Steven Kenik, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes/Mid West Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 17, 2000
01a00195 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 17, 2000)

01a00195

04-17-2000

Steven Kenik, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Great Lakes/Mid West Areas), Agency.


Steven Kenik, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01A00195

v. ) Agency No. 4J-600-0130-97

) Hearing No. 210-98-6435X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(Great Lakes/Mid West Areas), )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq <1> The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). Complainant alleges he was discriminated against

on the bases of race (Caucasian), color (white), and sex (male), when,

in January 1997, he was removed from his position during his probationary

period. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's

final decision.

The record reveals that complainant, a Rural Carrier Associate at the

agency's Grayslake, Illinois facility, filed a formal EEO complaint with

the agency on May 10, 1997, alleging that the agency had discriminated

against him as referenced above. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Following a hearing,

the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination.<2>

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of

sex discrimination because the similarly situated employee, not in his

protected class, was treated differently when she was retained during

her probationary period, and complainant was removed.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that complainant was

removed for failure to work at a sufficient speed necessary to keep up

with the work load. Specifically, the AJ found that management officials

credibly and consistently testified that complainant worked only two

different routes, whereas the female comparative employee worked five

different routes. Complainant's office work productivity was not as high

as the comparative employee's; i.e., she cased approximately 25% more mail

than complainant cased per hour. The comparative's delivery productivity,

though not as high as an experienced carrier's, was significantly

higher than complainant's productivity, i.e., the comparative delivered

approximately 25% more mail per hour than complainant.

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely than

not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful

discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found no evidence to

support complainant's assertion that the agency intentionally disregarded

important considerations when evaluating delivery times, in order to

discriminate against him based on his gender. For example, complainant

argued that the agency ignored weather considerations when assessing

his productivity. The AJ found complainant failed to show that the

weather factors had more of an affect on complainant than they did on the

comparative employee, and how that factor constituted sex discrimination.

The AJ found that complainant failed to persuade her that the agency's

reasons for its actions were because of sex.

On September 21, 1999, the agency issued a final decision adopting the

AJ's recommended decision. On appeal, complainant disputes the AJ's

decision and reminds us that he established a prima facie case of sex

discrimination.

Pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a)), all post-hearing factual findings by an

Administrative Judge will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.�

Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474,

477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding that discriminatory intent

did not exist is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant

failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated

by a discriminatory animus toward complainant's sex. We discern no

basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of

the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 17, 2000

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2The AJ noted that complainant failed to identify any similarly situated

individual outside of his protected race and/or color who was treated more

favorably than he was under similar circumstances. The AJ therefore

limited her decision to complainant's claim of sex discrimination.

On appeal, complainant does not raise an objection to the AJ's decision

in this regard. We therefore find complainant is appealing the AJ's

decision that found he was not discriminated against on the basis of sex.