Steelworkers Local 9292 (Allied Signal Technical Services)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 28, 2001

336 N.L.R.B. 52 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 52
United Steelworkers of America Local 9292, AFL–
CIO, CLC (Allied Signal Technical Services
Corporation) and Torrence Johnson. Case 12–
CB–4243
September 28, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, TRUESDALE, AND
WALSH
On February 25, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam N. Cates issued the attached decision. The Respon-
dent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief and a motion to take judicial notice.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
adopt the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent Union violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by filing internal union
charges against Torrence Johnson and suspending him
from membership in the Local Union for 6 months. For
the reasons discussed below, consistent with our deci-
sions in Office Employees Local 251 (Sandia National
Laboratories), 331 NLRB 1417 (2000), and Service Em-
ployees Local 254 (Brandeis University), 332 NLRB
1118 (2000), we find that the Respondent did not violate
Section 8(b)(1)(A) by its actions. Applying the analysis
set forth in these cases, we find that any infringement on
Johnson’s exercise of Section 7 rights is more than coun-
terbalanced by the Respondent Union’s legitimate and
substantial interest in policing its internal operations.
A. Facts
Allied Signal Technical Services Corporation (the
Company) is engaged in the business of providing main-
tenance and operations support to the United States Ma-
rine Corps for combat equipment prepositioned on ships
located around the world. United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica Local 9292, AFL–CIO, CLC (the Respondent or Un-
ion) represents approximately 400 of the Company’s
employees in a unit that includes service, warehouse, and
maintenance employees; plant clerical employees; truck
drivers; and driver/messengers.

1 The Respondent Union has moved for the Board to take judicial
notice of a Florida State court order granting the defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment against Terrence Johnson in a suit Johnson
filed against Terry Hutsell and the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL–CIO, CLC. In light of our disposition of this case, we deny the
motion as moot.
Torrence Johnson and Terry Hutsell are longtime em-
ployees of Allied Signal. Johnson was elected president
of the Union in 1990. He was reelected in 1992, and
then ran for a third term in 1994. Hutsell, who had been
Johnson’s vice president, challenged Johnson for the
presidency in the 1994 election. During the 1994 elec-
tion campaign, Johnson was accused of misappropriating
union funds and was subject to various investigations.
He testified that he found the campaign “pretty rough.”
Following a tie vote, Hutsell challenged the election by
filing charges with the Department of Labor, and a rerun
election was conducted. Hutsell won the second election
and served as president until May 1997.
During Hutsell’s tenure as union president, Johnson
voiced disagreement with Hutsell’s handling of union
business on numerous occasions, some of which echoed
election campaign allegations against Johnson. Hutsell
tried to appease Johnson by making him the steward of
the paint department in 1995. Johnson’s dealings with
Hutsell, however, remained hostile. This hostility mani-
fested itself in numerous internal union charges that
Johnson filed against Hutsell. Each of Johnson’s charges
accused Hutsell of intentionally violating the Local Un-
ion’s bylaws and the International Union’s constitution.
These charges are summarized below.

• On March 16, 1995, Johnson charged that Hutsell
had removed an employee from the workplace on
authorized paid Union business for a total of 2½
hours without the required Union membership ap-
proval. Johnson’s charge specifically accused
Hutsell of misappropriating Union funds and de-
liberately engaging in conduct in violation of the
responsibilities of members toward the Union.
Only after Hutsell agreed to reimburse the Union
out of his own pocket for the 2½ hours of pay did
Johnson drop the charges.
• On December 18, 1995, Johnson charged that Hut-
sell had improperly withdrawn a grievance that
Johnson had filed. Johnson’s grievance chal-
lenged the Company’s denial of his request for
educational assistance funds to cover paralegal
training that he wanted to take (even though he
was a body and fender employee). Johnson’s
charge alleged that Hutsell had deliberately inter-
fered with the performance of the Union’s legal or
contractual obligations.
• On February 2, 1996,2 Johnson charged that Hut-
sell had refused to process Johnson’s December
18, 1995 internal union charge. Johnson’s charge
accused Hutsell of deliberately interfering with
2 All subsequent dates refer to 1996 unless specified otherwise.
336 NLRB No. 2
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 9292 (ALLIED SIGNAL TECHNICAL SERVICES) 53
“any official of the International Union in the dis-
charge of that official’s” duties, deliberately en-
gaging in conduct in violation of the responsibility
of members toward the Union as an institution,
and deliberately interfering with the performance
of the Union’s legal or contractual obligations.
Following a personal meeting between Johnson
and Hutsell at which they agreed to put their dif-
ferences behind them, however, Johnson withdrew
his December 18, 1995 and February 2, 1996
charges.
• The abatement in Johnson’s hostility toward Hut-
sell was short-lived. On August 19 Johnson
charged that Hutsell had again violated the Union
by-laws and the International Union constitution,
this time by withdrawing a contractual grievance
Johnson had filed on July 22 on behalf of dis-
charged probationary employee George Mont-
gomery, Johnson’s uncle. Hutsell withdrew the
grievance because he believed that the Union
lacked the right to represent discharged probation-
ary employees because the contract provided that
the Company could discipline and discharge pro-
bationary employees at its “sole discretion.” John-
son believed instead that the Company’s action
against Montgomery violated the contractual non-
discrimination provision, which he understood to
apply even to probationary employees. Johnson’s
charge alleged that Hutsell deliberately interfered
with the performance of the Union’s legal or con-
tractual obligations.
• On September 18, Johnson charged that Hutsell
had improperly withdrawn a contractual grievance
Johnson had filed on July 12 concerning the sub-
contracting of work Johnson thought he should
have performed. Johnson withdrew the internal
union charges when he later discovered that Hut-
sell had not withdrawn the grievance.

On September 23, Hutsell filed internal union charges
against Johnson accusing Johnson of filing numerous
unwarranted and unfounded charges against him in an
effort to interfere with the performance of his duties as
the union president. Hutsell also charged Johnson with
assisting other union members in filing false and unwar-
ranted charges against Hutsell.
Hutsell testified without contradiction that Johnson’s
internal union charges forced him to spend a consider-
able amount of time not only preparing his defenses to
the charges, but also putting into motion the internal un-
ion machinery necessary for processing the charges.
Hutsell further testified without contradiction that these
charges were, at critical times, distracting to the perform-
ance of his duties as union president. Even when certain
of the charges were resolved prior to a hearing before a
union trial committee, Hutsell was required to spend
considerable time and effort given the expedited nature
of the charge resolution process: within 4 weeks follow-
ing the filing of an internal charge a notice of the charge
must be posted, a membership meeting was held at which
the charge is discussed and either a trial committee se-
lected or a process to obtain such a committee chosen.
Thus, even though Johnson eventually withdrew the first
three internal union charges against Hutsell, the with-
drawals did not occur until after Hutsell had expended
considerable time and effort on the charges.
On September 25 Hutsell requested and received ap-
proval from the Local Union’s executive board to re-
move Johnson from the paint department steward posi-
tion to which Hutsell had appointed Johnson. On the
same day, Hutsell notified Johnson in writing of his re-
moval as steward. Johnson responded by filing more
internal union charges against Hutsell. Johnson’s
charges alleged that Hutsell’s action of removing him as
steward deliberately interfered with “any official of the
International Union in the discharge of that official’s”
duties, deliberately violated the responsibility of mem-
bers toward the Union as an institution, and deliberately
interfered with the performance of the Union’s legal or
contractual obligations.
Hutsell’s charges against Johnson and Johnson’s two
remaining charges against Hutsell (involving Hutsell’s
withdrawal of the grievance regarding Johnson’s uncle
and Hutsell’s removal of Johnson as a steward) were
scheduled for trial at the same time, and were thoroughly
considered by the Union at all levels of the organization.
First, committees of the Local Union’s members tried the
charges in November. On December 13 the Local Un-
ion’s membership voted to accept the trial committees’
recommendations to (1) dismiss Johnson’s charges
against Hutsell; (2) find Johnson guilty of all charges
filed by Hutsell; and (3) suspend Johnson from the Local
Union’s membership for 24 months.
Johnson appealed the decision to the International Un-
ion. An international commission recommended sustain-
ing the Local Union’s actions. Subsequently, the Interna-
tional Union executive board adopted the International
Commission’s recommendations, but reduced Johnson’s
suspension from membership to 6 months.
B. The Judge’s Decision
The complaint alleges that the Union violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by filing internal union charges
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 54
against Johnson and suspending him from membership.3
Applying a dual motive analysis, the judge found that
counsel for the General Counsel had established that (1)
Johnson’s charges against Hutsell were “inextricably
entangled” with Johnson’s attempts to enforce the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, certain company policies and
the Union’s bylaws and constitution and thus were pro-
tected activities; and (2) the Union’s charges against and
suspension of Johnson were necessarily directed against
these protected activities. The judge further concluded
that, because the Union failed to demonstrate that it
would have filed the charges against Johnson and sus-
pended him absent Johnson’s protected activities, a vio-
lation must be found.
C. Discussion
After the judge’s decision in this case issued, the
Board issued its decision in Office Employees Local 251
(Sandia National Laboratories), supra. In that case, the
Board reviewed the reach of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and its
proviso. As a result of that review, the Board concluded
that Section 8(b)(1)(A) does not proscribe wholly in-
traunion conduct and discipline. Instead, the Board
found that Section 8(b)(1)(A)’s proper scope in union
discipline cases is to proscribe union conduct against
union members that impacts on the employment relation-
ship; impairs access to the Board’s processes; pertains to
unacceptable methods of union coercion, such as physi-
cal violence in organizational or strike contexts; or oth-
erwise impairs policies imbedded in the Act. Id. at
1418–1419. In so doing, the Board overruled precedent
on which the judge relied in finding the discipline of
Johnson unlawful.
In this case, there is no indication that the Union’s dis-
cipline of Johnson impaired access to the Board’s proc-
esses, involved violence or other unacceptable methods
of coercion, or impaired policies imbedded in the Act.
The only category in which the discipline of Johnson
could arguably fall is the first category identified
above—namely, it potentially impacted on his relation-
ship with his Employer. Johnson’s internal union
charges, with two exceptions, related directly to how
grievances were handled under the terms of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement.4 Arguably, by suspending

3 The complaint does not allege that the Union’s removal of Johnson
from his shop steward position violated the Act, and the judge did not
find a violation based on that conduct. We also do not pass on this
issue.
4 As discussed below, the Union disciplined Johnson for attempting
to dictate the Union’s contractual grievance policy by filing internal
charges challenging the Union’s leadership decisions regarding the
proper handling of grievances. The Union did not discipline Johnson
for filing grievances or for voicing his opinion on their merits.
Johnson’s membership in the Union for challenging the
Union’s grievance handling strategies, the Union ad-
versely affected his right to file and pursue grievances
under the collective-bargaining agreement and thereby
affected his conditions of employment. Conversely, it
could colorably be argued that Johnson’s suspension
affects him only as a union member, does not affect his
conditions of employment and clearly did not affect his
job status. Although the discipline’s nexus with the em-
ployment relationship appears tenuous, we need not re-
solve this issue. For, even assuming the Union’s action
toward Johnson had an impact on his relationship with
his employer, we would still find no violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A).
Assuming, as we do, that there is a connection to the
employment relationship under Sandia, supra, then the
Union’s discipline of Johnson comes within the scope of
Section 8(b)(1)(A). We must then determine whether the
discipline violated Section 8(b)(1)(A), by balancing
Johnson’s Section 7 rights against the legitimacy of the
union interests at stake, in accord with longstanding
precedent.5
We begin by analyzing the Section 7 rights that are af-
fected by the Union’s discipline of Johnson. In filing
charges over Hutsell’s handling of the grievances, John-
son was exercising his Section 7 right “to question the
adequacy of his Union’s representation of the bargaining
unit and to seek to redirect his union’s policies and
strategies for dealing with his Employer.”6 By disciplin-
ing Johnson for filing the charges, therefore, the Union
arguably restrained Johnson in the exercise of his Section
7 rights within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Al-
though deprived temporarily of his union membership,
Johnson has other means available to exercise his Section
7 right to pursue changes in working conditions and to
influence his union representative’s bargaining policies.
He can, of course, continue to file grievances. He can

itions.
Two of Johnson’s charges were unrelated to the Union’s grievance
policy. Johnson’s March 16, 1995 charge challenged Hutsell’s place-
ment of an employee on authorized union business without the appro-
priate union approval, and his September 27, 1995 charge challenged
Hutsell’s removal of Johnson as steward.
5 Sandia and Brandeis expressly reaffirmed several Board decisions
in which the 8(b)(1)(A) issue was decided by balancing the employees’
Sec. 7 right to engage in or refrain from concerted activity against the
legitimacy of the union interest at stake. Brandeis, supra at 1122, and
Sandia, supra at 1420, citing Mine Workers Local 12419 (National
Grinding Wheel Co.), 176 NLRB 628 (1969); Molders Local 125
(Blackhawk Tanning Co.), 178 NLRB 208 (1969); and Plumbers Local
444 (T. S. Hanson Plumbing), 277 NLRB 1231 (1985).
6 Brandeis, supra at 1123. See also Sandia, supra at 1419, 1424,
discussing the longstanding principle that Sec. 7 encompasses the right
of employees to persuade their union representative to change its
bargaining policies and to pursue changes in their working cond
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 9292 (ALLIED SIGNAL TECHNICAL SERVICES) 55
initiate a decertification effort or rival union campaign.
And, significantly, he can pursue legal claims that the
Union mishandled his grievances, in breach of its duty of
fair representation.
We next examine the Union’s interests at stake in this
case. We find that, to the extent that Johnson’s suspen-
sion from union membership may be deemed a restraint
on Section 7 rights, that restraint is more than counter-
balanced by the Union’s legitimate interest in maintain-
ing control over the grievance process and in policing its
internal affairs so as to avoid erosion of its status. By
filing internal union charges protesting Hutsell’s han-
dling of grievances, Johnson was attempting to dictate
the Union’s contractual grievance policy. As the Board
and courts have long recognized, a union has a legitimate
interest in maintaining control over the grievance proc-
ess. Unions for the most part lack the resources neces-
sary to fully investigate and prosecute to arbitration
every grievance filed. Accordingly, they must be free to
decide, in good faith, which grievances to pursue and
which to abandon or to trade off in favor of some other
advantage.7
The repeated filing of internal union charges against
union officers because of a disagreement over their han-
dling of grievances jeopardizes the Union’s control over
the grievance process. It also potentially weakens the
grievance processes and, ultimately, the collective-
bargaining process as well. In the present case, for ex-
ample, Johnson’s attack on Hutsell through the repeated
filing of internal union charges caused Hutsell to spend
considerable time and effort defending the charges and it
interfered with the performance of his other duties as
union president.8 Further, the charges impacted finan-
cially on the Union, as the Union was required to reim-
burse union members and officers for the time they spent
processing the charges. If the Union were to accede to
Johnson’s demands, on the other hand, it would encour-
age other members to capitalize on this tactic and file
their own internal charges for the purpose of dictating the
Union’s contractual grievance policy. The union leader-
ship would then be required to expend more time and
money defending against such charges, thus taxing its
resources and distracting it from the performance of its
other duties as the employees’ exclusive collective-
bargaining representative.

7 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349 (1964). There is no evi-
dence in the record, nor is there any allegation, that the Union’s han-
dling of the grievances at issue in this case was arbitrary, discrimina-
tory or motivated by bad faith.
8 Hutsell’s testimony regarding the impact of Johnson’s filing of in-
ternal union charges on Hutsell’s ability to perform his duties as union
president was uncontradicted.
In concluding that the balance tips in favor of the Un-
ion’s interests at stake in this case, we are respecting the
essential balance of interests that Congress has embodied
in the 8(b)(1)(A) prohibitions and the 8(b)(1)(A) proviso.
In enacting Section 8(b)(1)(A), Congress specified that
that section’s protection against restraint on Section 7
rights “shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to proscribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein.” Congress thus rec-
ognized that unions had legitimate interests in deciding
how to regulate their internal affairs so as to forestall
erosion of their status. Setting the terms on which indi-
viduals could become and remain members was a sig-
nificant aspect of this. Food & Commercial Workers
Local 81 (MacDonald Meat Co.), 284 NLRB 1084, 1085
(1987), citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967). As the Board observed in MacDonald
Meat Co., supra, it has been generally assumed that
“rules with respect to the . . . retention of membership”
are those that provide for the suspension and expulsion
of employees from the union.
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we find that the
Union’s legitimate and substantial interest in maintaining
control over the grievance process and in policing its
internal affairs so as to avoid erosion of its status out-
weighs Johnson’s arguably impacted Section 7 rights.
We therefore conclude that the Union’s actions of filing
internal union charges against Johnson and suspending
Johnson from membership in the Union for 6 months do
not constitute unlawful restraint on those rights in viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(1)(A).9
In finding that the Union did not violate Section
8(b)(1)(A) by disciplining Johnson, we find distinguish-
able our decision in Operating Engineers Local 400
(Hilde Construction Co.), 225 NLRB 596 (1976), enfd.
mem. 561 F.2d 1021 (D.C. Cir 1977). In that case, the
Board found that the union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by imposing internal union fines on members who en-
gaged in dissident activity in an attempt to redirect their
union’s bargaining strategy. As we noted in Brandeis,
supra at 1124, an important factor in finding a violation
in Hilde was that the discipline was not “narrowly tai-
lored to serve [the] legitimate union interest.” In the
instant case, we find that the remedy the Union chose
was narrowly tailored to address the problems created by
9 Although we find that it was not an unfair labor practice to take the
aforementioned internal union action against Johnson, we note that
Johnson has other remedies at his disposal for resolving purely intraun-
ion quarrels concerning the propriety of intraunion decision making.
See Sandia, supra at 1425. For example, Johnson could pursue a claim
under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act that he has
been disciplined for attempting to be heard on his view of how the
union should operate. 29 U.S.C. § 411 et seq.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 56
Johnson’s repetitive filings. Simply removing Johnson
from his steward position would not solve the Union’s
problem because as a union member Johnson would still
be in a position to file internal union charges. Further-
more, suspending Johnson for only 6 months serves both
to limit the adverse impact on Johnson while providing
the Union with some short-term relief from the problem
Johnson’s repetitive filing of internal union charges
posed.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.

Dallas Manuel II, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Glen M. Connor, Esq., for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Jacksonville, Florida, on December 7 and 8,
1998, pursuant to a complaint issued by the Regional Director
for Region 12 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) on January 27, 1998, and is based on a charge filed by
Torrence Johnson, an individual (Johnson), on December 9,
1996, and amended on December 24, 1997. The complaint
alleges United Steelworkers of America, Local 9292, AFL–
CIO, CLC (Local Union) engaged in certain violations of Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
Issues
Whether the Union on or about September 23, 1996, through
its agent Terry Hutsell (Hutsell), filed internal union charges
against Johnson, and whether on or about January 1, 1997, the
Local Union suspended Johnson from membership for 6
months because Johnson filed internal union charges against
Hutsell over his decision not to process various grievances
which had been filed under the provisions of the collective-
bargaining agreement hereinafter referred to.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and to cross-examine
witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs.
On the entire record of the case, and from my observation of
the witnesses and their demeanor, I conclude and find the Un-
ion violated the Act substantially as alleged in the complaint.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BOARD’S JURISDICTION
Allied Signal Technical Services Corporation (the Company)
a wholly owned subsidiary of Allied Signal, Inc., with a place
of business located at Jacksonville, Florida, at times material
herein, has been and continues to be engaged in the business of
providing maintenance and operations support to the United
States Marine Corps, a branch of the armed forces of the United
States, for combat equipment prepositioned on ships located
around the world. During the past 12 months, the Company, in
conducting its business operations, provided services valued in
excess of $50,000 to the United States Marine Corps. The
Company, based on its operations described above, has a sub-
stantial impact on the national defense of the United States.
The evidence establishes, the parties admit, and I find that
the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Local Union admits, the evidence establishes, and I find
that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Johnson and Hutsell are long-term employees of the Com-
pany and both were active in bringing the Local Union in at the
Company. The Local Union was certified in March 1990 as the
collective-bargaining representative for the following unit of
employees:

All service, warehouse and maintenance employees, plant
clerical employees, truck drivers, and driver/messengers em-
ployed by the Company on the MPF Program at the Com-
pany’s facilities located at Blount Island, at A.D.D. on Heck-
scher Drive and Imeson Park; excluding administrative coor-
dinators, guards, administrative and confidential employees,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended.

Johnson and Hutsell have both been members of the Union
since 1990. Johnson was elected as the first president of the
Local Union in 1990 and reelected for a second term. Johnson
ran for reelection in 1994, but was defeated by his former vice
president, Hutsell. Hutsell served until Ronald Register was
elected president of the Local Union in 1997. The unit is made
up of approximately 400 members. The most recent collective-
bargaining agreement between the Company and Local Union
is effective from May 20, 1996, until May 20, 1999.
Essentially this litigation grew out of two former presidents’
apparent distrust or dislike of each other, or of their animosity
toward each other, or of their desire to take the Union in differ-
ent directions with different goals.
The Local Union is charged with violating Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, which reads as follows:

(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents—
(1) To restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 [Section 157 of this
Title]: provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to proscribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein.
Section 7 (Sec. 157) provides:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such ac-
tivities except to the extent that such right may be affected
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 9292 (ALLIED SIGNAL TECHNICAL SERVICES) 57
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment as authorized in Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) [Section 158(a)(3) of this Title].
IV. FACTS
The facts are set forth in what at first might appear greater
detail than is necessary. However, this more inclusive factual
narration is necessary to fully illuminate the time consuming
(and perhaps costly) disputes between the Local Union’s two
former presidents.
Johnson sought reelection as the Local Union’s president in
1994, and was opposed by his then vice president, Hutsell. The
election resulted in a tie vote following what Johnson described
as a “pretty rough” campaign in which “some accusations”1
were made. According to Johnson, Hutsell filed charges with
the Department of Labor, Office of Labor Management Stan-
dards, and as a result a rerun election was held. Hutsell was
declared the winner in the rerun election. Hutsell served as
president of the Local Union from 1994 until May 1997.
Hutsell testified that after he assumed the presidency he had
to quickly prepare for contract negotiations, which were very
time consuming. Hutsell testified he also had the additional
burden of knowing and planning for another local union (at
Florida Wire and Cable) being considered for and eventually
“amalgamated” into the Local Union herein.
Johnson said after Hutsell assumed the presidency of the Lo-
cal Union he had various “disputes” with Hutsell. Johnson
explained the disputes involved “grievance handling,” “griev-
ance procedures,” “the local union by-laws,” and various other
matters.2 Johnson said he tried to resolve some of the disputes
by talking with Hutsell3 but that the Union had procedures
where members could challenge decisions of its local officials
in a more formal method which he utilized. According to John-
son, formal challenges may be undertaken by filing local, “in-
ternal charges”4 against members or officials or by a complain-
ing member writing the International Union, with the Interna-
tional Union reviewing and/or investigating the challenged
actions of local union officials. Johnson further explained there
is a process for filing internal union charges against members
or officials pursuant to the Local Union’s bylaws as well as the
international constitution, which outlines in broad terms proce-
dures to be followed. Johnson said if a local union member or
officer believes one of the local members or officers have vio-

1 Johnson testified he “was accused of misappropriating union
funds” and that he was subject to “a few investigations.”
2 Hutsell testified he and Johnson had differences of opinion about
how the Local Union should be run.
3 Hutsell testified he was concerned that Johnson was still “stinging
a little bit from the loss in the past election”; therefore, in “an attempt
to try to pull Mr. Johnson back . . . into involvement in the Union and
to try to take advantage of the knowledge that he [Johnson] did have,”
he asked the Local Union executive board about appointing Johnson to
fill a shop steward’s vacancy in the paint department. Hutsell ap-
pointed Johnson to the position after speaking with employees in the
paint department.
4 The constitution of the International Union at art. 12, p. 57, out-
lines offenses any member (including officials) may be penalized for.
lated the local’s bylaws5 (or the International Union’s constitu-
tion) the member may file an internal union charge with the
recording secretary of the local.
A local union charging party member must cite specific vio-
lations in any charge, which is then read at the next regularly
scheduled local union meeting. Thereafter a trial committee is
appointed and/or approved by a local union membership and a
trial date on the charges is established. The trial committee
hears from witnesses and/or receives and considers documen-
tary evidence and thereafter makes a decision on the charges.
The trial committee’s decision is read at the next regularly
scheduled local union meeting and voted upon.
Any aggrieved party may appeal any decision of the Local
Union to the International Union. The International Union then
establishes an International commission. The International
commission visits the local union and hears and/or reviews the
previous evidence as well as any newly developed evidence.
The International commission reports its findings, along with a
recommendation, to the International Union. If an aggrieved
party seeks further review the matter is presented to the Interna-
tional Union, as a whole, at the International Union’s member-
ship meeting. The International Union membership’s vote is
final.
Hutsell testified he had been elected to move the Local Un-
ion forward but Johnson began filing internal union charges
against him. Hutsell explained that when internal union
charges are filed the membership has to be notified the date the
charges will be discussed, an investigation has to be launched, a
trial committee selected, and a trail date established. Hutsell
said these actions take considerable time and were distracting to
his performing other functions for the Local Union. Hutsell
testified that although the first three internal union charges filed
against him by Johnson were withdrawn by Johnson, such
withdrawals did not take place before considerable time and
energy had been expended on the charges.6
Johnson filed internal union charges against Hutsell on
March 16, 1995, in which he alleged Hutsell had, on January
17, 1995, removed an employee (Joseph Clark) from the work
place on authorized paid union business for 2-1/2 hours without
local union membership approval.7 Johnson asserts Hutsell’s
actions conflicted with the Local Union’s bylaws. According
to Johnson, Hutsell agreed to repay the Local Union for the 2-
1/2 hours. Johnson acknowledged he dropped the charges
against Hutsell before the charges were assigned a case or inci-
dent number.
Johnson filed internal union charges against Hutsell on De-
cember 18, 1995, for withdrawing a grievance he had filed.
Johnson explained he was notified on October 18, 1995, the
5 Art. X of the Local Union’s bylaws at “Trials of Members and Lo-
cal Union Officers” outlines in detail the procedures to be followed.
6 Hutsell testified, “there was a lot of pressure brought to bear on Mr.
Johnson and myself . . . from the members . . . saying . . . they felt . . .
this [charge filing] was silly.” Hutsell explained the members’ pressure
“was more along the lines they felt we were getting ready to waste a lot
of local time and local money on something that they felt was silly.”
7 Johnson stated the relief he sought was to have the Local Union re-
paid and to prevent this type of situation from happening in the future.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 58
grievance in question (8–95)8 had been “withdrawn before it
even got to a committee to review.” Johnson was notified of
the withdrawal in writing by Homer Wilson, a staff representa-
tive of the International Union.9 Johnson asserted the with-
drawal decision and notification was based on facts and/or in-
formation provided to Wilson by Hutsell, and possible others.
Johnson filed internal union charges against Hutsell on Feb-
ruary 2, 1996, stating “Mr. Hutsell refused to proceed with an
internal charge filed by me regarding his withdrawal of my
grievance (8–95).” Johnson explained he filed this internal
union charge because Hutsell would not proceed with the inter-
nal union charge he had filed on December 18, 1995. Johnson
alleged Hutsell’s refusal to proceed on the December 18, 1995,
internal union charge violated local bylaws, namely that a trial
committee should have been selected and the matter presented
to the trial committee for a resolution.
Johnson voluntarily withdrew the two internal union charges
he had filed on December 18, 1995, and February 2, 1996, after
he met with Hutsell “at a pray meeting.” Johnson explained,
“we just did it like a gentlemen thing” “we just agreed to . . . go
forward” and “put all that behind us.”
On July 22, 1996, Johnson filed a grievance on behalf of
probationary employee, George Montgomery,10 regarding
Montgomery’s discharge. Johnson knew Montgomery had not
completed his probationary period at the time the Company
discharged Montgomery and he was aware the collective-
bargaining agreement reflected the Company could discipline,
up to and including discharge, any employee during the em-
ployees’ probationary period “at the sole discretion of the
Company.” Johnson explained that notwithstanding the Com-
pany’s prerogatives he filed the grievance for two reasons,
namely, (1) there was a “No Discrimination provision”11 in the
collective-bargaining agreement, and (2) that during his tenure
as the Local Union’s president he had filed a grievance which
was processed by the Company for a probationary employee
regarding discrimination.
In a letter dated August 13, 1996, Hutsell notified the human
resources manager of the Company the Union was withdrawing

8 The grievance involved Johnson’s request for educational assis-
tance from the Company, which the Company denied. Johnson is as a
body and fender repair employee in the paint department. The educa-
tional assistance he sought from the Company was for paralegal train-
ing. Johnson acknowledged the Company does not utilize paralegals at
its Jacksonville, Florida location, but he contended the collective-
bargaining agreement did not specify job training had to be bargaining
unit work related.
9 Johnson testified on cross-examination that after he filed the
charges on December 18, 1995, Hutsell advised him in writing the
charge was untimely and if Johnson could not show it was filed within
the required 60 days the Local Union would not proceed with the
charge.
10 Johnson acknowledged on cross-examination that Montgomery is
his uncle.
11 Johnson provided a copy of the Company’s reaffirmation of its
EEOC policies dated August 9, 1996, which he contended reflected the
Company’s longstanding policy on nondiscrimination. Johnson under-
stood the policies applied even to probationary employees.
the grievance related to Montgomery’s termination.12 Johnson
learned of the withdrawal and filed internal union charges
against Hutsell on August 19, 1996, in which he asserted the
grievance involving Montgomery had been withdrawn before it
had been investigated; without discussion by the grievance
committee; and before the Company even responded to it.
Johnson testified that by filing this internal union charge
against Hutsell he was attempting to have Montgomery’s griev-
ance reinstated.
Johnson testified that before he had an opportunity to present
evidence and/or arguments regarding his August 19, 1996,
internal union charges Hutsell had written to and received a
reply from the International Union regarding the charges. In-
ternational Union Secretary-Treasure Leo W. Gerard’s Septem-
ber 23, 1996 response, reads as follows:

Nona M. Rice, Recording Secretary
USWA Local Union 9292
435 Clark Road, Ste. 103
Jacksonville, FL 32218

Dear Sister Rice:

I am in receipt of charges by Torrence Johnson against
the Local Union President, Terry Hutsell, which were filed
on August 19, 1996.
Please be advised that, based on the contractual lan-
guage, it appears that these charges are frivolous in nature
since probationary employees do not have the right to
process a grievance. If this be the case, the Local Union
should not entertain the charge as submitted.

In Solidarity,
/s/ Leo W. Gerard

Leo W. Gerard
International Secretary-Treasure

c. Homer Wilson, Director
Terry Hutsell, President

International Union Secretary-Treasure Gerard’s letter was
read at the Local Union memberships’ regularly scheduled
October 19, 1996 membership meeting. According to Johnson,
Hutsell stated the Local Union would not proceed with John-
son’s August 19, 1996 charge. Johnson testified “dissention
arose” and International Union District Director Homer Wilson
agreed the charge could not be dropped but must be processed
by the Local Union.
According to Johnson, a trial committee was to have been
chosen at the October 1996 meeting for his August 19, 1996,
internal union charges, but the trial committee was not chosen
until later and was chosen by the executive board of the Local
Union at random from its checkoff list. Johnson testified the
bylaws of the Local Union called for the members to appoint
(or approve) the selection of a trial committee rather than the
executive board.
12 Hustell explained he withdrew the grievance because, “there was
little or no doubt that Mr. Montgomery was a probationary employee”
and under the parties collective-bargaining agreement “we did not have
the right to represent disciplined or [discharged] . . . employees.”
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 9292 (ALLIED SIGNAL TECHNICAL SERVICES) 59
Johnson filed internal union charges against Hutsell on Sep-
tember 18, 1996, alleging Hutsell had withdrawn a grievance13
Johnson had filed regarding the subcontracting of work John-
son contended he could and should have performed. Johnson
later withdrew this internal union charge when he learned the
underlying grievance had not actually been withdrawn.
On September 23, 1996, Hutsell filed internal union charges
against Johnson. The charges read in pertinent part as follows:

In compliance with references (a) and (b) I am filing charges
against fellow union member Brother Torrence Johnson.
These charges are as follows:

(1) Reference (a) Article XII Section (1) part (a), Ref-
erence (b) Article IX Section (1) part (a)
Brother Johnson, being a past president of this local, is
fully aware of all the previsions outlined in our Constitu-
tion, Bylaws and Collective Bargaining Agreement and
has knowingly violated such.
(2) Reference (a) Article XII Section (1) part (l), Ref-
erence (b) Article IX Section (1) part (l)
Brother Johnson has continuously filed or assisted oth-
ers in the filing of unwarranted and unfounded charges
against the local union president in an effort to deliberately
interfere with him in the discharge of his official duties.
(3) Reference (a) Article XII Section (1) part (m) and
(n), Reference (b) Article IX Section (1) part (m) and (n)
Brother Johnson has on a continuous basis engaged in
(1) conduct and actions against the organization as an in-
stitution (2) deliberately interfering with the performance
of the organization’s legal or contractual obligations. This
is based on the fact He has repeated filed and/or encourage
others to file unwarranted and unfounded charges in an ef-
fort to make it impossible for the local union president to
fulfill the legal and contractual obligations of the local.
(3) Reference (a) New Members Oath
Brother Johnson has knowingly and willingly wronged
a member by filing false and unfounded charges against
the local union president.

Sincerely,

/s/Terry Hutsell
Terry Hutsell
President, USWA Local 9292

Hutsell testified he conducted a local union executive board
meeting by telephone on September 25, 1996, in which he
asked the Local Union’s executive board members to support
his removing Johnson as job steward in the paint department.
Hutsell told the Local Union’s executive board members,
“Brother Torrence Johnson’s actions over the past months have
been destructive and counter productive to the Local.” The
Local Union’s executive board voted eight in favor of support-
ing President Hutsell’s requested action, one executive board
member voted against and one abstained.

13 The grievance appears to have been filed on July 12, 1996. In his
grievance Johnson was complaining the Company had sent a GMC
truck for body and fender repair to an employer outside the repair unit
herein.
Hutsell sent the following letter to Johnson on September 25,
1996:14

September 25, 1996

Torrence Johnson
5756 Tallpine Lane #5
Jacksonville, FL 32211

Dear Brother Johnson,

After careful review of your actions over the last sev-
eral months it is with regret a must inform you, that be-
cause of those actions, you have left me no alternative but
to remove you from the position of shop steward in this
local.
Before taking this action it was discussed in great
lengths with the local’s executive board members and our
international representatives and it was agreed that this ac-
tion is in the best interest of the local.
Brother Johnson, I find it very unfortunate this action
has to be taken, a former president, such as yourself, could
be one the most valuable assets this Local has to offer, un-
fortunately you decided to use those skills to try to divide
us and to continue to promote distrust among the member-
ship.
If you have any questions concerning this issue please
feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

/s/ Terry Hutsell
Terry Hutsell
President, USWA Local 9292

Johnson testified neither Hutsell nor any other union official
explained to him why he was removed as a job steward.15
Hutsell testified he removed Johnson from shop steward be-
cause of his “continuous filing of the frivolous charges” and
added, “the relationship between me and Mr. Johnson had dete-
riorated to the point that it was no longer workable.”
Johnson filed internal union charges against Hutsell on Sep-
tember 27, 1996, for removing him as steward. Johnson as-
serted the removal letter did not “address any violations or
other actions which constitutes this decision.” Johnson further
asserted “this action was not addressed with the executive
board or the staff representatives as his letter claims.”
Hutsell in his September 23, 1996 internal union charges
against Johnson asserted Johnson, “continuously filed or as-
sisted others in the filing of unwarranted and unfound charges
against the Local Union president in an effort to deliberately
interfere with him in the discharge of his official duties.” Hut-
sell testified he viewed Johnson’s charges “as harassment and
14 Johnson served as shop steward in the paint department from De-
cember 1995 until September 1996. Johnson contends stewards’ posi-
tions are elected. However, it appears Hutsell simply conducted an
informal poll of the paint department before appointing Johnson as
steward therein.
15 Johnson testified the procedure for removing a job steward is to
have internal union charges filed against the steward followed by the
selection of a trial committee to decide whether the steward should be
removed.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 60
an attempt by Mr. Johnson to burden me with other things . . .
because some of the charges came at pretty critical times that
would interfere with what I . . . might have had going on at that
particular time.”
Johnson was notified in writing on November 21, 1996, of
trial dates for certain of his internal union charges. Trial dates
were selected for two of the internal union charges Johnson
filed against Hutsell; namely, the charge regarding Johnson’s
removal as a shop steward and the internal union charge related
to the withdrawal of the Montgomery grievance. Also sched-
uled for trial during that same time was the internal union
charges filed by Hutsell against Johnson.16
Johnson testified he attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to get
the trial committee’s hearing dates rescheduled.17
The results of the trial committees on the three internal union
charges were reported to the Local Union’s membership at its
December 1996 regularly scheduled union meeting.
The Local Union notified Johnson that the membership, by
majority vote, supported the trial committees’ recommendation
that the internal union charges by Johnson against Hutsell be
dismissed.
The membership supported the trial committees’ “guilty on
all counts” decision regarding Hutsell’s charges against John-
son and his suspension from membership in the Local Union
for 24 months.
The trial committees’ report to the Local Union’s members
dated December 9, 1996, pointed out that Johnson did not ap-
pear at trial even after being notified his request to reschedule
the hearings had been rejected.
Following the Local Union’s membership’s December 13,
1996 approval of its trial committees’ decision, Johnson ap-
pealed the decision (regarding his 24-month suspension from
the Union and his being removed as shop steward) to the Inter-
national Union. Johnson sought to have the International Un-
ion stay the Local Union’s actions until the International Union
acted thereon.
The International Union notified Johnson on January 17,
1997, his appeal from the actions of the local union member-
ship was accepted, but his request for a stay was denied. The
International Union notified Johnson on February 5, 1997, that
his appeal would be, and was, heard by an international com-
mission in Jacksonville, Florida, on March 1, 1997.
Johnson attended the March 1, 1997 international internal
commission hearing and submitted two written briefs. Johnson
urged the international commission to reverse the findings of
the Local Union on two major points, namely, that the charges
against him were not specific and were untimely.
Following the March 1, 1997 international commission hear-
ings, the international commission made its report to the Inter-
national Union’s executive board in May 1997. The interna-
tional commission concluded in pertinent part:

III. FINDINGS

16 The actual hearing dates for the three internal union charges were
November 22, 25, and 26, 1996.
17 Johnson acknowledged he had been excused from work on the se-
lected dates but elected not to attend the trials.
All parties were given full opportunity to call wit-
nesses, introduce evidence, and present oral argument. On
the basis of all the evidence, including our own observa-
tions of the witnesses, and after considering the arguments
advanced by the parties; we have arrived at the following
findings and recommendations.
Charge #0496
The testimony disclosed that Torrence Johnson had re-
peatedly filed false and unwarranted charges against Terry
Hutsell, president of the Local, that Torrence Johnson
recommended to a group that tried to organize with the
Steelworkers that they go to the Teamsters, that he also as-
sisted other members of the Local in filing false and un-
warranted charges against Hutsell, and constantly because
of his actions interfered with the president and Local in
administering the collective-bargaining agreement.
Charge #0596
The evidence disclosed that Torrence Johnson choose
not to attend the hearings of the trial committee, because
he felt that the trial committee and membership didn’t
have enough sense to make such a decision on the various
charges and would wait for an international commission to
hear his cases.
The evidence also showed that ever since Terry Hut-
sell beat Torrence Johnson for the office of president of
the Local, Torrence Johnson has filed or caused to be filed
through others, many unwarranted and unjust charges
against Terry Hutsell, president of the Local.
The evidence showed that Terry Hutsell did not violate
the constitution or bylaws when he removed Torrence
Johnson as shop steward in the paint department, as Tor-
rence Johnson was appointed by the president of the Lo-
cal, approved by the local executive board and removed by
the president of the Local because of Torrence Johnson’s
constant harassment, etc., with approval of the Local ex-
ecutive board. It is interesting that according to unrefuted
(sic.) testimony Torrence Johnson got up in the local union
meeting and withdrew charge #5 but latter appealed it to
the International.
Accordingly, we find Torrence Johnson (Charge
#0496) guilty as charged on all four (4) counts, and Terry
Hutsell (Charge #0596) not guilty. We also find that the
Local Union’s actions were reasonable in Charge #0496
by suspending Torrence Johnson’s good standing for
twenty-four (24) months and were proper in dismissing
Charge #0596 against Terry Hutsell.
IV. Recommendations
We find that the Local Union’s actions in Charges
#0496 & #0596 to have been proper with no procedural er-
rors, and the Appeals of Torrence Johnson be denied and
the Local Union’s actions be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John Herron
John Herron, Chairman

STEELWORKERS LOCAL 9292 (ALLIED SIGNAL TECHNICAL SERVICES) 61
/s/ Billy McColeman
Billy McColeman, Secretary

On August 15, 1997, the International Union executive board
notified Johnson, in writing, it had adopted the International
commission’s report and recommendations, but had modified
the discipline imposed to the extent it reduced Johnson’s sus-
pension from local union membership from 24 to 6 months.
Johnson appealed the International Union executive board’s
decision to the entire international union membership at its
annual convention. The decision of the International Union
executive board was upheld.
V. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
It is helpful to look at certain guiding Board principles. The
Board in Steelworkers Local 1397 (U.S. Steel Corp., Home-
stead Works), 240 NLRB 848 (1979), stated “that an em-
ployee’s right to engage in intraunion activities in opposition to
the incumbent leadership of his union is concerted activity pro-
tected by Section 7 is, of course, elementary.” See also Labor-
ers Local 836 (Corbet Construction), 307 NLRB 801, 803
(1992). [Judge Thomas A. Ricci noted “that members have a
statutory right to object to the way officers, or even a majority
of the union members, chose to operate the union is so clear as
to require no citation of authority.”] Stated differently, the
Board in Longshoremen Local 20 (Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring
Co.), 323 NLRB 1115, 1126 (1997), noted, “The governing law
is clear—a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act if it
processes internal union charges against one of its members
because that member engages in protected [dissent] union
activity.” The Board has also held that the threatened,
attempted, or actual invocation of internal disciplinary charges
by a union representative has a sufficient tendency to impede
employees in the exercise of rights protected by the Act to fall
within the pressures condemned by Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. Machinists Local 707 (United Technologies), 276 NLRB
985 (1985). It is well established that the immunity accorded a
union by the proviso with respect to the internal enforcement of
its rules and policies is not an unqualified one. See, e.g., Auto
Workers Local 1989 (Caterpillar Tractor Co.), 249 NLRB 922
(1980). A union may not under the guise of enforcing internal
discipline deprive its members of the right to participate fully
and freely in the internal affairs of their own union. A union’s
right to proscribe its own rules with respect to acquisition or
retention of membership therein does not give the union a li-
cense for intimidation of members who wish to express criti-
cism of union leadership. A violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) can
even be premised on a union’s imposition of internal union
discipline that does not affect the employment relationship, that
is based on conduct related solely to internal union affairs, and
does not rise from the employment relationship. Cf. Laborers
Local 652 (Southern California Contractors’ Assn.), 319
NLRB 694 (1995).
It is appropriate for cases alleging conduct in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) to turn on a Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert denied 455 U.S.
989 (1982), analysis. This is particularly true where it is as-
serted there was a legitimate (employee’s filing unwarranted
and unfounded internal union charges which are intended to
interfere with the union’s ability to carry out its duties as the
bargaining representative under the labor agreement and under
the Act) basis for the union discipline.
VI. DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on the above principles for general guidance, I find
counsel for the General Counsel has established a prima facie
case. It is clear that Johnson and Hutsell are political oppo-
nents and at the time of the operative events, Johnson was out
of the Local Union’s power structure while Hutsell was the
president thereof. Johnson was persuaded Hutsell was not
managing the Local Union as it should have been while Hutsell
was persuaded Johnson was a disruptive troublemaker.
A review of Johnson’s actions are not only helpful but nec-
essary.
The first (March 16, 1995) internal union charges filed
against Hutsell by Johnson related to Johnson’s claim that Hut-
sell had removed an employee (Joseph Clark) from the plant on
authorized paid union business for 2-1/2 hours without the Lo-
cal Union’s membership approval. Johnson contended Hut-
sell’s actions conflicted with the Local Union’s bylaws. Ac-
cording to the credited testimony of Johnson, Hutsell agreed to
repay the Local Union for the 2-1/2 hours and the charges were
dropped. Although this matter may have been minor in nature
it appears to have been more than a frivolous action by John-
son. The remedy resulted in the Local Union being reimbursed
the expense for the 2-1/2 hours paid to Clark.
The next occasion (December 18, 1995) Johnson filed inter-
nal union charges against Hutsell, related to Hutsell’s with-
drawing a grievance Johnson had filed regarding the Com-
pany’s denying Johnson’s request for educational assistance.
Johnson had sought, even though the grievance procedure, to
have the Company pay for paralegal training for him even
though he was a body and fender repair employee in the paint
department. Johnson testified the collective-bargaining agree-
ment did not specify that reimbursement for training had to be
for training specifically job related. Johnson testified, without
contradiction, that the Company utilizes paralegals at other
locations. Johnson credibly testified that Hutsell notified him
his grievance had been withdrawn even before a committee had
reviewed it. Again the actions of Johnson do not appear too
frivolous and his actions relate to his relationship with the
Company. Johnson’s internal union charges were challenging
the actions of the incumbent leadership specifically his political
foe, Local Union President Hutsell.
Johnson credibility testified that when he learned Hutsell
was not proceeding with the internal union charges he had filed
on December 18, 1995, he, on February 2, 1996, filed addi-
tional internal union charges against Hutsell refusing to do so.
While these charges may have been annoying to Hutsell it ap-
pears the charges were, at least in part, an attempt by Johnson
to enforce certain the Local Union’s bylaws. The fact Johnson
and Hutsell were able to do a “gentlemen thing” and resolve the
matters so the two could “agreed to go forward” and put all that
“behind them” does not in any manner make Johnson’s filings
any less legitimate. Stated differently that Johnson withdrew
these two internal union charges as a result of a gentlemen’s
agreement to move forward does not convert the filing of the
charges into frivolous actions on Johnson’s part.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 62
The next internal union charges filed by Johnson against Hut-
sell on August 19, 1996, related to Hutsell’s withdrawing a
grievance Johnson filed on July 22, 1996, on behalf of probation-
ary employee Montgomery who had been discharged during his
probationary period. In his internal union charges Johnson ac-
cused Hutsell of withdrawing the Montgomery grievance before
it had been investigated by the Local Union or responded to by
the Company. Johnson testified, without contradiction, that when
he was president of the Local Union he had filed a grievance on
behalf of a probationary employee, which was processed by the
Company. Johnson also believed the grievance could be validly
processed pursuant to certain non-discrimination language con-
tained in the parties collective-bargaining agreement. According
to Johnson’s credited testimony, the membership, along with
International Union District Director Wilson, agreed the charges
could not be dropped but must be and were processed. Again, it
appears Johnson’s actions were based on a legitimate effort by
him to have a grievance advanced pursuant to the collective-
bargaining agreement in accordance with past practice that Local
Union President Hutsell was attempting, in Johnson’s view, to
short circuit by simply withdrawing the grievance.
The September 18, 1996, internal union charges filed by John-
son against Hutsell grew out of Johnson’s mistaken belief that
Hutsell had withdrawn a grievance Johnson filed on July 12,
1996, regarding the Company’s subcontracting out work Johnson
believed he was entitled to and should have been permitted to
have performed. In the grievance Johnson contended he was
entitled to perform certain body and fender repairs on a specific
GMC truck that was sent to an outside repair shop. When John-
son learned his subcontracting grievance had not actually been
withdrawn he immediately withdrew his internal union charges
related thereto.
It is against this background that Hutsell filed internal union
charges against Johnson on September 23, 1996, asserting in part:
“Brother Johnson has continuously filed or assisted others in the
filing of unwarranted and unfounded charges against the local
union president in an effort to deliberately interfere with him in
the discharge of his official duties.” On September 25, 1996,
Hutsell, in writing, removed Johnson from the position of shop
steward in the paint department.
Was the Local Union discriminatorily motivated when it,
through Hutsell, filed internal union charges against Johnson and
removed him from the shop steward position in the paint depart-
ment at the Company. I find the Local Union did discriminate
against Johnson and therefore violated the Act as alleged. Hut-
sell testified he removed Johnson from shop steward because of
his “continuous filing of frivolous charges.” However, as re-
viewed above, Johnson’s internal union charges against Hutsell
grew out of or were inextricably entangled with grievances he
had filed on behalf of himself or others. The grievances were
attempts to have the collective-bargaining agreement, certain
company policies, and/or the Local Union’s constitution and
bylaws enforced. For example, one of the grievances related to
what Johnson perceived as outsourcing of unit work by the Com-
pany. Another grievance related to the discharge of an employee,
albeit a probationary one, but the Local Union under Johnson’s
leadership had proceeded with a similar situation. Another of the
grievance/internal union charges situation involved Johnson’s
attempts to have the administration of Hutsell justify expendi-
tures for an employee allegedly on union business. In that situa-
tion Hutsell reimbursed the Local Union. These forms of dissent
are protected and the Local Union may not lawfully file charges
against and suspend Johnson from membership simply to keep
him from challenging certain decisions of its current leadership.
Although Hutsell may have viewed Johnson as a force for
obstruction, a focus for resentment, and a source of division
such does not reduce Johnson’s actions to that of frivolous. I
am persuaded neither Johnson’ conduct, actions, or speech
impeded Hutsell’s ability to meet and/or perform any of the
Local Union’s contractual and/or legal obligations. In that
regard, I note the first three of Johnson’s first five internal un-
ion charges were never processed by the Local Union even to
the initial extent of selecting a trial committee. In sum, the
Local Union has failed to demonstrate Hutsell would have filed
the charges against Johnson or removed him from his position
of shop steward absent Johnson’s protected conduct.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended18
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Local Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Allied Signal Technical Services Corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Allied Signal, Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
3. By filing internal union charges against and suspending
Torrence Johnson for 6 months from membership in the Local
Union, the Local Union has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Local Union has engaged in unfair la-
bor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I
shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. I shall recommend the Local Union, within 14
days from the date of this Order, be ordered to withdraw the
internal union charges filed against Torrence Johnson on or
about September 23, 1996, and within 14 days from the date of
this Order rescind all disciplinary findings against Torrence
Johnson with respect to those charges. I shall also recommend
the Local Union, within 14 days from the date of this Order, be
ordered to remove from its files any records it may have of
those charges and the disciplinary action related thereto, and
within 3 days thereafter, notify Torrence Johnson in writing
that this action has been taken. Finally, I recommend the Local
Union be ordered, within 14 days after service by the Region,
to post an appropriate “Notice to Members,” for a period of 60
consecutive days in order that its members may be apprised of
their rights under the Act and the Local Union’s obligation to
remedy its unfair labor practices.

18 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
STEELWORKERS LOCAL 9292 (ALLIED SIGNAL TECHNICAL SERVICES) 63
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]