Stephen L. Hodge

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 24, 2019

15341572 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/341,572 11/02/2016 Stephen L. HODGE 3210.1040001 2925
26111 7590 10/24/2019
STERNE, KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN & FOX P.L.L.C.
1100 NEW YORK AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, DC 20005
EXAMINER
POWERS, WILLIAM S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2434
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/24/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
e-office@sternekessler.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte STEPHEN L. HODGE
____________________

Appeal 2018-006258
Application 15/341,572
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.

MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 7–11, 13, 14, and 16–34. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

1 Appellant indicates the real parties in interest is Global Tel*Link
Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 10 are illustrative of the claimed subject matter
(emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. The system comprising:
[A.] an inmate profile database comprising an inmate
information database, an internet profile database, an
internet filter category database, and an internet access
log database;
[B.] an input device configured to receive login information
from an inmate residing in a controlled environment
facility;
[C.] an authentication subsystem configured to verify an
identity of the inmate based on the received login
information;
[D.] an internet profile generator configured to:
[i.] retrieve, from the inmate information database,
inmate information associated with the inmate,
wherein the inmate information includes a criminal
report detailing crimes committed by the inmate,
[ii.] automatically generate an inmate internet profile
that includes internet content categories permitted
or prohibited for the inmate based directly on the
inmate information, and
[iii.] store the inmate internet profile in the internet
profile database; and
[E.] an internet content filtering subsystem configured to:
[i.] receive a request to view a website from the inmate,
[ii.] determine one or more content categories of the
requested website from the internet filter category
database, and
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[iii.] permit internet access to the requested website using
the one or more content categories of the requested
website and a full inmate filter profile, wherein the
full inmate filter profile is a logical combination
of the internet content categories of the inmate
internet profile and a global internet profile
providing internet restrictions applicable to all
inmates of the controlled environment facility
10. The system of claim 1, wherein the internet content filtering
subsystem is further configured to:
[F.] determine from the internet filter category database that the
requested website is an uncategorized website;
[G.] search of the uncategorized website for problematic
content based on the inmate internet profile; and
[H.] provide the inmate with internet access to the
uncategorized website based on the search of the
uncategorized website for problematic content based on
the inmate internet profile.
REFERENCES2
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Kipust US 6,002,427 Dec. 14, 1999
Thomas US 7,134,130 B1 Nov. 7, 2006
Hind US 2002/0095296 Al July 18, 2002
Gutta US 2003/0126267 A1 July 3, 2003
Hodge US 2006/0285650 Al Dec. 21, 2006
Gupta US 2015/0188925 A1 July 2, 2015

2 All citations herein to these references are by reference to the first named
inventor only.
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REJECTION
A.
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 9–11, 16–18, 21–23, 25–30, and
32–34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of
Gupta, Gutta, and Hodge. Final Act. 7–12.
Appellant separately argues claims 1 and 10. Appellant does not
present separate arguments for claims 2–4, 9, 11, 16–18, 21–23, 25–30, and
32–34. Thus, the rejections of these claims turn on our decisions as to claim
1 (with which claims 2–4, 9, 11, 16–18, 21–23, 25–30, and 32–34 are
grouped) and claim 10 (with which claim 18 is grouped). Except for our
ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 103 rejection of claims 2–4, 9, 11,
16–18, 21–23, 25–30, and 32–34 further herein.
B.
The Examiner rejects claims 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, 20, 24, and 31 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over the combination of Gupta, Gutta,
and Hodge in various combinations with other references. Final Act. 13–17.
Appellant does not present arguments for claims 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, 20,
24, and 31. Thus, the rejections of these claims turn on our decision as to
claim 1. Except for our ultimate decision, we do not discuss the § 103
rejections of claims 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, 20, 24, and 31 further herein.

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OPINION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner has erred.
A.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Gupta’s view of the state of the art is that controlled
environments offer one limited, generic restriction profile,
namely a profile that limits almost all content available on the
Internet for everyone. Gupta, para. [0018].
Gupta then proceeds to discuss a new approach, whereby Gupta
replaces the one limited generic, restriction profile described in
paragraph [0018] with his alternative approach. But Gupta’s
alternative approach does not satisfy the recited two separate
profiles, namely the recited “inmate internet profile and a global
internet profile.”
Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis added).
Gupta’s alternative approach does not satisfy the recited
combination of two separate profiles, namely the “inmate
internet profile and a global internet profile.” Instead, Gupta
replaces one profile (a limited, generic profile), not with two
profiles, but with another profile (a customizable profile). . . .
In summary, Gupta does not disclose a “combination” of two
profiles, but instead merely replaces the historical one-profile
approach with another single profile approach.
Appeal Br. 15–16.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. We disagree with
Appellant’s assertion that Gupta uses a “single profile approach.”
Paragraphs 40–54 of Gupta teach using a logical combination of Access Sets
(each defining authorized web content) and Trump Sets (each defining
denied web content).
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In contemplated embodiments, each webpage (or entire
website) or web link listed in a Trump Set is tagged with a hard
deny. This denial of access trumps any conflicting authorization
by an “Access Set.” Thus, if an administrator or overseer
inadvertently assigns or designates a webpage or web links
thereof to an Access Set, or perhaps even assigns the same
webpage or web link to both the Asset Set and the Trump Set,
any designation of the same webpage or web links on a Trump
Set will override the Access Set and access will be denied. If the
ability to create a Trump Set is confined to fewer users than those
able to create Access Sets, denial of access to web content on the
Trump Set can effectively be ensured even when a person
creating an Access Set lacks specific awareness of web content
that has been predefined in Trump Set.
In the correctional facility context, the creation and
acceptance of Access Sets and Trump Sets may be accomplished
for resident inmates individually or as a group, such that one or
more inmates may be provided with one or more “Access Sets”
for the system in use based on a user class as shown at step 228.
Gupta ¶¶ 51–52 (emphasis added). Contrary to Appellant’s “single profile
approach” argument, we determine that there is no meaningful difference
between combining Gupta’s Access/Trump Sets to determine inmate
Internet access, and the combining restrictions to determine inmate Internet
access as described by Appellant.
Once the CIBMS[3] 110 verifies the inmate and authorizes access
to the Internet, the CIBMS 110 retrieves Internet restrictions
unique to that user from a user profile. In an embodiment, it
may be necessary for each inmate to have personal restrictions
that may differ from other inmates. For example, an inmate with
a known proclivity towards pornography may have extremely
broad restrictions on nude images, partial nude images, or even
suggestive content, whereas other inmates may have access to
such content. In an embodiment, the CIBMS 110 may also have
global restrictions that are applicable to all inmates. Thus, by

3 “Controlled Internet browsing management system.” Spec. ¶ 17.
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combining the personal restrictions with the global restrictions,
a full filter profile can be applied to each individual inmate.
Using this filter profile, the CIBMS 110 filters the Internet
contents permitted for the inmate.
Spec. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).
B.
Appellant also raises the following arguments in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Gupta’s approach is a two-step approach that relies on the
intermediate “user class” to provide the connection between the
“inmate information” and the “inmate’s internet profile.” While
the association between the “user class” and the “inmate
information” may be manual or automatic, the association
between the “user class” and the internet restrictions is manual.
Gupta, ¶ [0056].
Accordingly, given that one of the steps in the Gupta’s
two-step process is manual and the product of the discretion of
the prison officials, the overall Gupta process is therefore manual
and not automatable.
Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. The argument is not
commensurate with the scope of the claim language. Essentially,
Appellant’s argument is reading the term “fully” into claim 1 as a modifier
for “automatically.” Claim 1 is not explicitly so limited, nor does Appellant
explain how claim 1 would be inherently so limited, nor do we find any
basis elsewhere in the claims or Specification that would similarly mandate
the argued limitation.
Also, as Appellant acknowledges, Gupta’s “association between the
‘user class’ and the ‘inmate information’ may be manual or automatic.”
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That a portion of Gupta’s process is automatic is sufficient to teach or
suggest show “automatically generat[ing]” as required by claim 1.
C.
Appellant further raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Gupta’s generation of the purported “inmate internet profile” is
obtained directly from Gupta’s user class, the intermediary
involved in Gupta’s process. Therefore, Gupta’s generation of
the purported “inmate internet profile” is obtained indirectly, not
directly, from the “inmate information.”
Appeal Br. 18.
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument. Again, the argument is
not commensurate with the scope of the claim language. Appellant’s
“intermediary” argument appears to be arguing that “directly” is a
connection modifier. We disagree. Rather, claim 1 states “internet content
categories permitted or prohibited for the inmate based directly on the
inmate information” in which we read “directly” as an informational
modifier. That is, the “permitted or prohibited” categories must be based
“directly” on the “inmate information.” Although we find Appellant’s
Specification silent as to the term “directly,” Appellant discloses:
The Internet profile generator 334 uses the inmate information
database 342 to generate Internet profiles for the inmates based
on their offenses, charges, sentencing, current disciplinary status,
among others. The Internet profiles consist of different
categories of Internet contents and indication of which categories
the inmate has permission to access.
Spec. ¶ 35 (emphasis added). Gupta similarly states:
For example, violent offenders may be provided access to
different web content than non-violent inmates via differently
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defined Access Sets and Trump Sets tailored to the needs and
concerns associated with each resident/inmate group user class.
Gupta ¶ 53. We agree with the Examiner’s determination that Gupta teaches
an offender’s access can be based directly on information about the inmate’s
offense.
D.
Appellant raises the following argument in contending that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 10 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
[N]either Gupta nor Gutta appear to deal with making a
determination that “the requested website is an uncategorized
website,” as required by dependent claims 10 and 18. . . .
The Office’s [analysis] appears to be the contrary of what is
required to meet the recited feature.
Appeal Br. 20.
We are persuaded there is insufficient articulated reasoning to support
the Examiner’s determination that Gupta, Gutta, and Hodge suggest
“determine . . . that the requested website is an uncategorized website.”
Therefore, we further conclude that there is insufficient articulated reasoning
to support the Examiner’s final conclusion that claim 10 would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of Appellant’s
invention.

CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1–4, 7–9, 11, 13, 14,
16, 17, and 19–34 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appellant has established that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
10 and 18 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4, 7–9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, and
19–34 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 10 and 18 as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is reversed.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 9–11,
16–18, 21–
23, 25–30,
32–34
103 Gupta, Gutta, Hodge 1–4, 9, 11,
16, 17, 21–
23, 25–30,
32–34
10, 18
7, 8, 13, 14,
19, 20, 24,
31
103 Gupta, Gutta, Hodge,
Kipust, Thomas, Hind
7, 8, 13,
14, 19, 20,
24, 31

Overall
Outcome

1–4, 7–9,
11, 13, 14,
16, 17, 19–
34
10, 18

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART