STC Limited Corp.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 31, 2021

2019003763 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/664,567 07/31/2017 Hyesun SONG P11478US 2104
86144 7590 03/31/2021
LRK Patent Law Firm
1952 Gallows Rd
Suite 200
Vienna, VA 22182
EXAMINER
KALINOWSKI, ALEXANDER G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
e_oa@lrkpatent.com
plee@lrkpatent.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte HYESUN SONG
________________

Appeal 2019-003763
Application 15/664,567
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, ERIC B. CHEN, and
TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 3, 5–10, which constitute all of the pending claims.1
Appeal Br. 4–11. Claims 2 and 4 have been canceled. Appeal Br. 20–26
(Claims App.). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to Banking Payment System by Using Body
Information Without Card and Method Thereof. Spec. 1. Appellant
describes the claimed subject matter as follows:
This invention relates to a banking payment system that
uses body information without credit card. Current banking
transactions involve the use of password authentications like
security card and OTP, and there are limitations in preventing
wrongful banking transactions due to loss of security card or
OTP and piracy of resident registration number. In addition,
unlawful banking transactions often occur from loss of bankbook
and personal seal or hacking of password.
Spec. Abstr.
Claim 5, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies STC Limited Corp. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief filed October 24, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 2.
2 Appellant argues all of the claims together as a group. Appeal Br. 5–7.
Accordingly, we select independent claim 5 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject to the same ground of
rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal
as to the ground of rejection with respect to the group or subgroup on the
basis of the selected claim alone.”).
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5. A banking payment method that uses body information
without card, comprising:
a step (S11) in which banking transaction information
including customer password, device serial number of a device
of a member store, facial recognition information of customer,
bank account number, customer name, account balance, name of
member store owner, and bank account number of member store
owner, is saved and registered on a server of a financial
institution;
a step (S12) in which a device of a member store
connected to the server of the financial institution receives
customer password input by the customer and sends the
password to the server of the financial institution;
a step (SI 3) in which the server of the financial institution
checks if the passwords match, and sends the facial recognition
information of the customer to the device of the member store if
the passwords match, so that the device of the member store
saves the facial recognition information;
a step (S14) in which a camera attached to the device of
the member store takes an image of the customer and sends the
image information to the device of the member store;
a step (S15) in which the device of the member store
extracts facial recognition information from the image
information;
a step (S16) in which the device of the member store
compares the extracted facial recognition information and the
facial recognition information saved previously;
a step (S17) in which the device of the member store
displays product information including name, price and quantity
of product, using a display area of the device of the member store
if both of the facial recognition information match;
a step (S18) in which the device of the member store sends
device serial number of the device and the product information
to the server of the financial institution;
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a step (S19) in which the server of the financial institution
processes banking transactions including account transfer, using
the banking transaction information; and
a step (S20) in which the server of the financial institution
sends results of the banking transactions to a designated device
of the customer and a designated device of the member store
owner.
Appeal Br. 23–24 (Claims App.) (emphasis added).
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 3, and 5–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2, 8–14; see also
Final Act. 2 (noting claims 2 and 4 were cancelled).
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.

Rejection of Claims 1, 3, and 5–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Section 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
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useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.’” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
To determine whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing
Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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The Patent Office recently issued guidance regarding this framework.
See USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).3 Under the Revised
Guidance, to decide whether a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
evaluate whether the claim (1) recites subject matter falling within an
abstract idea grouping listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to
integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP
§ 2106. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim recites an inventive concept. Thus, under
the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the
following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application.4
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:

3 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates
this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106. All references
to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June
2020), unless otherwise indicated.
4 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by
(a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106(d).
In addition, the Patent Office issued supplemental guidance on
eligibility. October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df) (“October 2019 Guidance Update”); see also USPTO, 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying
the public of the availability of the October 2019 Guidance Update).
In the § 101 rejections, Appellant argues claims 1, 3, and 5–10
together. See Appeal Br. 12–19; Reply Br. 2–8. As permitted by 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37, we decide the appeal for this rejection based on claim 5. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Noting claims 1 and 3 recite systems and
claims 5–10 recite a method and, therefore, each falls within a category of
§ 101, we turn to the Examiner’s § 101 rejection.

The Judicial Exception—Abstract Idea
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). MPEP § 2106.04(a).
The Examiner determined that claims 1, 3, and 5–10 recite subject
matter directed toward a “method of fraud prevention by verifying the
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authenticity of the customer's identity prior to proceeding with a banking
transaction” which are prevalent practices similar to those identified as
abstract ideas in Alice, Bilski, and buySAFE. Final Act. 9 (citing Alice, 573
U.S. at 221; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353−55 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)). Specifically, the
Examiner contends that the claimed steps—(1) obtaining customer specific
information (facial recognition information), (2) comparing the obtained
customer specific information with customer information previously stored
at a financial institution server to authenticate the customer's identity upon
entering a password, and (3) determining whether the transaction should
proceed when a match from the comparison verifies the authenticity of the
customer's identity—“are [concepts] directed to organizing a human activity
and managing risk.” Final Act. 9 (discussing steps in claims 1, 3, and 5–10).
The Examiner states that “[t]hese steps describe a method of fraud
prevention by verifying the authenticity of the customer’s identity prior to
proceeding with a banking transaction, which . . . bank tellers have used for
many years.” Id.
As enumerated above, claim 5 includes “sav[ing] and register[ing] on
a server of a financial institution” customer specific banking transaction
information (step S11), receiving and sending “the password to the server of
a financial institution” (step S12), where the financial institution server
“checks if the passwords match and sends [customer] facial recognition
information” to the member store device (step S13), where the device takes
an image of the customer and compares facial recognition data with the
received facial recognition from the financial institution (steps S13–S16);
and sending device and product information, processing banking
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transactions including account transfer and sending the results of the
transaction based on the match (steps S17–S20). Appeal Br. 23–24. Under
the broadest reasonable interpretation, all these limitations (steps S11–S20)
contribute to a method of organizing a human activity and mental processes.
MPEP § 2106.04(a).
The Examiner correctly finds that these and other steps recite generic
data receiving, data comparing (“save and register on a server of a financial
institution,” and “checks if the passwords match,” and compares facial
recognition data steps), and data transmitting of the human activity of a
commercial sale and risk mitigation. Final Act. 9. Elec. Power Grp. LLC v.
Alstom SA, 830 F.3d 1350, 1353−54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims do not
include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception because the receiving, sending, and
comparing found in each of the elements, either individually or in
combination as a whole, provides computer functions similar to receiving,
processing and storing data and/or receiving and transmitting data over a
network, which the courts have determined to be un-patentable. See Alice
Corp., 573 U.S. at 227; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,
716−17; (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Appellant argues that no mental processing or human interaction is
used in the claims, as all the fraud prevention by verifying the customers
identify occurs between the server of the financial information and the
customers password and body information. Ans. 14–15; Reply Br. 4–5.
This approach avoids false identification or bank cards used to commit
fraud. Ans. 15. We agree with the Examiner (Ans. 5–7) that at least
limitations steps S13 through S16 could be performed as mental processes of
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identity verification to authenticate a transaction. See 2019 Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 nn.14–15 (listing mental processes as including
observation, evaluation, and the use of pen and paper).
For these reasons, the combination of limitations (S11) through (S20)
recites a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A,
prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance. See RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855
F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another
abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”).
Step 2A, Prong 2:
Because claim 5 recites a judicial exception, we next analyze whether
claim 5 recites additional elements that individually or in combination
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53–55. The Revised Guidance identifies
considerations indicative of whether an additional element or combination of
elements integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, such as
an additional element reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a
computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at
55; MPEP § 2106.05(d). We consider whether an additional element (or
combination of elements) adds a limitation that is not well-understood,
routine, conventional (“WURC”) activity in the field or whether the
additional elements simply append WURC activities previously known to
the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
On the record before us, claim 5, like claim 1, recites “a server of a
financial institution,” “a device of the member store,” and “a camera
attached to the device of the member store.” Appeal Br. 20–21, 23–24. The
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Examiner found that the camera at the member device and the financial
institution server are no more than generic components and provide no
function beyond those functions typically performed alone or in
combination. Final Act 5. Indeed, the Examiner states:
claim recites additional elements - using a server, member store
device and a camera to perform the save, register, capture,
compare, match and processing transaction steps. The device
and server in both steps is recited at a high-level of generality
(i.e., as a generic processor performing a generic computer
function of saving, registering, matching such that it amounts no
more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a
generic computer component.
Ans. 6–7. We agree with the Examiner. The use of two machines (a server
of a financial institution and a device of member store) in a general manner
is fails to do more than use the machines for their generic instructed
functions. See Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7.
Appellant’s arguments that claims do not preempt any and every
possible way of performing the steps claimed (App. Br. 13) are not availing.
The issue of preemption alone is not determinative and fails to address the
two-step framework in the Revised Guidance. See Ans. 9. Appellant’s
further argue that the “claims avoid any mental processing or human
interaction” by “intermediated settlement” (Reply. Br. 6), which solves “the
technical problem of fraud prevention in conducting a transaction between a
customer and a store . . . [in a manner] that extends beyond a generic
computer” (id. at 7). We disagree as Appellant’s argument that the claims
solve a technical problem of fraud prevention by using a customer’s
password and body information to prevent the use of a false ID and bank
card (App. Br. 14–15) do not demonstrate that the claims add any limitation
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or functions or beyond the judicial exception. Instead, we agree with the
Examiner that “verification of appearance, facial recognition and signature
matches have been utilized historically to prevent fraud” and that Appellant
has “not explained how performing these [claimed] steps in generic manner
on a machine is different or unconventional from the steps of the conducted
by humans.” Ans. 12. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process,
or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.,
838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Diehr,
450 U.S. at 188–89).
Turning to step 2B, we look to whether the claim: (a) recites a
specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or (b) simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 84
Fed. Reg. 56; see Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (“[W]e consider the elements of
each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine
whether the claim includes “significantly more” than the ineligible concept)
(citation omitted); see also BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350 (“[A]n inventive
concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement
of known, conventional pieces.”).
We discern no additional element or combination of elements recited
in independent claim 5 that contain any “inventive concept” or add anything
“significantly more” to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible
application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We do not find any portion of the
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Specification indicating that the claimed computer processor performs
anything other than well-understood, routine, and conventional functions,
such as receiving data, processing data, and displaying/delivering data. See
Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the [S]pecification,
requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional computer, network,
and display technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired
information.”); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26 (receiving, storing,
sending information over networks insufficient to add an inventive concept);
buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That
a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no
further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Instead, Appellant’s claimed subject matter simply uses a generic
computer processor to verify the customer’s identity occurs between the
server of the financial information and the customer’s password and body
information. As noted above, the use of a generic computer does not alone
transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. As
our reviewing court has observed, “after Alice, there can remain no doubt:
recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 573
U.S. at 223).
As further noted above, the independent claims only recite steps that
are undertaken using generic computer functions that were well-understood,
routine, and conventional, individually and in combination. As such,
claims 1, 10, and 12 are devoid of an inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217. “[T]he ‘inventive concept’ [under the second part of the Mayo/Alice
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test] cannot be the abstract idea itself” and “Berkheimer . . . leave[s]
untouched the numerous cases from [the Federal Circuit] which have held
claims ineligible because the only alleged ‘inventive concept’ is the abstract
idea.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore,
J., concurring) (citations omitted). “It has been clear since Alice that a
claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899
F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Therefore, the computer functions recited in claim 5 are, in fact,
generic, and are met by numerous precedent establishing that using a generic
computer to expedite and automate processes traditionally performed
manually, or that are otherwise abstract, is a well-understood, routine, and
conventional use of such computers. See also, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an
intermediary computer to forward information); Bancorp Services,
L.L.C., 687 F.3d at 1278 (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s
claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of
repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the
scope of those claims.”).
Therefore, we conclude that the cited claim’s steps, both individually
and as an ordered combination, do not provide an inventive concept. See 84
Fed. Reg. 56; see also Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1370 (“The limitations
amount to no more than performing the abstract idea of parsing and
comparing data with conventional computer components.”); Bancorp, 687
F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible
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process for no more than its most basic function—making calculations or
computations—fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract
ideas and mental processes.”). In many cases, “relying on a computer to
perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to
render a claim patent eligible.” OIP Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788
F.3d 1359, 1363 (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 224) (“[U]se of a computer to
create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous
instructions” is not an inventive concept.); see also, e.g., Intellectual
Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“[M]erely adding computer functionality to increase the speed or
efficiency of the process does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise
abstract idea.”). Therefore, the functions recited in independent claims 1
and 5 do not add meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
abstract idea to the particular technological environment.
Because Appellant’s claim 5 recites an abstract concept without
something “significantly more” under the second prong of the Alice analysis,
independent claim 5 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101 without reciting significantly more.
For these reasons, we conclude that claim 5, considered as a whole
does not include an inventive concept. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
§ 101 rejection of independent claim 5. For the reasons discussed above, we
also sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of dependent claims 1, 3, and 6–
10, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments made with respect to
claim 5. Appeal Br. 12–19; Reply Br. 2–8.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 5–10 101 Eligibility 1, 3, 5–10