Steven Sullivan

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 4, 2019

11852753 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/852,753 09/10/2007 Steven Sullivan 7013-115 1804
84649 7590 09/04/2019
Symbus Law Group, LLC
Cliff Hyra
11710 Plaza America Drive
Suite 2000
Reston, VA 20190
EXAMINER
WOLDEMARYAM, ASSRES H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3642
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chyra@symbus.com
docketing@symbus.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte STEVEN SULLIVAN
____________

Appeal 2017-011452
Application 11/852,753
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before LINDA E. HORNER, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
GEORGE R. HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8–12, 17–20, 24, 26, 28–32, 43–45, 47–
49, 52, 56, 58, 61–64, 68, 69, 71, 79–81, 84–88, 90–95, and 97–99.2 We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 Steven Sullivan (“Appellant”) is identified as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 2.
2 Claims 3, 6, 7, 13–16, 21–23, 25, 27, 33–42, 46, 50, 51, 53–55, 57, 59, 60,
65–67, 70, 72–78, 82, 83, 89, and 96 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 22–
31 (Claims App.).
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosure “relates to the field of fluid dynamics, and
particularly to the fluid flow relative to a surface such as a lifting and/or
thrust-generating body.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claims 1 and 2 are independent claims. Claim 1, reproduced below,
illustrates the claimed subject matter on appeal.
1. A wing apparatus having geometry that promotes
vortex-mixing for mitigating the formation of concentrated wake
vortex structures, comprising:
a solid body, a surface of which has a leading edge and a
trailing edge,
wherein the solid-body surface comprises a contour
surface geometry that varies in curvature in all three dimensions,
wherein the solid-body surface has oscillatory variations
in chord length due to the contour surface geometry, and wherein
the oscillatory variations are continuous across the entire span of
the solid-body surface, wherein the oscillatory variations are
configured to produce multiple wake vortices smaller than
concentrated vortex structures generated at a tip region of the
solid-body surface in the absence of such oscillatory variations.

Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App.).

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17–20, 26, 28–32, 43–45, 48, 49, 52, 56,
58, 61–63, 68, 69, 71, 79–81, 84–88, 90–95, 97, and 98 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement.3

3 The rejection of claims 10–12, 24, 47, 64, and 99 under this ground has
been withdrawn. Ans. 13. The enablement rejection set forth in the
Examiner’s Answer includes claims 52 and 61, although these claims were
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2. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29, 43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and
90–95 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gao (US
5,114,099, issued May 19, 1992).
3. Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29, 43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and
91–95 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Moser (US
5,860,626, issued Jan. 19, 1999).
4. Claims 10–12, 18–20, 28, 45, 58, 71, 79, 80, 84, 85, and 97‒99
are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gao and Lisy
(US 6,837,465 B2, issued Jan. 4, 2005).
5. Claims 30, 49, 62, 64, 71, and 86–88 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gao and DiCocco (US 7,070,144 B1,
issued July 4, 2006).
6. Claims 31 and 32 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gao and Bauer (US 6,131,853, issued Oct. 17, 2000).
7. Claims 47, 48, 56, 68, and 69 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Gao and Fedorov (US 5,884,871, issued Mar.
23, 1999).

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
(Non-Enablement)
The enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
requires the as-filed disclosure to be sufficiently complete to enable a person

not included in the enablement rejection in the Final Action. Ans. 2–3; Final
Act. 4. For purposes of this appeal, we treat claims 52 and 61 as also being
included in this ground of rejection.
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of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to make and use the
claimed invention without undue experimentation. In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). When rejecting a claim for lack of enablement,
the PTO has the initial burden to provide “a reasonable explanation” as to
why it believes the specification is not enabling. In re Wright, 999 F.2d
1557, 1561–62 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The Examiner’s burden in an enablement
rejection is that:
[T]he explanation of the rejection should focus on those
factors, reasons, and evidence that lead the examiner to conclude
e.g., that the [S]pecification fails to teach how to make and use
the claimed invention without undue experimentation, or that the
scope of any enablement provided to one skilled in the art is not
commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2164.04. Factors to be
considered by the PTO in determining whether a disclosure would require
undue experimentation include multiple factors set forth in Wands.4 If the
PTO meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to Appellant to show that
one of ordinary skill in the art could have practiced the claimed invention
without undue experimentation. In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232
(CCPA 1982). An enablement rejection can be based on total lack of
enablement for any subject matter within the scope of the claims or on
failure of the specification to enable one skilled in the art to make and use
the invention commensurate with the scope of the claims. In re Cortright,

4 The “Wands factors” include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary,
(2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of
the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. Wands, 858
F.2d at 737.
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165 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Wright, 999 F.2d at 1561
(“Although not explicitly stated in section 112, to be enabling, the
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and
use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue
experimentation.”).
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17–20, 26, 28–32, 43–45, 48, 49, 52, 56, 58,
61–63, 71, 79–81, 85–88, 94, and 95
The body of the rejection addresses claims 68, 84, 90–93, 97, and 98,
each depending from claim 1. Final Act. 4–5. Appellant points out,
however, that the body of the rejection does not address claim 1 or any one
of claims 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 26, 28–32, 43–45, 49, 56, 58, 62, 63, 71, 79–81, 85–
88, and 94, and 95, each of which either depends directly from claim 1, or
depends from at least one intervening claim that the Examiner does not
address in the body of the rejection. Appeal Br. 4. Claim 2 is also not
addressed in the body of the rejection. Id.
In the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner states that the claim
limitation of “the solid-body surface comprises a contour surface geometry
that varies in curvature in all three dimensions” “is not well defined [and]
broadly reads on [a] broad range of structures.” Ans. 3. The Examiner does
not mention any specific claim; however, we note the claim limitation is in
claims 1 and 2. See Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App.).
In reply, Appellant contends that the Examiner provides no rationale
for why “a contour surface geometry that varies in curvature in all three
dimensions” is not enabled. Reply Br. 2. Appellant contends that the
Examiner does not address whether a person of skill in the art could make
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and use the claimed invention without undue experimentation, and does not
establish a prima facie case of non-enablement. Id.
We agree with Appellant. First, the Examiner does not explain why
the claim limitation is not “well defined.” This statement appears more akin
to the basis for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, than to
an enablement rejection. Second, if it is the Examiner’s position that the
claim limitation is “broad” and reads on a “broad range of structures,” but
the disclosure does not adequately apprise a skilled artisan how to make and
to use the claimed subject matter throughout the entire scope of claim 1 (and
claim 2) without undue experimentation, the Examiner also does not
adequately explain the basis for this position. Claim 1 further defines the
structure of the solid-body surface and contour surface geometry in reciting
“the solid-body surface has oscillatory variations in chord length due to the
contour surface geometry, and wherein the oscillatory variations are
continuous across the entire span of the solid-body surface.” The Examiner
does not appear to take this narrowing language into account in expressing
the position that claim 1 reads on a “broad range of structures.” Further, the
Examiner does not address any of the following Wands factors, considering
that claim 1 recites this narrowing language: (1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented in Appellant’s disclosure, (3) the presence or absence of working
examples, (4) the nature of Appellant’s invention, (5) the state of the prior
art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, or (7) the predictability or
unpredictability of the art. Instead, the Examiner’s position is conclusory
and does not explain adequately why the claim language is not sufficiently
enabled. We thus do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 4, 5,
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8, 9, 17‒20, 26, 28–32, 43–45, 48, 49, 52, 56, 58, 61‒63, 71, 79–81, 85–88,
94, and 95, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 1.
Claim 2 recites “the solid-body surface comprises a contour surface
geometry that varies in curvature in all three dimensions,” “wherein the
solid-body surface has oscillatory variations in span length due to the
contour surface geometry, and wherein the oscillatory variations are
continuous across the entire chord of the solid-body surface.” Appeal Br.
22 (Claims App. (emphasis added)). We also do not sustain the rejection of
claim 2 for reasons similar to those for claim 1.
Claims 68 and 69
Claim 68 recites that “the passive compliant surfaces are flexible
surfaces that absorb momentum without actuation.” Appeal Br. 28 (Claims
App.). In the rejection, the Examiner questions what a passive compliant
surface is, and how is the surface “flexible”? Final Act. 5.
Appellant contends that a skilled artisan would understand what a
passive compliant surface is based on paragraphs 72 and 73 of the
Specification. Appeal Br. 13. Paragraph 72 describes that “[c]ompliant
walls are flexible surfaces that absorb momentum that would otherwise be
detrimental. Passive compliant walls absorb momentum without actuation,
which is then damped internally.” (Emphasis added).5 Paragraph 73
describes that “[h]oles and/or porous surfaces are passive compliant
surfaces.” (Emphasis added). The Examiner responds that paragraphs 72
and 73 do not describe how the passive compliant surface is flexible. Ans. 7.

5 The Specification describes that an “active compliant surface” may require
power to activate the surface-boundary layer interaction. See Spec. ¶ 54.
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We agree with Appellant that the Examiner does not explain why a
person skilled in the art would need to conduct undue experimentation to
make and use the subject matter recited in claim 68. Reply Br. 4. The
Examiner’s question of how is the claimed passive compliant surface
flexible is unclear. Claim 68 does not require the passive compliant surface
to have any particular flexibility. Appellant’s Specification describes
examples of passive compliant surface structures. Appellant also explains
that flexibility is a material property. Id. Even if the term “flexible” may be
relatively broad, the Examiner does not articulate any reason why one of
ordinary skill in the art could not have practiced the subject matter, as
claimed, without undue experimentation. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 68 and its dependent claim 69.
Claim 84
Claim 84 recites, in part, that “distributed roughness is applied across
the surface by micro and nano machining.” Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.).
The Examiner questions what is micro and nano machining, how are they
related to the distributed roughness, and how are they different? Final Act.
5.
Appellant contends that a skilled artisan would have understood the
meaning of micro machining and nano machining based, for example, on
paragraph 87 of the Specification. Appeal Br. 13. Appellant further
contends that much like the skilled artisan would have understood the
differences between microscopic scale and nanoscopic scale, the skilled
artisan would have understood the differences between micro machining and
nano machining. Id. Appellant explains that a person skilled in the art
would be familiar with how micromachining and nanomachining create
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surface roughness, and how this can be done in selected/distributed areas of
the surface. Reply Br. 5.
Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. We agree that one of ordinary
skill in the art would understand that the terms “micro” and “nano” refer to
different size scales.6 For example, nano manufacturing is manufacturing at
the nano scale. The Examiner does not explain why one of ordinary skill in
the art would not have known how to apply distributed roughness across the
surface by either micro machining or nano machining without undue
experimentation. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 84.
Claims 90–93
Claim 90 recites that “the contour surface geometry is periodic and
comprises a sinusoidal form that varies in peak position along the span of
the contour surface.” Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
Claim 91 similarly recites that “the contour surface geometry comprises a
form which is periodic . . ., combined with a sinusoidal form that varies in
peak position along the span of the contour surface.” Appeal Br. 30 (Claims
App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner questions how the contour surface
geometry varies in peak position along the span of the surface and where is
this shown, and what does “periodic” mean, as this term seems to say that
the surface varies in time. Final Act. 4.
Appellant contends that support for the contour surface geometry
varying in peak position along the span of the surface is found in Figure 1

6 Particularly, “micro” means one millionth (10-6) and “nano” means one
billionth (10-9). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 783, 824 (11th
ed. 2003).
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and paragraph 917 of the Specification. Appeal Br. 9. The Examiner
responds that this disclosure does not show or describe how the contour
surface geometry varies in peak position along the span of the surface. Ans.
3. Appellant replies that the claim limitation is supported by Figure 6 and
paragraphs 938 and 11 of the Specification. Reply Br. 2. Appellant
contends that “the geometry has a sinusoidal form but the peaks of the
sinusoid vary along the span of the surface (e.g. wing). In other words, a
peak of the sinusoid is in one place at one point on the span and in another
place at another point on the span.” Id.
Appellant also contends that support for the term “periodic” is found
in Figure 1 and paragraphs 38, 93, 97, 102, and 104 of the Specification.9
Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. First, the term “periodic”
refers to the structure of the contour surface geometry, not to any time
variation of this geometry. The requirement that the contour surface
geometry varies in peak position along the span of the surface further
defines how this structure varies in the apparatus. Figures 1 and 6 show a
sinusoidal form and paragraph 94, for example, describes a sinusoidal form.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner does not explain adequately why
a person of ordinary skill in the art could not have made and used the

7 Appellant appears to be referencing the description in paragraph 92 of its
Specification. We note this same description is found in paragraph 91 of the
published application (US 2008/0061192 A1, published Mar. 13, 2008).
8 Appellant appears to be referencing the description found in paragraph 94
of the Specification, also found in paragraph 93 of the published application.
9 Appellant appears to be referencing the description in paragraphs 38, 94,
98, 103, and 105 of the Specification, as each of these paragraphs describes
the term “periodic” or “period.”
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claimed subject matter, such as a structure having a sinusoidal form as
shown in these figures, without undue experimentation. Accordingly, we do
not sustain the rejection of claims 90 and 91.
Claim 92 depends from claim 90 and recites that “the sinusoidal form
exhibits ringing.” Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Claim
93 depends from claim 91 and similarly recites that “the form which is
periodic is a sinusoidal form and the sinusoidal form is [sic] exhibits
ringing.” Appeal Br. 31 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner
questions what “ringing” means, how is it formed/achieved, and where is
this disclosed? Final Act. 4.
Appellant contends that, in wave theory, a skilled artisan would
understand that “ringing” refers to oscillation that is underdamped. Appeal
Br. 10. For example, a circuit that exhibits exponentially decaying
sinusoidal oscillations can be described as exhibiting ringing. Id. Appellant
contends that support for the term “ringing” is found in original claims 6, 7,
21, 22, and 27. Id. The Examiner responds that these original claims “recite
a ‘ringing function’ that is understood to be a character of an oscillatory
signal, but is in no way a physical characteristic[] of a claimed contour
surface geometry.” Ans. 4. The Examiner states that the present claims and
Specification do not describe a “ringing function,” nor does the Specification
describe “ringing.” Id. at 4–5. Appellant replies that the original claims
recited that the geometry has a sinusoidal form, such as a ringing function,
and thus the shape of a ringing function was clearly recited as a physical
characteristic of the contour surface geometry. Reply Br. 3. Appellant
contends that the present claims recite essentially the same subject matter.
Id. Appellant contends that ringing is a well-known characteristic of
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sinusoidal forms and the Examiner provides no explanation why a person of
skill in the art would have any difficulty making or using the claimed
invention, let alone why undue experimentation would be required. Id.
Appellant’s contentions are not persuasive. Even if the term “ringing”
is a well-known characteristic of sinusoidal waves in “wave theory,” claims
92 and 93 appear to encompass any sinusoidal forms that exhibit ringing,
although the Specification and drawings do not appear to describe or show
any specific ringing structure, that might provide guidance to a skilled
artisan as to how to make and use the claimed subject matter. Consequently,
we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would be able to
practice the full scope of the claimed subject matter. See Wright, 999 F.2d at
1561. We sustain the rejection of claims 92 and 93.
Claim 97
Claim 97 depends from claim 9 and recites that “the riblets are
compound riblets locally optimized to flow direction.” Appeal Br. 31
(Claims App.). The Examiner questions how the local optimization of the
riblets is achieved along the flow direction? Final Act. 4.
Appellant contends that support for claim 97 is found in original claim
67 and paragraphs 29, 70, and 102 of the Specification.10 Appeal Br. 10.
The Examiner responds that this disclosure does not describe how the local
optimization of the riblets is achieved along the flow direction. Ans. 5.
Appellant replies that the Specification “discloses that a surface feature may
be optimized for a flight configuration (wind speed and direction) by placing
it at a specific angle with respect to the wake vortex helix angle.” Reply Br.

10 Appellant appears to be referencing the description found in paragraphs 28
and 30, 71, and 103 of the Specification.
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3; see Spec ¶ 28. Appellant contends that “[t]he Examiner has made no
showing that undue experimentation would be required to determine the
appropriate angle of a surface feature to minimize induced drag at a given
wind direction.” Id. at 4.
Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. Appellant has identified
disclosure that describes how riblets (a “surface feature”) can be arranged to
affect fluid flow along the flow direction to minimize (i.e., optimize)
induced drag at a given wind direction. The Examiner does not explain why
this disclosure is inadequate, or why one of ordinary skill in the art would
still be unable to make and use the claimed subject matter without undue
experimentation despite this disclosure. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 97.
Claim 98
Claim 98 depends from claim 1 and recites, “further comprising at
least one of: an ionized gas blower . . ., a negative pressure source . . ., and a
field generator . . . .” Appeal Br. 31 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The
Examiner states that claim 98 appears to recite that the surface has three
parts used together, but the Specification fails to show how all three features
work at the same time on the apparatus. Final Act. 4.
In claim 98, the phrase “at least one of” encompasses one, two, or all
three of an ionized gas blower, a negative pressure source, and a field
generator on the apparatus. Appellant is correct, however, that claim 98
does not require that all three features work at the same time on the
apparatus, as asserted by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 11. Rather, claim 98
requires that the apparatus comprise one, two, or all three features, and that
each feature be “configured” to perform its corresponding recited function.
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Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that claim 98 is satisfied if the three
features are in place and configured as claimed. Reply Br. 4. We also agree
with Appellant that the Examiner does not provide any reason why one of
ordinary skill in the art would be unable to combine the three features. Id.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 98.

Rejection II
(Anticipation by Gao)
Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29, 43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and 90–95
Appellant contests the Examiner’s finding that Gao discloses all
limitations of claim 1. Appeal Br. 14; Final Act. 6 (citing Gao, Figs. 1, 8,
11). Particularly, Appellant contends that claim 1 recites that “the solid-
body surface has oscillatory variations in chord length due to the contour
surface geometry, and wherein the oscillatory variations are continuous
across the entire span of the solid-body surface.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant
explains that a “chord” is the distance between the leading edge and the
trailing edge of an airfoil at a given spanwise position.11 Id. at 15.
Appellant contends that Figure 11 is the only figure in Gao showing the
leading edge or trailing edge, but Figure 11 depicts the trailing edge (i.e.,
right edge) as straight or linear. Id. at 14–15. Appellant contends that, in
Gao, the surface features end at the trailing edge of the surface and are not
incorporated into the leading edge and the trailing edge (id. at 14), but are
only on the top of wing 74 (id. at 16). As such, Appellant contends that

11 We note a similar definition of the term “chord” is “the straight line
distance joining the leading and trailing edges of an airfoil.” Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 219 (11th ed. 2003).
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these surface features in Gao do not influence the chord or span of the
surface. Id. at 14. Appellant further contends that Figure 11 of Gao shows
that the leading edge and the trailing edge of wing 74 are converging straight
lines, and when moving along the span of the wing, in one direction the
chord length never increases, and in the other direction the chord length
never decreases. Id. at 15. Thus, the chord lengths of the wing(s) disclosed
by Gao do not exhibit oscillatory variations, as recited in claim 1. Id.
The Examiner disagrees that the surface features in Gao do not
influence the chord or span of the surface. Ans. 8. The Examiner states,
“the features upon which applicant relies (i.e., Gao fails to disclose
oscillatory variation in chord length of the wing) are not recited in the
rejected claim(s).” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). According to the Examiner,
the claim recitation requires the solid body surface to have oscillatory
variation in a chord length, not the wing. Id. at 10–11. The Examiner
determines that the oscillatory variation shown in Figure 7 and/or the arrays
78 shown in Figure 11 of Gao meet the limitation of claim 1. Id. at 11.
Appellant addresses the Examiner’s finding that claim 1 does not
recite oscillatory variations in chord length of a wing, and the finding that
Gao discloses oscillatory variations in the top surface of a wing and,
therefore, meets the limitations of claim 1. Reply Br. 5–6. Appellant
explains that “[t]he chord length is the distance between the trailing edge
and the point on the leading edge where the chord intersects the leading
edge.” Id. at 6. Appellant contends that a skilled artisan would not confuse
a “‘solid-body surface’ . . . which refer[s] to airfoils, with the top surface of
a wing in this context,” and that it is incorrect “that the top surface of a wing
or rotor blade (as opposed to the wing/blade itself- which are types of lifting
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surfaces) has variations in chord length, because the top surface of a wing
has no chord at all.” Id.
Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. Claim 1 recites “a solid body,
a surface of which has a leading edge and a trailing edge,” and “the solid-
body surface has oscillatory variations in chord length due to the contour
surface geometry, and wherein the oscillatory variations are continuous
across the entire span of the solid-body surface.” Appeal Br. 22 (Claims
App. (emphasis added)). Claim 1 requires that the chord length of the solid-
body surface, that is, the distance along a straight line between the leading
edge and trailing edge span of the solid-body surface, has oscillatory
variations across the entire span of the solid-body surface. As Appellant
explains, the wing shown in Figure 11 of Gao does not have an oscillatory
variation in chord length across the entire span of the wing. We agree with
Appellant that the surface features on the top surface of Gao’s wing do not
affect the chord length, much less do they provide continuous, oscillatory
variations in chord length across the entire span of the wing, as required by
claim 1. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, or
dependent claims 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29, 43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and 90–95, as
anticipated by Gao.
Claim 2
Claim 2 recites that “the solid-body surface has oscillatory variations
in span length due to the contour surface geometry, and wherein the
oscillatory variations are continuous across the entire chord of the solid-
body surface.” Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App. (emphasis added)). The
Examiner’s findings for claim 2 are the same as for claim 1. Final Act. 6.
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Appellant contends that claim 2 recites features similar to claim 1, and
thus, also distinguishes over Gao for reasons similar to those stated for claim
1. Appeal Br. 17. In response, the Examiner indicates that the Examiner’s
position for claim 1 also applies to claim 2.
We note that a definition of the term “span” as recited in claim 2 is
“the maximum distance laterally from tip to tip of an airplane.” Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1195 (11th ed. 2003). Even if the wing
shown in Figure 11 of Gao has a variation in span length across an entire
chord length of the wing, the surface features on the top surface of the wing
do not provide continuous, oscillatory variations in span length across the
entire chord of the wing, as required by claim 2. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of claim 2 as anticipated by Gao.

Rejection III
(Anticipation by Moser)
Claims 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29, 43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and 91–95
The Examiner finds that Moser discloses all limitations of claim 1.
Final Act. 7–8 (citing Moser’s figures).
Appellant contends that the surface features disclosed by Moser are
not incorporated into the leading edge and the trailing edge of its contour
surface, and, as such, the surface features do not influence the chord lengths
of the solid-body surface. Appeal Br. 17. Appellant contends that Moser
shows the contours of the leading edge or trailing edge only in Figure 1a,
which shows the leading edge (top of Figure 1a) and the trailing edge
(bottom of Figure 1a) as converging straight lines. Id. As such, Appellant
contends, the chord lengths disclosed by Moser vary linearly, and thus, the
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chord lengths fail to exhibit oscillatory variations in chord length that are
continuous across the entire span, as recited in claim 1. Id.
The Examiner disagrees that the surface features taught in Moser do
not influence the chord lengths. Ans. 11. The Examiner submits that Figure
1b of Moser shows that the surface features influence the chord lengths. Id.
The Examiner also states, “the features upon which applicant relies (i.e.,
Moser fails to disclose oscillatory variation in chord length of the wing) are
not recited in the rejected claim(s).” Id. at 12.
Appellant’s contentions are persuasive. As Appellant explains,
although the rotor blade shown in Figure 1a of Moser has a variation in
chord length across its span, this variation is not an oscillatory variation. We
agree with Appellant that the surface features on the top surface of the rotor
blade disclosed by Moser do not affect the chord length, much less do they
provide continuous, oscillatory variations in chord length across the entire
span of the rotor blade, as required by claim 1. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of claim 1, or dependent claims 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29,
43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and 91–95, as anticipated by Moser.
Claim 2
The Examiner makes the same findings for claim 2 as for claim 1.
Final Act. 7–8. Appellant contends that for reasons similar to those stated in
regard to claim 1, claim 2 also distinguishes over Moser. Appeal Br. 20. In
response, the Examiner indicates that the Examiner’s position for claim 1
also applies to claim 2. Ans. 13.
Even if the rotor blade shown in Figure 1a of Moser has a variation in
span length across an entire chord length, the surface features on the top
surface of the rotor blade do not affect the span length, much less do they
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provide continuous, oscillatory variations in span length across the entire
chord of the rotor blade, as required by claim 2. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of claim 2 as anticipated by Moser.

Rejections IV-VII
(Obviousness over Gao and one of Lisy, DiCocco, Bauer, or Fedorov)
The Examiner does not rely on Lisy, DiCocco, Bauer, or Fedorov in a
manner that cures the above-described deficiencies in the rejection of parent
claim 1 as anticipated by Gao. Final Act. 9–16. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of dependent claims 10–12, 18–20, 28, 30–32, 45, 47–
49, 56, 58, 62, 64, 68, 69, 71, 79, 80, 84–88, and 97–99 for the same reasons
as for claim 1.

DECISION
1. We affirm the rejection of claims 92 and 93, and reverse the
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17–20, 26, 28–32, 43–45, 48, 49, 52, 56,
58, 61–63, 68, 69, 71, 79–81, 84–88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 97, and 98, under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement
requirement.
2. We reverse the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29,
43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and 90–95 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Gao.
3. We reverse the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 17, 24, 26, 29,
43, 44, 63, 81, 84, and 91–95 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Moser.
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4. We reverse the rejection of claims 10–12, 18–20, 28, 45, 58, 71,
79, 80, 84, 85, and 97‒99 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Gao and Lisy.
5. We reverse the rejection of claims 30, 49, 62, 64, 71, and 86–88
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gao and DiCocco.
6. We reverse the rejection of claims 31 and 32 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Gao and Bauer.
7. We reverse the rejection of claims 47, 48, 56, 68, and 69 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gao and Fedorov.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART