Stella B.,1 Complainant,v.Jeff B. Sessions, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Prisons), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Oct 16, 2018

0120171497 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 16, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Stella B.,1
Complainant,

v.

Jeff B. Sessions,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice
(Federal Bureau of Prisons),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120171497

Agency No. BOP201501541

DECISION

On March 15, 2017, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
February 23, 2017 final decision concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Human Resource (“HR”) Specialist at the
Agency’s facility in Victorville, California.

On March 24, 2015, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint. Complainant claimed that the
Agency subjected her to a hostile work environment and discriminated against her based on race
(African-American) and her parental status when:

1. between November 2014 and February 2015, she was subjected to derogatory
comments and harsher supervision in the form of e-mails; and,

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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2. on February 23, 2015, she was forced to resign from the Crisis Negotiation Team
(“CNT”) when her supervisor canceled her scheduled CNT training.

On May 10, 2015, Complainant amended the formal complaint to add the following claim: that
she was discriminated against based on race (African-American), parental status, and in reprisal
for protected activity when:

3. her supervisor lowered her annual performance rating.

After an investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of
investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). When Complainant did not request a
hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f), the Agency issued a final
decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), finding no discrimination.

The instant appeal followed. Complainant argues that her supervisor, the Human Resource
Manager (white) cancelled her national training as a form of harassment. Complainant
acknowledges the Agency assertion that there was no coverage. Complainant notes, however,
that there were at least nine other employees at the time. Complainant also asserted that the HR
Manager “made it clear that she did not want [her] in the department and attempted to sabotage
[her] anyway that she could.”

Complainant also disputes the Agency’s determination that Complainant had problems adjusting
to the department. Complainant notes that the HR Manager frequently gave her special projects
to complete, and questioned why she would be given additional responsibilities if she was had
performance problems. Complainant also argues that the HR Manager’s reasons for her
evaluation were pretextual. Complainant notes that just the following year another individual
received a fully successful rating.

Finally, Complainant also asserts that following the filing of her formal complaint, other
incidents occurred which she did not report, for fear of additional retaliation. She notes that new
witnesses could testify to continued discrimination.

The record reflects the following pertinent matters regarding the subject claims.

Claim 1

On November 24, 2014, Complainant was informed by the HR Manager that she was selected
for the HR Specialist position. Complainant alleged that the HR Manager was unwelcoming, and
told her that she (Complainant) would be overwhelmed by the duties involved. Complainant
alleged that the HR Manager inferred that she, the HR Manager, was not pleased with
Complainant’s selection, and that she had preferred another person for the position. Complainant
also alleged that she was told she had too many collateral duties and that she would need to drop
some of these collateral duties.
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Complainant reported this exchange to the Associate Warden (white), but was told that she
probably just had to get used to the HR Manager’s communication style.

The HR Manager stated that Complainant misconstrued her statements. The HR Manager stated
that she told Complainant that the office was high paced, that there was a considerable amount of
work, and that it can be overwhelming at times. She acknowledged informing Complainant that
she had too many collateral duties. The HR Manager stated that Agency policy allowed
employees to spend about 20% of time on a collateral duty, but that over half of Complainant’s
time was being spent on her three collateral duties. The HR Manager stated that she had
recommended others for the position, but thought that with more training and time, Complainant
could also be successful. She denied ever stating that she was unhappy with Complainant’s
selection.

Complainant provided examples of the hostile work environment. For example, Complainant
stated that while working on an assignment, the HR Manager will come in and throw things on
top of her desk and tell Complainant that she needs something immediately. Complainant
believed that the HR Manager treated her differently from the other human resources specialists.
Complainant noted that the HR Manager would have frequently have closed door “meetings”
where laughter was clearly heard, and Complainant felt left out of these meetings. Complainant
noted another incident when her former department decided to throw her a surprise promotion
party. Her former department informed the HR Manager, who was supposed to tell Complainant.
However, the HR Manager left the day of the party, and never told Complainant. Complainant
felt this action was intentional, and indicative of the HR Manager’s feelings toward her.

The HR Manager stated that she was contacted regarding the party, but only for the purpose of
approving Complainant’s attendance at the party, and that the HR Manager did so. She was told
it was a surprise party, but assumed that the former supervisor would have made arrangements
for Complainant to attend. The HR Manager stated that any perception that she did not want
Complainant to attend was completely unintentional. Regarding adding projects to
Complainant’s desk, the HR Manager denied ever throwing anything at Complainant’s desk. She
acknowledged that she would occasionally bring projects to Complainant and note if those had
more time sensitive deadlines.

Concerning Complainant’s allegation that she would have closed door meetings and leave
Complainant out, the HR Manager noted that the department had an open hallway that was not
conducive to private conversations. She stated that there were times when privacy was a
necessity due to the nature of the conversation, especially if the conversation regarded pending
selections or disciplinary actions. She stated that sometimes conversations would move into
personal topics, and any laughter that ensued was not the product of excluding Complainant from
the conversations, but just the product of typical conversation. The HR Manager stated that some
of the employees involved in such conversations have worked together for years and know each
other very well, and it was not unusual for them to segue into a conversation and find humor in
whatever it was that they were talking about.

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Complainant stated that the HR Manager also asked her what her former work schedule used to
look like, and if her schedule was based on childcare issues. Complainant perceived this inquiry
was indicative of the HR Manager’s unhappiness with Complainant’s parental status. The HR
Manager stated that she was aware that Complainant was a parent, but did not know more than
that. She denied ever asking Complainant about childcare issues.

Complainant noted that the HR Manager had once told her that she (Complainant) had broken
her trust by filing a formal complaint. The HR Manager denied making such a comment. The HR
Manager stated that she never once spoke to Complainant about the instant complaint. She stated
that she did tell Complainant that the human resources department required a high level of trust,
and that she had lost trust in Complainant because Complainant had gone to the Union regarding
the CNT issue. The HR Manager stated that she said this to Complainant because she had to
remind Complainant that she was not part of a non-bargaining unit, and that her going to the
Union could be interpreted as misconduct because she was potentially releasing human resource
information to the representative of the bargaining unit. The HR Manager denied intending for
the comment to mean that she lost trust in Complainant because she went to the EEO process.

Claim 2

On February 20, 2015, Complainant was in a CNT training session when the HR Manager sent
her a message asking where she was. She informed the HR Manager that she was in a training, to
which the HR Manager responded for her to leave. The HR Manager later informed Complainant
that she needed to resign from CNT because she had too many collateral duties. Complainant
noted that she had three collateral duties at the time. Complainant offered to resign her other
collateral duties, but was told that she could not do so, and that she had to resign from CNT.
Complainant noted that a human resource specialist (white) (hereinafter referred to as “HRS2”)
was allowed to stay on with CNT.

The HR Manager stated that prior to Complainant’s arrival, HRS2 was already a part of CNT.
Based on how much time it took to participate in CNT, she could not let two HR staff members
remain in CNT. The HR Manager stated that HRS2 was a senior CNT member and that she also
has Agency seniority over Complainant. The HR Manager stated that HRS2 had five collateral
duties when she came to HR in 2013, and she was told that she would need to give up the
majority of them. HRS2 chose CNT back then, and was allowed to remain on the CNT because
at the time the CNT was without a Team Leader, and HRS2 had volunteered.

In or around March 2015, Complainant was in a CNT training, when the HR Manager sent her a
message that a retiree (black) (hereinafter referred to as “R1”) had arrived at the office to pick up
retirement credentials. R1 previously spoke to Complainant about visiting that day, but informed
her that he was not sure when, if at all, he would arrive. Knowing this, Complainant provided
R1’s information to a fellow human resource specialist (black) (hereinafter referred to as
“HRS1”) and asked that she assist R1 if he arrived while she was in training. However, at the
time of his arrival, HRS1 happened to be away, and Complainant was in the CNT training. The
appearance was that Complainant had not planned R1’s visit well.
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The HR Manager was unhappy with the situation, assuming that Complainant was so involved in
the collateral CNT training, that she neglected her duties. Complainant explained the situation to
the HR Manager, noting she had asked HRS1 to assist her if necessary, and that it was just bad
timing that both were absent when R1 arrived.

The HR Manager stated that she was upset that Complainant did not inform her of her pending
absence, and R1’s potential arrival. The HR Manager noted that she had previously spoken with
Complainant about her collateral duties interfering with her HRS duties, and that this clearly an
example. The HR Manager asked Complainant to resign from CNT given its interferences with
her HRS duties.

Sometime after, Complainant received an email informing her that she was to attend a CNT
training at the Management and Specialty Training Center in Aurora, Colorado. She informed
the HR Manager of the training. Approximately 30 minutes later, Complainant received an email
stating that the training was cancelled. Complainant brought the issue to the Associate Warden
(White). It was too late to get her back into that specific training, but that she was allowed to
continue CNT training, with the continued stipulation that it did not interfere with her assigned
HRS duties.

The HR Manager acknowledged cancelling the training. She did so because she thought
Complainant was going to resign from CNT. However, she noted that Complainant never
resigned from the CNT team, and continued attending trainings. The Warden (black) stated that
he did not know if Complainant was forced or asked to resign from CNT, but did not believe that
Complainant’s protected status would have been a factor. He was not aware of the HR Manager
cancelling the training, but that even if she had, it would have been due to her concerns that
Complainant was spread too thin. He noted that the HR Manager had previously spoken to him
about her concerns that Complainant might struggle to learn her new primary responsibilities
while also maintaining collateral duties.

Claim 3

The rating period for Complainant’s Performance Work Plan ("PWP") evaluation was from
December 29, 2014 until March 31, 2015. Complainant noted that during that first year, she did
not receive a progress review. When she received the evaluation, there were some areas that
noted Complainant could have improved in. Complainant asserted it was unfair that the HR
Manager never called her in prior to discuss any problems with her work. On April 14, 2015,
Complainant met with the HR Manager to discuss her evaluation. They met again on April 24,
2015. Complainant contended that her evaluation clearly stated that she exceeded the set
standards, therefore, she should have received an evaluation above satisfactory.

The evaluations were scored under the following scale, from lowest to highest: Unsatisfactory,
Minimally Satisfactory, Achieved Results, Excellent, and Outstanding. Complainant received a
total score of 320 points, which equated to a rating of “Achieved Results”.
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The performance evaluation was overwhelmingly positive, but it also noted areas where
Complainant could improve. For example, it praised Complainant for having 100% of her tickets
submitted, it acknowledged that she conducted follow-up on said tickets, but noted that
Complainant’s follow- up methods could improve. The evaluation also had notations praising
Complainant for her work despite circumstances not in her control, such as fund controls. The
end performance comment stated, “You are off to a terrific start. There will be no stopping you
with a full year of experience under your belt. Thank you for all you do.”

The HR Manager stated that at the time she had her review, it was actually Complainant’s 90-
day evaluation, but because Complainant had joined in December 2014, it was considered the
“yearly” review. She noted that she did not do a formal “progress review” because the first
evaluation period was around Complainant’s 90th day. Additionally, she noted that she had
informally spoken to Complainant about areas that she could improve in. For example, she noted
that she had informally spoken to Complainant about improving her follow up on tickets
submitted. The HR Manager further stated that it would be very difficult for her to justify an
Excellent, or higher, rating for someone who had only been in the department for ninety days.
The HR Manager noted that there was also still training that Complainant had yet to complete at
that time.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, he
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a
factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden,
the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance
of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally
consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases.
Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action
at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination.
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See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990);
Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8,
1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Even if we assume arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination,
the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. In several of the
examples provided, it was clear that poor communication skills contributed to the incident at
issue. For example, Complainant asserted that the HR Manager discriminatorily pressured her to
resign from the Crisis Negotiation Team (“CNT”), and canceled her CNT training in Colorado
(claim 2). The record demonstrated that the HR Manager was clear in her concerns regarding
Complainant’s attention being diverted to the CNT, particularly as it was only a collateral duty.
The HR Manager asked Complainant to resign from the CNT out of concern for the operational
needs of the department as she felt Complainant participated in CNT at the expense of her HRS
duties.

The HR Manager noted an incident in which she could not locate Complainant to assist with
finding R1’s paperwork. Complainant argued that she had arranged for another colleague, HRS1
to assist her, and that it was poor coincidence that both were out of the office when R1 arrived to
pick up his documents. In that incident, the HR Manager found that overall poor communication
led to the appearance that Complainant was not prioritizing her HRS duties, even though she had
in fact arranged for coverage. The HR Manager acknowledged that she later cancelled a CNT
training because she was under the presumption that Complainant would resign from CNT based
on her requests.

In the record, both the Warden and the Associate Warden, testified that both parties appeared to
have poor communication skills with the other, which lead to issues such as the cancelled CNT
training. Complainant argued that any management explanation was mere pretext, noting that
HRS2, a white colleague, was allowed to remain on the CNT. The HR Manager explained why
HRS2 was allowed to remain on, including that HRS2 had voluntarily removed other collateral
duties in favor of CNT prior to Complainant joining the HR department. Additionally, HRS2 had
seniority in both her CNT position and in the Agency department.

As the employer, the Agency has broad discretion to determine how best to manage its
operations and may make decisions, including personnel decisions, on any basis except a basis
that is unlawful under the discrimination statutes. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567 (1978); Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). An employer is
entitled to make its own business judgments. The reasonableness of the employer's decision may,
of course, be probative of whether it is pretext. Therefore, our analysis focuses on the Agency's
motivation, not its business judgment. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir.)
1979).
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In other words, it is not the function of this Commission to substitute its judgment for that of
management officials who are familiar with the needs of their facility, and who are in a better
position to make decisions, unless other facts suggest that proscribed considerations of bias
entered the decision-making process. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403
(Dec. 6, 1996), citing Bauer at 1048.

Here, there were documented incidents when the HR Manager could not locate Complainant
because she was participating in CNT training. CNT was not a function of Complainant’s
position, but a mere collateral duty. The HR Manager already had one employee, HRS2,
committed to CNT tasks, and felt it was not prudent to allow two members of her staff to remain
on the CNT. We find that the HR’s Manager requests for Complainant to resign, and her
cancellation of Complainant’s CNT training was part of her duties of managing the Agency’s
operational needs.

Regarding claim 3, Complainant argued that her Performance Work Plan ("PWP") evaluation
was discriminatorily lowered. However, there is no evidence of this. The rating period for
Complainant’s Performance Work Plan ("PWP") evaluation was from December 29, 2014 until
March 31, 2015. Complainant asserted it was unfair that the HR Manager never called her in
prior to discuss any problems with her work prior to giving her the evaluation. The HR Manager
disputed that, noting that she provided informal feedback, and did not feel the need to have
formal feedback given the short duration of time between Complainant’s hire, and the review.
Due to the timing of Complainant’s arrival, her PWP was given around her 90th day, but because
of the timing it was considered a “yearly” review. Complainant was unhappy with her
evaluation, but it was clear that while successful in a variety of ways, she was still learning and
improving.

Here, Complainant argued that the evaluation was lowered due to reprisal for initiating the
instant complaint. However, based on the record there is nothing to indicate that the HR
Manager’s comments, or scores, were fueled by retaliatory animus. Furthermore, we note that
Complainant argued on appeal that she has not reported other incidents for fear of additional
retaliation. We are unable to determine the validity of such a claim as Complainant has not
provided any additional information. Based on the record before the Commission, there is no
evidence to support Complainant’s contention of reprisal. If Complainant feels that she has been
subjected to reprisal as a result of her EEO activity, she should seek immediate counseling with
an EEO counselor.

In sum, there is no evidence which suggests the Agency’s actions were based on discriminatory
animus. Complainant has not provided any evidence that suggests that the Agency's reasons were
pretext for discrimination or that discriminatory animus was involved.

Harassment

To establish a claim of discriminatory hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show
that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the
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form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the Agency. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982).

In short, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to
conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s
position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove
that the conduct was taken because of a protected basis – in this case, because of her race or prior
EEO activity. Only if Complainant establishes both of those elements, hostility and motive, will
the question of Agency liability present itself.

Complainant has cited various incidents that she found to be adverse or disruptive to her. For
example, Complainant alleged that she was subjected to derogatory comments and harsher
supervision in the form of e-mails, and harassment by the HR Manager (claim 1). Complainant
provided several examples, including that the HR Manager was unwelcoming, informed
Complainant she was not her choice for HR, was told the work would be too overwhelming for
her, and that she was frequently left out of meetings. However, based on the record, it is clear
that a lack of communication between Complainant and the HR Manager lead to a contentious
relationship. For example, the HR Manager acknowledged informing Complainant that the HR
office was fast paced, and at times overwhelming. As a new employee to the department, the HR
Manager was, in her belief, informing Complainant of the realities of the office. Additionally, the
HR Manager stated that while Complainant was not her first choice for the position, she had faith
that with training and time, Complainant would be just as successful as another candidate. The
HR Manager also acknowledged having closed door meetings with other HRS, but there is no
indication that Complainant was ever left out of department wide meetings, or intentionally left
out of meetings that would have impacted her position.

Complainant acknowledged that the slights could appear as everyday work occurrences, but
argued that there was clearly a discriminatory component. However, Complainant has produced
no evidence to establish that her race or prior EEO activity was a factor in any of these actions.
The record simply does not show that the responsible Agency officials acted with discriminatory
or retaliatory animus towards Complainant.

Parental Status

Finally, the Commission has no jurisdiction over claims of parental status discrimination. An
agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee or applicant for employment who
believes that he or she has been discriminated against by that agency because of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. §1614.103, 106(a). Thus, a
claim of discrimination based on parental status fails to state a claim. Moran v. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 01A10499 (Oct. 8, 2002).
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Although the federal EEO laws do not prohibit discrimination against caregivers per se, there are
circumstances in which discrimination against caregivers might constitute unlawful disparate
treatment. Camden v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120093506 (July 27, 2012). Title VII
does not permit employers to treat female workers less favorably merely on the gender-based
assumption that a particular female worker will assume caretaking responsibilities or that a
female worker's caretaking responsibilities will interfere with her work performance. Id. (citing
Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities, EEOC Notice No. 915.002, at II.A.3 (May 23, 2007). Complainant did not
provide any information on whether her parental status claim stemmed from this type of gender
stereotyping as a caregiver. Complainant v. Department of Treasury, EEOC Appeal No.
0120143110 (Mar. 10, 2015).

CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision finding no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
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Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The
court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
October 16, 2018
Date