State Mechanical Constructors, Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJun 22, 1971191 N.L.R.B. 393 (N.L.R.B. 1971) Copy Citation STATE MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC. State Mechanical Constructors , Inc. and James Hart- TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION mann. Case 21-CA-9322 June 22, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS BROWN AND JENKINS On February 25, 1971, Trial Examiner Robert L. Piper issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceed- ing, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Trial Examiner's Decision attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex- aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that State Me- chanical Constructors, Inc., Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recom- mended Order. I These findings and conclusions are based , in part, upon credibility determinations of the Trial Examiner, to which the Respondent has ex- cepted. Having carefully reviewed the record , we conclude that the Trial Examiner's credibility findings are not contrary to the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence . Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing those findings. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3). T Respondent's contentions concerning the alleged reinstatement of Hartman and the termination of its backpay liability can be resolved at the compliance stage of this proceeding. 191 NLRB No. 83 393 STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT L. PIPER, Trial Examiner: This proceeding,' un- der Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, was heard at Los Angeles, California on November 17 and 18, 1970,2 pursuant to due notice. The complaint, which was issued on August 12, on a charge filed June 22, alleged in substance that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging James Hartmann, an employee. Respondent's answer denied the alleged unfair labor prac- tices. The General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT L JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS Respondent is a California corporation engaged in the in- stallation of plumbing, heating, and air conditioning systems with its principal office located in Hawthorne, California. During the past year it purchased and received supplies and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of California. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local Union No. 250 (hereinafter called the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction and Issues James Hartmann, the Charging Party, was employed by Respondent as a steamfitter on April 13 at its Criminal Courts Building project in downtown Los Angeles and, at the same time, appointed job steward by the Union. Thereafter, Hartmann presented certain employee grievances against Re- spondent,to the Union. Respondent discharged Hartmann on June 5. The issue, as framed by the pleadings, is alleged discrimina- tion and interference, restraint, and coercion by the discharge of Hartmann. The General Counsel contends that Hartmann was discharged because of his grievance activities as a job steward for the Union. Respondent contends that Hartmann was discharged for cause. B. Chronology of Events During 1969, Respondent entered into a subcontract to perform all of the plumbing, heating, and air conditioning work on the Criminal Courts Building project. At all times material Respondent was a party to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. Respondent was also a party to a collective-bargaining contract with the Plumbers' Local 78, from whose hiring hall Respondent obtained its plumbers. Respondent obtained its steamfitters, also called pipefitters, from the Union's hiring hall. Respondent employed plumbers I At the opening of the hearing, upon unopposed motion of the General Counsel, the caption was amended to correct the spelling of the name of the Charging Party I All dates hereinafter refer to 1970 unless otherwise indicated 394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on the project first. The first steamfitter hired by Respondent was Fred L. Six, whom Respondent subsequently made fore- man of a steamfitter crew, including Hartmann. On April 13, Hartmann was the second steamfitter hired and was ap- pointed job steward by the Union. John McWilliams, also a member of the Union, was Respondent's general foreman of steamfitters and Six's superior. Charles Watson, a member of the Plumbers' Local 78, was Respondent's superintendent of the project. Promptly after Hartmann's employment, both McWilliams and Six complained to him as the job steward that Respondent was failing to comply with a provision of the contract requiring certain minimum payments by Respond- ent to the employees for the parking of their automobiles. Paragraph 127 of Section XX of the collective-bargaining contract provided: Parking. Where free parking is not available within four (4) blocks of the job or project, the Contractor shall reimburse employees at the lowest rate available within said four (4) block area, provided the employee presents a signed and dated receipt for each parking expenditure. There was no free parking available. Respondent paid its employees 75 cents a day for parking, which required them to park at a lot they contended was 6 blocks from the project. Respondent would not pay the higher amount necessary to park within what the employees contended was a 4 block radius of the project. Six, McWilliams, and various em- ployees asked Hartmann to take this matter up with the Union as a claimed violation of the contract, which he did. The record establishes that between the parking lot in ques- tion and the project there were some six "blocks" or intersec- tions, a distance of between "/,o and % of a mile, but Respond- ent contended that the lot was within 4 blocks because of a definition secured from the City of Los Angeles that a "city block" was 660 feet, or % of a mile. Under this definition of a block, 4 blocks would equal % of a mile. Respondent also employed an independent surveyor, who reported that the parking lot was within % mile of the project. Regardless of the merits of the grievance, it is undisputed that Hartmann presented such complaint to the Union on behalf of the employees and Six and McWilliams. Hartmann presented the complaint or grievance to Donald Hall, division manager of the Union under the supervision of Don Mattern, the Union's business manager , both installed April 17 as the result of a recent Union election. Hartmann, the Plumbers' steward and the business representatives of both unions dis- cussed the employees' complaint about the parking situation, allegedly in violation of the contract, at least twice with Su- perintendent Watson. Watson's superiors were Hyman Rob- ins, executive vice president, and E. J. Weinberger, president, of Respondent. 'Watson admittedly informed Weinberger of each meeting he had with Hartmann and the others concern- ing the parking problem. Between April 13 and his discharge on June 5, Hartmann also presented another complaint to the Union concerning an alleged breach of the contract by Re- spondent with respect to the,use of an improper number of pipefitters in a composite crew employed by one of Respond- ent's subcontractors to install or rig coils at the project. During May, Hall, who was in agreement with the em- ployees that Respondent was not paying for parking within 4 blocks as required by the contract, took the complaint up with Respondent. Hall first contacted Weinberger and ex- plained the complaint to him. Weinberger requested Hall to take the matter up with Watson. Watson then told Hall that it was not Watson's responsibility and to take it up with Weinberger. Hall visited Respondent's supervisors on the project with Hartmann several times concerning this com- plaint, on one or two occasions accompanied by Arthur Caro- lan, the Plumbers' business agent, who had joined in com- plaining about this alleged violation of the contract. The disagreement was not settled. On or about May 21, Weinberger telephoned' Mattern with respect to the parking problem. Weinberger informed Mat- tern that Respondent had not had any problem about the parking situation with the Plumbers' union prior to the em- ployment of the Union's steward (Hartmann), and that if he was gone from the job Weinberger would not have any fur- ther problem about the parking. Mattern informed Wein- berger that Mattern was not going to replace Hartmann as the job steward. Mattern, whom I credit, so testified. Wein- berger, whom I do not credit unless otherwise corroborated, denied such conversation. As a result of the dispute, Hall and Carolan arranged a meeting for May 28 to discuss the parking situation with Respondent's officials, including Weinberger. The meeting, held at the project site, was attended by Weinberger, Robins, Watson, McWilliams, and several other representatives of Respondent, and Hall, Carolan, Hartmann, and Local 78's job steward. According to Hall, whom I credit, at the opening of the meeting Weinberger asked Hall what Hartmann was doing there. Hall replied that Hartmann was there because Hall had requested him to be there as the job steward and the Union's representative on the job. During the course of the discussion, Weinberger stated that he did not like stewards telling his supervisors how the job should be run or interpret- ing the contract for them. This statement was corroborated by all of the witnesses present, including Respondent's offi- cials, except Weinberger, who denied making any such state- ment. According to Hartmann and Carolan, whom I credit, while Weinberger was making the prior statement he was either looking or pointing at Hartmann, who was wearing his steward's button. Weinberger also said that he had not had any problems on the project about parking until the pipefit- ters and their steward had been employed. The parties then discussed the meaning of the 4-block parking provision in the contract, Respondent, for the reasons hereinabove found, contending that the lot was within 4 blocks of the project, and the Union contending that it was not. Both stewards left the meeting before its termination. Representatives of both sides then walked the distance to the parking lot and back, but the dispute remained unsettled. A couple of days later, Mattern and the business manager of Local 78 met with Robins and another representative of Respondent to discuss the parking dispute. Robins informed them that Weinberger had decided that he was not going to pay the additional amount requested. On June 3, Respondent fired a steamfitter for being intox- icated on the job. The following day, June 4, another steamfit- ter returned to the job at mid-day intoxicated and very angry because Respondent had fired his friend the preceding day. This employee entered the project office, created a terrific uproar, picked up a large pipe, threatened to break up the office, and demanded his pay immediately. He was about 6 feet 3 inches tall and `very husky. Although a number of Respondent's supervisors and others were present, at Six's request Hartmann succeeded in calming the belligerent em- ployee and keeping him under control for approximately an hour and a half until Respondent could obtain his check from the office. McWilliams complimented Hartmann for handling a difficult situation so well. Watson admitted that Hartmann had done so. Both Watson and McWilliams contacted Wein- berger with respect to the discharges for intoxication on the job on June 3 and 4. On the afternoon of June 4, Weinberger called the Union's office, spoke with Dan Delaney, another business representative, and informed him that Weinberger was tired of the steamfitters' steward causing so much trou- ble, that Respondent was not in violation of the parking provision in the contract, and that pursuant to the contract STATE MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC. 395 Respondent had mailed the Union a letter informing it'that its steward (Hartmann) was being fired. Paragraph 49 of section XII of the contract provided in substance that stew- ards could not be fired except for cause and required 24 hours notice in writing to the Union. It specifically provided, inter alia: . the Contractors, before transferring, laying off or discharging a Steward, shall notify the Union in writing of its intention to do so at least twenty-four (24) hours in advance of such intended action. The person ap- pointed Steward shall remain on the job as long as there is work in his particular classification which he is qua- lified to perform, and so long as there are three (3) men on the job, excluding the Steward; provided, however, the Steward does not engage in any activities which are contrary to the provisions of this Agreement. In no event shall a Contractor discriminate against a Steward or lay him off, or discharge him an account of any action taken by him in the proper performance of his Union duties. Delaney advised Weinberger that he had made a mistake and should not have fired Hartmann. The only reason Weinberger gave Delaney for discharging Hartmann was his complaint about the parking problem. Weinberger, whom I do not credit, denied any conversation with Delaney. Weinberger alone admittedly made the decision to dis- charge Hartmann, dictated the letter in substance, and saw a copy June 4 after it was mailed. The letter was signed by Robins, Respondent's executive vice president. Mattern re- ceived the letter at the Union's office on Friday, June 5, and construed it as the 24-hour notice required by the contract and that Hartmann had been discharged. The letter read: According to our agreement, we are exercising our option to lay Mr. James Hartman, the steward on this job off. The reason for the lay-off is because of the fact that this steward, who is a member of Local Union #250, has created undue trouble on the job and we absolutely our [sic] not in violation of our contract concerning the parking within the limitations of the agreement. Mattern, because he construed the letter as stating that Respondent had discharged Hartmann because of the undue trouble he had created on the job concerning the parking, immediately called Weinberger. Mattern told Weinberger that he had made a big mistake. Weinberger replied that he had had all he was going to take from the steward. Mattern informed Weinberger that it was against the Union's policy to permit a steward to be fired in such manner and the Union would have to take action. Weinberger admittedly suggested that Mattern tear up the letter. Mattern replied that he could not do so. That afternoon Mattern appointed a new job stew- ard to report to Respondent's project Monday morning, which he did. Thus on Monday morning Respondent knew that Hartmann would not be returning to the job. Mattern testified that he had no complaint about Hartmann's per- formance as a steward. On June 5 Mattern also filed a formal grievance with the joint Union and Employer Council alleg- ing that Respondent had laid off the Union's steward without good cause. The same day the Union and Plumbers' Local 78 each filed a formal grievance with the Joint Council with respect to the parking dispute. The Hartmann grievance was held in abeyance pending the outcome of this proceeding, and the grievances concerning parking remained pending at the time of the hearing in this proceeding. That evening, June 5, Hartmann attended a regularly scheduled meeting of the Union. He was not aware of his discharge. Hartmann had worked the entire day without any communication from Respondent's supervisors. Mattern met Hartmann before the meeting, told him of the receipt of the letter from Respondent, and informed him that he had been discharged. Hartmann replied that it was news to him and asked about his pay. Mattern replied that he had received the letter and would show it to Hartmann on Monday because the Union meeting was about to start, but that Hartmann had been fired and Mattern had dispatched a new steward for Monday. While they were talking Six, Hartmann's foreman, joined the conversation and said Hartmann's discharge was a surprise to Six, he didn't know anything about it and as foreman had no reason to fire Hartmann. Six further said that Respondent in fact should have given Hartmann a bonus for his handling of the drunk and disorderly employee the previ- ous day. During the ensuing union meeting, Mattern an- nounced-to the membership that Respondent had fired Hart- mann and that the Union had filed a grievance because of the discharge of its steward. Hartmann did not return to work on Monday, June 8, having been informed that he had been discharged and re- placed. Hartmann was familiar with the 24-hour notice provi- sion in the contract concerning the discharge of stewards, having frequently served as a steward. On June 10, Mattern delivered Respondent's letter of June 4 to Hartmann and a check for his last 2 days of work, which Mattern had received in the mail from Respondent without a covering letter. About a week after Hartmann's discharge Mattern and Delaney met with Weinberger at his office to try to negotiate a settlement of the Hartmann grievance. They had Respond- ent's letter of June 4 with them and pointed out to Wein- berger that the reason stated therein was not a legitimate reason for the discharge of a steward. Weinberger advanced no other reasons for Hartmann's discharge during the meet- ing. They also discussed the parking grievance. No settlement of either was reached. Weinberger, whom I do not credit, denied any such meeting. Hartmann filed his charge with the Board on June 22. On July 6, in response to a letter from the Board's Regional Office, Robins as Respondent's executive vice president wrote the Regional Office setting forth Respondent's alleged rea- sons for Hartmann's discharge. After referring to the letter of June 4 to the Union advising it of Hartmann's discharge, the July 6 letter to the Region stated: The following is a list of our reasons for terminating his services: 1. He left early for lunch. 2. He returned late from lunch. 3. He returned from lunch with alcohol on his breath. 4. He took unauthorized coffee breaks. 5. He rode manlift without hard hat in violation of safety regu- lations, State of California. This was the first occasion, more than a month later, that Respondent gave any reason for Hartmann's discharge other than that set forth in the letter of June 4. On July 30, Wein- berger executed an affidavit stating his reasons for discharg- ing Hartmann as: 1. He was going to lunch early and coming back late; and 2. He had alcohol on his breath. No reference was made to coffee breaks, hard hats or loafing on the job. During the hearing, in addition to the reasons for Hartmann's termination set forth in Respondent's letter of July 6, Re- spondent offered considerable proof that Hartmann was also guilty of laziness or "goofing off" during working hours. Hartmann, whom I credit, denied any such conduct. C. Discrimination and Interference, Restraint, and Coercion The complaint alleged that Respondent discharged Hart- mann on June 5 because he had joined and assisted the Union or engaged in other union activity or protected concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. From the time of his employment and appointment as job steward on April 13, Hartmann vig- 396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD orously pursued the employees' complaint that Respondent was not complying with the parking provisions of the con- tract. In fact, it was conceded that he was also requested to do so by two of Respondent's supervisors, Six and McWil- liams. As a result, numerous meetings were held between officials of Respondent, Hartmann, and business representa- tives of the Union, and Local 78 also became interested and joined in the complaint. Respondent's letter of June 4 to the Union advising it of Hartmann's discharge, as well as Wein- berger's subsequent conversations with Delaney and Mat- tern, make clear that Respondent's real reason for discharg- ing Hartmann was because of his vigorous prosecution of the parking grievance. Respondent's letter of June 4 specifically stated that "the reason for the lay-off is because of the fact that this steward, who is a member of Local Union # 250, has created undue trouble on the job and we absolutely our [sic] not in violation of our contract concerning parking within the limitations of the agreement." During his conversations with Mattern and Delaney after the letter of discharge, Wein- berger never advanced any other reason for Hartmann's dis- charge. On July 6, substantially after the fact and as an apparent afterthought, Respondent in a letter to the Board for the first time listed five reasons, consisting of alleged misconduct, for Hartmann's discharge. The reasons advanced in the July 6 letter to the Board were that Hartmann left early and re- turned late from lunch, returned from lunch with alcohol on his breath, took unauthorized coffee breaks and rode the manlift without a hard hat in violation of safety regulations. Respondent offered considerable proof through Six, McWil- liams, and Watson concerning the items listed in its letter of July 6. Hartmann, whom I credit, denied ever engaging in any such conduct. Perhaps more significantly, with one or two minor exceptions it was undisputed that none of Re- spondent's supervisors had ever criticized or warned Hart- mann about any of his alleged misconduct. On one occasion only Hartmann was observed returning from lunch riding the manlift without a hard hat and McWilliams mentioned this to him. Hartmann replied, and it was not disputed, that many of the employees did not wear their hard hats either coming to or going from work, or going to and coming from lunch, because at such times it was safe because no work was taking place on the project. It was also undisputed that many of the employees, including supervisors, often had alcoholic drinks, including beer, with their lunch. Respondent conceded that Hartmann was never under the influence of alcohol on the job and was a competent worker. Hartmann, whom I credit, denied ever having any drinks with lunch other than beer. It is patent the Respondent's alleged reasons for discharg- ing Hartmann, after its admission of June 4, were shifting, evasive, inconsistent, and apparent afterthoughts. In the let- ter of June 4 and the conferences with Mattern and Delaney concerning Hartmann's discharge, the only reason advanced by Weinberger' was that set forth in said letter. On July 30, Weinberger's affidavit set forth his reasons for Hartmann's discharge, which failed to include two of the reasons set forth in the letter of July 6 to the Board, which Weinberger admit- tedly participated in preparing. Moreover, during the hearing Respondent offered considerable testimony that one of its principal reasons for Hartmann's discharge was his constant "goofing off" on the job, a reason not set forth in the letter of July 6 or in Weinberger's affidavit. It is, of course, well established that advancing shifting, evasive, inconsistent, and inconsequential reasons for a discharge may be considered in determining the real motivation for such discharge. Weinber- ger's conversation with Mattern on or about May 21 suggest- ing that Hartmann be removed from the job because of his complaints about the parking, Weinberger' s statements dur- ing the May 28 meeting concerning the parking dispute, about job stewards and his reference to Hartmann, Respond- ent's letter to the Union on June 4 notifying it of the discharge of Hartmann, and Weinberger's subsequent discussions with Mattern and Delaney concerning Hartmann's discharge, all clearly reveal that Respondent's real reason for discharging Hartmann was his diligence as job steward in pursuing the employees' complaints concerning Respondent's alleged fail- ure to comply with the parking provisions of the contract. The merits of the parking grievance are immaterial. It is now well settled that discharging or otherwise dis- criminating against an employee, because of his processing employee complaints or grievances as a union steward, or his or his union 's assertion of a claim or right pursuant to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, is a violation of both Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.' A preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the entire record convinces me, and I find, that Respondent's alleged reasons for terminating Hartmann were pretextual, and that Respondent's real reason for discharging Hartmann was be- cause of his activity, as job steward, in presenting to the Union and pursuing the employees' complaints and grievance concerning Respondent's alleged failure to comply with the parking requirements of the contract, thereby discriminating against him in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing-him in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce, and the Union is a labor organization , within the meaning of the Act. 2. By discharging Hartmann , because of his activities as a job steward on behalf of the employees pursuant to the terms of the collective-bargaining contract , Respondent engaged in discrimination to discourage membership in the Union, and interfered with, restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action of the type which is conventionally ordered in such cases as provided in the Order recommended below, which I find necessary to remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:' ' NL.R.B. v. Pruden Products Co., 422 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1970); Great Falls White Truck Co., 183 NLRB No. 64 (1970); George Kennedy Con- struction Company, Inc., 172 NLRB No. 196 (1968); Bowman Transporta- tion Incorporated, 134 NLRB 1419 (1961); and Monsanto Chemical Com- pany, 130 NLRB 1097 (1961). ° In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions and Order, and all objections thereto shall be STATE MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC. ORDER State Mechanical Constructors, Inc., its officers, agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fit- ting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local Union No. 250, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment because of their union or concerted activities. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or, coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran- teed to them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectu- ate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer James Hartmann immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job, or if this job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his se- niority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned from the date of his discharge to the date of such offer of reinstatement , less his net earnings during said period (Crosser Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440), said backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, together with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum (Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716). (b) Immediately notify James Hartmann, if presently serv- ing in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, person- nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under this Order. (d) Post at its Criminal Courts Building project site in Los Angeles, California copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix. "I Copies,of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, deemed waived for all purposes. S In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 397 within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.' 6 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read- "Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local Union No. 250, or any other labor organization of our employees, by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against our employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment because of their union or con- certed activities. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them by the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer James Hartmann immediate and full reinstatement to his former job, or if this job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay which he may have suffered as a result of our discrimination against him. All of our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement conforming to the provisions of Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. STATE MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTORS, INC. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) We will notify immediately James Hartmann, if pres- ently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act. This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any- one. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, Cali- fornia 90014, Telephone 213-688-5229. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation