Steven Yu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2021

2021002319 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/917,789 03/11/2018 Steven Sounyoung Yu ARV-05 3801
7590 09/30/2021
Steven Yu
9810 Cresence Way
Fairfax, VA 22032
EXAMINER
MCPARTLIN, SARAH BURNHAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3636
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN SOUNYOUNG YU and SOUNIL YU
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
Technology Center 3600
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, KEVIN F. TURNER, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.
GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART and enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION
of rejection of claim 19 pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b).

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as inventors, Steven
Yu and Sounil Yu. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “Autonomous Unmanned Road Vehicle for
Making Deliveries.” Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced as the sole
independent claim on appeal, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An autonomous unmanned road vehicle comprising:
a cargo compartment;
a power source for propelling the vehicle;
an external keypad for entering an access code, wherein
entry of a correct access code gives access to the cargo
compartment;
wherein the vehicle has a wheelbase of at least 60 inches
and a dry weight of at least 550 pounds;
wherein the vehicle does not have any passenger seats.

THE REJECTIONS
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Goosman US 2003/0033825 A1 Feb. 20, 2003
Zini US 2010/0234990 A1 Sept. 16, 2010
Villamar US 9,235,213 B2 Jan. 12, 2016
Abhyanker US 9,373,149 B2 June 21, 2016
MotorTrend 2013 Smart Fortwo Electric Drive
First Drive Specs. (“MotorTrend”)
Jan. 16, 2020
The following rejections are before us for review:
I. Claims 1, 3, 17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Villamar, Zini, and
MotorTrend.
II. Claims 2 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Villamar, Zini, MotorTrend, and
Abhyanker.
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
3
III. Claims 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, and 18 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Villamar, Zini,
MotorTrend, and Goosman.
IV. Claims 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Villamar, Zini, MotorTrend,
Abhyanker, and Goosman.

OPINION
Rejection I
Independent claim 1 and dependent claims 17 and 20
Appellant argues claims 1, 17, and 20 as a group. Appeal Br. 5–9.
We select independent claim 1 as representative, and claims 17 and 20 stand
or fall therewith. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Villamar
discloses an autonomous unmanned road vehicle (i.e., delivery vehicle 200),
comprising a cargo compartment and a power source, and without any
passenger seats, as claimed. Final Act. 2 (citing Villamar 5:36, 37, Fig. 5).
The Examiner relies on Zini for disclosing an external keypad for entering
an access code, wherein entry of a correct access code gives access to the
cargo compartment, as required by claim 1, and reasons that it would have
been obvious “to secure the delivery items within the delivery vehicle
disclosed by Villamar with an access code . . . as taught by Zini since such a
modification would ensure that the products are only delivered to the
intended recipient.” Id. at 3 (citing Zini ¶ 123).
Regarding the claim limitation requiring a wheelbase of at least 60
inches and a dry weight of at least 550 pounds, the Examiner finds that
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
4
“Villamar discloses using a small vehicle as a platform of the delivery
vehicles but does not specifically teach the size of that car (weight,
wheelbase).” Final Act. 3; see Villamar 5:35–37 (“delivery vehicle 200 may
be small in size, thus reducing the weight of the vehicle and correspondingly
reducing petrol or energy consumption rate”). The Examiner reasons that it
would have been obvious “to systematically experiment with various small
vehicle platforms on the market of varying sizes to arrive at a platform that
reliable provides the delivery function desired while operating with fuel
efficiency.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner also relies MotorTrend for teaching
“dimensions of a vehicle for operation on a conventional street surface,”
which “promote fuel and energy efficiency,” and reasons that “the routine
experimentation of various sizes to achieve a particular result[] (i.e. cargo
capacity with fuel efficiency . . . would require only routine skill in the art.”
Ans. 3–4.
First, Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to “make a statement
of why the two references themselves should be combined,” and in
particular, “why someone reading about the street vehicle of Villamar would
look to the hospital robot of Zini.” Appeal Br. 7; id. at 5–8. We are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument, which fails to address the why, or
rationale, that is provided by the Examiner: to ensure that the products are
only delivered to the intended recipient. See Final Act. 3; Ans. 3.
Second, Appellant argues that the Examiner “cherry picks one
disclosure element (access keypad) while ignoring the rest of Zini” and
improperly relies on hindsight. Reply Br. 4–5. We disagree. Similar to
Villamar’s delivery vehicles 200, Zini’s cart is “an autonomous robotic tug
and cart” for delivering items. Id. ¶ 3. In addition, Zini expressly discloses
that “the end user enters an access code on the cart keypad to unlock the
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
5
door of the cart,” such that “the cart door may be opened to gain access to
the payload in the interior of the cart.” Zini ¶ 123. Thus, the Examiner’s
reliance on Zini is factually based, when considering the entirety of Zini’s
disclosure, and the Examiner provides a sufficient, non-hindsight reason to
combine the references.
Third, Appellant submits that Villamar discloses an automated
delivery vehicle that does not carry any passengers, while MotorTrend
discloses a passenger vehicle. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant argues that the
Examiner’s reason for modifying Villamar, in view of MotorTrend, to result
in the claimed wheelbase and dry weight lacks sufficient rational
underpinning. Id. at 8–9.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner is
relying on MotorTrend as evidence that the prior art recognizes both
wheelbase and dry weight as variables that effect a vehicle’s fuel
efficiency—with or without passenger seats. As noted supra, Villamar itself
discloses that “delivery vehicle 200 may be small in size, thus reducing the
weight of the vehicle and correspondingly reducing petrol or energy
consumption rate.” Villamar 5:35–37. “[W]here the general conditions of a
claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the
optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.” In re Aller, 220
F.2d 454, 456 (CCPA 1955). This rule is limited to cases in which the
optimized variable is a “result-effective variable.” In re Antonie, 559 F.2d
618, 620 (CCPA 1977). Appellant’s argument does not apprise us of error
in the Examiner’s reasoning that the claimed wheelbase and dry weight are
recognized in the prior art as variables that affect a vehicle’s resulting fuel
efficiency, nor does Appellant provide sufficient argument or evidence that
the claimed wheelbase and dry weight are critical (i.e., provide unexpected
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
6
results). In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also In
re Scherl, 156 F.2d 72, 74–75 (CCPA 1946) (“Where the issue of criticality
is involved, the applicant has the burden of establishing his position by a
proper showing of the facts upon which he relies.”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1, and claims 17 and 20 fall therewith.
Dependent claim 3
Claim 3 depends from independent claim 1 and recites, in relevant
part, “further comprising a control system that is programmed . . . to monitor
a condition of the vehicle and assess technical problems being experienced
by the vehicle.” Appeal Br. 12 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Zini teaches a control system (or remote
host) programmed to monitor the condition of the vehicle for a technical
problem. Final Act. 3 (citing Zini ¶ 98). The Examiner explains that claim
3 “does not require that the control system be onboard the vehicle,” only that
the autonomous vehicle of claim 1 further comprise a control system.
Ans. 4. The Examiner finds that “[a] vehicle can ‘comprise a control
system’ when the vehicle communicates with a control system that is remote
from the vehicle.” Id. The Examiner reasons that it would have been
obvious to have modified Villamar’s delivery vehicles “to provide
monitoring . . . [as] safety measures to prolong the life of the device.” Final
Act. 3.
Appellant argues that Zini only discloses a remote control—not a
control that is “on-board the tug robot.” Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 5 (“[t]he
Examiner argues that claim 3 does not require that the control system be
physically part of (onboard) the vehicle”). Appellant submits that “[t]he
Examiner overbroadly interprets the term ‘autonomous unmanned road
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
7
vehicle comprising’ to encompass things that are separate and remote from
the vehicle.” Reply Br. 6. In particular, Appellant submits that “[t]here is
nothing in the claim language that indicates that the ‘control system’ could
be a component that is not physically part of the vehicle.” Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant further submits that the Specification “does make it clear when a
physically separate, remote control system configuration is intended” and
“appropriately calls such embodiments a ‘system.’” Id.
During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are given their
ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech.,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). A construction that is
“unreasonably broad” and which does not “reasonably reflect the plain
language and disclosure” will not pass muster. Microsoft Corp. v.
Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Construing claims
broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the applicant, because the
applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more precise
claim coverage. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Center, 367 F.3d at 1364.
The Specification discloses that “[t]he vehicle’s control system may
include a navigation system that is capable of autonomously driving the
vehicle to specific coordinates.” Spec. 7:2–4; see also id. at 7:18 (“[t]he
vehicle has a computer control system . . . .”). The Specification also
discloses that “[t]he unmanned vehicle’s control system may be programmed
to monitor the condition of the vehicle.” Id. at 12:8–9. The Specification
further discloses that “[t]he vehicle is equipped with radio communication
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
8
equipment” and that “[t]he radio communications equipment may be
integrated with or in connection with the control system, surveillance
system, and/or perception system of the vehicle.” Id. at 13:27–14:4. Figures
1A and 1B depict “perception apparatus 20 . . . mounted on top of light
beacon 30,” which is “mounted on the roof of the main body 10” of the
unmanned ground vehicle. Spec. 21:21–23.
Thus, although the Specification discloses that perception apparatus
20 is on-board the vehicle, the Specification does not require (or depict) the
vehicle’s control system as being on-board the vehicle. To the contrary, the
Specification at least suggests that the vehicle’s radio communication
equipment may be integrated with the vehicle’s control system, in the event
the vehicle’s control system is on-board the vehicle, or be in connection with
the vehicle’s control system, in the event the vehicle’s control system is not
on-board (or is remote from) the vehicle.
We find that claim 3, as written, does not require the recited control
system to be on-board the autonomous unmanned road vehicle, and
therefore, Appellant’s argument does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s findings or reasoning.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim
3.
Dependent claim 19
Claim 19 depends from independent claim 1 and recites:
[t]he autonomous vehicle of claim 1, further comprising:
a perception system for detecting objects around the
vehicle;
a surveillance system that includes a multidirectional
camera system that has one or more cameras for imaging in
multiple directions, wherein the surveillance system is in
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
9
operation even when the vehicle is not traveling or when the
perception system is not active.
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.).
The Specification discloses that “[t]he vehicle has a computer control
system for its autonomous driving capability and has a perception system for
detecting objects in its surroundings.” Spec. 7:18–19. The Specification
also discloses that
[i]n some embodiments, the vehicle has a surveillance
system that operates separately or in conjunction with the
perception system. The surveillance system may share the same
components as the perception system, such as using the same
camera(s). The surveillance system is designed to counter hostile
physical actions against the vehicle, such as vandalism. As such
the surveillance system may be operating during a time when the
vehicle is not traveling or when the driving perception system is
not active. For example, the surveillance system may be
operating when the vehicle is parked.
Id. at 13:4–10.
The Examiner finds that “Zini further teaches a camera, in addition to
sensors for the perception system, for imaging in multiple directions,
wherein the camera is not tied to movement/travel of the robot [(or tug)].”
Final Act. 3. The Examiner finds that Zini’s camera “constitutes a multi-
directional camera given that it is capable of capturing an image useful by a
remote operator to diagnose a situation in which the robot is ‘stuck,’” and
that “[s]ending an indication of the tug being stuck constitutes a surveillance
system that is in operation when the vehicle is not travel[]ing.” Ans. 4
(citing Zini ¶ 98). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to
modify Villamar’s delivery vehicle “to provide monitoring and perception
systems as taught by Zini since . . . safety measures . . . prolong the life of
the device.” Final Act. 3.
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
10
Appellant argues that, in Zini, “there is no specific disclosure that [the
camera] is a ‘multidirectional camera system.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant
also argues that Zini does not specifically disclose that “the ‘surveillance
system is in operation even when the vehicle is not travelling,” in that Zini
fails to disclose that the “‘robot is stuck’ or [a] continuous surveillance
operation in such ‘stuck’ situation.’” Id.
As relied on by the Examiner, Zini discloses that
if a tug sends an electronic notification to the help desk that it is
‘stuck,’ the help desk can use its web-enabled software to view a
map of the environment in which the tug currently resides and
can see the location of the tug relative to its intended path and
the environment. The help desk operator can view real-time
images captured by a camera onboard the tug and can diagnose
certain problems based on the captured images.
Zini ¶ 98. Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
finding that Zini discloses that the surveillance system (i.e., Zini’s onboard
camera) is in operation when the tug is not traveling (i.e., is stuck).
However, although Zini discloses, with respect to “an onboard
camera,” that “[s]uch a camera may be an ordinary visual camera, an
infrared camera, a stereovision camera or any other imaging sensor,” Zini
fails to expressly disclose that the camera may be multidirectional, as
required by claim 19. Zini ¶ 71. The Examiner’s finding that Zini’s camera
must constitute a multidirectional camera is also conclusory and lacks
factual support.
Notwithstanding the Examiner’s erroneous reliance on Zini for
disclosing a multidirectional camera, we find that Abhyanker discloses “[a]
multiple sensor systems 102 . . . physically associated with [an] autonomous
neighborhood vehicle 100 so that the vehicle is able to capture and/or
analyze its surrounding environment and/or navigate,” including “camera
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
11
226” (Abhyanker 12:1–8), and that “camera 226 may be a set of cameras, a
single multidirectional camera, a camera with a 360 degree view, a rotating
camera, a stereo optic camera etc.” (id. 15:61–67). Thus, Abhyanker cures
Zini’s deficiency, and we further reason that it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time of the invention, to have modified
Villamar’s delivery vehicle to have a surveillance system including a
camera, as disclosed in Zini, and further, to have a multidirectional camera,
as disclosed in Abhyanker, for imaging in multiple directions, to allow
Villamar’s delivery vehicle to capture, analyze, and navigate its surrounding
environment, as taught in Abhyanker.
Accordingly, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19
due to the Examiner’s erroneous reliance on Zini for disclosing a
multidirectional camera; however, we enter a NEW GROUND OF
REJECTION of claim 19, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Villamar, Zini, MotorTrend, and Abhyanker, due to our reliance on
Abhyanker’s disclosure of a multidirectional camera.
Rejection II
Appellant chose not to present arguments for the patentability of claim
2, which depends from independent claim 1, apart from the arguments
presented for independent claim 1, discussed supra. Appeal Br. 5–11.
Appellant also relies on the same arguments for the patentability of
dependent claim 4 as presented supra for the patentability of claim 3.
Appeal Br. 9–10. Accordingly, for essentially the same reasons as set forth
supra relative to claims 1 and 3, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 2 and 4.

Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
12
Rejections III and IV
Appellant chose not to present arguments for the patentability of
claims 5–16 and 18 apart from the arguments, discussed supra, presented for
independent claim 1, from which these claims depend; therefore, for
essentially the same reasons as set forth supra relative to claim 1, we also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5–16 and 18. Appeal Br. 5–11.

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–18 and 20.
We REVERSE the Examiner’s rejection of claim 19.
We enter a NEW GROUND OF REJETION of claim 19.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1, 3, 17,
19, 20
103 Villamar, Zini,
MotorTrend,
1, 3, 17,
20
19
2, 4 103 Villamar, Zini,
MotorTrend,
Abhyanker
2, 4 19
5, 7, 9,
11, 13,
15, 18
103 Villamar, Zini,
MotorTrend,
Goosman
5, 7, 9,
11, 13,
15, 18

6, 8, 10,
12, 14, 16
103 Villamar, Zini,
MotorTrend,
Abhyanker,
Goosman
6, 8, 10,
12, 14, 16

Overall
Outcome
1–18, 20 19 19
Appeal 2021-002319
Application 15/917,789
13

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
This Decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of
rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial
review.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution
will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. . . .

Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.

AFFIRMED IN PART
37 C.F.R. 41.50(b)