Steven Madden, Ltd.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 29, 2013

No. 85313681 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2013)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Hearing: Mailed:
November 21, 2013 November 29, 2013

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Steven Madden, Ltd.
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Serial No. 85313681
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Thomas M. Furth for Kudman Trachten Aloe LLP for Steven Madden, Ltd.

Zachary Bello, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 111 (Robert Lorenzo,
Managing Attorney).
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Before Rogers, Grendel and Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Steven Madden, Ltd. (“applicant”) filed an intent-to-use application to
register the mark Freebird by Steven, in standard character form, for “shoes,” in
Class 25.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused to register applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground
that applicant’s mark so resembles the previously registered mark FREE BIRD, in
standard character form, for “A-shirts; Button-front aloha shirts; Camp shirts;
Dress shirts; Golf shirts; Knit shirts; Long-sleeved shirts; Night shirts; Open-necked
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shirts; Pique shirts; Polo shirts; Shirts; Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts; Short-
sleeved shirts; Pants; Lingerie; Jackets,” in Class 25, as to be likely to cause
confusion.
Preliminary Issue
In its brief, applicant requested that the Board take judicial notice of the
definition of the term “Free Bird” from the Wikipedia entry that it attached to its
appeal brief. The Trademark Examining Attorney objected to applicant’s
submission of the Wikipedia entry on the ground that the evidence was not timely
filed. Further, the Trademark Examining Attorney argued that Wikipedia evidence
is not the type of evidence of which the Board may take judicial notice.
In ex parte appeals, the Board may take judicial notice of such things as
dictionary definitions, encyclopedia entries, standard reference works and
commonly known facts. See authorities collected in TBMP §1208.04 (3d ed. rev.2
2013).
The Board addressed the admissibility of evidence derived from Wikipedia in
In re IP Carrier Consulting Group, 84 USPQ2d 1028 (TTAB 2007).
There are inherent problems regarding the
reliability of Wikipedia entries because Wikipedia is
a collaborative website that permits anyone to edit
the entries. See in re Total Quality Group, Inc., 51
USPQ2d 1474, 1475-1476 (TTAB 1999) (information
retrieved from the Internet is probative to the extent that
it is information available to the public, and of the way in
which a term is used by the public, but the weight given
to such evidence must be carefully evaluated because the
source is often unknown). In fact, the “About Wikipedia”
section of wikipedia.org warns users that articles can be
edited by anyone with access to the Internet. That section
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further explains that editors do not need any specialized
qualifications to contribute. As a result, entries,
especially newer entries and recent edits, may contain
significant misinformation, false or debatable
information, “unencyclopedic” content, unexpected
oversights and omissions, vandalism, or unchecked
information that requires removal. At any given time an
article may be in the middle of an edit or controversial
rewrite. The editors provide the following warning:
“Therefore, a common conclusion is that it [Wikipedia] is
a valuable resource and provides a good reference point on
its subjects, but like any online source, unfamiliar
information should be checked before relying on it.”
Id. at 1032 (Emphasis added). Because Wikipedia is a source whose accuracy may
be questioned, it is not a source from which the Board may take judicial notice, and
it must be offered into the record at a time when the non-offering party will have an
opportunity to rebut the evidence. Id. at 1032 (“the Board will consider evidence
taken from Wikipedia so long as the non-offering party has an opportunity to rebut
that evidence by submitting other evidence that may call into question the accuracy
of the particular Wikipedia information.”).
Also, Trademark Rule 2.142(d) provides the following:
The record in the application should be complete prior to
the filing of an appeal. The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board will ordinarily not consider additional evidence
filed with the Board by the appellant or by the examiner
after the appeal is filed. After an appeal is filed, if the
appellant or the examiner desires to introduce additional
evidence, the appellant or the examiner may request the
Board to suspend the appeal and to remand the
application for further examination.
Accordingly, applicant’s evidence derived from Wikipedia and submitted for the first
time with its brief was not timely filed, and was not offered at a time when the
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examining attorney would have had a chance to rebut it, because Rule 2.142(d) bars
the examining attorney from offering rebuttal evidence with his brief.
The objection is, therefore, sustained and we will not consider the evidence
submitted with applicant’s brief. Nevertheless, even if we had considered it, it
would not have affected our decision.
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on an
analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567
(CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the similarities
between the goods and/or services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976). See also, In re Dixie
Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
A. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entirety in terms of
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.

We turn first to the du Pont likelihood of confusion factor focusing on the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. In re E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 177
USPQ at 567. In comparing the marks, we are mindful the test is not whether the
marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather
whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial
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impression so that confusion as to the source of the services offered under the
respective marks is likely to result. San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD
Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977); Spoons
Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d
unpublished, No. 92-1086 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1992). The proper focus is on the
recollection of the average customer, who retains a general rather than specific
impression of the marks. Winnebago Industries, Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207
USPQ 335, 344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106,
108 (TTAB 1975). As discussed below, since the applicant’s goods are shoes and
registrant’s goods are shirts, pants, lingerie and jackets and neither description of
goods has any limitations or restrictions, the average customer is an ordinary
consumer.
Applicant’s mark Freebird by Steven and the registered mark FREE BIRD
are similar to the extent that they both include the term “Free Bird.” The
presence or absence of a space between applicant’s display of “Freebird” and
registrant’s display of FREE BIRD is an inconsequential difference that even if
noticed or remembered by consumers would not serve to distinguish these marks.
See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward International, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB
1984) (SEA GUARD and SEAGUARD are "essentially identical"); In re Best Western
Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827 (TTAB 1984) (“there can be little doubt
that the marks [BEEFMASTER for restaurant services and BEEF MASTER for
frankfurters and bologna] are practically identical and indeed applicant has not
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argued otherwise.”) (Emphasis in the original). See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company v. Dayco Corporation, 201 USPQ 485, 489 n.4 (TTAB 1978) (“Fast-Finder”
with hyphen is in legal contemplation substantially identical to “Fastfinder”
without hyphen).
Applicant’s mark encompasses registrant’s entire mark FREE BIRD. In such
circumstances, where the entirety of one mark is incorporated within another,
likelihood of confusion often has been found. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Memphis, Tennessee, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 188
USPQ 105 (CCPA 1975) (applicant’s mark BENGAL LANCER for club soda,
quinine water and ginger ale is likely to cause confusion with BENGAL for gin);
Johnson Publishing Co. v. International Development Ltd., 221 USPQ 155, 156
(TTAB 1982) (applicant’s mark EBONY DRUM for hairdressing and conditioner is
likely to cause confusion with EBONY for cosmetics); In re Cosvetic Laboratories,
Inc., 202 USPQ 842 (TTAB 1979) (applicant’s mark HEAD START COSVETIC for
vitamins for hair conditioners and shampoo is likely to cause confusion with HEAD
START for men’s hair lotion and after-shaving lotion).
However, because the marks share the term “Freebird”/FREE BIRD, that in
and of itself does not mean that the marks are similar. The similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks is determined based on the marks in their entireties, and
our analysis cannot be predicated on dissecting the marks into their various
components; that is, the decision must be based on the entire marks, not just part of
the marks. In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir.
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1985). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ
23, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not be dissected and
considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in determining
likelihood of confusion”). On the other hand, different features may be analyzed to
determine whether the marks are similar. Price Candy Company v. Gold Medal
Candy Corporation, 220 F.2d 759, 105 USPQ 266, 268 (CCPA 1955). In fact, there
is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has
been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests
on a consideration of the marks in their entireties. In re National Data Corp., 224
USPQ at 751.
We find that the term “Freebird” is the dominant element of applicant’s
mark. Since it is the first part of applicant’s mark, it is that part of the mark which
is most likely to catch the attention of consumers. See Presto Products Inc. v. Nice-
Pak Products, Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“[I]t is often the first part of
a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered”). See also Palm Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Fondee
En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Veuve” is the
most prominent part of the mark VEUVE CLICQUOT because “veuve” is the first
word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label); Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (upon encountering the marks, consumers will first notice the identical lead
word).
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Moreover, in applicant’s mark, Freebird would be seen as the product mark
identifying the source of a specific item (i.e., shoes), while “by Steven” would be seen
as a house mark that may be used on a wide range of products manufactured by
that entity. Consumers could well think that “by Steven” identifies the source of
the FREE BIRD products or that registrant has licensed applicant to manufacture
shoes under the Freebird brand. In other cases where an applicant has used a
source modifier, such as “by Steven,” with an otherwise registrable term, such as
“Freebird,” the Board has held that the source modifier does not distinguish the
marks. See In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007) (CORAZON
BY CHICA v. CHICA: “BY CHICA” will be viewed as the identification of the
previously anonymous source of the goods sold under the mark CORAZON); Saks &
Co. v. TFM Industries, Inc., 5 USPQ2d 1762, 1764 (TTAB 1987) (FOLIO v. FOLIO
BY FIRE ISLANDER; “the use of the phrase BY FIRE ISLANDER may only tend to
increase and not decrease the likelihood of confusion.”); In re Apparel Ventures, Inc.,
229 USPQ 225, 226 (TTAB 1986) (SPARKS v. SPARKS by sassafras: “Those
already familiar with registrant’s use of its mark in connection with its goods, upon
encountering applicant’s mark on applicant’s goods, could easily assume that
‘sassafras’ is some sort of house mark that may be used with only some of the
SPARKS goods. Conversely, those familiar with only applicant’s mark would, upon
encountering the registered mark on related goods, assume that all SPARKS
products come from a single source, and that source was in some instances further
identified with the words ‘by sassafras.’”);
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Nevertheless, applicant argues that the addition of the term “by Steven” is
sufficient to distinguish the marks because Steven Madden is “almost synonymous
with shoes.”1 To corroborate its argument, applicant references the thirteen (13)
registrations it made of record for STEVEN and STEVEN formative marks owned
by applicant, and stories from general and fashion-oriented publications featuring
extensive coverage of Steven Madden and his shoe designs and other business
endeavors. Thus, applicant concludes that “[i]t is without question that consumers
encountering FREEBIRD BY STEVEN as a mark for shoes will associate the mark
with Steve Madden.”2
Applicant’s evidence and argument has some deficiencies. First, the
registrations owned by applicant incorporating the name STEVEN are not evidence
that consumers recognize the mark STEVEN as a reference to Steven Madden.
Registrations are not evidence that marks are in use or that the public has become
familiar with them. Cf. Smith Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Stone Mfg. Co., 476 F.2d 1004, 177
USPQ 462, 463 (CCPA 1973) (the purchasing public is not aware of registrations
reposing in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); In re Hub Distributing, Inc., 218
USPQ 284, 285 (TTAB 1983).
Second, applicant’s evidence demonstrates that Steven Madden is a
renowned shoe designer and entrepreneur; but there is no evidence that consumers
seeing a mark incorporating the term “by Steven” in connection with clothing or
shoes think of Steven Madden.

1 Applicant’s Brief, p. 4.
2 Applicant’s Brief, pp. 3-4.
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Finally, even if the record showed that consumers associated “by Steven”
with Steven Madden, the du Pont factors only list the fame of the prior mark (FREE
BIRD) as relevant to our analysis. “A junior party’s fame cannot excuse likelihood
of confusion created by its use of a mark similar to one already in use.” General
Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Industry SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1602 (TTAB
2011), citing In re Christian Dior SA, 225 USPQ 533, 535 (TTAB 1985) (CACHET
vs. LE CACHET DE DIOR: “those purchasers familiar with registrant’s ‘CACHET’
products would, upon encountering ‘LE CACHET DE DIOR’ shirts, assume that
DIOR is the source of the CACHET products.”).
Applicant also argues that “when used in connection with women’s apparel,
the term [FREE BIRD] is highly suggestive” and, thus, the addition of the source
modifier “by Steven” is sufficient to distinguish the marks.3 Applicant’s argument
regarding the distinctiveness of the term “FREE BIRD” is based on its reference to
the lyrics of the Lynyrd Skynyrd song “Free Bird” which “refers to the relationships
between men and women” and that the term “Bird” is British slang for a girl.”4 We
disagree. First, British slang is not American slang and there is nothing in the
record to prove that American consumers understand that the term “Bird” means
girl. Second, even if the Lynyrd Skynyrd song “FREE BIRD” refers to the
relationships between men and women, we fail to see how that has anything to do
with shoes and clothing. We cannot conclude, in the absence of supporting

3 Applicant’s Brief, pp. 3-4.
4 Applicant’s Brief, p. 4.
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evidence, that FREE BIRD is highly suggestive or that it is weak term when used in
connection with shirts, pants, lingerie and jackets.
In view of the foregoing, we find that applicant’s mark Freebird by Steven
is similar to the mark FREE BIRD in terms of appearance, sound, meaning and
commercial impression.
B. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods described in the
application and the registration, the established likely-to-continue trade
channels and classes of consumers.

Applicant is seeking to register its mark for “shoes.” The registered mark is
for shirts, pants, lingerie and jackets. The evidence demonstrating that shoes are
related to shirts, pants, lingerie and jackets is sparse. However, applicant does not
dispute the proposition that shoes can originate from the same source as other
items of apparel.5
In the March 10, 2012 Office action, the Trademark Examining Attorney
submitted the following evidence to show that shoes are related to shirts, pants,
lingerie and jackets:
1. Registration Nos. 1097555 and 1168477 for the mark GUCCI for inter alia
footwear and shirts.6 GUCCI is a well-known designer mark. Since it is well-
recognized that designer marks can be used to identify a broad range of products,

5 Applicant’s Brief, p. 6.
6 The Trademark Examining Attorney also submitted a copy of Registration No. 0078333
for the mark MACY’S (stylized) but shoes has been deleted from the description of goods.
Because the description of goods does not include goods listed in both the application and
registration, it has no probative value.
The Trademark Examining Attorney also submitted an excerpt from the GUCCI website
displaying the sale of handbags and shoes. Because the excerpt does not show the sale of
products in both the application and registration, it has no probative value.
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the inclusion of shirts and footwear in the registrations is not particularly
significant. Cf. In re Donnay International, S.A., 31 USPQ2d 1953, 1954 n.3 (TTAB
1994) (registrations for house marks have little probative value in showing that
goods are related); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6
(TTAB 1988) (noting that large department stores sell a wide variety of goods and
services and, therefore, registrations owned by department stores listing a wide
variety of products have little probative value in showing that goods are related).
2. An excerpt from the Macy’s website (macys.com) advertising a
“weekend sale” for “shoes” and “women,” “men,” “juniors,” and “kids” for which we
presume means clothing for those groups. However, since the excerpt does not
display any brands, the website does not show that shoes, pants, lingerie and
jackets emanate from the same source. The website shows only that Macy’s sells
those products and, therefore, that the products move in the same channels of trade.
In the October 5, 2012 Office action, the Trademark Examining Attorney
submitted the following evidence:7
1. Excerpts from the COLE HAAN website (colehaan.com) advertising
the sale of footwear and jackets. However, there is no evidence that the footwear
and jackets are identified by the same trademarks. It shows that the goods are sold
in the same channels of trade.

7 The Trademark Examining Attorney submitted an excerpt from the StatMyWeb website
(statemyweb.com) which provided statistical information about the Calvinklein.com
website. The description of the website stated “shop calvin klein for women’s and men’s
clothing, handbags, footwear, bedding, bath, dinnerware, and more.” This website has very
limited probative value because it does not actually show Calvin Klein offering the sale of
any of these products or whether any of these products are sold under the same trademark.
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2. Excerpts from the Michael Kors website (michaelkors.com) showing
that Michael Kors sells women’s and men’s clothing and shoes. However, there is
no evidence that the clothing and shoes are identified by the same trademarks.
This website shows that the goods move in the same trade channels.
3. Excerpts from the John Varvatos website (johnvarvatos.com) showing
that John Varvatos sells apparel and shoes. The excerpt shows that John Varvatos
sells JOHN VARVATOS branded shirts, jackets, pants and shoes.
4. Excerpts from the Kate Spade website (katespade.com) showing the
sale of shoes and clothing. However, there is no evidence that the clothing or shoes
are identified by the same trademarks. The website shows that the goods move in
the same trade channels.
5. Excerpts from the MARSHALL’S website (marshalls.com) showing the
sale of shows and clothing. However, there is no evidence that the clothing or shoes
are identified by the same trademarks. The website shows that the goods move in
the same trade channels.
6. Excerpts from the PUMA website (shop.puma.com) advertising the
sale of shoes and hoodies. There is nothing that shows the sale of shirts, pants,
lingerie or jackets.
7. Excerpts from the REEBOK website (shop.reebok.com) advertising the
sale of shoes. There is nothing that shows the sale of shirts, pants, lingerie or
jackets.
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8. Excerpts from the Nordstrom website (Nordstrom.com) advertising the
sale of Steven Madden shirts jackets and shoes. This evidence shows that applicant
sells shirts, jackets and shoes.
In addition, applicant submitted the following evidence in its February 17,
2012 response to Office action that shows that applicant sells shoes and other items
of apparel:
1. Registration No. 2856436 for the mark STEVEN for footwear; namely,
sandals, shoes and boots; and clothing; namely, tee shirts, shirts, jackets, skirts,
jeans, pants, dresses, coats, socks, undergarments and hats.
2. Applicant’s website (stevemadden.com) states that applicant is
expanding into apparel as well as shoes.
3. A March 3, 1997 article in brandweek.com reporting that applicant is
“extending the brand in a range of new directions, including clothing – an unusual
undertaking for a footwear manufacturer.”
Madden, however, claims its core customer has already
made the leap from shoe brand to clothes, via a series of
T-shirts it designed and marketed in-house, made
distinctive by their concept packaging and merchandising.
See also July 14, 1997 article in Newsday.com discussing applicant’s expansion into
designer sportswear and jeans.
We find it significant that applicant has expanded into apparel. This means
that applicant is competing with the registrant. The same person may purchase
Freebird by Steven shoes from applicant and later purchase FREE BIRD shirts,
pants, lingerie or jackets, or vice versa. In either case, it is likely that the purchaser
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will assume that there is a common source for shoes and apparel or an association
between the sources of each because of the similarity of the marks. Thus, we find
that applicant’s shoes and registrant’s shirts, pants, lingerie and jackets are related
and that they may be sold to the same potential purchasers. In addition, the
evidence also shows that shoes and other items of apparel are sold through the
same channels of trade.
Applicant contends that applicant’s shoes and registrant’s apparel move in
different channels of trade and are sold to different classes of consumers.
Applicant’s evidence demonstrates that the goods offered
by the Registrant, which are sold only via the internet
and only to wholesalers who have registered on its
website, are inexpensive items that are not sold in the
same channels as Applicant’s goods. Consumers are
generally influenced by the price of a fashion item in
assessing its quality. … [R]egistrant’s goods consist of
inexpensive dresses, skirts and tops (no footwear) and
they are not sold at prices that would lead to confusion
among consumers when compared to the prices of
[applicant’s] merchandise. The average item on
registrant’s website sells for $10-$12 at wholesale. As
shown in the evidence made of record by the Examining
Attorney, the retail prices of [applicant’s] shoes are often
well in excess of $100.8
The problem with applicant’s argument is that this proceeding concerns
applicant’s right to registration of a trademark, and we cannot focus on applicant’s
actual circumstances relating to use of its trademark. Because the scope of the
registration applicant seeks is defined by its application (and not by its actual use)

8 Applicant’s Brief, p. 7.
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it is the application (and not actual use) that we must look to in determining
applicant’s right to register:
The authority is legion that the question of registrability
of an applicant's mark must be decided on the basis of the
identification of goods set forth in the application
regardless of what the record may reveal as to the
particular nature of an applicant's goods, the particular
channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which sales
of the goods are directed.
Octocom Syst. Inc. v. Houston Computers Svcs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Likewise, in considering the scope of the cited registration,
we look to the registration itself, and not to extrinsic evidence about the registrant’s
actual goods, customers, or channels of trade. In re Elbaum, 211 USPQ 639, 640
(TTAB 1981), citing Kalart Co., Inc. v. Camera-Mart, Inc., 119 USPQ 139 (CCPA
1958). Because the description of goods in applicant’s application and the
description of goods in registrant’s registration are not limited to any specific
channels of trade or classes of consumers, it is presumed that the goods move in all
the channels of trade normal for those goods and that they are available to all
classes of purchasers for those goods. See In re Linkvest S.A., 24 USPQ2d 1716,
1716 (TTAB 1992).
Furthermore, we cannot resort to such extrinsic evidence to restrict the prices
of applicant’s or registrant’s goods. See In re Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., 229 USPQ
763, 764 (TTAB 1986) (evidence that relevant goods are expensive wines sold to
discriminating purchasers must be disregarded given the absence of any such
restrictions in the application or registration). We must presume that both
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applicant’s shoes and registrant’s apparel would be sold at all the usual prices for
such goods.
We find that applicant’s shoes and registrant’s shirts, pants, lingerie and
jackets are related products that move in the same channels of trade and are sold to
the same classes of consumers.
C. Balancing the factors.
Because the marks are similar and the goods are related and must be
presumed to move in the same channels of trade and be sold to the same classes of
consumers, we find that applicant’s mark Freebird by Steven for shoes would be
likely to cause confusion with the mark FREE BIRD for “A-shirts; Button-front
aloha shirts; Camp shirts; Dress shirts; Golf shirts; Knit shirts; Long-sleeved shirts;
Night shirts; Open-necked shirts; Pique shirts; Polo shirts; Shirts; Short-sleeved or
long-sleeved t-shirts; Short-sleeved shirts; Pants; Lingerie; Jackets.”.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.