Steelworkers, Local No. 7450Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsDec 7, 1979246 N.L.R.B. 878 (N.L.R.B. 1979) Copy Citation D)E(ISIONS OF NATIONA. I.ABOR REIATIIONS BOARI) United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 7450 (Asarco Incorporated) and Howard Davis. Case 14-CB-4290 December 7. 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS PENE.LO, MURPHY. ANI) TRtUESI)AI.E Upon a charge filed by Charging Party Howard Davis, the General Counsel for the National I.abor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 14, issued a complaint on January 4, 1979, against United Steelworkers of America, AFL CIO, Local No. 7450, herein called Respondent or the Union. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice of hear- ing before an administrative law judge were duly served on Respondent and the Charging Party. In substance, the complaint alleges that Respondent vio- lated Section 8(b)( )(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,' by attempting to cause, and causing, the Employer to withhold union dues from a paycheck after the employee had effectively resigned from the Union. The answer duly filed by Respondent admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, as well as some factual allegations. It denied, however, other critical factual allegations and the commission of any unfair labor practices. Respondent also raised two af- firmative defenses: (1) that employee Davis never re- voked his dues-checkoff authorization; and (2) that the unfair labor practice charges were barred by Sec- tion 10(b) of the Act. Thereafter, on March 23, 1979, the Charging Party, the General Counsel, and Respondent entered into a stipulation in which they agreed that the formal documents (G.C. Exhs. I(a) through (m) inclusive)2 and the "Stipulation of the Record," including Exhib- IThese provisions are as follows: Sec. 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent (I) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided. That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an em- ployer in the selection of his representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (aX3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. 2These exhibits are the charge: affidavit of service of said charge: amended charge; affidavit of service of said amended charge: the complaint and notice of heanng and the affidavit of service of the complaint and notice of hearing; Respondent's answer; original order rescheduling hearing; affida- vit of service or original order rescheduling hearing; order rescheduling hear- ing accompanied by certification; order postponing the hearing indefinitely: and index and descnption of formal documents. its A O, attached thereto, shall constitute the entire record herein, and that no oral testimony is necessary or desired by any of' the parties. Thus, the parties expressly waived all intermediate proceedings before an administrative law judge, and petitioned that this case be transferred to the Board for the purpose of making findings of ftact and conclusions of law, and issuing an appropriate order, reserving to themselves only the right to object to the materiality or relevancy of the stipulated facts. By order dated May 10, 1979, the Board approved the stipulation. transferred the proceedings to itself. and set a date for the filing of brieIs. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs, which have been duly considered by the Board. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the entire record herein as stipulated by the parties, as well as the briefs filed by Respondent and the General Counsel, and makes the following findings and conclusions: FA('IS 1. THIE BUSINESS OF IE EMPI.OYER Asarco Incorporated is a New Jersey corporation. It maintains a principal office and place of business at 120 Broadway, New York, New York, while operat- ing other plants in the State of Missouri, New Jersey, Texas, Colorado, Tennessee, Washington, and Ari- zona. Asarco is engaged in, and at all times material herein has been engaged in, the refinishing of nonfer- rous metals and related products. The plant located at Glover. Missouri, is the only facility involved in this proceeding. During the year ending December 31, 1978, which period is representative of its opera- tions during all times material herein, Asarco, in the course and conduct of its business operations, manu- factured, sold, and distributed at its Glover, Missouri, plant products valued in excess of $50,000, of which products valued in excess of' $50,000 were shipped from said plants to points located outside the State of Missouri. Based on the above, the parties stipulated, and we find, that Asarco is now, and at all times ma- terial herein has been, an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 11. IlE L.ABOR OR(GANIZA'IION INVOLVED The parties stipulated, and we find, that Respon- dent is now, and at all times material herein has been, 246 NLRB No. 139 878 a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II1. THE UNFAIR I.ABOR PRA('TICES A. The Issues 1. Whether the charge filed by Charging Party Howard Davis on December 7, 1978, is time-barred by Section 10(b) of the Act, when only Respondent's arbitration proceeding occurred within the 6-month period preceding the filing of the charge? 2. Whether the arbitration proceeding of Septem- ber 7, 1978, and subsequent award of September 22, 1978, complied with the standards of Spielherg Manu- facturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955), and therefore constitute a bar to the present proceeding?3 3. Whether Howard Davis' resignation from Re- spondent's membership, in a maintenance-of-mem- bership shop, has the effect of revoking a previously executed dues-checkoff authorization card? B. The Stipulated Facts Charging Party Howard Davis is employed as a maintenance mechanic4 at the Employer's refining plant at Glover, Missouri. He is a member of the bar- gaining unit of all production and maintenance em- ployees who, pursuant to a Certification of Repre- sentative issued by the Board on July 22, 1968, are represented by Respondent. The Employer and Respondent were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement from April 1, 1971, through August 31, 1973, which contained a mainte- nance-of-membership clause. An employee who has not joined Respondent's membership and has not ex- ecuted a dues-checkoff authorization card has no ob- ligation by pay monthly membership dues and/or maintenance service fees.5 Subsequent collective-bar- gaining agreements entered into between Respondent and the Employer, effective August 31, 1973, to Au- gust 31, 1976, and May 29, 1977, to March 31, 1980, contained identical provisions regarding maintenance The question concerning deferral is raised by the General Counsel. Re- spondent has not urged the Board to defer to the arbitration decision of September 22, 1978. 4Davis had held this position since September 1971. The authorization card provides in pertinent part: Pursuant to this authorization and assignment, please deduct from my pay each month. while I am in employment or within the collective- bargaining unit in the Company, monthly dues. assessments and (if owing by me) an initiation fee each as designated by the International Secretary-Treasurer of the Union, as my membership dues in said Union. The aforesaid membership dues shall be remitted promplly by you to Walter J. Burke, or his successor, International Secretar,-Treasurer of the United Steelworkers of America. or its successor. STEELWORKERS I.OCAL NO. 7450 of membership and authorization for union member- ship dues checkoff.6 On or about December 8, 1971. Howard Davis be- came a member of Respondent and, contemporane- ously, executed a dues-checkoff authorization card as provided for in the collective-bargaining agreement then in effect between Respondent and the Em- ployer.? Davis maintained his union membership until Au- gust 1976, when he resigned from Respondent Union. On August 26, 1976, Davis sent a letter of resignation to both the Employer and the International Secre- tary-Treasurer, United Steelworkers of America. The letter stated as follows: I am writing this to inform the Union that I am withdrawing my membership from Local x 7450 at the American Smelting & Refining Compans in Glover, Missouri. The date of my withdrawal is August 31, 1976. Sincerely. /s/ Howard J. Davis Respondent stipulated that it received the letter on September 3, 1976. and that it treated the letter as an effective resignation. In the meantime, following the expiration of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement on August 31, 1976, Respondent commenced an economic strike which continued from September 1, 1976. until May 29, 1977. When the strike concluded, the Employer resumed operations and the work force, including Davis. re- turned to work. In light of Davis' resignation from Respondent's membership, the Employer thereafter ceased deducting union membership dues from Da- vis' paychecks. By letters dated September 1., 1977, James English, assistant general counsel of the United Steelworkers of America, informed Curtis Bates, manager of the Employer, and Davis. that [a- vis' attempt to revoke his checkoff was untimely and. 'Art. II. sec. 3. of the current collective-bargaining agreement provides: All employees who, at the date of the signing of this Agreement. are members of the Union shall, as a condition of employ ment. be required to remain members for the duration of this Agreement: all employees who become members of the Union during the life of this Agreement shall be required to remain members as a condition if empl) menl for the duration of this Agreement. Art. II, sec. .of the collective-bargaining agreement provide a follows It is agreed that an initiation fee (if owed). monthly dues (it owed) and assessments (if owed) for each member of the Union in amounts as authorized shall be deducted rom the pay of the employee upon wntten authorization to the Company from each indi idual emplosee This au- thorization shall be upon a form furnished bh the UIni,on and approved by the Compan, and all such monies collected in this manner shall be remitted by the Company to the International Secretar-Treasurer UIniled Steelworkers of America. 1500 Commonealth Building. Pits- burgh. Penns.lsania 15222 879 I):('ISI()NS 1: NAII()NAI. I.ABOR RKIlAIO'()NS 3()ARI) accordingly, the checkoff was still in effect. There- after, on October 3, 1977, Respondent, by its agent, President Willis Alcorn and Vice President Henry Mecey, filed a grievance asserting Davis' failure to timely withdraw from his dues-deduction agreement, and seeking the Employer's continued withholding of dues from Davis' pay. The grievance, in pertinent part, read: We wrote you a letter concerning the dues de- duction of Howard Davis one of your employees, who in an untimely fashion, withdrew from the dues deduction agreement. You in turn have failed to deduct dues for the month of June, July, August, September. We have not heard from you on this matter, therefore ... we request that you withhold [sic] back dues and continue to with hold [sic] the Davis dues. Despite subsequent correspondence between the Em- ployer and Respondent on the issue of Davis' dues- checkoff authorization, a satisfactory agreement was not reached between the parties. On September 7, 1978, a hearing was held before an arbitrator, who rendered an award on September 22, 1978, directing the Employer to pay Respondent "for the dues in question not withheld and remitted, by making dou- ble monthly dues payments on behalf of Mr. Davis, until the arrearage is made current .... " The arbitra- tor further concluded that the Employer could with- hold the sums from Davis' paychecks. Since Septem- ber 22, 1978, the Employer has complied with the arbitrator's award. On December 7, 1978, Davis filed the original charge and on December 27, 1978, filed an amended charge in this proceeding alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) by attempting to cause, and causing, the Employer to check off regular union dues from his pay subsequent to this resignation from Respondent's membership. Discussion As a threshold matter, Respondent argues that the charge filed by Davis in this proceeding is barred by Section 10(b), since the alleged violation occurred more than 6 months before Davis filed his original unfair labor practice charge on December 7. 1978. According to Respondent. if any violation occurred, it occurred on October 3. 1977, the date the Union filed a grievance concerning the Employer's failure to withhold the dues, or, at the latest, on February 21, 1978, when Respondent wrote the Employer to in- voke arbitration of the matter. On the other hand, the General Counsel contends that the charge is not time-barred since both the arbi- tration hearing on September 7, 1978, and the issu- ance of the arbitration decision on September 22. 1978. occurred within the 6-month period. The Gen- eral Counsel argues that these dates are critical, since it was only after the issuance of the arbitration deci- sion that Respondent was able to effectuate its coer- cive purpose, by obtaining the [nmployer's compli- ance with Respondent's demand that the ELmploer deduct union dues from Davis' pa\icheck. We agree with the General Counsel that the charge herein is not barred by Section 10(h). This is so since Respondent only obtained checkoff of D)avis' dues af- ter the arbitrator's decision in its favor. The alleged unlawful conduct was not effectuated until that time. and thus the charge is not time-barred. 8 We also agree with the General Counsel that the Board should not defer to the arbitrator's September 22, 1978, decision in which he found that under the contract and Board law the Employer was required to withhold Davis' union dues until Davis revoked his dues-checkoff agreement in a timely fashion. The General Counsel takes the position that deferral is not ,appropriate under Spielherg. since Howard I)avis was not a party to the arbitration, and the decision, in an' event, is repugnant to the Act. Respondent takes no position on whether the Board should defer to the arbitrator's decision. Under Spielberg. the Board will defer to an arbitra- tion decision when: (I) it appears to have been fair and regular: (2) all parties have agreed to be bound: and (3) the decision is not repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. It is also necessary that the arbitrator's decision resolve the unfair labor practice issues presented.' In the instant case, only the Em- ployer and the Union were parties to the arbitration. tloward Davis was not a party, he was not a witness or even present at the hearing, and he did not partici- pate in the arbitration in any way. Nevertheless, the arbitrator found not only that the the Employer was required to withhold L)avis' dues pursuant to the checkoff agreement, but also that Davis. and not the Employer, was required to pay the Union for the back dues. Under these circumstances, we agree with the Gen- eral C('ounsel that Howard Davis should have been a party to the arbitration, or at least that he should have been permitted to present evidence or argument in his own behalf.:l The subject matter of the arbitra- I ior this same result, see Vc .e Meicri Dntri, r ( ild o!, ( arpntr l nd Jinerv 4 4merua, I l t a! 4 . Irner In ), 176 Nl RB 797 (1969) (halil /euri, 7ean.stnirs and Itelper.s "(;'eral" loa[in A 21 t, (]ai ' .S l San td (;raol ( mpanyl), 155 N LRB 273 19651 Raidheon ('clpare. 140 NRB 883 (1963). enlorcement denied on olihcr grounds 326 F2d 471 (Ist (r 1964) I0 this latter lactor dstinguishes this case trom Ih .,oial6/d PreI,, 199 N I.RB 1110 (1972). here the Board deterred to 1a arhillrat ln decision similar to the one herein, since in 4sl.o. tlater d Preo. eenl though the empil(o- ees ere not parties to the arbitration. he? were permitted to present ullk their elidence and arguments. 880 SI I1.'()RKI RS. I()( A () 4l tion directl' atlected him. and his interests could not be adequatel\ represented bh either the nion ()or the t mplo er. Both the Employer and the I nion took posilions at odds with )avis' interest, since the tinion \ as seek- ing dues. and the ltmploer contended that if dues were owing. Davis- not the Lmplo er was liable to pay them. he arbitrator agreed with the :nlploer. concluding that "it would he extremely doubtful that Mr. I);avis would have a defense to the (omppan\'s third parts claim for the dues against \r. I)a;l i Accord illgl. xse find that the arbitralioll procccdiIlg does not nlee the second criterion of,l .S'pichicrg ad l we will not efer to the decision. Finall. we are presented with the question of whether )avis' resignation from Respondent tInion. Whn the collective-hargaining agreement pro itdes for maintenance of membership, had the effect of re- voking )avis' checkoff authorization which lie igned in 1971. Respondent argues that the resignation was inetlective for two reasons: (I) l)a is' resignationl dli not communicate an unambiguous intent to revoke the checkoff, and (2) even if it did, the resignation did not comply with the time and service requirements contained in the checkoff authorization. In support of its position. Respondent states that [)avis' intention to revoke must be unambiguous since other ise the logical inference is that, while Davis no longer wished to be a full member of the Union. he intended to support the Union financially. as a financial core member. The General Counsel on the other hand, argues that the resignation relieved Davis of anN obligation to pay dues. According to the General Counsel. ter- mination of membership extinguished any obligation to pay dues under either the collective-bargaining agreement or the checkoff authorization. In this re- gard the General Counsel emphasizes that there is no provision in either the contract or the checkoff autho- rization for a financial-core membership via payment of a service fee in lieu of membership dues. Rather. the payment of dues is the quid pro quo for member- ship rights. We have reviewed carefully the arguments of both sides and the relevant precedents and have con- cluded, under the facts presented here, that Davis' resignation relieved him of any obligation to pay dues. In so holding, we rely on two recent Board deci- sions Frilo-lavY, Inc. I aInd ('amphell Inlrr ict., L' " 243 N.iRH 17 (19791. Menmber Murph? discnnting 1? .Sn D.lg ( un Droilr ri ( itmn /l s/ ( arpen,-c. I iled Bril lrh,,,rd r, (I'arpenlr and J neri , .lwrln. .4l. ( 10 ( aimpnp ll IiulricL. 243 NlRB 147 11979). NMember Murph dssenting. Allhough Memhber Pencli did nl prlticipate in ( amprel,. he hhee Ihat l ia it orreIl l decided and. lor Ihe reasons ated ni/ra, ilonludes lhl.l is principles are iconlrolling hele lfI, cvcr. wilh regard II rir,* ,11,. In whsth Member Pencillo A.- did rll p.lfrtllipale. he tillid. 1l he li c u -ll slancs ,t thl case. tha.t It i ilnnecess.lrx It. pk.ic a1n rel.hantc therein bolh of 'hIIcl II Oil c sIul'ii legal questions,. I1 (Camp/el/ Ielipvh. iilffio'ces truck til;l.s i n the expiration of the collecti c-hirgeainiig grellenll. I)uring the strike, and prior to the slning of a n.ie, aIg-eClmenCt, some eInlo ecs resignlled At 1 Cl(l sCd 1the picket line. None specificalll revokeil their dlues- checkofft authorizations." Both the expired ;anld the new collective-bargaining agreements conlta inc1 unioll-securit prox:isions clih required an em- ploN!ee to Join the union h Ihis 31,t ',ta otl mph,!- menit ()n these facts. the A\dllilistra;ti .C I ;l\ Ildc cotncludedl that the mplo cs rcilgnatiions fronl tl unilon iil lnot al'ec the enllpo, Xes' obligation to pa 5 ilues piursuanit to the checkofl authorization for the period of the strike. Ihe \dlmillistrati e aw Judge reasoned that the resignations ere ineffecti' e to re- voke the checkoff because the resignations were nit timeIl ithin the re ocation clause of the authoriza- tion. ie further concluded that the resignations uere ineffectixe as a matter of' law since resignation hb it- selfl did not show that the emplo ees intendletl to cease paying dues for all purposes: the emplosees could resign from membership. but still wish to pa\ dues in order to support tile union financiallN. Alter- nati els. the Administrative I.au Judge rejected the argument that the checkoff ' as an integral part of the union-security clause, and that, therefore, when the union-securit clause ,,ias not in effect the checkoff' was ineffective. He found that. under the Act, a checkoff authorization is an "independent wage as- signment" which is unaffected b the expiration of the union-securitN clause. The Board. however. reversed the Administrative I.aw Judge, and tfound that the union violated Section 8(b)( I )(A) by virtue of its successful collection of dues during the hiatus period bet,.een collective-hargain- ing agreements. The Board examined the checkoff au- thorization itself; and noted that "it is furnished 'in consideration of the benefits received and to he re- ceived by me as a result of m\ membership in the Union. " Because of this "specific language." the Board concluded that "an effective resignation from the Local Union also revoked the checkoff authoriza- tion by operation of law.'' 4 B'3 contrast the checkoff authorization in Frito-Lay did not contain any language which showed that the payment of dues was in consideration for member- ship. Moreover. the expired collective-bargaining agreement contained an agenc\-shop clause which re- the alltlhorlizaiuln a; ep.arae trolm Ihc expired collelixe-hargaining .igrcenicllei In pertinentll part. the tc it Ilhc .lilhorlin v., s.s, Ii,ns NunS. IliI RI IIIRI, In co,nsider;llion oI the bhenetil rcclcd nd t hI rccl.eicd h . I ,me i. re.ulil lI mr merclship in Ihe Ihc / n. i. Ihe unldel rlgedi. ol m o-sn Iree ull n a. acord. hereh authi r i/e and direclt i 1 l clrp;ain to1 dedlucl nl\ nrlthls rllermhrship dlles n sIPI I nn tril m\ lirMp pi itf eich iliHli , I . curtilrrl minth '4 ( i.nip/l.L pr ,Sl I)8 LCISIONS 01 NA'IIONAI. ILABOR REIAIIONS BOARD quired the payment of dues regardless of whether the employee was a member of the union. Under these circumstances, the Board concluded that resignation from the union did not, as a matter of law, revoke the checkoff. The Board also held in Frito-l.av that a re- vocation, in order to be effective, had to be accom- plished during the time periods set out in the checkoff authorization itself, even during the hiatus between contracts. Since the revocations were not timely and the resignation was ineffective, the Board concluded that the union's successful collection of dues during the hiatus was lawful. In the instant case, Davis effectively resigned from the Union. He did not, however, comply with the re- vocation provision of the checkoff' authorization. Both the new and the old contracts contained a main- tenance-of-mermbership provision, which requires em- plovees who are members when the contract is signed to remain members for the duration of the agreement. The contract also provides from checkoff' of' each member's dues, pursuant to an authorization. Since Davis did not revoke his authorization in a timely manner, the issue is whether his resignation, as a mat- ter of law, revoked the authorization. Under ('amp- bell and Frilo-lav, in order to answer this question we look to the authorization itself. It provides, in rel- evant part: Pursuant to this authorization and assignment. please deduct from my pay each month while I am in employment within the collective-bargain- ing unit in the Company, monthly dues, assess- ments and (if owing by me) an initiation fee each as designated by the International Secretary- Treasurer of the Union, as my membership dues in said Union. [G.C. Exh. A, emphasis supplied.] Thus, the authorization states that the payment of dues is in consideration for union membership. More- over, there is no provision in either the authorization or the collective-bargaining agreement fr financial- core membership. Indeed, employees have no obliga- tion either to join the Union or to pay dues, unless they are union members when the contract is signed. Under these facts, we conclude, as we did in Camp- bell, that Davis' effective resignation from the Union revoked his dues-checkoff authorization as a matter of law. Accordingly, we find that Respondent's at- tempt to cause, and is causing, the Employer to with- hold Davis' dues for the period following his resigna- tion, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. CON(LUSIONS iOF LAW 1. Asarco Incorporated is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent United Steelworkers of America, AFI, ('10, Local No. 7450, is a labor organization within the meaning of' Section 2(5) of' the Act. 3. By attempting to cause, and by causing, the Em- ployer to withhold the dues of an employee who had effectively resigned from Respondent where the em- ployees' dues-checkoff authorization was in consider- ation for union membership. Respondent violated Section 8(b)( 1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Tiiw Riaiin )y' Having found that Respondent has engaged in un- fair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom, and to take certain affirmative ac- tion to effectuate the policies of the Act. We shall order Respondent to make I)avis' 5 whole for any monetary loss Davis may have suffered by reason of Respondent's unlawful conduct in causing the Employer to withhold Davis' dues after Davis had effectively resigned from Respondent's member- ship, with interest in accord with the formula pre- scribed in Fl'orida Sleel rporportion, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of' the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board hereby orders that the Respondent, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 7450, Glover, Missouri, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Causing dues to be withheld from employees who have effectively resigned their union member- ship. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or co- ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed them by Section 7 of' the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Reimburse or refund to Howard Davis or an- other appropriate party the dues unlawfully collected from him for the period following his resignation, as set out in the section herein entitled "The Remedy." (b) Post at its offices and meeting halls in Glover, Missouri, copies of the attached notice marked "Ap- " We recognize that the arbitrator ordered Asarco. not Davis, to pay to the Union the owed dues by making double the monthly payment until the arrearage is current It also appears, however, that this money owed was deducted rom Davis' paycheck and that therefore the Union must repay l)avis. Thus, we iorder Respondent to repay Davis. unless the Employer can show at the compliance stage that it paid D)avis' dues without deducting any moneys from Davis' paycheck. ' See, generally, is Plumhing & Heating (o. 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 882 STEI.tWORKERS. IOCAI NO(). 7450) pendix."l7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representa- tive, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it fir 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees and members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no- tices are not altered, defaced. or covered by any other material. (c) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 14 signed copies of said notice in sufficient number to be posted by Asarco, Inc., if' it is willing. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 14. in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order. what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT Is FRIltER ORDt-RI) that the remainder of the complaint be, and it herebx is, dismissed. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting: The majority here once again erroneously- finds that resignation from a union is equivalent to revoca- tion of a checkoff authorization and therefore finds that the Union unlawfully caused the Employer to withhold dues from employee Davis' pay. I disagree. Davis resigned from the Union effective August 31, 1976, the last day of the then-current collective-bar- gaining agreement, but did not take any specific ac- tion to revoke his checkoff authorization either at that time or, insofar as is shown by this record, at any other. The majority here finds, as it did in San Diego County, District Council of Carpenters. United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of A rnerica, A FL- CIO (Campbell Industries), 243 NLRB 147 (1979), that an employee's resignation from a union necessarily re- vokes his or her dues-checkoff authorization where the checkoff authorization contains language that the payment of dues is in consideration for membership. However, as I emphasized in my dissent in that case, I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board." this should not be the law. as such language is merely hortatory in that it recites the obvious quid pro quo of all checkoff authorizations but possibly one. the agency shop. Accordingly. and for all reasons set forth in m~ opinion in Campbell. which I incorporate herein. I dissent from the majority's finding" that the iUnion violated Section 8(b)( I )(A) and (2) of the Act. I agree lith the mal.rit. tr Ihe reasons ia ted h' hem. that the charge herein is nol barred by Sec I(Xh) ol the ct and Ihat Ihe arhitrll.on pnrieed- ng did not cmplh ith the standards estalhished mI .Spwlh1,rg tlmda,,II.ir lgi, i (,oirpa.n. 112 NI RB 1(800 1955 Also. as thie case does not n,olve explicit res-,atlin o1 .a checkoff autho- rilltion during a hiatus between collecte-hargalning agreerments, l,,ii,-li, Irt. 243 N RR 137 (1979). n hich I dissenied. has r1 releance to Ihe clrcumslance, at issule here APPN 1I)I X NOllt I To EMPIY I:-S NiND MI1tMBRS PosTEDl BY O)RI)IR ()I IlF NAII()NAI. LABO()R RIAII()ONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had the opportu- nity to present evidence, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and we have been ordered to post this notice. WE X1.. NO1 restrain or coerce employees who exercise the rights guaranteed them in Sec- tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act in effectively resigning their union membership and returning to work by causing dues to he withheld from such employees for the period after they effectively resigned. WE WIl.l. NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. WF WIlL reimburse, with interest, Howard Davis for dues collected under the above-de- scribed circumstances. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA AFL CIO. LOCAL No. 7450 883 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation