“appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that
imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.”
(See 2019 Guidance at 54–55.) In view of the above, we do not find
Appellant’s arguments persuasive.
Therefore, under prong one of the two prong test in the 2019
Guidance, claim 1 recites an abstract idea; and, under prong two, additional
elements in claim 1 do not “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” (See 2019 Guidance at 54.) As such, under step one of the Alice
framework, the claim is directed to an abstract idea, and we move to step
two.
Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for
an ‘ “inventive concept” ’––i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217–18 (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73). Under
step two, we examine, inter alia, whether an additional element or
combination of elements “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

15
field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present.” (2019
Guidance at 56.)
Appellant argues that “Appellant has identified at least eight different
processors for carrying out the steps required to practice the claimed
method. The components invented by the Appellant to construct this system
and practice this method are not generic, routine, or well-known.” (Appeal
Br. 19.) We do not find this argument persuasive.
Taking the claim elements separately, the functions performed in
claim 1 by the generically recited account maintenance processor, projected
longevity processor, investment manager processor, periodic redemption
recalculation processor, redemption payment processor, and risk assessment
database to receive data, analyze data, monitor data, and issue instructions
are purely conventional. Receiving data, analyzing data, monitoring data,
and issuing instructions are well-understood, routine, and conventional
functions previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d
at 1356 (The claims “do not include any requirement for performing the
claimed functions of gathering, analyzing, and displaying in real time by use
of anything but entirely conventional, generic technology.”); see also
Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (determining claims requiring “arranging, storing, retrieving, sorting,
eliminating, determining” to “involve the normal, basic functions of a
computer” and to be “conventional, routine, and well-known”), In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d at 1316.
Considered as an ordered combination, the generic computer
components of Appellant’s claimed invention add nothing that is not already
present when the limitations are considered separately. For example,
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

16
claim 1 does not purport to improve the functioning of the processors or
database themselves. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. Instead, claim 1 amounts to nothing
significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using generic
computer components performing routine computer functions. That is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1.
Claims 2–21 are not separately argued and fall with claim 1. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant argues that “[c]laims 22-34 are system claims with
numerous hardware elements. . . . Appellant submits that the Examiner has
not properly shown that the system, as claimed, is made only from generic
computer components.” (Appeal Br. 17.) Specifically, Appellant argues
that there are significant hardware and software elements of the
claimed invention that are not conventional, well-known, or
routine. The claimed invention provides a system and method
that facilitates the pooling of longevity risk to provide lifetime
income protection. The processors of the current invention are
programmed to determine a payment amount based on the
various pieces of data accessed or calculated by the system (e.g.,
asset balances, surviving participants, etc.). These payment
amounts are determined, and if necessary adjusted, to ensure that
the program funds remain in a state of actuarial equivalence (i.e.,
asset balance equals present value of future payments).

(Id.) For the reasons discussed above, we do not find this argument
persuasive. In short,
the system claims are no different from the method claims in
substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea
implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a
Appeal 2020-006707
Application 13/569,343

17
handful of generic computer components configured to
implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] …
against” interpreting § 101 “in ways that make patent eligibility
‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’ ”

Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72). We are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 22 or
dependent claims 23–34.
Appellant’s other arguments have been considered but are not
persuasive of error.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
Specifically:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–34 101 Eligibility 1–34

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED