Stella L. Barnett, Appellant,v.Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 22, 1998
01970961 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 22, 1998)

01970961

10-22-1998

Stella L. Barnett, Appellant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Stella L. Barnett, )

Appellant, )

)

) Appeal No. 01970961

v. ) Agency No. 950811

)

)

Daniel R. Glickman, )

Secretary, )

Department of Agriculture, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision not to implement

the terms of the settlement agreement entered into by the parties.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.402, .504(b); EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency breached the settlement

agreement.

BACKGROUND

A review of the record reveals that appellant filed a formal EEO complaint

alleging that she had been subjected to unlawful discrimination.

Appellant and the agency settled the complaint on January 29, 1996.

The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:

The Agency agrees to pay [appellant] a lump sum cash settlement equivalent

to the difference of a GS-7, Step 6 and a GS-9, Step 4, computed from

July 9, 1992, to February 3, 1996.

The record further reveals that appellant and the agency amended the

settlement agreement on February 26, 1996, such that provision (1)

provided that:

The Agency agrees to pay [appellant] a lump sum cash settlement equivalent

to the difference of a GS-7, Step 6 and a GS-9, Step 4, computed from

July 9, 1992, to March 30, 1996.

By letter to the agency dated August 14, 1996, appellant alleged that the

agency had breached the settlement agreement. Appellant acknowledged that

she received an $8433.83 check from the agency purportedly for payment

of provision (1) of the settlement agreement, but asserted that she was

entitled to more money. Specifically, appellant asserted that because

the annual salary of a GS-9, step 4, was $33,725.00, and that of a GS-7,

step 6 was $29,239.00, a difference of $4,486.00, she was due, under

provision (1) of the agreement, $4,486.00 multiplied by the 3.75-year

time period identified in the agreement, for a total of $16,822.50.

In its final decision dated October 23, 1996, the agency declined to

implement the terms of the agreement, finding that it was in compliance.

The agency asserted that according to the language in the agreement,

appellant was to be paid a lump sum cash settlement equivalent to the

difference of the GS-7 previously paid and a GS-9, for the period from

July 9, 1992 to February 3, 1996. As a result of the foregoing, the

agency calculated the hourly difference in base pay and paid this amount

for all base hours paid for the above period, thus resulting in a gross

amount of $11,100.32. The agency then added an additional $36.27 for

overtime appellant worked during the period to make up for the difference

in overtime pay between the two pay grades, and $1,631.24 in interest,

thus raising the gross total to $12,767.83. After deducting federal

and state taxes and Medicare, appellant was due the remaining net amount

of $8,433.83.

On appeal, appellant contends that the agency erred in treating the

matter as a "backpay" settlement, as the plain language of the agreement

contains nothing about overtime or pro-rating the lump sum payment to

incorporate money appellant earned. By approaching it as a backpay issue,

appellant asserts that in calculating the amount of money due her, the

agency made adjustments in payment amounts to account for the succeeding

steps appellant would have achieved. Instead, appellant argues that the

face of the agreement provides for a lump sum payment of the difference

between annual salary of the two grades for the time period contemplated

by the settlement agreement.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties,

reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on

both parties. In addition, the Commission has held that a settlement

agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the agency,

to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996).

The Commission has consistently held that settlement agreements are

contracts between the appellant and the agency, and it is the intent of

the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention,

that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990).

In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a

settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain

meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing

appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be

determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to

extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building

Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

As a threshold matter, we note that the agency improperly calculated

the time period from the original settlement agreement (July 9, 1992 to

February 3, 1996) rather than from the period identified in the February

26, 1996 amendment to the agreement, (July 9, 1992, to March 30, 1996).

Further, we find nothing in the agreement which suggests that the

settlement payment identified in provision (1) represents backpay for

that period. Contrary to the agency's assertion, the settlement does not

require payment of the difference of the GS-7 previously paid and a GS-9,

for the period identified. Rather, the plain language of the agreement

provides that appellant was to be paid the lump sum difference between

a GS-7, step 6 and a GS-9, step 4, for the period from July 9, 1992,

to March 30, 1996. Moreover, as this lump sum payment is not defined as

backpay, we find that the agency improperly subtracted federal and state

taxes and Medicare, and improperly added interest. We find that the

plain meaning of the settlement agreement contemplates the calculation

of payment as suggested by appellant, i.e., multiplication of the annual

difference in salaries for the two grades by the time period identified

in the agreement.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding that it was in compliance with

the settlement agreement is hereby REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to

the agency for further processing in accordance with this decision and

the Order below.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following actions:

Within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall calculate the difference in annual salary

between a GS-7, step 6 and a GS-9, step 4, for the period from July 9,

1992, to March 30, 1996.

Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

the agency shall issue appellant a check for the amount calculated in

paragraph (1) of this Order, less the $8,433.83 already paid appellant,

plus interest for this amount for the period between when appellant

was issued the first check and her receipt of this subsequent check.

Copies of the agency's calculations and evidence of the issuance of the

appropriate check to appellant must be sent to the Compliance Officer

as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 22, 1998

______________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations