Steven Post

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2021

2020005029 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/851,231 08/05/2010 Steven W. Post 48593-90592 1333
103907 7590 04/02/2021
Thompson Coburn LLP
One US Bank Plaza
St. Louis, MO 63101
EXAMINER
ADJAGBE, MAXIME M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3745
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocket@thompsoncoburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte STEVEN W. POST
____________

Appeal 2020-005029
Application 12/851,231
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
BRETT C. MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision in the Final Office Action (dated Mar. 30, 2018, hereinafter “Final
Act.”) rejecting claims 1–17.2 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Regal Beloit America, Inc. is identified as the real party in
interest in Appellant’s Appeal Brief (filed Apr. 5, 2019, hereinafter “Appeal
Br.”). Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 18–20 are canceled. See Appeal Br. 3, 22 (Claims App.).
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SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM IN PART.

INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates “to an air handler blower assembly
including a blower housing containing a centrifugal fan and a motor
mounted on the blower housing and connected to the fan.” Spec. para. 1.
Claims 1, 7, and 13 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claimed invention and reads as follows:
1. An air handler blower assembly comprising:
a fan having a center axis of rotation that defines
mutually perpendicular axial and radial directions
relative to the blower assembly, the fan comprising a
plurality of blades, each blade extending axially from a
first end to a second end;
a motor having a motor casing, the motor being
operatively connected to the fan for rotation of the fan
relative to the motor casing in response to operation of
the motor;
a blower housing containing the fan, the blower
housing having an outer wall that extends around the fan
and the fan center axis and the blower housing having
first and second side walls on axially opposite sides of
the outer wall, the first side wall having a first air inlet
opening with a first diameter dimension, the second side
wall having a second air inlet opening with a second
diameter dimension, and the first diameter dimension
being larger than the second diameter dimension, the first
ends of the blades being adjacent the first air inlet
opening and the second ends of the blades being adjacent
the second air inlet opening, the blades surrounding and
defining a cylindrical interior volume of the fan, the
cylindrical interior volume extending from the first ends
of the blades to the second ends of the blades;
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a plurality of support arms operatively securing the
motor to the blower housing, each of the plurality of
support arms extending into the first air inlet opening
such that at least a substantial portion of each of the
plurality of support arms is positioned axially between
the first and second air inlet openings;
at least a substantial portion of the motor casing
being positioned axially between the first and second air
inlet openings, the fan and blower housing being
configured such that rotation of the fan about the center
axis of rotation causes air to be drawn into the fan via the
first and second air inlet openings.

REJECTIONS

I. The Examiner rejects claims 13–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
II. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 12 under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Kim.3,4
III. The Examiner rejects claims 1–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Ranz and Kim.

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
The Examiner finds that the limitation “first and second air inlet
openings being sized such that during operation of the blower assembly, air
flow rate through the first air inlet opening is substantially equal to air flow

3 Kim et al., US 2008/0127671 Al, published June 5, 2008.
4 The anticipation rejection of claims 13–15 and 17 based upon Kim was
withdrawn. Examiner’s Answer (dated July 23, 2019, hereinafter “Ans.”) 3.
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rate through the second air inlet opening” in independent claim 13 is not
supported by Appellant’s original disclosure. Final Act. 4 (emphasis
omitted); see also Appeal Br. 21. According to the Examiner, “[n]owhere in
the [S]pecification as originally filed is this limitation found, nor was it in
the initial claims as filed; the drawings do not suggest the claimed subject
matter.” Id.
Relying on paragraph 12 of the Specification Appellant contends that
the original disclosure supports: (1) “a teaching that the position of the
motor in the first inlet opening tends to reduce the air flow rate through the
first inlet opening” and (2) that “the enlarged size of the first inlet opening
accommodates the motor without substantially reducing the air flow through
the first inlet opening below that of the second inlet opening.” Appeal Br. 8.
Thus, according to Appellant, “because the airflow rate through the first inlet
opening is not substantially less than the airflow rate through the second
inlet opening, it is substantially the same as that through the second inlet
opening.” Id.
In response, the “Examiner recognizes that the position of the motor
in the first inlet opening would reduce the inflow of air therethrough.”
Ans. 4. However, according to the Examiner, “this does not automatically
mean that the reduction of inflow is such that air flow rate through the first
air inlet opening is substantially equal to air flow rate through the second air
inlet opening” because “[t]here is no information in the disclosure on how
much space or volume is occupied by the motor in the first inlet opening.” Id
(emphasis omitted)The Examiner explains that:
For the air flow rate through the first inlet opening to be
substantially equal to the air flow rate through [the] second
inlet opening . . . the inflow area of the first inlet opening has
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to be substantially equal to the inflow area of the second inlet
opening. This is not found anywhere and as explained earlier,
the area occupied by the motor in the first inlet opening is not
known and thus one could not reasonably establish from the
disclosure that the inflow area of the first inlet opening is
substantially equal to the inflow area of the second inlet
opening.

Id. at 5.
The purpose of the written description requirement in 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, is to “‘clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art
to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.’” Ariad Pharm.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Vas-
Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[T]he
test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon
reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. This test
“requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from
the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id.
Here, Appellant’s Specification states in paragraph 12 that in a
“common construction of blower housings . . . equal size inlet openings in
the side walls of the blower housings . . . avoid buffeting.” As the inlet
openings are the same size, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand that the airflow rates through the first and second inlet openings
in a “common construction of blower housings” are substantially equal.
Appellant’s Specification further describes in paragraph 12 that in the
claimed invention, even though the diameter dimension of the first inlet
opening is increased to accommodate the motor, “the inflow of air through
the first inlet opening is not substantially reduced” and “the second inlet
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opening is maintained at a smaller diameter dimension to avoid creating the
problem of buffeting.” Accordingly, in paragraph 12 of the Specification,
even though the size of the first inlet opening has increased to accommodate
a motor, nonetheless, the air flow rate through the first inlet opening “is not
substantially reduced,” as compared to a situation in which the motor is not
present in the first inlet opening, i.e., a common construction.
Furthermore, as the size of the second inlet opening is “maintained,”
the air flow rate through the second inlet is also maintained, as compared to
a situation in which the motor is not present in the first inlet opening, i.e., a
common construction. Hence, as the air flow rate through the first inlet
opening “is not substantially reduced” and the air flow rate through the
second inlet is maintained, as compared to a situation in which the motor is
not present in the first inlet opening, i.e., a common construction, the flow
rates are “substantially equal.” We, thus, agree with Appellant that “the
blower assembly [of independent claim 13] must operate in a condition
where the air flow rates through both the first and second air inlet openings
are substantially the same.” Reply Brief (filed Sept. 23, 2019, hereinafter
“Reply Br.”) 3.
Such an interpretation is also supported by the description in
paragraph 12 of the buffeting problem. In particular, paragraph 12 states
that in a “common construction of blower housings . . . equal size inlet
openings in the side walls of the blower housings . . . avoid buffeting.” As
the inlet openings are the same size, a person of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that the airflow rates are substantially equal, and, thus,
buffeting is avoided when the air flow rates through the openings is
substantially equal. Paragraph 12 further states that even though the size of
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the first inlet opening is increased, “the second inlet opening is maintained at
a smaller diameter dimension to avoid creating the problem of buffeting.”
As buffeting is avoided when the air flow rates through the openings is
substantially equal, we agree with Appellant that “air flow through the first
and second inlet openings [in independent claim 13] is substantially the
same.” Reply Br. 3.
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the limitation “first and
second air inlet openings being sized such that during operation of the
blower assembly, air flow rate through the first air inlet opening is
substantially equal to air flow rate through the second air inlet opening,” as
recited in independent claim 13, is supported by Appellant’s original
disclosure. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, of independent claim 13, and claims 14–17 depending
therefrom, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.

Rejection II
Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5
Independent claim 1 requires, inter alia, “at least a substantial portion
of the motor casing being positioned axially between the first and second air
inlet openings.” Appeal Br. 18 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Kim discloses an air blower including motor
6, wherein “at least a substantial portion of the motor casing . . . [is]
positioned axially between the first and second air inlet openings.” Final
Act. 6–7 (citing Kim, Fig. 3A). The Examiner explains that “support (80)
which is the casing extends axially between the first and second inlet
openings and supports arms (88 a) (reinforcement ribs) which are part of the
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support (80) also extends axially between the first and second inlets.” Ans.
5–6 (see Examiner’s annotated partial Figure 3B of Kim).
Appellant argues that Kims’ “supporter 80 cannot be considered to be
any type of ‘motor casing’ element.” Appeal Br. 11.
The Examiner responds that “[w]hether support 80 is part of the motor
or not is not relevant for it to be ‘a casing of the motor’,” because “[t]he
support 80 covers the motor and the motor shaft which is part of the motor
extends therethrough.” Id. at 6.
During examination, “claims . . . are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, [ ] and . . . claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
833 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (citing In re Sneed, 710 F.2d
1544, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This means that the words of the claim must be
given their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the
specification. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In this case,
an ordinary and customary meaning of the term “casing” is “a protective
case or cover” or a “housing.”5 This is consistent with Appellant’s Figures 1
and 4, which illustrate motor casing 44 as “a protective case or cover” or a
“housing” for motor 14. In contrast, Kim’s support 80 does not constitute “a
protective case or cover” or a “housing” for motor 6, but rather secures
motor 6 to the top air inlet 410b of fan housing 40. See Kim, para. 167, Fig.
3A. In other words, just because Kim’s support 80 covers motor 6 does not
mean that it protects motor 6 as well; rather, support 80 secures motor 6 to

5 See The Free Dictionary, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/casing (last
visited March 26, 2021).
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fan housing 40. Accordingly, the Examiner’s claim interpretation, which
relies on the view that any element that covers a motor constitutes a “motor
casing” is unreasonably broad in view of the plain and ordinary meaning of
the term “casing” as it would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in
the art in light of Appellant’s Specification.
As such, although Kim’s supporter 80 does not constitute a “motor
casing,” as it would be understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in
light of Appellant’s Specification, Kim’s motor 6, nonetheless, has a
corresponding “housing” that protects its internal components, i.e., rotor 60,
stator 65, shaft 68, rotor bushing 70, bearings 69a, 69b. See Kim, para. 50.
Kim’s Figure 3A illustrates motor 6, and its corresponding “motor casing, as
being positioned at the top air inlet 410b of fan housing 40.” See also Kim,
para. 167. We agree with Appellant that Kim’s “motor 6 is located above
the air inlet [410b] and is not located in any axial position between the two
air inlets 410a, 410b.” Appeal Br. 11.
Accordingly, “at least a substantial portion” of Kim’s motor 6, and its
corresponding “motor casing,” is not positioned axially between first and
second air inlet openings 410a, 410b or within the interior volume of
cylindrical fan 40, as called for by independent claim 1 and dependent claim
12, respectively. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) of independent claim 1, and its dependent claims 2, 4, and 5 as
anticipated by Kim.

Claims 7 and 9
Independent claim 7 requires, inter alia, “a first air inlet opening with
a first diameter dimension . . . a second air inlet opening with a second
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diameter dimension, and the first diameter dimension being larger than the
second diameter dimension.” See Appeal Br. 20 (Claims App.)
The Examiner finds that Kim’s first inlet opening 410b has a diameter
dimension larger than second inlet opening 410a. Final Act. 6 (citing Kim,
Fig. 3A).
Appellant argues that “[t]he Examiner’s reliance on Figure 3A is
misplaced.” Appeal Br. 12. According to Appellant, Figure 3A is not a
proper cross-sectional view because supporter 80 is shown in Figure 4A as
having support arms 80a (reinforcing ribs)6 separated at 120o, whereas in
Figure 3A they appear as separated by 180o. Id. Thus, Appellant contends
that because Figures 3A and 4A are inconsistent, Kim’s Figure 3A “cannot
be drawn to scale.” Id. Appellant further notes that “no additional
disclosure within Kim’s specification discloses or suggests unequal air inlet
openings, nor first and second air inlet openings having different sized
diameters.” Id. Accordingly, Appellant contends that “Kim’s lack of
specification disclosure in combination with non-planar section view
drawings shows that Kim does not disclose a blower having a first air inlet
opening with a diameter larger than a second air inlet opening.” Id. at 13
(citing Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, 222 F.3d 951, 956
(Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124 (CCPA 1977); In re Chitayat,
408 F.2d 475 (CCPA 1969)); see also Reply Br. 5–6.
Although we appreciate that the drawings in Kim are not designated
as being drawn to scale and thus cannot be relied upon to define precise
proportions of elements as Kim’s disclosure is completely silent on the

6 Nomenclature in parenthesis refers to Kim.
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issue, that does not mean “that things patent drawings show clearly are to be
disregarded.” In re Mraz, 455 F.2d 1069, 1072 (CCPA 1972). A drawing
teaches all that it reasonably discloses and suggests to a person of ordinary
skill in the art. In re Aslanian, 590 F.2d 911, 914 (CCPA 1979).
We do not find the Hockerson-Halberstadt decision to be closest on
point to the situation presented here. Hockerson-Halberstadt, which cites to
In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124 (CCPA 1977), both stand for the proposition that
it is error to rely on that which is illustrated in the drawings as disclosing
precise proportions or particular sizes of elements so illustrated if the
Specification is completely silent as to such proportions or sizes. See also
Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005). More specifically, the
Court in Wright cautioned that arguments based on measurements obtained
from patent drawings are regarded as having little value where the patent does
not disclose that the drawings are to scale and absent any disclosure of
quantitative values. Wright, 569 F.2d at 1127.
Rather, we find the Mraz and Aslanian decisions to be more on point.
In the Mraz case, the Court characterized the illustrations of the prior art
reference as, “focus[ing] on the edge rolls, showing them with great
particularity and showing the grooves thereon to have an angularity well
within the range recited in appellant’s claims.” Mraz, 435 F.2d at 1072.
Similarly, in Aslanian, the Court relied on the drawings of the prior art
reference to show that they anticipate “a longitudinally convex portion . . .
having a height approximately corresponding to [a height] said first convex
portion.” Aslanian, 590 F.2d at 912, 915 (emphasis added). In effect, these
cases stand for the proposition that a drawing teaches to a person of ordinary
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skill in the art features that are clearly shown and do not require a
determination of precise proportions or particular sizes of elements.
In this case, the claim limitation at issue is directed to “the first
diameter dimension being larger than the second diameter dimension.”
Appeal Br. 20 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). Appellants’ Specification
describes the “first diameter dimension” as “a first interior diameter
dimension” of “circular inner edge 92 of the first side wall 54” and the
“second diameter dimension” as “a second interior diameter dimension” of
“circular inner edge 96” of second side wall 56. See Spec. paras. 26, 27, Fig.
4. Simple observation of Figure 3A would clearly reveal to a skilled artisan
that Kim illustrates a “first diameter dimension” 410b of a circular edge of
shroud 44 of the first side wall (top side in Fig. 3A) and a “second diameter
dimension” 410a of a circular edge of shroud 44 of the second side wall
(bottom side in Fig. 3A). The Examiner’s annotated Figure 3A of Kim is
reproduced below:

The Examiner’s annotated Figure 3A of Kim illustrates first and
second inlet diameters. See Ans. 7.
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Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily observe in
Kim’s Figure 3A that the first inlet diameter is larger than the second inlet
diameter. Such a determination is not the result of measurements to
determine precise proportions or particular sizes of elements. Rather, it is
based on what is clearly shown in Kim’s Figure 3A to a person of ordinary
skill in the art and comparing two “diameter” dimensions, that is, the length
of the first inlet diameter and the length of the second inlet diameter, and
merely determining whether one is longer than the other. As discussed
above, in a similar fashion, the Court in Aslanian compared two “height”
dimensions in the drawings of the prior art reference to show that the
“height” of a longitudinally convex portion is “approximately” that of the
height of a first convex portion. Aslanian, 590 F.2d at 912, 915.
In contrast to the instant case and Aslanian, in Ex Parte Egon
Goppelsroder et al., 2013 WL 6217776 (PTAB, Nov. 25, 2013), the
Examiner compares a “radial” dimension with a “diameter” dimension in the
drawings of the prior art reference to show that one is smaller (shorter) than
the other. In other words, in contrast to the “diameter” dimensions of the
instant case and the “height” dimensions of Aslanian, Goppelsroder’s
“diameter” dimension is compared to a “radial” dimension; where a
diameter is related to a radius by a specific precise proportion of 2:1. As
such, Appellant’s citation to Goppelsroder for the proposition that “reliance
solely on Figure 3A of Kim to disclose different diameter air inlet openings
without any additional support within Kim’s specification is improper” is
misplaced. See Reply Br. 7–8. Making a determination in Goppelsroder
from the drawings of the prior art reference about whether the claimed
“radial” dimension is smaller than the claimed “diameter” dimension would
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require a skilled artisan to determine precise proportions, which, as
discussed supra, is not required in either the instant case or in Aslanian.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Kim’s Figures 3A and 4A are inconsistent because support arms 80a
(reinforcing ribs) are separated at 120o in Figure 4A, whereas in Figure 3A
they appear as separated by 180o. See Appeal Br. 12; Reply Br. 5–6. First,
Kim discloses that having three support arms 80a (reinforcing ribs) is merely
“preferable,” and, thus, other configurations are possible, such as four
support arms 80a (reinforcing ribs) separated by 90o. See Kim, para. 173.
Second, the feature discussed above, that is, a first inlet having a diameter
larger than the diameter of a second inlet, refers to the inlet diameters about
shroud 44 of fan housing 40, which is a component separate from supporter
80. See Kim, Fig. 3A. In other words, the features of supporter 80 have no
bearing on the features of fan housing 40, that is, on the first and second
inlets, as illustrated above in the Examiner’s annotated Figure 3A of Kim.
In conclusion, we agree with the Examiner that “it is clear from
[Kim’s] FIG. 3A that the two inlets have different sizes,” that is, “the first
inlet diameter is larger than second inlet diameter.” Ans. 7–8. Accordingly,
for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
of claim 7 as anticipated by Kim.
As Appellant does not separately argue claim 9 (see Appeal Br. 9–14),
which depends from claim 7, for the same reasons discussed supra, we
likewise sustain the anticipation rejection of claim 9 based upon Kim.

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Claim 12
Claim 12 depends from independent claim 7 and adds the limitation
that “at least a substantial portion of the motor casing is within the
cylindrical interior volume of the fan.” See Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).
This is the same feature that was discussed supra in the anticipation
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, for the same reasons discussed
above, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) of claim 12
as anticipated by Kim.

Rejection III
Claims 1–12
The Examiner finds that the combined teachings of Ranz and Kim
disclose all the limitations of claims 1–12. See Final Act. 12–18.
Appellant argues that “neither Kim nor Ranz, whether considered
individually or together, disclose or suggest air inlet openings of different
diameters,” as called for by independent claims 1 and 7. See Appeal Br. 15.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument for the reasons
discussed supra in the anticipation rejection of claims 7 and 9. As
discussed, a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily observe in
Kim’s Figure 3A that the first inlet diameter is larger than the second inlet
diameter. See Ans. 7, Examiner’s annotated Figure 3A of Kim. Appellant’s
conclusory assertion that “it would not be obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the art to arrive at the claimed invention in view of Ranz and Kim”
ignores and fails to point out the error in the reasoning provided by the
Examiner. See Final Act. 14.
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Accordingly, we sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of
claims 1–12 as unpatentable over Ranz and Kim.

Claims 13–17
Independent claim 13 requires, inter alia, that “air flow rate through
the first air inlet opening is substantially equal to air flow rate through the
second air inlet opening.” See Appeal Br. 21 (Claims App.).
The Examiner finds that Ranz discloses most of the limitations of
independent claim 13, but “does not specifically disclose the first diameter
dimension being larger than the second diameter dimension . . . air flow rate
through the first air inlet opening is substantially equal to air flow rate
through the second air inlet opening.” Final Act. 19–20. Nonetheless, the
Examiner finds that “the first diameter dimension being larger than the
second diameter dimension” and “air flow rate through the first air inlet
opening is substantially equal to air flow rate through the second air inlet
opening.” Id. at 20.
Appellant argues that “Kim discloses an imbalance in the inflow
rates of air for the different air inlet openings,” and, moreover, according to
Appellant, “Kim deems this imbalance desirable.” Appeal Br. 15–16 (citing
Kim, paras. 77, 137, 167, 181, and 182, Fig. 18).
It is undisputed that Kim discloses unequal air flow rates through first
and second air inlet openings 410b, 410. See Kim, para. 77 (“[A]n air flow
rate through the air inlet 410a opposite to a side the motor is mounted
thereon is higher.”). As such, modifying Ranz to have a first diameter
dimension larger than a second diameter dimension, as taught by Kim,
would result in unequal air flow rates through Ranz’s first and second air
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inlet openings. Hence, the combined teachings of Ranz and Kim do not
disclose an “air flow rate through the first air inlet opening [that] is
substantially equal to [an] air flow rate through the second air inlet opening,”
as called for by independent claim 13.
In addition, upon reviewing the record, we note that the Examiner’s
Answer offers no rebuttal to Appellant’s argument that Kim discloses
unequal air flow rates through first and second air inlet openings. Compare
Appeal Br. 15–17 with, Ans. 8–9. As such, this circumstance leads us to
determine that because Appellant’s argument under review is unrebutted by
the Examiner, it is therefore persuasive.
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of independent claim 13, and its
dependent claims 14–17, as unpatentable over Ranz and Kim.

CONCLUSION

Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
13–17 112, 1st ¶ Written description 13–17
1, 2, 4, 5,
7, 9, 12
103 Kim 7, 9 1, 2, 4, 5,
12
1–17 103 Ranz, Kim 1–12 13–17
Overall
Outcome
1–12 13–17

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED IN PART