Steven F. Kernan, Complainant,v.Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 30, 2009
0120091770 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 30, 2009)

0120091770

06-30-2009

Steven F. Kernan, Complainant, v. Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Steven F. Kernan,

Complainant,

v.

Tom J. Vilsack,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091770

Agency No. FS-2006-02088

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's January 6, 2009 final decision concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq.

In a formal complaint, dated May 24, 2007, complainant, a job applicant,

alleged that the agency discriminated against him on the bases of sex

(male) and age (over 40) when:

on April 18, 2006, he learned that he was not selected to the position

of Public Affairs Specialist, GS-1035-12, announced under Vacancy

Announcement Number AOS06-R6COL-001FS.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with

complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision on January 6,

2009, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

In its January 6, 2009 final decision, the agency found no discrimination.

Specifically, the agency found that complainant established a prima

facie case of sex and age discrimination because the selectee, outside of

complainant's protected groups, was selected for the position of Public

Affairs Specialist. The agency nevertheless found that management

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for complainant's

non-selection which complainant failed to show were a pretext for

discrimination.

The selecting official (SO) stated that she implemented a reviewing

panel of three agency officials to help her find the best candidate for

the position of Public Affairs Specialist. The record reflects that 16

candidates, including complainant, applied for the subject position and

were referred to SO for consideration. SO further stated that she was

looking for someone "who had demonstrated experience in the public affairs

and managing complex and controversial issues from a public affairs

aspect. I needed someone who had experience in working with local and

regional government agencies. I also wanted someone that had a natural

resources background and if possible experience working with wildfires

and/or other fire management aspects such as prescribed fire." SO stated

that the panel submitted a list of 4 to 5 candidates for consideration.

SO stated that she selected the selectee for the subject position because

she was the best qualified.

SO stated that in regard to public affairs experience category,

the selectee had worked since 1995 as a Fire Information Specialist

performing countless public affairs type duties such as developing

and implementing communication plans for fire and drought related

issues while complainant had some experience "but it was mainly on

the lines of marketing, business development and building training

programs for businesses to use to improve employee retention and sales."

Regarding complex and controversial issues within the public affairs

area, SO stated that the selectee "has much more experience in public

affairs with complex and controversial issues from the work she has done

on numerous large wildfires." SO further stated that some of the large

incidents the selectee had worked on as a Public Information Officer are

Thirty-Mile Fire and the World Trade Center bombing while complainant

only had experience in establishing and building new business and working

in the marketing arena of public affairs.

Further, SO stated that in regard to working with local and regional

government agencies, the selectee had worked with numerous local

government agencies including Tribal governments while complainant had

"limited work experience with local or regional government." Regarding

natural resource and/or fire background, SO stated that the selectee

had worked in natural resources since 1982 while complainant "has no

natural resource background." Finally, SO stated that complainant's

sex and age were not factors in her determination to select selectee

for the subject position.

One of the three panelists (P1) stated that the panel "individually

identified the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate in regards

to how they met the Knowledge, Skills and Abilities (KSA's) that were

contained in the vacancy announcement for the position." P1 further

stated that the panel then met to discuss how they individually evaluated

each candidate and "we each, individually, identified our top group

of candidates. We then came to agreement on which candidates to refer

to the selecting official."

On appeal, complainant contends that "a precedent needs to be established

and communicated in order to reform or deter the future Federal hiring

committee's and similar groups and or persons from pursuing a course of

action such as that which damaged the plaintiff [Complainant]. A positive

decision favoring [Complainant] will give additional incentive for

'applicant friendly' and fair Federal hiring practices and guidelines

that will lessen such stated discrimination tactics and favoritism in

the future [emphasis added]."

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

The agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions which complainant did not prove were a pretext for discrimination,

and that complainant has not demonstrated that these reasons were a

pretext for discrimination.

As an initial matter, we find that complainant, on appeal, has not

provided any persuasive argument regarding the propriety of the agency's

finding of no discrimination. The Commission determines that the agency

conducted a thorough investigation.

Therefore, after a review of the record in its entirety, including

consideration of all statements on appeal, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final

decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not

establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court

that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court

also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs,

or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as

amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request

is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an

attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 30, 2009

__________________

Date

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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