Steven Yu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2021

2021001818 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/872,723 01/16/2018 Steven Sounyoung Yu ARV-03 1562
7590 09/30/2021
Steven Yu
9810 Cresence Way
Fairfax, VA 22032
EXAMINER
MCPARTLIN, SARAH BURNHAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3636
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2021 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN SOUNYOUNG YU and SOUNIL YU
Appeal 2021-001818
Application 15/872,723
Technology Center 3600
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, KEVIN F. TURNER, and LISA M. GUIJT,
Administrative Patent Judges.
GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 12–23. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as inventors, Steven
Yu and Sounil Yu. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2021-001818
Application 15/872,723
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to “Autonomous Unmanned Road
Vehicle[s] for Making Deliveries.” Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced below
as the sole independent claim on appeal, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method of transporting an item from a sender to a
recipient using an autonomous unmanned road vehicle that
comprises a cargo compartment but does not have any
passenger seats, the method comprising:
receiving from the sender, a request for transporting an
item from a first location designated by the sender to a second
location designated by the recipient, wherein the request
includes the recipient’s contact information;
from a fleet of multiple autonomous unmanned road
vehicles, assigning a vehicle for transporting the item;
driving the assigned vehicle, at least partly in an
autonomous manner, to the first location via a paved roadway;
receiving into the cargo compartment, an item to be sent
to the recipient;
driving the assigned vehicle, at least partly in an
autonomous manner, to the second location;
notifying the recipient that the assigned vehicle is on its
way or has arrived;
wherein the sender is different from the recipient; and
wherein the first location is different from the second
location.

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THE REJECTIONS2
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Stevens US 6,820,805 B2 Nov. 23, 2004
Mountz  US 8,972,045 B1  Mar. 3, 2015 
Villamar  US 9,235,213 B2  Jan. 12, 2016 
Goosman  US 2003/0033825 A1  Feb. 20, 2003 
Sicard US 2010/0185482 A1 July 22, 2010
Zini US 2010/0234990 A1 Sept. 16, 2010
Dam US 2013/0102333 A1 Apr. 25, 2013
The following rejections are before us for review:
I. Claims 1–6, 9, 12, and 17–19 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Villamar, Mountz, and
Stevens.
II. Claims 7, 8, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Villamar, Mountz, Stevens, and
Sicard.
III. Claims 14, 15, 20, 21, and 23 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, and Zini.
IV. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Villamar, Mountz, Stevens, and
Goosman.
V. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Villamar, Mountz, Stevens, and Dam.

2 The Examiner’s rejection of Claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite has been withdrawn. Ans. 3.
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OPINION
Rejection I
Independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–6, 9, 12, and 19
Appellant argues claims 1–6, 9, 12, and 19 as a group. Appeal Br. 5.
We select independent claim 1 as representative, and claims 2–6, 9, 12, and
19 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that
Villamar’s “processor” corresponds to the claimed sender, which sends a
request for transporting an item from a first sender-designated location (i.e.,
placer robot 130’s location) to a second recipient-designated location (i.e.,
delivery destination 190), as required by claim 1. Final Act. 3. Villamar’s
Figure 1 is reproduced below.

Villamar’s Figure 1 depicts “an environment 100 . . . for automated delivery
using the delivery vehicle 200,” including “a network 110, the delivery
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vehicle 200, a warehouse 120, a placer robot 130, a product 140, a
processing device 150, a buyer 170, one or more client devices 180, an order
160, and a delivery destination [190].” Villamar 3:28–35. In particular,
Villamar’s Figure 1 shows a flowchart from order placement to product
delivery: buyer 170 places order 160 via network 110 whereby order 160 is
transmitted by processing device 150 to placer robot 130 at warehouse 120
(i.e., corresponding to the claimed first location), placer robot 130 places
product 140 into delivery vehicle 200, and delivery vehicle 200 delivers
product 140 to delivery destination 190 (i.e., corresponding to the second
claimed location).
The Examiner also finds that “Villamar does not disclose driving the
vehicle to the sender[’]s designated location via a paved roadway.” Final
Act. 3–4 (emphasis added); see also Ans. 4 (“Villamar does not explicitly
disclose the method step of driving the assigned vehicle ‘via a paved
roadway’”). The Examiner observes that “Villamar does teach that the
delivery vehicle may be configured to allow the vehicle to move on a surface
with no track such as a conventional street surface.” Final Act. 4; see
Villamar 5:52–54 (“wheel 230 may be configured to allow the delivery
vehicle 200 to move on a surface area which has no tracks such as a
conventional street surface”). The Examiner relies on Mountz for disclosing
“an inventory management system that spans multiple buildings” and
reasons that “[i]t would have been obvious to use the vehicles disclosed by
Villamar in a multi-building warehouse complex, thereby requiring driving
of the vehicle (200) on ‘conventional’ street surface[s] or paved roadway[s]
since large warehousing and processing facilities are well known to span
multiple buildings.” Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 4 (“[the] combination
proposes using the Villamar autonomous delivery vehicle within a multi-
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facility warehousing system, as taught by Mountz”). The Examiner finds
that “[s]uch a system is well known in the art of warehousing spaces for
ensuring the robots are able to perform the duties required by the system.”
Final Act. 4.
Appellant argues that “Villamar is incompatible with Mountz, and
therefore, there is no motivation.” Appeal Br. 6 (emphasis omitted). In
particular, Appellant submits that “the Examiner proposes that [Mountz’s]
warehouse robots 106 could be replaced by Villamar’s delivery vehicles,”
but that “this proposed combination does not work for two reasons.” Id. at
6–7. First, Appellant contends that “warehouse robots 106 in Mountz are
limited to circulating within the warehouse floor” and “Mountz makes no
suggestion that its warehouse robots 106 could itself make the outbound
shipments.” Id. at 7. Second, Appellant contends that “Mountz’s loading
mechanism is incompatible with Villamar’s loading mechanism” because,
for example, “[i]n contrast to Mountz’s lateral loading design, Villamar’s
design is a drop-loading (or top-loading) design,” and “[t]he Examiner’s
proposed combination of incompatible loading mechanisms results in
something that does not work in the manner intended.” Id. at 7–8.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner’s
rejection does not propose substituting Mountz’s warehouse robots 106 with
Villamar’s delivery vehicles 200 for the purpose of transporting inventory
holders to and from freight transporters for outbound shipment, or to
perform a loading function, as disclosed with respect to embodiments
disclosed in Mountz. See, e.g., Mountz 3:29–31. Rather, the Examiner
merely relies on Mountz for teaching, more generally, that Villamar’s first
location (i.e., the location of placer robot 130 in a warehouse) may be within
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a fully-paved warehouse complex, such that Villamar’s delivery vehicles
travel via a paved roadway to the first location, as required by claim 1.
Next, Appellant submits that “Villamar and Mountz focus on different
aspects of a transportation system,” and, therefore, “there is no ‘perceptible
benefit’ in the Examiner’s proposal for replacing the warehouse robots 106
of Mountz with Villamar’s delivery vehicles 200.” Appeal Br. 9–10
(emphasis omitted). Again, Appellant’s argument is misplaced, as the
Examiner is not proposing the substitution of Mountz’s robots 106 with
Villamar’s deliver vehicles 200, but rather, the Examiner modifies
Villamar’s first location (i.e., the location of placer robot 130 in a
warehouse) to be within a paved warehouse complex, such that the assigned
delivery vehicle drives to the first location via a paved roadway, for the
benefit of ensuring the delivery vehicles are able to perform the duties
required by the inventory system.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1, and claims 2–6, 9, 12, and 19 fall therewith.
Dependent claim 17
Claim 17 depends from independent claim 1 and recites, in relevant
part, “wherein the assigned vehicle is neither the sender’s or the recipient’s
legal possession.” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that there are “three options” regarding the legal
possession of Villamar’s delivery vehicles: the vehicles are owned by the
senders, the recipients, or neither the senders nor the recipients. Ans. 5. The
Examiner reasons that because “[t]his is a very small finite group of
options[,] . . . it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to consider
any of the three ‘possession’ characteristics based upon the product being
shipped.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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Appellant submits that “Villamar does not explicitly mention who
possesses the delivery vehicle 200” and that “the more plausible reading of
Villamar is that the warehouse or factory (i.e. the purported ‘sender’) owns
the delivery vehicle 200, which is contrary to the claim recitation.” Appeal
Br. 12. Appellant argues that, to the extent the Examiner is relying on a
“common sense” or an “Obvious to Try” rationale, “the Examiner must
explain why the Villamar delivery vehicle should not be the ‘sender’s …
legal possession’ and also not the ‘recipient’s legal possession.’” Reply
Br. 5.
The “obvious to try” analysis is addressed in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc.:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue
the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads
to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of
innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that
instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might
show that it was obvious under § 103.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
Here, we find that the Examiner’s rationale, either by common sense
or due to a finite number of identified, predictable solutions (i.e., legal
possessors of Villamar’s delivery vehicle 200), is sufficient to state a prima
facie case of obviousness. In support, we point to Villamar’s disclosure that
the delivery vehicles “may be used to deliver goods from a factory to a store
or warehouse” or “by individuals to attain goods from stores,” wherein
“[f]or this purpose, the delivery vehicles 200 may be kept by individuals at
homes.” Villamar 5:42–46. This passage suggests that legal possession of
delivery vehicle 200 may be by any of a discrete number of parties involved
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in automating the delivery of goods, including a factory, a store, a
warehouse, and an individual. Mountz suggests that another party having
legal possession of the delivery robots may be an owner/operator of the
inventory management system, for example, by characterizing the facility
and the inventory management system as two different assets: “mobile order
fulfillment systems are used within inventory facilities.” Mountz 1:20–21.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that a known option within the
technical grasp of a person of ordinary skill in the art is that legal possession
of Villimar’s assigned vehicle is neither the sender’s (i.e., the
owner/operator of processing device 150) nor the recipient’s (i.e., the
individual buyer), but rather, is warehouse owner’s—in other words, as
suggested in Mountz, a third party (other than the warehouse owner) is the
owner of the inventory management system (i.e., processing device 150).
Cf. Spec. 34:14–16 (“The unmanned ground vehicle is not the possession of
the customer. Some other party, such as the local retail facility, has legal
possession of the unmanned ground vehicle (e.g. owns, leases, or through
other contractual arrangement.)”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim
17.
Dependent claim 18
Claim 18 depends from independent claim 1 and recites, in relevant
part, “further comprising notifying the sender that the assigned vehicle is on
its way or has arrived.” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that “[t]he claim does not specify that the
notification be indicative of the assigned vehicle being on its way or arrived
at the first location or at the second location.” Ans. 5. Notwithstanding, the
Examiner relies on Stevens for disclosing that “a message . . . is sent from a
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central processing unit on a vehicle (i.e.[,] delivery truck) to a central server
(sender) upon arrival of the vehicle at a receptacle used by the customer.”
Id. at 6 (citing Stevens 6:19–22). The Examiner reasons that
adding such a messaging step (i.e. message sent from vehicle
(200) upon arrival at delivery destination (190) to processing
device (150)) would be obvious to enable communication about
the delivery status to be made from the processing device (150)
to the buyer at the delivery destination to ensure secure delivery
of the items to the appropriate buyer.
Id.
Appellant argues that, in Villamar’s Figure 1, the arrows show
forwarding order 160 from processing device 150, “[b]ut there is no message
sent back to the processing device 150.” Appeal Br. 13. Appellant’s
argument, however, does not address the rejection as articulated by the
Examiner, which relies on a modification of Villamar, in view of Stevens.
Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
Rejections II and IV
Appellant chose not to present arguments for the patentability of
dependent claims 7, 8, 13, and 16 apart from the arguments presented for
independent claim 1 supra. Appeal Br. 5–15. Accordingly, for essentially
the same reasons as set forth supra, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 7, 8, 13, and 16.

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Rejection III
Dependent claims 15 and 23
Claims 15 and 23 (ultimately) depend from independent claim 1, and
each further requires, in relevant part, that driving the assigned vehicle is
“performed by a combination of human control via remote operation and
autonomous control.” Appeal Br. 18, 19 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Zini discloses that “[t]he autonomous robot
can also be controlled via a remote control.” Final Act. 5, 6–7 (citing Zini
¶¶ 67–69). The Examiner explains that, in Zini, “[an] autonomous tug can
send an indication that the tug is ‘stuck’ and . . . a help desk operator can
take control of the functionality and operation of the tug via remote control.”
Ans. 5 (citing Zini ¶ 98). The Examiner reasons that it would have been
obvious to add “remote control” to Villamar’s method for automated
delivery “for conditions which could cause damage to the unit, such as
extreme weather.” Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s motivation for combining the
references is “not sufficient,” because the Examiner does not state “why the
two references should be combined.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant also argues
that “Villamar makes no specific mention or has any contemplation that its
automated delivery vehicle is designed for roaming inside hospitals,” similar
to Zini’s “hospital robot.” Reply Br. 4.
Appellant’s argument does not address the rationale (or the why),
which is expressly provided by the Examiner, namely, to allow human
control of Villamar’s delivery vehicle via remote operation, in addition to
autonomous control, in the event weather conditions cause damage to the
delivery vehicle. In addition, Villamar is not relied on for teaching a
hospital robot; rather, the Examiner proposes modifying Villamar’s
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autonomous delivery vehicle 200 to be capable of being driven by human
control via remote operation, as taught by Zini.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims
15 and 23.
Dependent claims 14, 20, and 21
Appellant chose not to present arguments for the patentability of
dependent claims 14, 20, and 21 apart from the arguments presented for
independent claim 1 and dependent claim 15 supra. Appeal Br. 5–15.
Accordingly, for essentially the same reasons as set forth supra, we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 14, 20, and 21.
Rejection V
Claim 22 depends on independent claim 1 and recites, in relevant part,
“wherein the assigned vehicle is selected from the fleet of multiple
autonomous unmanned road vehicles based, at least in part, on the proximity
of the assigned vehicle to the first location.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.).
The Examiner relies on Dam for describing “how proximity of a
particular fleet vehicle . . . is used as a dispatch/assignment criteria.” Final
Act. 6 (citing Dam ¶ 27). In particular, the Examiner finds that Dam
discloses “allocating work assignments to [a series of field crews (46), (62),
and (64)] based on a series of factors,” including “the closest field crew 46,
62, or 64 to the emergency condition.” Ans. 6 (citing Dam ¶ 27). The
Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to apply Dam’s teaching
to Villamar’s automated delivery vehicle system to “cut down on waste (i.e.
travel time) in the system, thereby improving overall efficiency and
customer satisfaction.” Final Act. 6.
Appellant argues that Dam’s disclosure is limited to “one particular
utility crew,” and not “selection from [a] fleet [of vehicles].” Appeal Br. 15.
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Appellant also argues that “Dam’s work crew assignment system is
irrelevant to Villamar . . . because all the delivery vehicles of Villamar
originate from the same place, i.e. the product warehouse from where they
are dispatched,” and thus, “all the delivery vehicles are equidistant to any
delivery site.” Reply Br. 6. Appellant further argues that “[t]he fleet
assignment system of Dam, which is based on proximity of the work crew to
the various work sites, is irrelevant to how Villamar operates,” and
therefore, “there is no motivation for the combination proposed by the
Examiner.” Id. at 7.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. A preponderance of
the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that Dam discloses
coordinating work assignments between more than one field crew (i.e., a
fleet of field crews), and further, that such coordination is based on the
proximity of the crew to an emergency condition location: “the dispatching
server 26 may receive information indicating an emergency utility grid
condition and the server 26 may determine the closest field crew 46, 62, or
64 to the emergency condition and immediately assign the field crew 46, 62,
and 64 to go to the emergency condition location.” Dam ¶ 27. We also do
not agree with Appellant that Villamar’s delivery vehicles must necessarily
originate from the same place; rather, as discussed supra, Villamar’s
delivery vehicles, as modified by Mountz, may be located within a multi-
facility warehousing system. Finally, notwithstanding the differences
between the environments of Villamar’s automated delivery vehicle system
and Dam’s system for dispatching utility repairs, Appellant’s argument does
not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s reasoning that modifying
Villamar’s automated delivery vehicle system to coordinate vehicle
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assignment based on proximity, as taught in Dam, reduces travel times for
Villamar’s fleet of autonomous delivery vehicles.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–9 and 12–23 are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–6, 9, 12,
17–19
103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens
1–6, 9, 12,
17–19

7, 8, 13 103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, Sicard
7, 8, 13
14, 15, 20,
21, 23
103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, Zini
14, 15, 20,
21, 23

16 103 Villamar, Mountz,
Stevens, Goosman
16
22 103 Villamar Mountz,
Stevens, Dam
22
Overall
Outcome
1–9, 12–23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED