Stewart, Curt et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 27, 2020

13959458 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/959,458 08/05/2013 Curt Stewart SF-16091.105036 6722
164349 7590 02/27/2020
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP - State Farm
300 N. Meridian Street
Suite 2500
Indianapolis, IN 46204
EXAMINER
SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
inteas@faegredrinker.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CURT STEWART, MATTHEW T. FRANK, NEALE
McCORMICK, MATT BAUGHMAN, and RAMAKRISHNA DUVVURI
____________

Appeal 2018-008049
Application 13/959,4581
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Appeal Br. 2.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant states “[t]he present disclosure relates generally to systems
and methods for rating an insurance product.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 14, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
14. A method for storing and accessing a plurality of collected data to
provide an insurance rate using a programmed computer system including a
processor and a non-transitory, tangible computer readable medium
communicatively coupled to the processor and storing instructions
executable by the processor to perform the method comprising:
storing, in a database, (a) an array of grid-based geographic areas, and
(b) data received from multiple data sources, including aligned Raster data
and applied tabular data representing particular insurance data related to one
or more non-grid-based geographic areas;
comparing the received data against existing data in the database to
identify relevant data against a particular insurance coverage;
transforming the stored and relevant data into developed geographic
data associated with a specific truncated grid identifier key;
the processor generating a displayed image of the array of grid-based
geographic areas and a displayed image of the one or more non-grid-based
geographic areas;
the processor identifying shared pixels between the displayed image
of the array of grid-based geographic areas and the displayed image of the
one or more non-grid-based geographic areas;
the processor calculating a quantity of the particular data
corresponding to individual grid-based geographic areas based at least on the
quantity of identified shared pixels for each grid-based geographic area;
the processor receiving an insurance rate query indicating a particular
geographic location by, at least in part, indicating a coordinate pair
comprising a latitude and longitude of the location;
the processor selecting a subset of the grid-based geographic areas
related to the particular geographic location by comparing the coordinate
pair to a lookup table of truncated decimal representations of longitude and
latitude and wherein the subset includes at least a primary grid-based
geographic area based on a selected truncated decimal representation;
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the processor determining a quantity of stored data associated with the
subset of grid-based geographic areas, including the calculated quantity of
the particular data corresponding to each of the subset of grid-based
geographic areas;
the processor calculating a predictiveness value based on the
calculated quantity of the stored data associated with the subset of grid-
based geographic areas;
the processor determining that the predictiveness value is below a
target credibility threshold;
in response to determining that the predictiveness value is below the
target credibility threshold, the processor iteratively increasing the subset of
grid-based geographic areas by adding at least one additional grid-based
geographic area adjacent the primary grid-based geographic area and
determining a quantity of stored data associated with the increased subset of
grid-based geographic areas, until a credibility factor determined for the
increased subset of grid-based geographic areas meets or exceeds the target
credibility threshold; and
upon the predictiveness value meeting or exceeding the target
credibility threshold, the processor calculating an insurance rate based at
least on the on the stored data associated with the increased subset of grid-
based geographic areas; and
the processor communicating the calculated insurance rate to a
user.

THE REJECTION
Claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 2–11 in the
Final Office Action2 and on pages 3–8 in the Examiner’s Answer.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues claims 14–20, 22, and 24–26 as a group.
(Appeal Br. 8). We select claim 14 as the representative claim for this
group, and so the remaining claims stand or fall with claim 14. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate

2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on January 12, 2018.
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settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January, 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
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(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that
“the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in
light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether
the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology
or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states:
A typical family seeking automobile insurance cannot,
however, produce anywhere near the amount of data needed to
make a reliable and accurate estimate of anticipated claims for
their vehicle or vehicles. Thus, insurance companies must rate
personal policies in a risk pool of comparable policies to
produce enough data to make such an estimate. One
mechanism for doing this is to assess what data is available for
the family (e.g., demographic information, types of vehicles,
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and what limited claim information is available) and use that
data to assign an appropriate pool to the family.

Specification ¶ 5.

The preamble states it is for, “accessing a plurality of collected data to
provide an insurance rate.”
Claim 14 recites in pertinent part the abstractions of:
storing, . . . (a) an array of grid-based geographic areas, and
(b) data received from multiple data sources, . . . including
applied tabular data representing particular insurance data
related to one or more non-grid-based geographic areas;
comparing the received data against existing data in the
database to identify relevant data against a particular insurance
coverage; transforming the stored and relevant data into
developed geographic data associated with a specific truncated
grid identifier key; . . . generating a displayed image of the
array of grid-based geographic areas and a displayed image of
the one or more non-grid-based geographic areas; . . .
identifying shared pixels between the displayed image of the
array of grid-based geographic areas and the displayed image of
the one or more non-grid-based geographic areas; . . .
calculating a quantity of the particular data corresponding to
individual grid-based geographic areas based at least on the
quantity of identified shared pixels for each grid-based
geographic area; . . . receiving an insurance rate query
indicating a particular geographic location by, at least in part,
indicating a coordinate pair comprising a latitude and longitude
of the location; . . . selecting a subset of the grid-based
geographic areas related to the particular geographic location by
comparing the coordinate pair to a lookup table of truncated
decimal representations of longitude and latitude and wherein
the subset includes at least a primary grid-based geographic
area based on a selected truncated decimal representation; . . .
determining a quantity of stored data associated with the subset
of grid-based geographic areas, including the calculated
quantity of the particular data corresponding to each of the
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subset of grid-based geographic areas; . . . calculating a
predictiveness value based on the calculated quantity of the
stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic
areas; . . . determining that the predictiveness value is below a
target credibility threshold; in response to determining that the
predictiveness value is below the target credibility threshold, . .
. iteratively increasing the subset of grid-based geographic areas
by adding at least one additional grid-based geographic area
adjacent the primary grid-based geographic area and
determining a quantity of stored data associated with the
increased subset of grid-based geographic areas, until a
credibility factor determined for the increased subset of grid-
based geographic areas meets or exceeds the target credibility
threshold; and upon the predictiveness value meeting or
exceeding the target credibility threshold, . . . calculating an
insurance rate based at least on the on the stored data associated
with the increased subset of grid-based geographic areas; and . .
. communicating the calculated insurance rate to a user.

The Examiner found claim 14 is “directed to providing an insurance
rate based on a plurality of collected data which is considered to be an
abstract idea similar to the concepts that have been identified by the courts
such as managing an insurance policy ([See] Bancorp Services v. Sunlife)
and creating a contractual relationship ([See] buySAFE, Inc. v. Google,
Inc.).” (Final Act. 2).
We similarly find that claim 14 recites a method of determining an
insurance rating based on a plurality of collected data. This is apparent from
the plain language of the claim which recites in pertinent part, “provide an
insurance rate,” “identify relevant data against a particular insurance
coverage,” “receiv[e] an insurance rate query,” and “calculat[e] an insurance
rate.” Determining an insurance rating is a fundamental economic principle
or practice because it keeps the insurer solvent. A fundamental economic
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principle is an enumerated certain method of organizing human behavior and
hence a judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, citing Bilski, 561
U.S. 593, 611.
We also find that claim 14 recites a mental process and/or a
mathematical concept for calculating an insurance rate query for a particular
geographic location. Limitations such as, “calculating a predictiveness value
based on the calculated quantity of the stored data associated with the subset
of grid-based geographic areas;” “determining that the predictiveness value
is below a target credibility threshold;” “determining that the predictiveness
value is below the target credibility threshold, …iteratively increasing the
subset of grid-based geographic areas by adding at least one additional grid-
based geographic area adjacent the primary grid-based geographic area,” are
mental process steps and/or mathematical concepts which are enumerated
judicial exceptions and thus abstract ideas. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52, citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611, Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71.
Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 14 is also directed to
mental process steps and/or mathematical concepts. This also is consistent
with the Examiner’s determination.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 14 only
generically requires “a database,” and “a processor.” These components are
described in the Specification at a high level of generality. See Spec.
¶¶ 132–139, Fig. 11. We fail to see how the generic recitations of these
most basic computer components and/or of a system so integrates the
judicial exception as to “impose[] a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
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Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exceptions of a
fundamental economic principle and mental process/mathematical concepts.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to insurance ratings, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claim 14 is directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claim must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs., 566 U.S. at
72–73).
Concerning this step the Examiner found the following:

The elements of the instant process, when taken alone,
each execute in a manner routinely and conventionally expected
of these elements. For instance the functions such as “storing
data, comparing the received data against existing data,
transforming data based on criteria, generating images,
identifying information, calculating based on transformed data
and identified information, receiving a query, selecting,
determining, calculating a predictiveness value, determining,
iteratively determining comparing the predictiveness value with
a threshold, calculating a rate, and communicating the rate” are
conventional functions of a computer. The elements of the
instant process, when taken in combination, together do not
offer substantially more than the sum of the functions of the
elements when each is taken alone. That is, the elements
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involved in the recited process undertake their roles in
performance of their activities according to their generic
functionalities which are well-understood, routine and
conventional. The elements together execute in routinely and
conventionally accepted coordinated manners and interact with
their partner elements to achieve an overall outcome which,
similarly, is merely the combined and coordinated execution of
generic computer functionalities which are well-understood,
routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry. Similar reasoning and rationale applies to the system
claim 25 and computer product claim 26 also.
(Final Act. 8). We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claim[] here do[es] more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 225. It does not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to store, compare, transform, calculate, determine, communicate
and apply decision criteria to data amounts to electronic data query and
retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a computer. All of these
computer functions are well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive
Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. The claim does not, for example, purport to improve
the functioning of the computer itself. In addition, as we stated above, the
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claim does not effect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of
information access under different scenarios (see, e.g., See Spec. ¶¶ 132–
139, Fig. 11). Thus, claim 14 amounts to nothing significantly more than
instructions to apply the abstract idea using some unspecified, generic
computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–226.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 14 adds nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis
(compare, transform, calculate, determine, communicate and apply decision
criteria to data) and storing is equally generic and conventional or has
otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for
exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an
abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d
1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that sequence of data retrieval,
analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission was abstract),
Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329,
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding sequence of processing, routing, controlling,
and monitoring was abstract). The ordering of the steps is, therefore,
ordinary and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
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under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 8–14, Reply Brief 2–9). We find that
our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments,
which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address
various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues:

The allowed claims of the parent patent, U.S. Patent No.
8,504,393, are similar to the claims of the present application. .
. . The claims of the present application are directed to
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, similar to all of
the claims in the issued patents of the patent family. Thus, the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 should be withdrawn.

(Appeal Br. 8–10).

We disagree with Appellant because the issue date of U.S. Patent No.
8,504,393 was August 6, 2013, and since that date, the jurisprudence on
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 has changed. See e.g., Alice Corp.
573 U.S. 208, 219–220.
Citing to Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L., v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018), Appellant argues that its claims are similar
to those in Coreless Wireless because “claims to computing devices were
held patent eligible because the court concluded that they are directed to an
improved user interface for electronic devices, not to the abstract idea of an
index.” (Appeal Br. 11).
We disagree with Appellant. In Core Wireless, the claims were
directed to improved functionality in a user interface, an unconventional
device improvement. Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362. Specifically:
Claim 1 of the ‘476 patent requires “an application summary
that can be reached directly from the menu,” specifying a
particular manner by which the summary window must be
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accessed. The claim further requires the application summary
window list a limited set of data, “each of the data in the list
being selectable to launch the respective application and enable
the selected data to be seen within the respective application.”
This claim limitation restrains the type of data that can be
displayed in the summary window. Finally, the claim recites
that the summary window “is displayed while the one or more
applications are in an un-launched state,” a requirement that
the device applications exist in a particular state. These
limitations disclose a specific manner of displaying a limited set
of information to the user, rather than using conventional user
interface methods to display a generic index on a computer.

Id. at 1362–63 (emphasis added). The words shown in italics above
emphasize specific technical features which the court found were
technological improvements over the existing technology environment.
Even accepting that the claims before us on appeal here result in “a specific
manner of displaying a limited set of information to a user (id.),” that still
would not demonstrate a technical improvement because and “the claim
language here [(claim 14)] provides only a result-oriented solution, with
insufficient detail for how a computer accomplishes it.” Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2017), see also Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 Fed. App’x 950,
954 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Nonprecedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature
and devoid of any implementation details or technical description that would
permit us to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something
other than the abstract idea identified by the district court.”).
Nor do we agree that Trading Tech. Int'l., Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F.
App’x. 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2017) is helpful to Appellant’s position. (Appeal
Br. 12–13). In Trading Technologies, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding that the patented claims (which recited a method and
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system for displaying market information on a graphical user interface) were
not directed to an abstract idea because the district court found, and the
Federal Circuit agreed, that the challenged patents did not simply claim
displaying information on a graphical user interface; instead, the claims
required “a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a
prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s
structure that is addressed to and resolves a specifically identified problem in
the prior state of the art.” Trading Technologies, 675 F. App’x at 1004. The
Federal Circuit, thus, found that the district court’s ruling was in accord with
precedent that has recognized that “specific technologic modifications to
solve a problem or improve the functioning of a known system generally
produce patent-eligible subject matter.” Id. at 1004–05.
In contrast, the claims before us on appeal here do not involve any
such specific technological improvements, let alone ones to a GUI. We find
no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any
indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 14 invoke any
assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Claim 14 does not improve another technology, because, e.g., using a
processor to calculate a predictiveness value based on the calculated quantity
of the stored data associated with the subset of grid-based geographic areas,
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is a conventional use of a computer. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55; see also
MPEP § 2106.05(a). Because no more than a generic computer is required,
the claim also does not define, or rely on, a “particular machine.” MPEP §
2106.05(b).
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered, but are not persuasive
of error. (See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51 (“Eligibility-
related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP
(published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”)).
For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no
deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection of patent ineligibility of the rejected
claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims
14–20, 22, and 24–26.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 14–20, 22,
and 24–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
14–20, 22,
24–26
101 Eligibility 14–20, 22,
24–26

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED