Stoutco, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 15, 1969

180 N.L.R.B. 178 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Stoutco , Inc. and United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 25-CA-3209 and 25-RC-3819
December 15, 1969
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On May 26, 1969, Trial Examiner Maurice S.
Bush issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding , finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action , as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. He further
found that the Respondent had not engaged in
certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommended dismissal as to them.
In addition, the Trial Examiner found that the
Respondent 's conduct prior to the election held in
Case 25-RC-3819 was not so objectionable as to
justify the setting aside of the election, and
recommended the certification of the results thereof.
Thereafter the General Counsel and the Charging
Party filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's
Decision and supporting briefs. The Respondent
filed a brief in opposition to the exceptions filed by
the Charging Party.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed . The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision , the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions , and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner , as modified herein.
1. In the absence of any further identification or
connection being made between Bergbreiter and the
references to, or derogatory characterizations of,
paid union organizers during President Stout's
speech, we find insufficient basis for the Trial
Examiner ' s 8(a)(l) finding predicated solely upon
Stout' s action in having Bergbreiter identify a
particular book as being a union organizer's
handbook and then immediately embarking on a
speech in which repeated references were made to
paid union organizers . However , we do find, in
agreement with the General Counsel ' s exceptions,
that Stout exceeded the bounds of the free speech
proviso of the Act in his private conversation with
Bergbreiter occurring immediately following the
aforementioned speech . Stout 's invitation to
Bergbreiter to quit his employment with the
Respondent and his prediction that Bergbreiter
would be gone by August 16 (the first Friday
following the scheduled election) were an attempt to
harrass and coerce Bergbreiter in the exercise of his
Section 7 rights, and hence violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.'
2. The General Counsel and the Charging Party
have further excepted to the Trial Examiner's failure
to set aside the election and issue an appropriate
order requiring the Respondent to recognize and
bargain with the Union as the majority
representative of its employees. We find merit in the
first of these exceptions.
As more fully set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Decision, during the critical period preceding the
August 13, 1968, election, where the Union failed to
achieve a majority of the votes cast in the
Board-conducted election, the Respondent, primarily
through the medium of welding shop foreman
Waterson , on numerous occasions threatened loss of
existing benefits, plant closing or the imposition of
harsher working conditions , and made unlawful
interrogations and promises of benefit in an attempt
to dissuade the employees from joining or
supporting the Union. These threats, etc., were
accompanied by seven antiunion speeches made by
the Respondent's President Stout, the first of which
occurred on July 2, 1968, 1 day after the Union
received authorization cards from a majority of the
Respondent ' s employees.
In refusing to set the election aside and
recommending certification of the results thereof,
the Trial Examiner observed that in view of the
"minimal nature of the misconduct" and "the fact
that the misconduct, if it had any affect at all, was
directed at only a very small fraction of the
employees voting at the election," the
"Respondent's pre-election conduct had virtually no
impact or effect on the outcome of the election."
Thus, the Trial Examiner has erroneously assumed
that the restraining effect of the coercive conduct is
limited solely to the employees directly involved and
that there must be a clear showing of actual impact
on the outcome of the election. However, contrary
to the Trial Examiner, the Board and courts have
long recognized that employer threats, etc.,
concerning union activity, particularly in an
industrial plant and during a preelection campaign,
are likely to receive prompt and wide circulation.'
Accordingly, to evaluate properly the probable effect
of conduct which is coercive in nature , the number
of instances of interference, or the number of
employees directly involved, cannot serve as
determinative factors.3 The controlling factor is
'See Garcrest Division of United Mills Corporation , 118 NLRB 158,
163-164.
'See Leonard Refineries , inc., 147 NLRB 488
'See N. L.R B. v . Donnelly Garment Co ., 330 U.S. 219, 231 , where the
Supreme Court observed that "a feeling by employees 'that they were
under no sense of constraint... is a subtle thing , and the recognition of
constraint may call for a high degree of introspective perception'.. .
Since the impact of the specific conduct upon the employee directly
involved is so inexactly ascertainable, the possibility of measuring the
180 NLRB No. 11
STOUTCO, INC.
whether the conduct involved in each case
reasonably tends to interfere with a free and
uncoerced choice by the employees. In all the
circumstances of this case, we find that the
Respondent's conduct tended to inhibit a free choice
by the employees and necessitates the setting aside
of the election.4
However, contrary to the contention of both the
Charging Party and General Counsel, we do not
believe that, in all the circumstances of this case, the
unfair labor practices were of such a nature as to
warrant imposition of a bargaining order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, as
modified below, and hereby orders that the
Respondent , Stoutco, Inc., Bristol , Indiana, its
officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as herein modified:
1. Add the following as paragraph 1(f) of the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order:
"(f) Inviting or suggesting that any employee seek
employment elsewhere because of membership in, or
activities on behalf of, the Union."
2. Add the following as the sixth indented
paragraph of the notice marked "Appendix":
WE WILL NOT invite or suggest that any
employee seek employment elsewhere because of
membership in, or activities on behalf of, the
Union.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on
August 13, 1968, in Case 25-RC-3819, be, and it
hereby is, set aside, and said case is hereby
remanded to the Regional Director for Region 25 to
conduct a new election.
[Direction of Second Election' omitted from
publication.]
precise impact upon others not identified would appear futile.
'Nor do we , unlike the Trial Examiner, believe that Waterson 's threats,
etc., were any less coercive because the "psychological relationship of
Waterson to the welders was more that of an equal than that of a
supervisor ." Cf. Mallory Plastics , 149 NLRB 1649, where the Board found
a foreman's request to remove a union insignia, made "as a friend, not as
a foreman ," was coercive.
'Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Company , 395 U.S. 575.
'In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to
be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all
parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their
addresses which may be used to communicate with them . Excelsior
Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB 1236; N. L.R.B. v . Wyman-Gordon Company,
394 U.S. 759. Accordingly , it is hereby directed that an election eligibility
list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters , must be
filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 25 within 7
days after the date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the
Regional Director . The Regional Director shall make the list available to
all parties to the election . No extension of time to file this list shall be
granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances.
Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside
the election whenever proper objections are filed.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
179
MAURICE S. BUSH , Trial Examiner: This consolidated
proceeding presents three basic issues . The first of these
under the amended complaint, as amended, in Case
25-CA-3209 is whether the Respondent has interfered
with, restrained, or coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) thereof
by alleged acts and conduct as follows: (1) threatening
employees with the withdrawal of existing employee
benefits and existing terms and conditions of employment
if the Union got in, (2) threatening to coercively exact
greater amounts of work from its employees if the Union
got in , (3) interrogating employees concerning their own
and other employees' union membership, activities, and
desires, (4) threatening employees with the loss of their
jobs if they supported the Union or if the Union got in,
(5) threatening to close its doors if the Union got in and
(6) threatening and coercing employees because of their
activity on behalf of the Union.'
The above asserted unfair labor practices by
Respondent are alleged by the complaint herein to have
occurred prior to a consent election conducted by the
Board on August 13, 1968, upon petition of the Union.
The Union lost the election by a vote of 35 for and 45
against the Union, out of 80 counted valid votes. In
addition there were 7 challenged ballots. The Union
thereafter filed objections to the conduct of the
Respondent affecting the results of the election. The
objections, as certified by the Regional Director, are
identical with the unfair labor practices charged by the
original complaint in Case 25-CA-3209.
The second issue in this consolidated proceeding is
whether the results of the election should be set aside
because of Respondent's alleged aforementioned
preelection unfair labor practices.
The third and final issue is whether Respondent is in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act (a) by its admitted
refusal to recognize the Union and to bargain with it
under the Union's claim that it represented a majority of
the employees in the involved bargaining unit, and (b) by
its alleged conduct in undermining the Union and
destroying its majority status through its aforementioned
alleged preelection unfair labor practices. One of
Respondent's defenses is that it refused to bargain with
the Union because the Union did not represent a majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit. The Union
requested recognition from the Respondent by letter dated
June 19, 1968 and indirectly by a petition for an election
filed with the Board on June 25, 1968 at which times it is
a conceded fact that the Union did not represent a
majority of the employees in the unit. The Union made no
new or further demands for recognition upon Respondent
other than those contained in its letter of June 19 and its
election petition of June 25. The Union finally attained
majority status on July 1, 1968. There being no new
demand for recognition on July 1, the ultimate question
under Respondent's said defense is whether Respondent
on July 1 was under a continuing demand for recognition
and bargaining by reason of the Union demand letter of
'The alleged conduct set forth above under the numerical (5) was made
part of the amended complaint in Case 25-CA-3209 by oral amendment at
the trial . G C. Exh. 1(n)
180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
June 19 and its petition of June 25 as contended by
counsel supporting the complaint. This involves a mixed
question of fact and law In addition, Respondent also
defends its admitted refusal to bargain with the Union
from and after July 1, 1968, on the ground that it had a
good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status as of
July 1, 1968, and thereafter.
Respondent denies all of the unfair labor practices
alleged in the amended complaint as amended at the trial.
The original complaint in Case 25-CA-3209 was issued
on October 31, 1968, pursuant to a charge filed and
served on Respondent on August 16, 1968. An amended
complaint, based upon the same charge, was issued on
January 2, 1968 The "Report on Objections To Conduct
Affecting Results of the Election" in Case 25-RC-3819
was also issued on October 31, 1969. The latter also
contained an order consolidating the two cases for
"purposes of hearing, ruling, and decision by a Trial
Examiner."
The consolidated cases were tried at Elkhart, Indiana,
on February 4 and 5, 1969. Briefs received from counsel
for General Counsel and for Respondent have been
carefully reviewed and considered.
Upon the entire record and from his observation of the
witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent Stoutco, Inc., an Indiana corporation, is
engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
fabricated steel products, and related products at its plant
in Bristol, Indiana, which is also its principal office and
place of business. During the past 12 months, a
representative period, Respondent in the course and
conduct of its business operations, purchased, transferred,
and delivered to its plant, goods and materials valued in
excess of $50,000, which were transported to its plant
directly from States other than the State of Indiana.
Similarly, during the past 12 months, Respondent in the
course and conduct of its business operations,
manufactured, sold, and distributed at its plant, products
valued in excess of $50,000, which were shipped from its
plant directly to States other than the State of Indiana
[I. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
By stipulation , it is found that the United Steelworkers
of America , AFL-CIO , is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background Facts
Stoutco, Inc., was founded as a business enterprise by
Richard H. Stout in 1959. From the inception of the
Company, Stout has been its majority stockholder,
president, and chairman of its board of directors. More
specifically than heretofore stated, the Company is
engaged in the manufacture of parts and panels for truck
bodies, truck trailers, boats, camper trailers, and
miscellaneous medium and heavy sheet metal fabrications.
It manufactures some 3,000 parts for shipment to the
plants of customers for assemble into the final product.
Respondent's plant has a number of departments and
operates two shifts per day. Among those mentioned at
the hearing were the welding, press, shearing, shipping,
and maintenance departments. The record shows that the
only department involved in the alleged 8(a)(1) unfair
labor practices has been its welding department. The
record further shows that only the day shift of the welding
department was involved in these alleged unfair labor
practices. During the 2-month period prior to the election
held on August 13, 1968, the number of welders employed
in the day shift fluctuated between 5 and 9. In the same
2-month period, Respondent's total number of employees
in the appropriate unit here involved averaged about 135
Large layoffs occurred both prior to and shortly after the
election due to business recessions. At the time of the
trial, only some 42 persons were employed at the plant.
It is established by the pleadings that all hourly rated
employees of the Respondent at its Bristol plant, exclusive
of supervisors, guards, and office personnel, constitute a
unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
Respondent has an extremely high labor turnover due
to the highly competitive labor market of the area in
which its plant is located In 1968, it hired approximately
600 employees to maintain a payroll which never exceeded
150 employees. About four out of six employees quit
voluntarily sometime during the course of the year. Some
employees worked as little as an hour or two or only a
few days when they quit. As stated by one of
Respondent's former employees, Tolby Owens, there was
"such a turnover there, maybe you would get acquainted
with one guy one day and he would be gone the next."
The record shows that for every termination during the
year here in question there were 50 to 75 quits. None of
the seven former employees who testified in support of the
complaint were terminated; some quit and some were
layed off due to lack of work. The complaint does not
charge the Respondent with any Section 8(a)(3)
discriminatory terminations or layoffs
B. Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations
General Counsel's 8(a)(1) case is built largely around
the testimony of Jack Bergbreiter, Ronald Green, Charles
W. Nolan, Jr., and Tolby Owens. They are former
employees of Respondent who had worked at the times
here pertinent as welders on the day shift in Respondent's
welding department under the supervision of foreman
Russell Waterson.2 At an employees' union organizational
meeting held some days prior to the Union's letter of June
19, 1968, to the Company demanding recognition, they
were elected to serve on the Union's negotiation
committee. Bergbreiter, Green, and Owens voluntarily left
Respondent's employment not long after the Union lost
the representation election held on August 13, 1968;
Nolan was layed off on June 13, 1968, due to lack of
work and failed to return to Respondent's employment
when recalled two months later.
Waterson has been in the employment of the Company
since the latter part of 1965. He was day shift foreman of
Stoutco's welding department from about February 1968
to about December 1968 when he was transferred to
Stoutco's maintenance department where he was working
at the time of the trial.
Owens, who worked for Stoutco from December 1967
to late August 1968, appears from the record to have been
the earliest active advocate among the welders for a union
'By amendment to the complaint the name of "Watterson" was
corrected to "Waterson "
STOUTCO, INC.
shop. Waterson's testimony shows that Owens approached
him to sign a Union authorization card on June 11, 1968,
but that he declined. Thereafter numerous conversations
took place between Waterson and the welders he
supervised concerning the Union. The employee-witnesses
had difficulty in recalling the dates of these various
conversations but generally placed them as having taken
place either before or after a speech made by President
Stout to his employees on July 2, 1968. Stout's speech of
July 2 was the first of 10 preelection speeches he made to
his employees in which he sought to persuade them to
vote against the Union in the representation election
scheduled for August 13, 1968. The complaint herein does
not allege that any of Stout's preelection speeches were in
violation of the Act. The Union, as heretofore noted, lost
the election.
Waterson in his supervisory capacity was in almost
hourly contact with his welders. In these contacts, the
conversation frequently veered to the subject of the
Union's efforts to organize the plant. Waterson admitted
talking to Bergbreiter about the Union about once or
twice a day during the 2-month period prior to the
election. One or the other would initiate the subject of the
Union, but the subject was more frequently brought up by
Bergbreiter. In these conversations which were spirited but
friendly, Bergbreiter espoused the Union's cause and
Waterson expressed his opposition to having any union in
the plant, In break periods, Waterson, by his own
admission , would sometimes ask the welders who were
wearing union buttons, "How's things going?" with the
Union. In his various conversations with the welders,
Waterson admitted that he told them that he did not care
to have the Union come into the plant.
Waterson's first conversation with Bergbreiter about the
Union occurred on June 11, 1968, the day Bergbreiter had
just returned to his job after a vacation. Waterson
inquired whether he had signed a union authorization
card. Upon Bergbreiter's admission that he had signed a
card, Waterson told him that if the Union got in, the
Company would hire a new welding department foreman
"with a bull whip" who would not be nearly as lenient
with his men as he was.'
A few days later Waterson made the same statement to
Bergbreiter and otherwelders as they were walking in a
group to their work stations after a rest break.
On July 2, 1968, after Stout had made his first speech
on the Union issue to the employees in the plant,
Waterson approached the work station where Bergbreiter
and Owens and Aaron Moore, another welder, were
working and asked them if they liked receiving free work
gloves, work goggles, and anti-freeze (for their cars) from
the Company. The men readily agreed that they enjoyed
getting these items "free." Waterson thereupon told them
that if the Union got in, they would no longer be receiving
these items without charge, but would be obliged to pay
for them.
Some 20 minutes later, Moore approached Waterson at
his desk with a request for a pair of work gloves and a
colored lens replacement. Waterson handed him the
requested items with the remark, "You won't be getting
any more of this free stuff if the union gets in." This
reported comment is based on the credited testimony of
Moore and Bergbreiter who was at Waterson's desk at
that time also getting himself a pair of gloves. Moore had
brief employment of only 27 days with the Respondent
'The findings in this paragraph and the next paragraph are based upon
the credited testimony of Bergbreiter
181
when he was layed off due to lack of work. He was in
layoff status at the time of the election. He was recalled
on August 28, 1968, but did not accept reemployment
with the Company.
A few days later on, or about July 5, 1968, Richard J.
Curtis, a 20 year old trainee-welder, similarly requested
Waterson for a pair of gloves. As Waterson handed the
gloves he told him, "You will have to buy your gloves
when the union gets in here The same goes for your
[protective] goggles." Disturbed by what Waterson had
told him, Curtis sought out Bergbreiter and demanded the
return of his union authorization card. Bergbreiter, when
made aware of what was troubling Curtis, assured him
that he would not lose any of the employee benefits he
was then receiving if the Union got in Curtis thereupon
told Bergbreiter that he could keep his card. Later that
day Waterson brought a pair of goggles to Curtis at his
work station that he had earlier requested. In handing him
the goggles, Waterson repeated to Curtis in the presence
of Bergbreiter his prior comment that the Company would
cease furnishing such items free to employees if the Union
got in. The findings in this paragraph are based upon the
joint testimony of Curtis and Bergbreiter.
Some days later, on or about July 10, Waterson, came
to Curtis' station to replace a clamp that had gone bad.
He blamed Curtis for allowing the clamp to wear out
prematurely and told him that if the Union got in, the
Company would penalize employees for negligent handling
of equipment. Curtis was laid off a month before the
election due to lack of work and never returned to the
employment of the Company.
Referring once again to July 2, 1968, the record shows
still another incident in which Waterson made predictions
to welders under his supervision as to what would happen
if the Union got in. The incident occurred as a group of
welders including Bergbreiter, Charles Anglemyer and
Ronald Green were walking back to their stations from an
employees' meeting to which they had been summoned to
hear President Stout's first union-issue speech. The men
were talking about the Union as they were walking to
their station. Waterson came along and joined the
conversation. In accordance with the credited testimony of
Green, Waterson told the men, "If they [Union] got in
here they will hire a foreman in here with a black whip to
run you guys." Anglemyer in relating the incident could
not recall Waterson using the term "bull whip," but he
did recall that Waterson on the occasion here referred to
made it plain to the welders that more work would be
expected of them if the Union got in. Green left the
employment of the Company in October 1968, and
Anglemyer, in November 1968; both left voluntarily.
The joint testimony of Green and welder Owens further
shows that some 2 or 3 days later, Waterson directed a
similar remark to Owens, Bergbreiter, and Moore.
The credited joint testimony of Green and welder
Owens also shows that Waterson, in speaking to Owens,
Bergbreiter, and Moore some 2 or 3 days later at their
work station, told them that, "...if the Union ever gets
in, that a lot of benefits would go [out] such as
[automobile] license plate money and [free] turkeys at
Thanksgiving...."
Owens' testimony further shows that in the same
conversation, Waterson also stated that, ". . . if the union
got in, the company would replace him [Waterson] with a
man with a bull whip or black snake whip ..." to force
more work out of the welders.
Owens' testimony further shows that conversations
about the Union between Waterson and his welders were
182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
practically daily occurrences. At one of these
conversations in early July 1968, as creditably related by
both Owens and Bergbreiter, Waterson told Owens,
Moore and Bergbreiter at their work stations that if they
dropped the Union and formed an independent bargaining
committee of their own, the Company would give them a
better deal than they would get through the Union.
Another incident related by Owens as well as by
Bergbreiter shows that immediately after a speech by
President Stout to his employees in mid-July concerning
the financial strains Union demands for increased wages
might impose upon the Company, Waterson came to
Owens' work station where he was working with Moore
and Bergbreiter and made the following comment to
them, "See, the Union won't help you a bit. In fact if the
Union gets in here and tries to get more money out of
there, Stout is just going to have to close the door."
Owens participated in the election of August 13, 1968,
but voluntarily left the employment of the Company
shortly thereafter.
Testimony was also received from another welder on
the Union's bargaining committee, Charles W. Nolan, Jr.,
relating to remarks he heard Waterson make about the
Union. As heretofore noted, Nolan was laid off on June
13, 1968, due to lack of work, but when recalled some 2
months later, failed to return to Respondent's
employment. His total employment with Respondent
comprised only a month. As Nolan who gave his age as
50 but looked many years older did not prove to be a
reliable witness,, only so much of his testimony as finds
substantial corroboration in the testimony of the other
welders will be credited.
Nolan's credited testimony shows that around July 10,
1968, Waterson asked him whether he (as a new
employee) knew that the Company gave its employees
such free benefits as money for their automobile license
plates, picnics, anti-freeze, and the use of Company camp
trailers, but then went on to say that if the Union got in
the employees would lose these benefits.
Nolan's testimony further shows that several days later
Waterson in a conversation with Nolan told him that if
the Union won the election, the Company would hire a
new "hardboiled" welding foreman to crack a black snake
whip over the welders to get more work out of them.
The above concludes the Examiner's findings on the
evidence presented by counsel for General Counsel in
support of the allegations of the amended complaint that
Respondent by its "supervisor and agent, Russell
Waterson," engaged in various unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Waterson's denials
of the various antiunion remarks attributed to him as set
forth above are not credited.
At the opening of the hearing, however, the amended
complaint was again amended to include an additional
allegation that Respondent , by its "supervisor and agent,
Richard Stout," who as shown above is Respondent's
president, "threatened and coerced its employees because
of their activity on behalf of the Union" in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. General Counsel relies on the
'rhe following incident is illustrative of Nolan ' s unreliability as a
witness When Respondent recalled him to work, Nolan asked for an
extension of time in which to report to work on the ground that his wife
was in a hospital with a heart attack . The unrebutted testimony of
Respondent' s then plant manager , Milton Bronk , shows that at the time
Nolan claimed that his wife was in a hospital, she was in fact working at
her regular job in a factory . The record also contains a number of other
indications reflecting on Nolan 's veracity which it is not deemed necessary
to set forth here.
testimony of Bergbreiter to support the allegation.
Bergbreiter's credited testimony shows that he was present
at one of the speeches Stout made to his employees in
which Stout made repeated references to "paid union
organizers" and implied that there were such persons
among the Company's employees, but did not specifically
name anyone. Bergbreiter's undisputed testimony further
shows that Stout, dust prior to starting his speech, stopped
in front of Bergbreiter in the meeting room, exhibited a
book to him, and asked him in the presence and hearing
of the assembled employees if he knew whether the book
was a union organizer's handbook Bregbreiter from his
observation of the title on the book, acknowledged that it
was, and Stout quickly passed on to deliver his talk. In his
speech, Stout made repeated reference to paid union
organizers. Bergbreiter, feeling that Stout was creating the
impression that he was a paid union organizer, raised his
hand to seek permission to refute the impression. Stout
declined Bergbreiter's request to be heard, but told him he
would see him in his office right after the meeting. At the
conclusion of the speech, Bergbreiter in a private
conference with Stout protested the impression Stout had
created that he (Bergbreiter) was a paid union organizer.
Stout thereupon asked Bergbreiter, "Well, have you a
guilty conscience?" Bergbreiter replied that he was not
being paid by the Union for his efforts to organize the
shop. Stout ended the conversation by telling Bergbreiter,
"Why don't you dust leave and go back where you came
from?" Bergbreiter returned to his work. He was not fired
but voluntarily left the employment of Respondent about
2 weeks after the Union lost the election.
The record shows that Stout knew that Bergbreiter was
on the Union's negotiation committee for some weeks
prior to the above noted incident.
Discussion and Conclusions
From the evidence of record as set forth in the above
findings, I find and conclude that the 8(a)(1) allegations of
the amended complaint, as amended, have been
substantiated with the exceptions hereinafter noted. The
chief figure in these multiple violations has been
Waterson, Respondent's welding department foreman.
Waterson's denials that he made the antiunion remarks
attributed to him cannot be credited in the face of the
massive and mutually corroborating and sincere testimony
from many employees under his former supervision that
he frequently made such remarks in the 2-month period
preceding the representation election of August 13, 1968.
However, the impact of the oral testimony and the printed
record leaves the clear impression that the great bulk of
Waterson's antiunion remarks were made in the course of
give-and-take conversations between Waterson and the
welders on a peer basis during a period when the subject
of the Union naturally dominated the plant due to the
forthcoming election. This talk appears to have been as
often initiated by the four welders serving on the Union's
negotiating committee as by Waterson. There is evidence
that Waterson was not infrequently goaded into
expressions of his antiunion views by the welder members
of the Union's negotiation committee. The record
supports an inference that these welders, particularly
Bergbreiter , were trying to persuade Waterson to become
a union supporter and that this provoked a great deal of
talk about the merits and demerits of a union shop. In the
exchange of views on the subject of the Union between
Waterson and the welder members of the Union's
bargaining committee, the record supports the further
STOUTCO, INC. 183
inference and conclusion that the psychological
relationship of Waterson to the welders was more that of
an equal than that of a supervisor. The antiunion views
expressed by Waterson in these exchanges with his welders
were contrary to the oral and written instructions received
by Waterson from the Company. (Resp. Exh. 1) They
appear to have been expressions of Waterson's own
personal views. However, in view of the fact that
Waterson was at all times here pertinent an admitted
agent of the Respondent and a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act, the law is clear that Respondent must
nevertheless be held responsible for the above described
unfair labor practice conduct of Waterson as its agent.
I also find and conclude that Respondent is in further
violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act by reason of the
conduct of President Stout with respect to Bergbreiter
whom he knew to be a member of the Union's bargaining
committee. As heretofore noted, Stout held a series of
employee meetings at which he sought to persuade his
employees by carefully prepared speeches that their best
interests lay in voting against the Union at the then
forthcoming election. At one of these meetings as noted in
the findings, Stout, before starting the meeting, asked
Bergbreiter in the presence of the assembled employees
whether a book he exhibited to Bergbreiter was a union
organizer's handbook and after receiving a "Yes" answer,
immediately launched into his speech in which he made
repeated references to paid union organizers. There can be
little doubt that this conduct on the part of Stout, both
before and during the course of his speech, was designed
to cast aspersions by implication on Bergbreiter as a paid
union organizer and thus place him in possible contempt
and ridicule before the assembled employees because of
his union activities. I therefore find and conclude that
Stout's speech and prespeech conduct "threatened and
coerced" Bergbreiter because of his union activities as
alleged in paragraph 5(g) of the amended complaint, as
amended at the trial.
Certain portions of the complaint alleging 8(a)(1)
violations will be recommended for dismissal because of
failure of proof. Paragraph 5(c) of the amended complaint
alleges that Respondent by its supervisors and agents,
Russell Waterson and Roger Nielson, threatened to exact
greater amounts of work from its employees if the union
got in. As no evidence was presented to show that Roger
Nielson made any of the threats alleged in the indicated
paragraph of the amended complaint that part of the
paragraph making reference to Roger Nielson will be
recommended for dismissal for failure of proof.
I will also recommend for dismissal Paragraph 5(e) of
the amended complaint because of failure of proof. The
allegations of that paragraph reads-
Respondent, by its supervisors and agents, Russell
Waterson and Roger Nielson, at the facility, around the
second week of July 1968, and about July 15, 1968, and
on other occasions in July 1968, threatened its
employees with loss of their jobs if they supported the
Union or if the Union got in.
It is noted that counsel for General Counsel pursuant to
my request has attached to his brief an Appendix
containing the allegations of the amended complaint
annotated to show the names of witnesses testifying in
their support together with the page numbers of the
transcript where such testimony may be found.' It is
noteworthy that the Appendix fails to show that any
witnesses were produced in support of the allegations of
Paragraph 5(e) of the amended complaint. It should also
be noted that the allegations of Paragraph 5(e) are quite
different than those of Paragraph 5(f) of the amended
complaint which alleges that Respondent through its agent
Waterson threatened to close its doors if the Union got in
which would, of course, involve wholesale loss of jobs.
Paragraph 5(f) has been fully substantiated by credited
testimony whereas no testimony was offered in support of
Paragraph 5(e). In the essential effect of loss of jobs,
however, the two paragraphs are duplicative of each other,
but with all supporting evidence directed at Paragraph
5(f). Respondent in its brief treats the two paragraphs as
duplicative.
C. Issue as to whether Election should be set aside
because of Objectionable Conduct Affecting Election
The issue raised by Case 25-RC-3819 is whether the
election of August 13, 1968, which the Union lost should
be set aside by reason of the alleged unfair labor practices
charged to the Company in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act as set forth in the amended complaint, as further
amended at the trial, in Case 25-CA-3209.
It was shown above that Respondent is in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by reasons of numerous
statements made by its agent and supervisor, Waterson, to
Respondent's welders that if the Union got in, existing
employee benefits would be withdrawn, working
conditions would be harder, and the Company might be
obliged to close its doors because of greater financial
burdens under a union contract. In addition there is an
isolated incident of coercive interrogation by Waterson of
a single employee, Bergbreiter.6 It was also shown above
that Respondent is in further violation of Section 8(a)(1)
by reason of the conduct of its President Stout towards
welder Bergbreiter by which he threatened and coerced
Bergbreiter because of his union activities.
The above-summarized unfair labor practices took
place over a period of the two months preceding the
August 13, 1968, election. In this 2-month period,
Respondent's total employment averaged some 135
employees in the bargaining unit here involved. No more
than 9 of these 135 employees, all in Respondent's
welding department, were subjected to the described unfair
labor practices. Seven of these nine welders testified in
support of the complaint herein, but at the time of the
election only four of the seven welders who so testified
were in the employment of the Respondent. Of the four
welders in the employment of the Company at the time of
the election, three welders (Bergbreiter, Green, and
Owens) were members of the Union's bargaining
committee. It is found from the testimony of record and
by inference that none of the welders on the Union's
bargaining committee were deflected from voting for the
Union at the election by any of the above-noted unfair
labor practices. It is again noted that the welders, by and
large , regarded Waterson's dire predictions of what would
happen if the Union got in as merely "an exchange of
opinions more than anything else." At the time of the
'Respondent's brief at my request also contains a similar annotated
Appendix showing the names of witnesses who testified in refutation of the
allegations of the amended complaint.
'Similar testimony by employee Nolan that he was also interrogated as
to his union membership by Waterson is not credited because of the prior
finding that Nolan was not a reliable witness and that only such testimony
given by Nolan as appears supported by testimony from other reliable
witnesses would be given credence The testimony given by Nolan that he
was interrogated by Waterson as to his union membership does not fall in
the latter category.
184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
election, Waterson had only five welders working under
him, including the three indicated members of the Union's
bargaining committee.
The record by stipulation shows that the Union did not
represent a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit at the time it made written request to Respondent for
recognition on June 19, 1968, nor on June 25, 1968, when
the Union filed a petition for an election, but did attain
majority status on and after July I, 1968.
Discussion and Conclusions
In the light of the above evidentiary findings, it is clear
that Respondent's preelection conduct had virtually no
impact or affect on the outcome of the election This is
evident both from the minimal nature of the misconduct
and from the fact that the misconduct, if it had any affect
at all, was directed at only a very small fraction of the
employees voting at the election. As indicated,
Respondent's preelection unfair labor practices consisted
chiefly of statements by only one of its supervisors,
Waterson, to employees in the welding department that
the work would become harder, that existing
employee-benefits would be withdrawn, and that the
Company might close its plant under the financial burdens
of higher union wages if the Union succeeded in becoming
the representative of the bargaining unit . Counsel for
General Counsel has not cited any cases in which such
minimal unfair labor practices have been held justification
for the setting aside of an election The more typical
situation in which an election is set aside is reflected in
Northwest Engineering Company, et at, 148 NLRB 1136
There the Board found that the Respondent (in that case)
"had violated Section 8(a)(I) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, by the calculated timing of its
announcement to employees regarding increased insurance
benefits, by instituting direct negotiations with employees
over grievances, by granting employees extraordinary
overtime, by threatening employees with economic reprisal
if the Union won the representation election herein, and
by promising additional benefits in return for repudiation
of the Union, all within a 2-week period immediately
preceding the election, and further, by unilaterally
granting additional benefits to employees while objections
to the election were pending and unresolved." The unfair
labor practices in the instant proceeding obviously fall far
short of the aggravated and serious nature of the unfair
labor practices found in the Northwest Engineering case,
and are insufficient in themselves to justify the setting
aside of the election and the issuance of an order for a
new election
Moreover, in view of the fact that the unfair labor
practices here involved were directed at only 5 out of 126
employees still at the unit at the time of the election, it is
obvious that the involved unfair labor practices would not
have altered the results of the election since the Company
won the election by a vote of 10 over that received by the
Union and especially in view of the further fact that 3 of
the mentioned 5 employees were members of the Union's
bargaining committee and, from the record, wholly
unlikely to have been deflected from voting for the Union
by reason of the unfair labor practices found above
D Alleged 8(a)(5) Violation and Discussion and
Conclusions
As an alternate to having the election set aside and a
new election ordered on the basis of the Respondent's
preelection unfair labor practices , the amended complaint
seeks a more drastic order , to wit, an outright order
requiring Respondent to recognize and bargain with the
Union, notwithstanding the fact that the Union lost the
election , on the ground that the Union represented a
majority of the employees in the unit prior to the election
and that the Respondent undermined and destroyed this
majority by its preelection unfair labor practices This
relief is claimed on the basis of the Respondent's admitted
refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union after
demand.
Respondent ' s defense is three-fold It denies preelection
conduct affecting the election (on which findings have
been heretofore made ), it asserts a good - faith doubt as to
the Union ' s majority at the times demands were made by
the Union for recognition ; and it denies that the Union
made any demand on the Company for recognition from
and after July 1, 1968, when the Union finally attained
majority status
As Respondent ' s preelection unfair labor practices have
been set forth in detail in an earlier section of this
Decision , they will not be repeated here In the section
immediately preceding this section , it was found that
Respondent ' s preelection conduct was not of sufficient
gravity to justify an order for a new election . Under the
same facts and rationale , I find and conclude that
Respondent ' s preelection Section 8 (a)(1) violations are so
lacking in flagrance and gravity and are so minimal in
character and impact that they did not undermine the
Union and destroy its majority and accordingly do not
merit an order requiring Respondent to recognize and
bargain with the Union notwithstanding the fact that the
Union lost the election . In Hammond & Irving.
Incorporated , 154 NLRB 1071, 1073, the Board held, " .
not every act of misconduct necessarily vitiates the
Respondent ' s good faith For, there are some situations in
which the violations are not truly inconsistent with a
good - faith doubt that the Union represents a majority of
the employees . Whether the conduct involved reflects on
the good faith of the employer , requires an evaluation of
the facts in each case " ( Emphasis supplied.)
I find and conclude under all the facts of record that
Respondent's. good - faith doubt as to the Union ' s majority
status was not vitiated by its minimal preelection
misconduct
In addition the record shows more positive aspects in
support of Respondent ' s defense of a good - faith doubt as
to the Union's claimed majority status The Union made
written demand on Respondent for recognition and
bargaining on June 19, 1968 . The Company under date of
June 24, 1968, declined recognition on the ground that it
had an "honest belief" that the Union did not represent a
majority of its employees and suggested that the Union
file an election petition The Union filed such a petition
on June 25 which I deem and find in effect a renewal of
the original demand for recognition. It is*established that
the Union on June 19 did not in fact represent a majority
of the employees in the unit as the record shows by
stipulation that as of June 19 the Union had signed
authorization cards from only 34 employees out of the 144
employees then constituting the unit . Similarly it is
established that the Union as of June 25, 1968 , when it
filed its election petition , likewise did not represent a
majority of the employees in the unit as the record shows
by stipulation that as of June 25 the Union had signed
cards from only 53 employees out of the 135 employees
then constituting the unit . The stipulations here referred
were based on an actual count of the cards made at the
STOUTCO, INC.
trial herein. It is noteworthy that even after counsel had
stipulated the number of authorization cards the Union
had on June 19 and 25, they revised their stipulation upon
further study of the cards to show that the Union had
even somewhat fewer cards' on those dates than originally
stipulated.
Thus the actual subsequent count of the cards reveals
that Respondent's claim of a good-faith doubt as to the
Union's claimed majority was not a sham but was in
retrospect a bona fide belief that the Union did not in fact
represent a majority of its employees. It is evident from
the record that Respondent's good-faith doubt as to the
Union's majority stemmed in part from the fact that
Respondent's plant in the period here pertinent was
subject to very large labor turnovers, with four out of six
employees quitting their jobs shortly after hiring.
Other than the demands for recognition stated in the
Union's letter of June 19 and in its election petition of
June 25, 1968, the Union made no further demands for
recognition and bargaining.
The record by further stipulation shows that the Union
finally attained majority status on July 1, 1968, as on that
date the Union had signed authorization cards from 69 of
the 128 employees then in the unit. Counsel for General
Counsel concedes that Respondent may have had
"legitimate doubts" as to the Union's majority status
before July 1, but contends that from and after July 1,
Respondent could no longer have a "reasonable basis for
doubt after that date." It bases this contention primarily
on the misconduct heretofore outlined on the part of
Respondent's welding foreman, Waterson, by which it is
argued that Respondent was "seeking time within which
to undermine the union." For reasons heretofore stated, I
again find this contention in the present connection
likewise lacking in merit. As Government counsel
concedes that Respondent could have had a legitimate
doubt as to the Union's majority status on June 19 or 25,
I agree with Respondent's argument (on brief) "that the
Respondent would have to have been psychic to have
known that the Union obtained a majority on July 1,
1968." 1 find and conclude under all of the facts of record
that the good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority
expressed by the Company in its letter of June 24, 1968,
to the Union carried over to July 1 and through August
13, 1968, when the election took place.
As I find that Respondent had a good-faith doubt as to
the Union's majority on July I, 1968, and at all times
here pertinent, this would normally be dispositive of the
8(a)(5) issue herein, with resultant dismissal of the
amended complaint insofar as it seeks an 8(a)(5) order
requiring the Respondent to recognize and bargain with
the Union.
However, wholly aside from Respondent's defense on
the merits that it had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's
majority status at all times here pertinent, Respondent
also asserts the technical defense that it was not legally
obligated to bargain with the Union as of July 1, 1968,
when the Union attained majority status, because no
demand was made upon it on that date or any subsequent
date for recognition and bargaining by the Union and
because all prior demands for such recognition by the
Union were made in the 2-week period prior to July I
when the Union had not yet attained majority status.
'No question was raised at the trial as to the validity of these signed
authorization cards as so frequently happens when an order is sought
requiring an employer to bargain with a union based on a card count
majority
185
Counsel for General Counsel also advances the further
argument that ". . . even if the original demand were not
a continuing one, the Union's processing of its
representation petition in itself constituted a continuing
demand sufficient to place on Respondent a duty to
bargain." The two cases, American Compressed Steel
Corporation, 146 NLRB 1463, 1470-71, enfd. 343 F.2d
307, and Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc, 159 NLRB
1256, cited by Government counsel in support of these
propositions, contain factual situations so entirely
dissimilar from here as to be inapposite. In the American
Compressed Steel Corporation the Union made written
demand for recognition on April 18, filed a petition for
election on April 22 but did not attain majority status
until April 25, 1963. The Trial Examiner in that case,
whose decision the Board adopted, found a violation of
Section 8(a)(5) but only because the Employer in that case
had totally ignored the Union's demand letter and thus
envinced "an outright refusal of the Union's request
without regard to the number of cards here." Under these
circumstances the Examiner in the American Compressed
case held "it would have been futile for the Union
formally to renew its request after April 25." In the
instant case, as seen, the Company did reply by letter of
June 24 to the Union's request, declining recognition
because of a stated honest belief that the Union did not
represent a majority of its employees and suggesting that
the Union file an election petition. There is no indication
in Respondent's letter or any other conduct of the
Respondent that it might not have acceded to a later
request for recognition based on a card count. The fact
that the Union on July 12, 1968, entered into a stipulation
with Respondent for a consent election is an indication
that the Union from and after the filing of its petition for
an election on June 25 was no longer insisting that the
Company recognize the Union as the representative of its
employees on the basis of a card count. The other case,
Ed's Foodland, cited by counsel for General Counsel, does
not appear to have any relevance to the issue here under
discussion.
It is firmly established that a demand by a union for
recognition and bargaining is a condition precedent for a
finding of a refusal to bargain on the part of an employer
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v.
Columbia Enameling Co., 306 U.S. 292, 297; Wafford
Cabinet Co., 95 NLRB 1407, 1408.
Under the full circumstances of this case and in view of
the fact that the Union did not represent a majority of the
employees either on June 19, 1968, when it served written
demand for recognition upon Respondent, nor on June 25,
1968, when it filed its representation petition with the
Board, I hold that the Union's demand of June 19 became
exhausted, spent, and nonoperative'on July 1, 1968, when
the Union finally attained majority status.
The parties having stipulated that there were no new
demands by the Union upon Respondent for bargaining
from and after July 1, 1968, when the Union attained
majority status, I further hold and conclude that counsel
supporting the complaint has failed to show a refusal to
bargain on the part of the Respondent because of the
failure to show a demand by the Union for recognition as
of the time the Union gained majority representation.
N.L.R. B. v. Columbia Enameling Co., supra; Wafford
Cabinet Co, supra; N.L.R.B. v. Arkansas Grain
Corporation, 390 F.2d 824, 828 (C. A. 4);
Schwarzenbach-Huber Company v. N.L.R.B., 408 F.2d
236 (C.A. 2).
186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section
111, above, occurring in connection with the operation of
Respondent described in section I above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. CONCLUSIONS RE PETITIONER 'S OBJECTIONS
The Union' s objections to the election in Case
25-RC-3819, insofar as they were issues before me under
the rulings of the Regional Director , together with
"additional objectable conduct,"' were the subject of
allegations of unfair labor practices of the amended
complaint in Case 25-CA-3209 These issues have been
resolved above. In summary I have concluded that
Respondent ' s conduct did not affect the outcome of the
election . Accordingly, it is recommended that the results
of the election be certified
Pursuant to the Order of the Regional Director, Case
25-RC-3819 is hereby transferred to and continued before
the Board in Washington, D.C
VI. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent engaged in
certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act , it will be recommended that
Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
upon the entire record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce and the
Union is a labor organization, all within the meaning of
the Act.
2 By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged, and is
engaging , in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. All hourly rated employees of the Respondent at
Respondent' s Bristol , Indiana plant, exclusive of all
supervisors, guards, and office personnel, constitute a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act.
5. That the Union did not represent a majority of the
employees in the above-described unit either on June 19,
1968, when it served a written demand upon Respondent
for recognition and bargaining or on June 25, 1968, when
it filed a representation petition with the Board.
6. That the Union made no demand on the Respondent
for recognition and bargaining other than the demands
contained in its said letter of June 19, 1968, and in the
representation petition it filed with the Board on June 25,
'This phrase is quoted from the Order of the Regional Director in Case
25-RC-3819
1968.
7. That the Union's said recognition demand of June
19, 1968, and its said representation petition of June 25,
1968, do not constitute a continuing demand upon
Respondent for recognition and collective bargaining
8. That the Union on July 1, 1968, attained
representation of the majority of the employees in the unit
but failed to make any recognition demands on
Respondent on that date or on any date thereafter.
9. That by reason of the Union's failure to make
demand on the Respondent for recognition on and after
July 1, 1968, when it attained majority status, the
Respondent is not in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
10. That Respondent's refusal of June 24, 1968, to
recognize and bargain with the Union pursuant to the
Union's request of June 19, 1968, was based on a bona
fide good-faith doubt as to the Union's claimed majority
status which as shown above the Union did not have on
June 19 or on June 25, 1968, when it filed its
representation petition.
11. That Respondent's said good-faith doubt as to the
Union's claimed majority status was a continuing
good-faith doubt at all times here pertinent.
12. That the Respondent is not in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by reason of its refusal to
recognize and bargain with the Union under all the
circumstances of this case.
13. That Respondent is not in violation of the Act by
reason of the conduct alleged in paragraph 5(c) and (e) of
the amended complaint insofar and only insofar as it
relates to the alleged misconduct of Respondent's
supervisor and agent Roger Nielson because of a complete
absence of proof that he engaged in the alleged
misconduct.
14. That Respondent is not in violation of the Act by
reason of the conduct alleged in paragraph 5(d) of the
amended complaint insofar and only insofar as it alleges
interrogation by Respondent of its employees as to the
Union membership, activities and desires of other
employees in the plant, because of a failure of proof
thereon.
15. That Respondent is not in violation of the Act by
reason of the misconduct alleged in paragraph 5(e) of the
amended complaint because of a complete absence of
proof thereon.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case,
the Trial Examiner recommends that the Respondent,
Stoutco, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees that Respondent would
withdraw existing employee benefits if they select the
Union to represent them.
(b) Threatening employees that Respondent would
impose more onerous working conditions on them if they
selected the Union to represent them.
(c) Promising employees better benefits than the Union
could get for them if they withdrew from the Union and
formed an independent employee committee to bargain
with the Union.
(d) Coercively interrogating employees about their
union activities
STOUTCO, INC.
(e) Threatening to close up its plant if the Union got in.
2 Take the following affirmative action
(a) Post at its plant at Bristol, Indiana, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."9 Copies of said
notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 25, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered
by any other material
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith 10
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and such other
unfair labor practices on which there was found above a
failure of proof.
'In the event that this Recommended Order be apopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board 's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of,
Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order "
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
187
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that
WE WILL NOT ask you if you are a member of a
union or if you take part in union activities or what
your feelings are about any union.
WE WILL NOT promise you better employee benefits
than the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
or any other union , could get for you if you withdrew
from the above-named Union or any union and formed
an independent employee committee to bargain
collectively with the Company.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with the withdrawal of
existing employee benefits if you select the
above-named Union or any union to represent you in
collective bargaining with the Company
WE WILL NOT threaten you with more difficult
working conditions if you select the above-named
Union or any union to represent you in collective
bargaining with the Company
WE WILL NOT threaten to close our plant if you
select the above-named Union or any union to represent
you in collective bargaining with the Company.
You are all free to become or remain members of the
United Steelworkers' Union or any other union, if you
want to, and we won't punish you in any way if you do
STOUTCO,INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614 ISTA
Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana
46204, Telephone 633-8921.