01981489
02-22-1999
Stephen A. Thompson, Appellant, v. Craven H. Crowell, Jr., Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.
Stephen A. Thompson v. Tennessee Valley Authority
01981489
February 22, 1999
Stephen A. Thompson, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01981489
) Agency No. 0323-93053
Craven H. Crowell, Jr., )
Chairman, )
Tennessee Valley Authority, )
Agency. )
_________________________________)
DECISION
Appellant filed the instant appeal from the agency's November 17, 1997
decision finding that the agency did not breach the settlement agreement
entered into by the parties on January 10, 1992. The settlement agreement
provided:
TVA agrees to select [appellant] for a position of Mechanical Maintenance
Planner, Pay Group 04, at a salary of $39,000 effective November 4,
1991.
The instant matter has been the subject of two prior Commission decisions.
In the most recent decision the Commission stated that appellant had
alleged that the agency breached the agreement when on November 16,
1992 the Mechanical Maintenance Planner position appellant had been
placed into pursuant to the settlement agreement was surplused and
appellant was placed into the Employee Transition Program. Thompson
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, EEOC Appeal No. 01952534 (Oct. 18, 1996).
The Commission found:
[B]oth parties agree that appellant was selected for a Maintenance Planner
position pursuant to the settlement agreement. Both parties also agree
that appellant's position was "surplused" effective ten months later.
. . . .
[A]ppellant has alleged that agency officials were aware, at the time
the settlement agreement was reached, that appellant's position was
slated for elimination. The agency has not responded directly to
this allegation. However, if the agency knew, and did not disclose,
that the promised position would soon be eliminated, appellant could
be entitled to rescind the agreement based on the agency's failure to
bargain in good faith. Because the record before us is insufficient
to allow us to determine whether the agency was aware, at the time the
settlement agreement was reached, that appellant's position would be
surplused within a short period of time, and therefore whether equity
requires that the settlement agreement be set aside, we must REMAND
appellant's allegations for a supplemental investigation.
Id. (citation omitted).
On November 17, 1997 the agency, after conducting an investigation, found
that "the agency was not aware, at the time the settlement agreement
was reached, that [appellant's] position as a Maintenance Planner, PG-4,
would be surplused within a short period of time." The agency concluded
that it did not breach the settlement agreement. Appellant filed the
instant appeal from the November 17, 1997 decision.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties shall be
binding on both parties. If the complainant believes that the agency
has failed to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement, then the
complainant shall notify the EEO Director of the alleged noncompliance
"within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of
the alleged noncompliance." 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a). The complainant
may request that the terms of the settlement agreement be specifically
implemented or request that the complaint be reinstated for further
processing from the point processing ceased. Id.
Settlement agreements are contracts between the appellant and the agency
and it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and not
some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(Aug. 23, 1990); In re Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 94 F.2d 296 (7th
Cir. 1938). In reviewing settlement agreements to determine if there is
a breach, the Commission is often required to ascertain the intent of the
parties and will generally rely on the plain meaning rule. Wong v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05931097 (Apr. 29, 1994) (citing
Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (Dec. 2,
1991)). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and
unambiguous on its face, then its meaning must be determined from the
four corners of the instrument without any resort to extrinsic evidence
of any nature. Id. (citing Montgomery Elevator v. Building Engineering
Service, 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984)).
The Commission finds that the agency has submitted evidence, most
significantly in the form of an affidavit from the Site Vice-President
(on October 30, 1997), showing that the agency had no knowledge, at the
time the agreement was entered into, that appellant's position would be
surplused. The agency's explanation that it did not know that appellant's
position would be surplused when it entered the agreement is reasonable.
Appellant has not rebutted the agency's claim with any persuasive evidence
showing that the agency had knowledge or likely had such knowledge
of the decision to surplus appellant's position when the agreement
was entered into. Therefore, we find that: (1) there is no persuasive
evidence showing that the agency entered the agreement in bad faith and;
(2) appellant has failed to show that the agency breached the agreement.
The agency's decision finding that the agency did not breach the
settlement agreement is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Feb 22, 1999
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations