STC Limited Corp.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 31, 20212019003763 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/664,567 07/31/2017 Hyesun SONG P11478US 2104 86144 7590 03/31/2021 LRK Patent Law Firm 1952 Gallows Rd Suite 200 Vienna, VA 22182 EXAMINER KALINOWSKI, ALEXANDER G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3691 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/31/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): e_oa@lrkpatent.com plee@lrkpatent.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte HYESUN SONG ________________ Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 Technology Center 3600 ________________ Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ERIC B. CHEN, and TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 2 Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3, 5–10, which constitute all of the pending claims.1 Appeal Br. 4–11. Claims 2 and 4 have been canceled. Appeal Br. 20–26 (Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to Banking Payment System by Using Body Information Without Card and Method Thereof. Spec. 1. Appellant describes the claimed subject matter as follows: This invention relates to a banking payment system that uses body information without credit card. Current banking transactions involve the use of password authentications like security card and OTP, and there are limitations in preventing wrongful banking transactions due to loss of security card or OTP and piracy of resident registration number. In addition, unlawful banking transactions often occur from loss of bankbook and personal seal or hacking of password. Spec. Abstr. Claim 5, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:2 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies STC Limited Corp. as the real party in interest. Appeal Brief filed October 24, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 2. 2 Appellant argues all of the claims together as a group. Appeal Br. 5–7. Accordingly, we select independent claim 5 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone.”). Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 3 5. A banking payment method that uses body information without card, comprising: a step (S11) in which banking transaction information including customer password, device serial number of a device of a member store, facial recognition information of customer, bank account number, customer name, account balance, name of member store owner, and bank account number of member store owner, is saved and registered on a server of a financial institution; a step (S12) in which a device of a member store connected to the server of the financial institution receives customer password input by the customer and sends the password to the server of the financial institution; a step (SI 3) in which the server of the financial institution checks if the passwords match, and sends the facial recognition information of the customer to the device of the member store if the passwords match, so that the device of the member store saves the facial recognition information; a step (S14) in which a camera attached to the device of the member store takes an image of the customer and sends the image information to the device of the member store; a step (S15) in which the device of the member store extracts facial recognition information from the image information; a step (S16) in which the device of the member store compares the extracted facial recognition information and the facial recognition information saved previously; a step (S17) in which the device of the member store displays product information including name, price and quantity of product, using a display area of the device of the member store if both of the facial recognition information match; a step (S18) in which the device of the member store sends device serial number of the device and the product information to the server of the financial institution; Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 4 a step (S19) in which the server of the financial institution processes banking transactions including account transfer, using the banking transaction information; and a step (S20) in which the server of the financial institution sends results of the banking transactions to a designated device of the customer and a designated device of the member store owner. Appeal Br. 23–24 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). REJECTIONS Claims 1, 3, and 5–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2, 8–14; see also Final Act. 2 (noting claims 2 and 4 were cancelled). OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Rejection of Claims 1, 3, and 5–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 A. Section 101 Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 5 useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section: “‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). To determine whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 6 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 7 The Patent Office recently issued guidance regarding this framework. See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).3 Under the Revised Guidance, to decide whether a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the claim (1) recites subject matter falling within an abstract idea grouping listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP § 2106. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine whether the claim recites an inventive concept. Thus, under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the following: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.4 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: 3 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106. All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. 4 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 8 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106(d). In addition, the Patent Office issued supplemental guidance on eligibility. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df) (“October 2019 Guidance Update”); see also USPTO, 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the October 2019 Guidance Update). In the § 101 rejections, Appellant argues claims 1, 3, and 5–10 together. See Appeal Br. 12–19; Reply Br. 2–8. As permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37, we decide the appeal for this rejection based on claim 5. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Noting claims 1 and 3 recite systems and claims 5–10 recite a method and, therefore, each falls within a category of § 101, we turn to the Examiner’s § 101 rejection. The Judicial Exception—Abstract Idea Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). MPEP § 2106.04(a). The Examiner determined that claims 1, 3, and 5–10 recite subject matter directed toward a “method of fraud prevention by verifying the Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 9 authenticity of the customer's identity prior to proceeding with a banking transaction” which are prevalent practices similar to those identified as abstract ideas in Alice, Bilski, and buySAFE. Final Act. 9 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 221; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353−55 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)). Specifically, the Examiner contends that the claimed steps—(1) obtaining customer specific information (facial recognition information), (2) comparing the obtained customer specific information with customer information previously stored at a financial institution server to authenticate the customer's identity upon entering a password, and (3) determining whether the transaction should proceed when a match from the comparison verifies the authenticity of the customer's identity—“are [concepts] directed to organizing a human activity and managing risk.” Final Act. 9 (discussing steps in claims 1, 3, and 5–10). The Examiner states that “[t]hese steps describe a method of fraud prevention by verifying the authenticity of the customer’s identity prior to proceeding with a banking transaction, which . . . bank tellers have used for many years.” Id. As enumerated above, claim 5 includes “sav[ing] and register[ing] on a server of a financial institution” customer specific banking transaction information (step S11), receiving and sending “the password to the server of a financial institution” (step S12), where the financial institution server “checks if the passwords match and sends [customer] facial recognition information” to the member store device (step S13), where the device takes an image of the customer and compares facial recognition data with the received facial recognition from the financial institution (steps S13–S16); and sending device and product information, processing banking Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 10 transactions including account transfer and sending the results of the transaction based on the match (steps S17–S20). Appeal Br. 23–24. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, all these limitations (steps S11–S20) contribute to a method of organizing a human activity and mental processes. MPEP § 2106.04(a). The Examiner correctly finds that these and other steps recite generic data receiving, data comparing (“save and register on a server of a financial institution,” and “checks if the passwords match,” and compares facial recognition data steps), and data transmitting of the human activity of a commercial sale and risk mitigation. Final Act. 9. Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom SA, 830 F.3d 1350, 1353−54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the receiving, sending, and comparing found in each of the elements, either individually or in combination as a whole, provides computer functions similar to receiving, processing and storing data and/or receiving and transmitting data over a network, which the courts have determined to be un-patentable. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 227; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716−17; (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appellant argues that no mental processing or human interaction is used in the claims, as all the fraud prevention by verifying the customers identify occurs between the server of the financial information and the customers password and body information. Ans. 14–15; Reply Br. 4–5. This approach avoids false identification or bank cards used to commit fraud. Ans. 15. We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 5–7) that at least limitations steps S13 through S16 could be performed as mental processes of Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 11 identity verification to authenticate a transaction. See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 nn.14–15 (listing mental processes as including observation, evaluation, and the use of pen and paper). For these reasons, the combination of limitations (S11) through (S20) recites a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”). Step 2A, Prong 2: Because claim 5 recites a judicial exception, we next analyze whether claim 5 recites additional elements that individually or in combination integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–55. The Revised Guidance identifies considerations indicative of whether an additional element or combination of elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, such as an additional element reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(d). We consider whether an additional element (or combination of elements) adds a limitation that is not well-understood, routine, conventional (“WURC”) activity in the field or whether the additional elements simply append WURC activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. MPEP § 2106.05(d). On the record before us, claim 5, like claim 1, recites “a server of a financial institution,” “a device of the member store,” and “a camera attached to the device of the member store.” Appeal Br. 20–21, 23–24. The Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 12 Examiner found that the camera at the member device and the financial institution server are no more than generic components and provide no function beyond those functions typically performed alone or in combination. Final Act 5. Indeed, the Examiner states: claim recites additional elements - using a server, member store device and a camera to perform the save, register, capture, compare, match and processing transaction steps. The device and server in both steps is recited at a high-level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer function of saving, registering, matching such that it amounts no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component. Ans. 6–7. We agree with the Examiner. The use of two machines (a server of a financial institution and a device of member store) in a general manner is fails to do more than use the machines for their generic instructed functions. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7. Appellant’s arguments that claims do not preempt any and every possible way of performing the steps claimed (App. Br. 13) are not availing. The issue of preemption alone is not determinative and fails to address the two-step framework in the Revised Guidance. See Ans. 9. Appellant’s further argue that the “claims avoid any mental processing or human interaction” by “intermediated settlement” (Reply. Br. 6), which solves “the technical problem of fraud prevention in conducting a transaction between a customer and a store . . . [in a manner] that extends beyond a generic computer” (id. at 7). We disagree as Appellant’s argument that the claims solve a technical problem of fraud prevention by using a customer’s password and body information to prevent the use of a false ID and bank card (App. Br. 14–15) do not demonstrate that the claims add any limitation Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 13 or functions or beyond the judicial exception. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that “verification of appearance, facial recognition and signature matches have been utilized historically to prevent fraud” and that Appellant has “not explained how performing these [claimed] steps in generic manner on a machine is different or unconventional from the steps of the conducted by humans.” Ans. 12. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89). Turning to step 2B, we look to whether the claim: (a) recites a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well- understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or (b) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 84 Fed. Reg. 56; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“[W]e consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether the claim includes “significantly more” than the ineligible concept) (citation omitted); see also BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (“[A]n inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.”). We discern no additional element or combination of elements recited in independent claim 5 that contain any “inventive concept” or add anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We do not find any portion of the Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 14 Specification indicating that the claimed computer processor performs anything other than well-understood, routine, and conventional functions, such as receiving data, processing data, and displaying/delivering data. See Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the [S]pecification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information.”); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26 (receiving, storing, sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). Instead, Appellant’s claimed subject matter simply uses a generic computer processor to verify the customer’s identity occurs between the server of the financial information and the customer’s password and body information. As noted above, the use of a generic computer does not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As our reviewing court has observed, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 223). As further noted above, the independent claims only recite steps that are undertaken using generic computer functions that were well-understood, routine, and conventional, individually and in combination. As such, claims 1, 10, and 12 are devoid of an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. “[T]he ‘inventive concept’ [under the second part of the Mayo/Alice Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 15 test] cannot be the abstract idea itself” and “Berkheimer . . . leave[s] untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal Circuit] which have held claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract idea.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (citations omitted). “It has been clear since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Therefore, the computer functions recited in claim 5 are, in fact, generic, and are met by numerous precedent establishing that using a generic computer to expedite and automate processes traditionally performed manually, or that are otherwise abstract, is a well-understood, routine, and conventional use of such computers. See also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an intermediary computer to forward information); Bancorp Services, L.L.C., 687 F.3d at 1278 (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”). Therefore, we conclude that the cited claim’s steps, both individually and as an ordered combination, do not provide an inventive concept. See 84 Fed. Reg. 56; see also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370 (“The limitations amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and comparing data with conventional computer components.”); Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 16 process for no more than its most basic function—making calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.”). In many cases, “relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 224) (“[U]se of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions” is not an inventive concept.); see also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise abstract idea.”). Therefore, the functions recited in independent claims 1 and 5 do not add meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the abstract idea to the particular technological environment. Because Appellant’s claim 5 recites an abstract concept without something “significantly more” under the second prong of the Alice analysis, independent claim 5 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 without reciting significantly more. For these reasons, we conclude that claim 5, considered as a whole does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claim 5. For the reasons discussed above, we also sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of dependent claims 1, 3, and 6– 10, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments made with respect to claim 5. Appeal Br. 12–19; Reply Br. 2–8. Appeal 2019-003763 Application 15/664,567 17 DECISION SUMMARY In summary: TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 5–10 101 Eligibility 1, 3, 5–10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation