Strein, Michael J. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 29, 2019

15348882 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/348,882 11/10/2016 Michael J. Strein 0260504 6079
63649 7590 10/29/2019
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
C/O FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP
26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691
EXAMINER
YENKE, BRIAN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2422
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/29/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@farjami.com
farjamidocketing@yahoo.com
ffarjami@farjami.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MICHAEL J. STREIN, VLADISLAV FELDMAN,
and CRAIG BEARDSLEY
____________________

Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before JENNIFER S. BISK, LARRY J. HUME, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 seeks review of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 This Decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the original
Specification, filed November 10, 2016; “Final Act.” for the Final Office
Action, mailed January 2, 2018; “Appeal Br.” for Appellant’s Appeal Brief,
filed July 2, 2018; “Ans.” for Examiner’s Answer, mailed August 7, 2018;
and “Reply Br.” for Appellant’s Reply Brief, filed October 8, 2018.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Disney
Enterprises, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company.
Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

2
BACKGROUND
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
“systems and methods for aligning frames of digital video content in an
Internet Protocol (IP) domain.” Spec. 2:2–5. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system comprising:
a non-transitory memory storing an executable code;
a hardware processor executing the executable code to:
receive a first Internet protocol (IP) video packet
including a first video content, and a second IP video
packet including a second video content;
identify a common reference time for the first and second
IP video packets;
identify a first frame number, a first line number, and a
first pixel number of the first video content, the first
frame number, the first line number, and the first pixel
number corresponding to the common reference time;
determine a first buffering interval for synchronizing the
first IP video packet with the second IP video packet, the
first buffering interval being determined based on the
first frame number, the first line number, the first pixel
number, and the common reference time;
hold the first IP video packet during the first buffering
interval; and
release the first IP video packet when the first buffering
interval elapses so as to align the first video content with
the second video content at the common reference time;
wherein the common reference time is one of a first time
the first IP video packet is received and a second time the
second IP video packet is received.
Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

3
REJECTION3
Claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Shenoi (US 8,379,151 B2, issued February 19, 2013) and
“Prior Art” including Meyer (US 2016/0080288 A1, published March 17,
2016), Botsford (US 2016/0277473 A1, published September 22, 2016),
Michaelis (US 8,094,556 B2, issued January 10, 2012), and Kloeden
(US 2015/0281038 A1, published October 1, 2015). Final Act. 3–8.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Obviousness Rejection of Claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious over Shenoi, Meyer, Botsford, Michaelis, and Kloeden.
See Final Act. 3–8; accord Appeal Br. 7. Appellant argues these claims

3 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner also rejected claims 1, 3–11, and
13–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
(Final Act. 2–3); however, the Examiner withdrew this rejection in the
Advisory Action mailed April 20, 2018.
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

4
together as a group, using independent claim 1 as a representative claim (see
Appeal Br. 7–13, 16), and Appellant separately argues dependent claims 3–5
(see id. at 13–16). We begin our analysis with independent claim 1.
Claim 1 recites: “determine a first buffering interval for
synchronizing the first IP video packet with the second IP video packet, the
first buffering interval being determined based on the first frame number, the
first line number, the first pixel number, and the common reference time.”
Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.) (referred to herein as the “buffering interval
limitation”). In the Final Office Action, the Examiner found that Shenoi
discloses “determining a first buffering interval,” as it receives IP packets
including video and synchronizes audio and video streams by adding delay
in a buffer. Final Act. 5 (citing Shenoi 9:14–41). The Examiner also found:
The [E]xaminer notes the inclusion of information into a
video IP packet including the line, frame, pixel number etc.[ ]
are [sic] conventional in the art (US 20160080288, para 46)
whether as markers, timestamps, metadata etc... It is also
known that video packets can be received that receive the same
content (US 20160277473, para 30 for example) or different
content (same timestamp/sequence) (US 8,094,556, abstract).
Id. at 4–5 (ellipses in original) (citing Meyer ¶ 46; Botsford ¶ 30; Michaelis,
Abstract). The Examiner further stated that the combination of Shenoi with
these other references (i.e., Meyer, Botsford, and Michaelis) renders the
claim obvious, but failed to articulate any rationale to combine or modify the
references. Id. at 6.
Appellant contends that the Examiner fails to make a prima facie of
obviousness because the rejection fails to identify where the proposed
combination teaches or suggests “determine a first buffering interval for
synchronizing the first IP video packet with the second IP video packet, the
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

5
first buffering interval being determined based on the first frame number,
the first line number, the first pixel number, and the common reference
time,” as required by claim 1. Appeal Br. 7–8 (emphasis omitted and
added).
In the Answer, the Examiner responds that the “rejection is based
upon what is known/conventional,” and “it is known to receive and align
packets . . . based upon the information included in the packets.” Ans. 17–
18. The Examiner explains that, “since video is sequential/successive in
nature, the order/alignment of packets is required for display,” analogizing
to synchronization of watches using their hour, minute, and second hands.
Id. at 18. The Examiner also states:
The [E]xaminer notes IP packets have reference points ( . . .
pixel, line and frame number) which would be obvious/required
to align the video packets.
. . .
The base reference, Shenoi, US 8,379,151, discloses
synchronizing IP packets including audio and video, where the
aligning/sync is performed using a delay if needed in the
buffer/memory.
US 20160080288 [Meyer] (para 46), which discloses
[sic] locating the frame, pixel and line number and compare it
to a system clock.
Id. at 19. The Examiner then states that Botsford, Michaelis, and Kloeden
disclose two streams of video packets, which can be the same or different,
and the use of a timestamp for each packet. Id. From this, the Examiner
concludes that the prior art, in combination, “meet[s] the limitations of
aligning 2 video packets using the information provided in the packet to a
common time source.” Id. at 20.
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

6
We are persuaded of Examiner error. Neither the Final Office Action
nor the Answer provide a clear explanation of the Examiner’s mapping of
the cited references to the buffering interval limitation.4 See Final Act. 4–6;
Ans. 17–20. The Examiner finds Shenoi discloses “determining a first
buffering interval” (see Final Act. 5; Ans. 19), but the Examiner fails to
adequately explain (and it is unclear from our review) how the relied-upon
disclosures teach or suggest that this first buffering interval is “based on the
first frame number, the first line number, [and] the first pixel number,” as
specifically required by claim 1.
In particular, the Examiner appears to cite paragraph 46 of Meyer to
show that the buffering interval is based on frame number, line number, and
pixel number. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Meyer’s video IP
packets include frame, line and pixel numbers (Final Act. 4–5 (citing Meyer
¶ 46)), and the Examiner finds that Meyer compares these numbers to a
system clock (Ans. 19 (quoting Meyer ¶ 46)). However, Meyer’s paragraph
46 describes locating “a video frame marker” (which indicates a data packet
for line 1 and pixel 1 of the frame) and “compar[ing] the data packet video
frame interval unit to the system clock interval unit.” Meyer ¶ 46. This
does not expressly disclose either of the Examiner’s findings (i.e., that the IP
packet includes a frame, line, and pixel numbers, or that any of these
numbers are compared to a system clock), and the Examiner fails to explain

4 Moreover, the Examiner’s explanation of the rejection of claim 1 as a
whole is insufficient because it was excessively ambiguous. In the Final
Office Action, the Examiner recited claim 1 in its entirety, and then made
various findings regarding what is “conventional in the art,” citing to the
identified prior art; however, for many of these findings, it is not clear why
or how these statements relate to limitations of the claim. Final Act. 3–6.
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

7
why these concepts are either inherently taught or suggested by the
reference. See Reply Br. 2 (arguing that Meyer’s paragraph 46 fails to
disclose these concepts). As a result, we do not perceive support in Meyer
for the Examiner’s factual findings.
But, even if we were to agree with the Examiner that Meyer teaches
locating frame, pixel, and line numbers and comparing these numbers to a
system clock, we still would not sustain the rejection because the Examiner
failed to sufficiently explain why or how it would have been obvious to
modify Shenoi, given the teachings of Meyer, to determine a buffering
interval based on a frame number, a line number, and a pixel number. For
example, the Examiner fails to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the
art would have found it obvious to combine Shenoi and Meyer. Moreover,
in the context of the rejection’s other deficiencies, the Examiner’s
explanation of why an ordinary artisan would have modified the references
to yield the claim limitations is insufficient. See Ans. 18 (finding that “it is
known to receive and align packets . . . based upon the information included
in the packets,” without explaining why it would be obvious to use the
particular information required by claim 1); id. (stating that it would have
been obvious to use this information in a frame because “video is
sequential/successive in nature,” without explaining how the sequential
nature of video frames indicates that it would have been obvious to set a
buffering interval based on a pixel or line number). Consequently, the Final
Office Action does not establish a prima facie case of obviousness of the
claimed invention. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(requiring a “rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

8
obviousness”), cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007).
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are
persuaded of at least one error in the Examiner’s reliance on the cited prior
art combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 1, such
that we find error in the Examiner’s resulting legal conclusion of
obviousness. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of independent claim 1, or independent claim 11, which recites the
disputed limitation in commensurate form.5 For the same reasons, we also
reverse the rejection of dependent claims 3–10 and 13–20, which depend
from independent claims 1 and 11.
Because this determination resolves the § 103 rejection for all pending
claims, we need not address Appellant’s other arguments regarding
Examiner error. See, e.g., Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy, 742 F.2d 1421, 1423
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an administrative agency may render a
decision based on “a single dispositive issue”).
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–11, and 13–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Shenoi, Meyer, Botsford, Michaelis,
and Kloeden. Final Act. 3–8.

5 Notably, we have not considered, and do not decide, whether a prima facie
case of obvious could be made using Shenoi and Meyer. Rather, we review
the rejection articulated by the Examiner (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.50), and we
find that this rejection failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness.
Appeal 2019-000210
Application 15/348,882

9
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §  References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–11,
13–20
103   Shenoi, Meyer,
Botsford, Michaelis,
Kloeden
1, 3–11, 13–
20

REVERSED