Stauffer Chemical Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 9, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 98 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Stauffer Chemical Company and Delores Anderson.
Case 32-CA-272 (formerly Case 20 CA 13142)
May 9, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PENEILO. MURPHY, AND TRUESDAL.E
On May 16, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Gor-
don J. Myatt issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a
brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as
modified herein, and to adopt his recommended Or-
der.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent had violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by refusing to reinstate economic striker Delores An-
derson because of her failure to comply with the
terms of a strike settlement agreement which, inter
alia, had conditioned reinstatement upon a striker's
return to work by June 10, 1977. While we agree with
the Administrative Law Judge's finding of a violation
in this case, we disagree with his rationale for doing
so, and rely instead on the reasons set forth below.
The facts here are not complicated. Delores Ander-
son was first employed by Respondent in March
1977. During that month, Anderson changed her ad-
dress and telephone number, but neglected to so in-
form Respondent. She did, however, give her new
telephone number to an official of the Union who
presumably was engaged in preparing for an impend-
ing strike.
As a result of a breakdown in contract negotia-
tions, the Union called an economic strike on April 1,
1977. On June 6, the parties entered into a strike set-
tlement agreement which provided, inter alia, that
"Employees failing to report to work by June 10.
1977, without just cause, will be considered as having
quit their job and will be permanently terminated
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard DrL' Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(195), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
from employment." The Union requested that Re-
spondent notify the employees of the strike's termina-
tion and also notify them that the agreed-to recall
period would run from June 8 to June 10. Respondent
refused, claiming that it was the Union who had pre-
cipitated the economic action and therefore that it
was the Union's responsibility to notify the striking
employees of the procedure governing their return to
work. Apparently acquiescing in Respondent's posi-
tion, the Union agreed to notify the employees in-
volved. This last fact is undisputed.
Anderson testified that she first learned from her
mother on June 13 that the strike was over. Anderson
reported for work the following day at her normal
starting time and was informed by two coworkers of
the June 10 deadline for reporting. Pursuant to the
employees' suggestions, Anderson went directly to the
office of Personnel Manager Mike Rice, who, after a
series of conversations, informed her that, because of
her failure to comply with the June 10 deadline, she
was ineligible for reinstatement. 2
In reaching his conclusion that Respondent's re-
fusal to reinstate Anderson violated the Act, the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge stated that "the obligation to
notify and reinstate striking employees rests solely
with the Respondent. and cannot be transferred to
the Union. By making the Union its agent for this
purpose, the Respondent here must also assume re-
sponsibility for any failure on the part of the Union to
successfully communicate terms of the settlement
agreement to all of the striking employees. Cf. Ernst
Construction, 217 NLRB 1069 (1975)." While we do
not quarrel with the Administrative Law Judge's find-
ing that the responsibility for reinstating strikers is
exclusively an employer's, we disagree with his fur-
ther conclusion that the obligation to notify striking
employees of the recall terms of a bargained-for strike
settlement agreement, at least under circumstances as
here, is also vested immutably in an employer. The
Administrative Law Judge had referred to no Board
precedent to support his conclusion, aside from a
comparison citation to Ernst Construction, supra, a
case which is factually inapposite. There, the respon-
dent was obligated under a Board order to offer rein-
statement to a discriminatee. The respondent elected
to utilize the union as its conduit to make the offer.
The union failed to make a timely offer, thus resulting
in the discriminatee's being denied an opportunity for
reinstatement. The Board there found that the re-
spondent, who by its prior conduct had violated the
Act and had been ordered to offer the discriminatee
2 During an early stage in these conversations. Rice indicated that Ander-
son might be rehired, but only as a new employee without any of the senior-
ity rights she might have accrued earlier. Anderson agreed to this arrange-
ment. but it was ultimately rejected by Respondent
242 NLRB No. 21
98
STAUFFER CHEMI(CAL (COMPANY
reinstatement, could not shield itself from that Order
by virtue of the union's failure to act in a timely fash-
ion. That is not the situation here as there was no
outstanding Board order directing Respondent to re-
instate Anderson.
Rather, here. Respondent and the Union engaged
in bargaining that resulted in the termination of the
strike and in an agreement on the terms governing the
recall of all striking employees. The question of noti-
fication arose and, after discussion, the Union ac-
cepted the responsibility of notifying unit employees
of the termination of the strike and the agreed-to re-
call procedure. In the absence of any unlawful coer-
cion exerted by Respondent upon the Union, the
Union's agreement to accept the responsibility for no-
tification appears to have been a natural outgrowth of
the collective-bargaining process. Obviously, it was
incumbent upon one of the parties to inform the strik-
ers of the details of the settlement agreement in order
to accord them the opportunity to comply therewith.
In the ordinary case, the employer, anxious to resume
operations, may prefer to take the lead in recalling
employees. Here, however. Respondent rejected that
role and the Union agreed to accept that responsibil-
ity. As we recognize the intrinsic authority of a union
to extend an offer to return to work on behalf of all
striking employees, we likewise recognize that a union
may also be the proper party: () to receive an em-
ployer's acceptance of its offer of the employee's re-
turn; and (2) by agreement, to communicate the
terms of that acceptance to its principals, the striking
employees. In the latter circumstances, which exist
here, we would not find that an employer. like Re-
spondent, thereby had also made the union its agent
for purposes of notifying the employees and had as-
sumed responsibility for the union's failure to notify a
striker, like Anderson. of the terms of the recall. Ac-
cordingly, we reject the Administrative Law Judge's
finding of a violation here on such grounds.
Nevertheless, we find, based on the facts before us.
that Respondent was not justified in its decision to
reject Anderson's application to return to work. Pre-
sumably, Respondent's concern in negotiating the
strike settlement agreement was to enable it to relieve
its supervisory personnel by expediting the filling of
those vacancies not occupied by returning strikers by
June 10. Respondent, for whatever reason, had
elected not to replace Anderson by the time of her
application on the morning of June 14, the second
business day following the termination of the recall
period. Thus, Respondent can hardly claim that An-
derson's reinstatement would have frustrated its goal,
implicit in the settlement agreement. as it had re-
frained from hiring anyone to replace her. Accord-
ingly, under the limited circumstances of this case, we
find that Anderson's reinstatement rights as an unre-
placed economic striker were not nullified by the
strike settlement agreement. and that. in the absence
of a compelling business justification. Respondent's
refusal to reinstate her violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.'
ORDI)R
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Stauffer Chemical
Company, San Jose, California, its officers, agents.
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the said recommended Order.
' Moreover. Respondent was. at the 'er) least. ohligated to treat Anderson
in a nondiscriminator> fashion in considering her application tr reinstate-
ment The record, howeser, indicates hat despite Anderson's %i llignes to
forgo the senmoriti rights which she had accrued during her tenure with
Respondent, thereb relegating herself to the status of a new emploee, Re-
spondent declined io accept her applicalion for reemplo\menl hbecause ot her
prior failure to seek rcinstlernenn in alccordance Ulth the tIrll, o the Igree-
mnen I his t also w is not prisvileged it do)
DECISION
SrAIE li\N1 )1F 1 fin CAS I
GoRnON J. MvtAr. Administrative l.a Judge: The
charge in this case was filed on Jul 12. 1977. h Delorcs
Anderson an individual (hereinafter called Anderson or the
Charging Parts) against Stauffer Chemical Company (here-
inafter called Respondent). On August 30. 1977. the Re-
gional Director fr Region 20 issued a complaint and notice
of hearing on behalf of the General Counsel, alleging that
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and I ) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (hereinafter called the Act). 29 U.S.C.
§151. et seq. Basically, the complaint alleges that Respon-
dent's employees, including the Charging Party. were en-
gaged in an economic strike which terminated on June 6.
1977.1 Further, that on June 14. the Charging Party made
an unconditional offer to return to her former position of
employment, and Respondent unlawfully refused to rein-
state her. Respondent filed an answer denying certain alle-
gations of the complaint and specificall denying the corm-
mission of any unfair labor practices.'
A hearing was held in this matter on JanuarN 19, 1978 in
San Jose. California. All parties were represented b coun-
sel and afforded full opportunit to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, and to present material and relevant evi-
dence on the issues involved. Briefs were submitted b both
counsel and have been dulv considered.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying,
I make the following:
UI nless otherwise indicated. all dales herein referred to are 1977
1 At the hearing he parties entered into a stipulatioln on the record regard-
ing certain facts While the stipulation clarified certain responses contained
in Respondent's answer. It in no way affected Respondent's posltion that it
had not committed any unfair lahor practices.
99
D[ECISIONS OF NATIONAl. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS ()F FA(CI
I. JURISDI('TION
The Respondent. Stauffer Chemical Company, is, and
has been at all times material herein, a Delaware corpora-
tion with a place of business in San Jose, California, where
it is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale of food
ingredients. During the past calendar year, in the course
and conduct of its business operations in San Jose. Respon-
dent sold and delivered goods in excess of $50.000 directly
to customers located outside the State of California. The
pleadings admit, and I find, that Respondent is, and has
been at all times material herein, an employer as defined in
Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in opera-
tions affecting commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 294 is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
111II. THE ALLEGEI) UNFAIR LABOR PRA(CTICES
The basic facts of this case are not in serious dispute.
Respondent's employees are represented by International
Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 294. Commencing
sometime in February, the Union and Respondent were
engaged in negotiations for a new collective-bargaining
agreement. The parties were unable to agree on the terms of
a new contract, and the Union called an economic strike on
April 1. The strike ended on June 6. While the strike was in
progress, Respondent continued to operate its plant with
salaried personnel on a 12-hour shift basis, and did not hire
strike replacements.
At the termination of the strike on June 6, the parties
entered into a strike settlement agreement, the partinent
parts of which are set forth below:
A. Memorandum of Agreement
It is agreed by and between Stauffer Chemical Com-
pany and the International Chemical Workers Union
and its Local Union No. 294 that as a part of cessation
of the Union's strike against the Company and final
agreement between the Company and the Union, the
following conditions will be met:
4. Employees failing to report to work by June
10,1977, without just cause, will be considered as hav-
ing quit their job and will be permanently terminated
from employment. Other employment commitments
will not be considered as just cause.
5. The Union recognizes and accepts the fact that
some former employees may be delayed in their return
to work or may not return to work following the strike
and, therefore, agrees that the Company supervisors or
other salaried employees of the Company may perform
normal bargaining unit work duties until their return
or until their replacements may be hired. The Com-
pany agrees that there will be no unnecessary delay in
their (sic) attempt to hire replacements.
The uncontroverted testimony reveals that the Union
asked Respondent to notify the employees that the strike
was terminated and that they were to return to work begin-
ning June 8, and not later than June 10. Respondent re-
fused on the ground that the Union had taken the economic
action, and it was the Union's responsibility to notify the
employees to return to work. The Union verbally agreed to
undertake to discharge this responsibility.'
B. The Events Relating to Anderson
Anderson worked the day shift in Respondent's house-
keeping department. Sometime in March, she moved to a
new residence and her home telephone number was
changed in the process. Anderson did not inform Respon-
dent's personnel office of her new address and telephone
number. Shortly before the commencement of the strike,
however, Anderson gave her new telephone number to one
of the union officials, who was getting the names and tele-
phone numbers of the employees presumably,. in prepara-
tion for the strike.
Anderson testified that during the course of the strike,
she was contacted at home on the telephone by union rep-
resentatives on two occasions for assignment to picket line
duty. She walked the picket line for one one day in response
to the Union's first request, but did not show up for picket
duty on the second occasion. Anderson further testified that
she initially followed the practice of calling the plant office
once or twice a week to ascertain if the strike was still in
progress. She later limited her calls to once a week. She
stated that other than the two calls for picket line duty, she
never received any calls from the Union, nor were any mes-
sages left with her mother.' Anderson did not engage in any
other employment during the time of the strike.
Anderson testified she first learned the strike was over on
the evening of June 13, when her mother informed her that
it was announced on television. She immediately called the
plant in an effort to reach her supervisor. Her attempt in
this regard was unsuccessful, however, as the day shift had
already ended. The next morning (June 14), Anderson re-
ported to work in time for her shift. As she was changing
clothes she was informed by two coworkers that Respon-
dent had given the Union 48 hours to notify the employees
to return to work. They advised her to see someone in the
personnel office before starting work.
Anderson testified she went directly to the office of Mike
Rice, Respondent's personnel manager. According to An-
derson, when she told Rice she had only learned of the
termination of the strike the evening before, he stated that
the Company had given the Union 48 hours to notify the
employees to report back to work. Anderson testified that
Rice suggested she could probably be reinstated, but would
1Several weeks prior to the commencement of the strike, management
gave the union representatives a list, taken from the personnel records, con-
taining the employees' names, addresses, and telephone numbers.
'Anderson testified that she lived with her mother.
I00
STAUJFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY
have to lose her seniority and start as a new employee. She
agreed to this, and Rice sent her across the hall to wait in
the office of one of his assistants until a decision could be
made. Anderson stated that approximately 15 minutes later
Rice came over and told her he was uncertain whether she
could be reinstated. He instructed her to remain there until
he could see what he could do about her situation. Accord-
ing to Anderson, she spoke with Rice in his office approxi-
mately 20 minutes later. He told her that she could not be
reinstated and she left the plant.
Rice testified that there was only one conversation with
Anderson. He stated he saw Anderson sitting in his assis-
tant's office, and he went over to ask her why she had not
returned to work by June 10. According to Rice, when An-
derson stated she had just learned that the strike had ended,
he explained about the memorandum of agreement be-
tween Respondent and the Union requiring the employees
to return to work by June 10. Rice testified that he in-
formed Anderson she could not be reinstated, and he ad-
vised her to see her union representative. He denies ever
telling Anderson that she could probably be reinstated as a
new employee.
Rice further testified that he made the decision not to
reinstate Anderson because he was familiar with the memo-
randum of agreement, and Respondent's actions in this re-
gard could have an effect on future situations following a
strike. He admits that he called Gregory Miller, Respon-
dent's regional employee relations representative, and dis-
cussed the matter with him. Rice stated, however, that he
did so after his conversation with Anderson. Rice further
acknowledged that Anderson had not been replaced at the
time she applied for reinstatement.
Miller's testimony confirms that he received a call from
Rice regarding Anderson's request for reinstatement. Miller
discussed the matter with his superior as well as with Rice.
According to Miller, the decision not to reinstate the em-
ployee was a correct one because (I) Respondent had to
adhere to the strike settlement agreement, and (2) any devi-
ation would have an adverse impact on future strike settle-
ment situations, not only covering that plant, but other
plants of Respondent where the employees were represent-
ed by the Union.
On the basis of my observation of the witnesses, I credit
the testimony of Anderson regarding her conversation with
Rice. Anderson impressed me as being sincere and forth-
right in her testimony. In addition, I find it improbable that
Rice made the decision not to reinstate the employee with-
out first contacting Miller, who was the chief negotiator on
behalf of Respondent in working out the strike settlement
arrangement. The fact that Rice discussed Anderson's rein-
statement with Miller lends credence to her testimony that
Rice had her wait until a decision could be made on her
request for reinstatement. Accordingly, I find that Ander-
son and Rice had more than one conversation on the morn-
ing of June 14, and I further find that Rice made the state-
ments attributed to him by Anderson during these
conversations.
C. Concluding Findings
The General Counsel argues that the memorandum of
agreement is an invalid infringement on the rights of em-
ployees to engage in a lawful economic strike, as the period
in which the employees were required to return to work was
"unreasonably" short. Therefore, the strike settlement
agreement violated the criteria set forth in the United Air-
craft, supra, and Laher Spring & Electric Car, supra,. cases.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the agree-
ment is a valid result of collective bargaining encouraged
by the Act to settle labor disputes, and to impose on the
parties something other than agreed upon in the bargaining
process violates the ruling of the Supreme Court in H.K.
Porter Comnpanl., Inc., 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
I find neither of these arguments. although ably pre-
sented in the briefs, meets the fundamental issue in this
case. There is no question that the Act protects the right of
employees to engage in an economic strike.' It is equally
well settled that a refusal to reinstate unreplaced striking
employees, upon an unconditional offer to return, is inher-
ently destructive of this protected right. But the right is not
an absolute one and can be defeated by a showing of legiti-
mate and substantial business justifications. N.L.R.B. v.
Fleertwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375 (1967): VN.L.R.B.
v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). It is for the
Board to strike the proper balance between the asserted
business justifications and the invasion of this important
employee right in the light of the Act and its policy. United
Aircraft Corporation, supra. at 387.8
However, the facts of the instant case are such I do not
find it necessary to determine the validity or invalidity of
the strike settlement agreement. Indeed, for purposes of this
Decision it is assumed that the agreement is valid and was
not discriminatorily applied by Respondent. Nevertheless, I
find that the circumstances here require the finding of a
violation.
Having entered into a strike settlement agreement
through the normal bargaining process, Respondent in-
sisted on delegating to the Union the responsibility for noti-
fying the employees of the terms governing their return to
work. But the obligation to notify and reinstate striking
employees rests solely with Respondent, and cannot be
transferred to the Union. By making the Union its agent for
this purpose, Respondent here must also assume responsi-
bility for any failure on the part of the Union to successful-
ly communicate the terms of the settlement to all of the
striking employees. Cf. Ernst Construction, Division of Ernst
Steel Corporation 217 NLRB 1069 (1975).
The record in the instant case does not contain a scintilla
of evidence showing that the Union communicated or at-
tempted to communicate the strike settlement terms to An-
derson. To the contrary, Anderson's credited testimony that
no such communication was ever made stands unrefuted.
While it is true that other employees were contacted, this
alone is not enough to support an inference that Anderson
I United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt and Whitney Division, 192 NLRB 382
(1971).
6 Laher Spring & Electric Car Corp., 192 NLRB 464 11971).
' Sec. 13 of the Act specifically provides:
Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right.
I N.LR.B. v. Fleetrwood Trailer Co.. supra at 378: The Laidlaw Corporation,
171 NLRB 1366 (1968).
101
DE(CISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was similarly contacted, nor is it sufficient to destroy her
protected status as a striking employee.
In these circumstances, Respondent's rigid application of
the time limitation to Anderson's request for reinstatement
must be considered an impermissible violation of the statu-
tory rights of striking employees. The preservation of these
important employee rights, in the circumstances presented
here, far outweight any adverse effects that a deviation
from the time limitation would have on Respondent's fu-
ture dealings with the Union in strike situations. This is
especially true where, as here, Respondent failed to ade-
quately communicate the time limitation for returning to
work to the striking employee; the striking employee re-
ported to work at the first opportunity after gaining knowl-
edge of the termination of the strike-2 working days be-
yond the time limitation: and the striking employee had not
been replaced at the time she reported for work. To hold
otherwise. would penalize the striking employee for exercis-
ing statutory rights while allowing Respondent to terminate
her status as an employee with less than full satisfaction of
its reinstatement obligation.
Accordingly, I find that by failing to reinstate Anderson
under the circumstances here, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act.
CON(C.USI(NS ()I LAoW
1. The Respondent. Stauffer Chemical Company, is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. International Chemical Workers Union, Local No.
294 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. By refusing, on June 14. 1977, to reinstate striking em-
ployee Delores Anderson upon an unconditional offer to
return to work, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Tlit REMEIY
Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of
the Act, Respondent shall be ordered to cease and desist
therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. It shall be recommended
that Respondent offer Delores Anderson immediate and
full reinstatement to her former position of employment or,
if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equiv-
alent position, without prejudice to her seniority or her
other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss
of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the unlawful
termination of her employment. Backpay shall be com-
puted with interest thereon, in the manner prescribed in
F. W. Woolworth Companv, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Flor-
ida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651 (1977).'
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, contusions of law,
and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act. I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Stauffer Chemical Company, San Jose,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to reinstate unreplaced economic strikers
who unconditionally offer to return to work and who were
never properly informed of the time limitation contained in
the strike settlement agreement governing such return.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, as amended.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Delores Anderson immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former position of employment, or ift' that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with-
out prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make her whole, in the manner set forth above in the
section entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of earnings she
may have suffered by reason of the unlawful discrimination
against her.
(b) Preserve and, upon request. make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(c) Post at its San Jose, California, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix."'' Copies of said no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 32. after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re-
ceipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 32. in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
has taken to comply herewith.
See. generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
1 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
102
STAIIFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY
APPENDIX
NOICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSI ED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board Having Found, After
a Hearing in Which All Parties Had an Opportunity to
Present Evidence, That We Committed Certain Unfair La-
bor Practices in Violation of the National Labor Relations
Act, as Amended, We Hereby Notify You That:
WE WILL. NOT refuse to reinstate unreplaced eco-
nomic strikers who unconditionally offer to return to
work, and who are not properly informed of the time
limitation for returning to work as contained in the
strike settlement agreement with the Union.
WE WIL.L NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WIt.I offer Delores Anderson immediate and full
reinstatement to her former position of employ ment or,
if that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority
or other rights and privileges, and Vi ii.l make her
whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered
by reason of the unlawful termination of her employ-
ment.
STAUI:FER CHEMICAL. COMPANY
103