Star Forge, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 24, 1975

220 N.L.R.B. 582 (N.L.R.B. 1975)

582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge,
Inc. and Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers, and Al-
lied Workers International Union, Local 74, AFL-
CIO and District No. 122 , International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
and the Metal Trades Department of the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations. Cases 13-CA-13319 and 13-CA-
13443
September 24, 1975
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND PENELLO
On March 31, 1975, Administrative Law Judge
Jerry B. Stone issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding . Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief , and the General Coun-
sel filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three -member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order as modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
i The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge . It is the Board's established policy not to over-
rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility
unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us
that the resolutions are incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully
examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
2 The Administrative Law Judge found that Respondent violated Sec.
8(aXl) by promising benefits and threatening loss of benefits on May 29,
1974, when Plant Manager Danielson made it clear to Scott that he had had
his overtime and wages reduced because he had joined the Union and that
another employee had lost a 50 -cent raise for the same reason . While we
agree with the Administrative Law Judge that this withdrawing of benefits
constituted an illegal threat of loss of benefits in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1). we
do not agree with him that the same evidence is sufficient to establish the
converse of the proposition ; i.e., that Respondent illegally made a promise
of benefits. Accordingly , we shall dismiss the 8(a)(l) allegation concerning a
promise of benefits.
Members Fanning and Penello do not adopt any implication in the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge 's Decision that Respondent's demand for the Union
membership list as the contract provided could be exercised only if Respon-
dent established a legitimate purpose for having the list ; however, they
agree that the Union 's failure to provide the list had no relation to
Respondent's duty to bargain with the Union, and the absence of the list
affords Respondent no defense for its refusal to bargain.
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Star
Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge,
Inc., Carpentersville , Illinois , its officers , agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the recommended Order, as modified herein:
1. Delete paragraph 1(c) and renumber the follow-
ing paragraphs accordingly.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
CHAIRMAN MURPHY, dissenting in part, concurring in
part:
Contrary to my colleagues, I would find that Re-
spondent withdrew recognition of the Union on July
30, 1974,' and thereafter refused to bargain with the
Union because of a reasonably based doubt of the
Union's majority status . Under established Board
precedent a certified union, upon the expiration of
the first year following its certification, enjoys a re-
buttable presumption that its majority representative
status continues.4 To rebut that presumption, the em-
ployer need not prove that the union no longer repre-
sents a majority of the employees, but only that at
the time it refused to bargain there were sufficient
objective considerations to support a reasonable
doubt of the union's majority status.' In my opinion,
the circumstances here, when viewed in their entire-
ty, clearly establish that Respondent has met that
test.
While I concur in my colleagues' finding that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act,
in my opinion these violations were isolated occur-
rences which involved only 1 employee out of a work
force of over 80 employees and cannot reasonably be
adjudged to have caused any significant erosion of
union strength. Therefore, I would find these unfair
labor practices were of a minimal nature and did not
"taint" the objective consideration on which Respon-
dent relied in withdrawing recognition from the
Union.6
The facts relating to Respondent's objective con-
siderations are as follows : The Union has been the
certified bargaining representative of the employees
since 1942 and thus Respondent and the Union have
a long history of amicable collective bargaining. The
latest collective-bargaining agreement was effective
from September 1, 1971, until September 1, 1974,
and was automatically renewable for successive 1-
year periods unless, at least 60 days prior to its termi-
nation, either party gave written notice of a desire to
terminate. On June 11, the Union requested a meet-
3 All dates herein refer to 1974 unless otherwise noted.
° Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664 ( 1951).
5 Orion Corporation, 210 NLRB 633 ( 1974).
6 Taft Broadcasting, WDAF-TV, AM-FM, 201 NLRB 801 (1973).
220 NLRB No. 76
STAR MANUFACTURING CO. 583
ing with Respondent to begin negotiating a new
agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Re-
spondent demanded that the Union provide a list of
its current members. On July 8, Respondent again
requested this list, indicating that upon receipt of
such information a meeting would be scheduled. On
three subsequent occasions, July 11, 15, and 20, Re-
spondent renewed its request for the membership list,
indicating that fulfillment of this demand was neces-
sary before the parties could have a joint meeting.
On July 30, Haderly, the Union's business represen-
tative, called Company President Ward and said that
he could not furnish the list to the Company. Ward
replied, "If we don't have a list we aren't going to
have a meeting." Despite the Union's contractual
obligation no list was ever produced.
The Respondent withdrew recognition of the
Union on July 30, asserting a good-faith doubt as to
the Union's majority status. Respondent contends
that besides the staleness of the Union's certification
and the Union's adamant refusal to furnish a list of
its membership, there were, on July 30, additional
significant objective indications that the Union no
longer represented a majority of the unit employees.
The facts reveal that, during the term of the contract,
considerable changes occurred in the composition of
the bargaining unit. Employee terminations within
the factory unit increased at a rapid rate in relation
to the unit size. While there were 180 unit termina-
tions in all of 1972, during the first 7 months of 1974
there were 133 unit terminations.
The Respondent's records showed that, on the
date of July 30, only a small percentage of the unit
employees were members of the Union. Out of a unit
of 83 or 84 employees, only 22 employees or 26 per-
cent of the unit had authorized the deduction of
union dues from their wages-hardly a majority.
While employee support cannot necessarily be mea-
sured solely or exclusively by the number of employ-
ees who actually become members of the union as
expressed through union checkoff authorizations,
nonetheless I cannot ignore the implications of such
data. For as the Board observed in Convair Division
of General Dynamics Corporation, 169 NLRB 131,
(1968), "the sole evidence readily available to the Re-
spondent as a reliable measure of union support was
that provided by the employees' checkoff authoriza-
tions."' Moreover, in N. L. R. B. v. H. P. Wasson &
Company, 422 F.2d 558, 561 (C.A. 7, 1970), the court
decreed that turnover and decrease in checkoff could
reasonably give rise to genuine doubts of a union's
majority status.
From the inception of the contract until July 30
only two formal grievances were filed by the Union
against the Company. Both were filed in June 1974,
and dropped after the first step of the grievance pro-
cedure, even though the disposition of the grievances
was unfavorable to the employees involved. Anoth-
er was filed in August but was denied at the second
step of the grievance procedure and no further ap-
peal was taken. In fact, Union Steward Hayden,
upon receipt of a denial in June 1974 of the first
grievance that he had ever filed, stated that he did
not know what the next step was.
Respondent most persuasively points out yet an-
other objective consideration, the fact that the union
steward himself opined that the Union was weak. On
June 18, prior to his formal designation as union
steward, Hayden expressed the opinion to Respon-
dent that he would prefer to have a different union at
Respondent's plant because "This Union does not
keep up to date on what is happening." Hayden also
asserted to Respondent that the Union was not
strong enough to do what was necessary, and he him-
self was going to get out before expiration of the con-
tract.
While each of the above objective considerations
standing alone may not be enough to support a good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority status , I note that
Respondent did not rely on any one factor but rather
relied on the cumulative effect of all the consider-
ations. Considering all the factors available to Re-
spondent, I find that Respondent did have an objec-
tive basis for doubting the Union's majority status. I
find particularly significant the age of the Union's
certification, 33 years, and the apparently amicable
relationship between Respondent and the Union be-
fore this; the high number of terminations and rapid
turnover rate; the low percentage of employees au-
thorizing dues checkoffs; the Union's refusal to pro-
vide Respondent with a list of its members despite a
contractual obligation to do so; and, significantly,
the union steward's admissions that the Union was
not up to date and was weak.
In conclusion, I find that, at the time it withdrew
recognition, Respondent had valid reasons for doub-
ting the Union's majority status and thus, in the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary, I find that Respon-
dent lawfully refused to bargain. Accordingly, I
would dismiss that portion of the complaint.
'See Otto Klein , et al., d/b/a Artiste Permanent Wave Company, 172
NLRB 1922 (1968), and Hayworth Roll and Panel Company, 130 NLRB 604
(1961), where the fact that the union had checkoff cards from less than a
majority of the employees was a decisive factor in the Board's dismissal of
the 8(a)(5) complaint.
584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees concerning their union membership, ac-
tivities , and sympathies.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss
of benefits and other reprisals in order to dis-
courage employee membership in and support
of labor organizations.
WE WILL NOT encourage and solicit employees
to withdraw their membership from labor orga-
nizations.
WE WILL NOT reduce the assignment of over-
time to and the wage rates of employees in order
to discourage employee membership in and sup-
port of labor organizations.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with the Union, The Metal Trades Department
of the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations, as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees in the unit
herein found to be inappropriate. The appropri-
ate collective-bargaining unit is:
All factory employees employed by us at our
Carpentersville, Illinois, facility, excluding of-
fice employees, company executives, shop
clerks, foremen and others in a supervisory
position or in confidential relations with man-
agement.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act except to the extent that such right may be
affected by lawful agreements in accordance
with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the Met-
al Trades Department of the American Federa-
tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Orga-
nizations as the exclusive representative of our
employees in the unit found herein to be appro-
priate and embody such understanding reached
in a signed agreement.
WE WILL make Jim Scott whole for any loss of
pay suffered by reason of the discrimination
against him with respect to the reduction of ov-
ertime assignments and the reduction of his
wage rates.
All employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the
Metal Trades Department of the American Federa-
tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, or any affiliated union therewith or any other
labor organization, except to the extent provided by
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
STAR MANUFACTURING COMPANY, DIVISION
OF STAR FORGE, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JERRY B. STONE, Administrative Law Judge: This pro-
ceeding, under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, was tried pursuant to due notice on
November 20, 21, and 22, 1974, Chicago, Illinois.
The charge in Case 13-CA-13319 was filed on June 3,
1974. The charge in Case 13-CA-13443 was filed on July
23, 1974, and the first amended charge in Case 13-CA-
13443 (erroneously appearing on the face thereof as Case
13-CA-13319) was filed on September 3, 1974. The order
consolidating cases and the consolidated complaint was is-
sued on October 11, 1974. The issues presented are (1)
whether the Respondent has engaged in various acts of
interrogation, promises of benefits , threats, and solicitation
of withdrawals from the Union, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act; (2) whether the Respondent has discrim-
inatorily reduced the hours of overtime and the wage rates
of employee Jim Scott in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act; and (3) whether the Respondent has refused
to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
All parties were afforded full opportunity to participate
in the proceeding, and the General Counsel and the Re-
spondent filed briefs which have been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of witnesses , I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER I
Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge,
Inc., the Respondent , is, and has been at all times material
herein, a corporation duly organized under, and existing by
virtue of, the laws of the State of Illinois . Respondent, at
all times material herein, has maintained a facility at 2 East
Main Street, Carpentersville , Illinois , where it is engaged in
the manufacture of parts for agricultural equipment. Dur-
ing a representative 1-year period, Respondent sold and
shipped goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
from its facility in Carpentersville, Illinois , directly to
points outside the State of Illinois.
Based upon the foregoing and as conceded by the Re-
spondent, it is concluded and found that the Respondent is
now, and has been at all times material herein, an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
1 The facts are based upon the pleadings and admissions herein.
STAR MANUFACTURING CO. 585
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Based upon the pleadings and admissions therein, it is
concluded and found that Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers
and Allied Workers International Union , Local 74, AFL-
CIO; District No. 122, International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO; the Metal
Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations ; Local No. 1600,
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers , Iron Ship-
builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers; and Local No.
369, International Molders and Foundry Workers Union
of North America , each is, and has been at all times mate-
rial to this proceeding, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The certified appropriate collective-bargaining unit re-
ferred to above and covered in such collective-bargaining
contract is as follows:
At all times material herein, the following employees
at the Respondent's facility at 2 East Main Street,
Carpentersville, Illinois, have constituted a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All factory
employees employed by Respondent at its Carpenters-
Ville, Illinois , facility, excluding office employees,
company executives, shop clerks, foremen and others
in a supervisory position or in confidential relations
with management.
The above referred to collective-bargaining agreement
(1971-74) did not contain standard union-security provi-
sions but did contain fairly typical maintenance-of-mem-
bership provisions with appropriate escape clauses.
A. Preliminary Issue: Supervisory Status 2
At all times material herein , the following named per-
sons occupied the positions set opposite their respective
names, and have been, and are now, agents of Respondent,
acting on its behalf , within the meaning of Section 2(13) of
the Act, and are supervisors within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act:
Carson Ward President
Dan Johnson Vice President
R. J. Matz Secretary
Jim Danielson Plant Manager
Harry Daugherty Foreman
William Kennedy Foreman
Ray Bruening Shipping Dept . Foreman
B. Setting: Collective-Bargaining History; Appropriate
Bargaining Unit 3
In 1942 the Metal Trades Department of the American
Federation of Labor was certified, pursuant to Section 9(a)
of the Act, as the sole and exclusive collective-bargaining
representative for all factory employees employed by Star
Manufacturing Company, Division of Illinois Iron and
Bolt, at its Carpentersville , Illinois, facility.
Subsequent to 1942 and until 1971, the Metal Trades
Department of the American Federation of Labor and its
successor organization , the Metal Trades Department of
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations , were at all times therein parties to suc-
cessive collective-bargaining agreements with Illinois Iron
and Bolt, said agreements covering all factory employees at
the Carpentersville, Illinois, facility of Star Manufacturing
Company.
In 1971 Star Forge, Inc., acquired Star Manufacturing
Company, and on September 1, 1971, Star Manufacturing
Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc., the successor of
Star Manufacturing Company , Division of Illinois Iron
and Bolt , entered into a collective-bargaining agreement
effective to September 1, 1974.
2 The facts are based upon the pleadings, admissions, and stipulations.
3 The facts are based upon a composite of the stipulations of the parties
and the pleadings and admissions therein.
C. Jim Scott; Reduction of Overtime and Wages;
Interrogation °
Jim Scott commenced his employment with the Respon-
dent in March 1973 and worked thereafter until July 13,
1974. During his employment, it may be summarized, as
time went on Scott worked both as a machinist and as a
welder. During the time of Scott's employment, he received
a number of raises, some as a result of the contract and
some unrelated to the contract.
Background evidence was introduced to reveal that
around the time Scott was employed and later Respondent
officials expressed to him their animus toward the Union.
Thus, around March 1973, Plant Manager Danielson told
Scott that he (Danielson) didn't care one way or the other,
but the Union couldn't do anything for him. Later, around
June 1973, Foreman Daugherty told Scott that at a small
place, like the Respondent's, a small union couldn't really
help a person, that a person could rise faster in the organi-
zation if he weren't in a union.
Scott did not join the Union until May 1974. During the
time between his initial employment and his joining the
Union, as indicated before, Scott received a number of
raises and was allowed to work much overtime.5
Scott became unhappy in May 1974 concerning some
tools he thought the Company should pay for but
wouldn't. As a result, it appears that Scott decided to join
the Union. Scott joined the Union on May 20, 1974.
On May 22, 1974 Foreman Daugherty spoke to Scott
and told him in effect that there would be no more unlimit-
ed overtime in the machine shop, that an employee, Szut-
kowski, would be the only person to continue such over-
time work.
The question of whether Scott continued to receive over-
time as in the past was litigated. The overriding facts reveal
The facts are based upon a composite of the credited aspects of Scott's
and Daugherty's testimony.
5 Scott credibly testified to the effect that with respect to one raise he was
told by Daugherty not to say anything about the raise to the Union , that it
was not a raise covered by the contract classification . The evidence clearly
reveals this raise to have been proper. Under such circumstances I find no
probative value to such evidence as relating to the question of animus.
586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the following. Prior to May 22, 1974, the Respondent had
allowed the employees in the machine shop to virtually set
their own overtime work on the same job they worked dai-
ly. There were several other employees, like Scott, who
worked overtime during the regular workdays. After May
22, 1974, an examination of the work records reveals, the
other employees continued to work overtime during their
regular workdays but that, as a practice, Scott did not.
Scott did, however , receive some overtime , mostly on other
days. It is clear from a comparison of the records that the
overtime work performed by Scott was cut back.
The Respondent contends in effect that it did not dis-
criminate against Scott in the assignment of overtime. The
Respondent contends in effect that it cut back the unlimit-
ed assignment of overtime to all the employees. The facts
do not support the Respondent's contentions. The other
employees continued in the same pattern of overtime for a
substantial period of time after May 22, 1974. Scott's over-
time work was clearly reduced.
As indicated later herein, Foreman Daugherty ques-
tioned Scott on May 23, 1974, as to why he had joined the
Union and Daugherty announced a cut in Scott's wages.
The evidence reveals that later, after May 22, 1974, on
occasion, Scott was offered some overtime work in the
welding shop (not the machine shop) and turned the same
down. Scott testified, in effect, that the reduction in over-
time in the machine shop resulted in his having to make
other plans to aid his income. The offer of some overtime
work in the welding shop does not negate the discrimina-
tion in the assignment of work as revealed otherwise .6
Considering all of the foregoing, the timing of Scott's
union activity, the reduction of overtime, the Respondent's
knowledge of Scott's union activity, and the evidence as to
animus set forth before and hereinafter , I am persuaded
that the preponderance of the evidence reveals that the
Respondent discriminatorily reduced the assignment of ov-
ertime work to Scott because of his union activity. Such
conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
As indicated, on May 23, 1974, Foreman Daugherty had
another conversation with Scott. The conversation took
place in Daugherty's office. Daugherty asked Scott why he
(Scott) had joined the Union. Scott told Daugherty that he
was mad because the Company would not replace some
tools that had been stolen from him. Daugherty told Scott
that his wages (machine shop) were being reduced from
$4.24 per hour to $3.78 per hour. It should be noted at this
point that, although Scott was not told anything about his
welding wages, the next time Scott performed welding
work his wages were reduced from $4.81 to $4 per hour for
welding.
Daugherty spoke to Scott about all of the things the
Company had done for him, schools and training.
Scott had another conversation with Daugherty on May
23, 1974. In this conversation, Scott asked Daugherty
whether he would get his wages back if he got out of the
6 If Scott worked elsewhere at such times , the earnings for such other
work constitute a matter to be considered as possible offset in backpay
computations If not, the declination of overtime work in the welding shop
can be considered in the compliance stage as possible offset for backpay
purposes
Union. Daugherty told Scott that he didn't know, that he
(Scott) would have to talk to Plant Manager Danielson.
Later, on May 29, 1974, Scott spoke to Plant Manager
Danielson and told him that he had made a mistake in
joining the Union. Danielson told Scott that he knew this.
Scott asked if he would get his wages back if he got out of
the Union. Danielson told Scott that he was drafting a
withdrawal letter for employees to submit to the Union.
Scott told Danielson that he had already submitted his res-
ignation to the Union and showed Danielson a copy of
such letter. Danielson told Scott that he would have to earn
his wages back, could perhaps do so in 6 months, that it
had been like a slap in the face when Scott had joined the
Union, that Scott was not worth the $4.24-per-hour rate,
and that the raises had been given as an incentive for him
to do better work. Danielson spoke to Scott about what the
Company had done for him, schools and training. Scott
asked if the training would continue and was told that it
would.7
Danielson also told Scott that another employee had
been up for a 50-cent raise but would not get such raise
because he had joined the Union.'
The General Counsel contends that the Respondent dis-
criminatorily reduced Scott's wages because he had joined
the Union. The Respondent contends that Scott's wages
were reduced because the increases had been given him,
not as merit, but as incentive to do better work, and to help
him with his personal problems. It is sufficient to say that I
do not credit Danielson's and Daugherty's testimony in
such regard and to the effect that his work was poor.
Considering all of the foregoing, I am persuaded and
conclude and find that the Respondent discriminatorily re-
duced the wages of Scott (both in the machine shop and in
welding) because of his union membership. I find it hard to
believe and don't believe that the raises given to Scott be-
fore May 23, 1974, were given to him in a charitable mood.
The evidence as to the timing of union activity and the
wage reductions, the overtime reduction, the remarks by
Daugherty and Danielson concerning the Union,
Danielson's remarks about not giving another employee a
raise because of his union activity, and Daugherty's re-
sponse to see Danielson about a possible regaining of wag-
es, all clearly persuade that the reduction in Scott's wages
was because of his union activity. Such conduct is violative
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. It is so concluded.
Considering all of the above, the interrogation of Scott
as to why he had joined the Union occurred in a manner
constituting interference with, restraint, and coercion with-
in the meaning of the Act. Such conduct is violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is so concluded and found.
Considering all of the foregoing, I am persuaded and
conclude and find that the Respondent, by Danielson, so-
licited and encouraged employees to withdraw from the
Union. Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. It is so concluded and found.9
7 1 discredit Danielson 's denial that he referred to drafting a letter of
withdrawal from the Union Scott's testimony on this point had more of a
rtn5g of truth than did Danielson's
There was evidence of discussion of what the Company would do con-
cerning a "closed shop ." It will be discussed later herein.
9 Such solicitation and encouragement was not necessary in Scott's case.
STAR MANUFACTURING CO.
D. Promise of Benefits; Threats; Loss of Benefits
The General Counsel alleges and the Respondent denies
that on or about May 29 , 1974, Respondent , by Jim Dan-
ielson , made promise of benefits and threatened the loss of
benefits to an employee in order to discourage employees'
union membership in, and activities on behalf of , the labor
organization (involved in this proceeding).
The facts relating to this allegation are the facts set forth
in section C above relating to the conversation between
Danielson and Scott . The facts are clear that Danielson
threatened the loss of benefits to employees in such conver-
sation . Thus, Danielson made it clear to Scott that he had
lost benefits because he joined the Union. Danielson also
made it clear that another employee had lost a 50-cent
raise because he had joined the Union . By implication,
Danielson 's remarks about the raises to Scott not having
been earned , coupled with his remarks about Scott's having
joined the Union as being a slap in the face , and the threats
of loss of benefits amounted to an implied promise of ben-
efits to employees who did not support the Union. Such
conduct , promises of benefits , and threats of loss of bene-
fits, depending upon the employee 's union activity or lack
thereof , constitutes conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
E. Alleged Threat To Close the Plant
The General Counsel alleges and the Respondent denies
that (1) "On or about May 29, 1974, Respondent, by Jim
Danielson , threatened its employees that Respondent
would close its Carpentersville facility in order to discour-
age their union membership in, and activities on behalf of,
the labor organization , (in this proceeding)," and that (2)
"In or about May 1974, the exact date being unknown to
the Regional Director, Respondent , by William Kennedy,
threatened its employees that Respondent would close its
Carpentersville facility in order to discourage their union
membership in, and activities on behalf of, the labor orga-
nization (in this proceeding)."
The General Counsel 's evidence relating to the above
allegation concerning Danielson consists of the testimony
of Scott . The General Counsel's evidence relating to the
above allegation concerning Kennedy consists of the testi-
mony of Hayden.
Both witnesses testified to the effect that the
Respondent's official's remarks were to the effect that Re-
spondent would close the doors before agreeing to a
"closed shop." Although contractual provisions providing
for union security are lawful, provisions providing for a
closed shop are unlawful. Accordingly, even if such re-
marks were made , I would not find that statements to the
effect that the Respondent would close its doors before
agreeing to an unlawful provision constitute unlawful con-
duct. Accordingly, such allegations of unlawful conduct
shall be recommended to be dismissed.
The Respondent 's unfair labor practices had already set the stage for Scott's
withdrawal . Danielson 's solicitation and encouragement resulted in Scott's
showing Danielson his letter of withdrawal.
F. The Refusal To Bargain
587
As has been indicated in section B, the Union has been
the certified bargaining representative of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit of the employing enterprise
since 1942. Since such time the Union and the employing
enterprise have been in contractual relationship. The latest
collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and
the Respondent provided that the agreement would be in
effect from September 1, 1971, to September 1, 1974,
would be automatically renewable for successive 1-year pe-
riods unless-at least 60 days prior to September 1, 1974,
or any anniversary thereafter-either party gave written
notice to the other party of a desire to terminate the agree-
ment.
On June 10, 1974, Frank Haderly, business representa-
tive for the Union, by letter to Robert Matz (secretary of
Respondent) requested the latest weighted plant average of
the production and maintenance unit and hourly cost of
each fringe benefit for use in preparation for the "coming
negotiations." 10 Haderly, by letter to Matz, gave notice to
the Respondent of termination of the current agreement at
the expiration date and gave notice of readiness for negoti-
ations for a new contract.
On June 17, 1974, Frank Hayden, the union steward,
filed a grievance with the Respondent on behalf of an em-
ployee named Ervin Holtz. Thereafter, on June 18, 1974,
President Ward called Hayden into his office and told him
in effect that he wanted him to furnish written authoriza-
tion from the Union to the effect that Hayden was author-
ized to sign grievances. Hayden told Ward that this would
be no problem.ll
For many years and until mid-1973, the union steward
had been a man named Weinke. Around mid-1973, Hay-
den became the union steward. There is no evidence that
prior to June 18, 1974, the Respondent had ever required
formal notification from the Union as to who was union
steward. Further, it is clear that the Respondent was aware
that Weinke retired in mid-1973 and that from such time
until June 18, 1974, Respondent made no request for for-
mal notification of the new steward. Thus, even though the
record reveals that Ward had heard from other employees
that Hayden was the union steward, the Respondent made
no request for formal notification thereto until June 18,
1974.
On June 18, 1974, the same day that Ward had requested
Hayden to secure formal notification of his status, Vice
President Johnson replied to the Union's June 11, 1974,
letter. Johnson referred to the Union's letter relating to the
expiration of the contract and, pursuant to provisions in
the contract, requested that the Union, by June 25, 1974,
10 Such information as requested was never provided. The General Coun-
sel, however , does not allege that the Respondent has violated Sec. 8(a)(5)
and (I) by failure to provide such information.
11 Ward credibly testified to the effect that after receiving notification of
the June 3 , 1974, unfair labor practice charges he started checking on the
number of people on dues checkoff , that he had not asked for a list of
union officers before he did because he and the Union had had a good
relationship and no problems . It is clear that the filing of the June 3, 1974,
charges triggered the Respondent's checking of those on dues checkoff, and
the request for formal notification of who was the union steward , who were
officers of the Union, and who were members of the Union.
588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
furnish the Respondent a notarized list of current union
members by the contract.
On June 24, 1974, President Ward , by memorandum,
informed Union Steward Hayden , with reference to
Holtz' grievance , that he had asked him for written notice
from the Union as to Hayden 's authority and as to the
officers , that he had received nothing to date , and that he
was holding Holtz' grievance until he got such letter from
the Union.
Hayden later contacted Union Representative Haderly
and told him of the problem concerning Respondent's rec-
ognition of him as the union steward . Around July 8 or 9,
1974, Haderly contacted Matz , Respondent 's secretary,
and informed him that Hayden was the Union 's steward.
Matz requested that this be given him in writing . On July 9,
1974, Haderly sent the Respondent a letter to the effect
that Hayden was the selected union steward.
In the meantime , on July 8 , 1974, the Respondent, by
Matz , sent a letter to the Union with a copy of its June 18,
1974, letter . In effect , the Respondent reiterated its request
for a notarized list of the current union members . The Re-
spondent set forth that it had not received a reply to its
June 18 , 1974, letter , and would appreciate a reply so that
an agreeable date could be scheduled concerning the expir-
ing labor contract.12
On July 11, 1974, Union Representative Haderly went to
Respondent's office and spoke to Matz , Respondent's sec-
retary. During this meeting Matz reiterated the
Respondent's request for a list of the Union 's current
members . Haderly countered by telling Matz that he want-
ed certain data concerning pension rights . Haderly then
told Matz that he would furnish the list of union members
when the Respondent furnished the pension data . Haderly
told Matz in effect that the provisions concerning the list of
union members and pension data had been in the contract
for years and that neither of the parties had insisted upon
the same . Matz told Haderly in effect that the pension data
was there, was available , but his instructions were to obtain
a written list of union members.13
Haderly and Matz discussed a proposed meeting date.
Haderly expressed a desire to meet in the morning but
agreed with Matz for a meeting to be held on July 18, 1974,
at 4:30 p .m. in the company offices.
On July 12, 1974, Matz telephoned Haderly and told him
that the July 18, 1974, meeting had to be canceled because
President Ward would be out of town on July 18, 1974,
that he would call him later about a new date. 4
12 As President Ward pointed out in his testimony , the Respondent never
referred to "negotiations" only to "meetings."
13 The pension agreement provided for a written report to be furnished
annually to the Union. I credit Matz' testimony to the effect as indicated
Considering the "written " report aspects of the pension agreement, I am
persuaded that both Matz and Haderly construed that the Respondent was
withholding such report contingent upon receipt of the written list of union
members.
14 The General Counsel pursued a line of questioning of witnesses appar-
ently designed to elicit answers to establish an inference that Matz had
intentionally set a date for a meeting that would have to be canceled, that
Ward did not have a medical examination on July 18, 1974, at the Mayo
Clinic, or that the medical examination was scheduled as a pretext for can-
celing the July 18, 1974, scheduled meeting . It is sufficient to say that the
evidence is insufficient to establish such point.
On July 15, 1974, Haderly went to Respondent's facility
and spoke to Matz in the latter's office. Haderly gave Matz
a copy of the Union's proposals concerning a new contract,
told him to study them and to call him about a date for a
meeting . Matz told Haderly that he would do so. Around
this time President Ward came into the office where Had-
erly and Matz were speaking. Matz told Ward about the
receipt of the Union's contract proposals. Ward told Had-
erly that Frank Zaborek had an unfair labor practice
charge against the Respondent, that this was costing the
Respondent money, and the Respondent had to hire attor-
neys now. Ward told Haderly that he should talk to Zabo-
rek and get him to drop his charge, that they could then set
up meetings.ls
Ward also repeated the Respondent's request for a list of
the current union members and for a list of union officials.
Haderly told Ward and Matz that he had a problem of
getting the list of members, that he had to wait for help
from a person who worked at another plant.16
On the same date the Respondent, by President Ward,
transmitted a letter to the Union. By such letter the Re-
spondent returned the Union's contract proposals and in
effect reiterated its request for a list of the Union's current
members.
On July 19, 1974, the Respondent, by letter from Ward,
reiterated in effect to the Union its request for a list of the
current union members and a desire to schedule a meeting
(after receipt of such list)."
On July 30, 1974, Haderly telephoned Ward. During the
ensuing conversation Haderly told Ward that he would not
get a list of the union members, and Ward told Haderly
that there would be no meetings until he received a list of
union members.18 Haderly, in answer to a leading question,
timed this last event as occurring on August 5, 1974. I cred-
it Ward's testimony fixing the time on July 30, 1974.
This July 30, 1974, conversation was the last significant
event that occurred concerning the refusal-to-bargain is-
15 1 credit Haderly's testimony concerning the remarks concerning Zabo-
rek and the unfair labor practice charges Ward denied making such request
on direct examination Considering the leading nature of the questions
asked Ward and Ward's answers concerning the issue on cross-examination,
I find Haderly's testimony more complete, frank, and forthright on such
issue and so credit the facts.
16 Respondent's letter of July 19, 1974, sets forth in effect a claim that
Haderly promised to furnish a list of the union membership by July 18,
1974. No evidence was adduced to such effect as to the events at the meet-
ing on July 15, 1974. Haderly denies discussion of the union membership
lists on July 15, 1974. Considering his total testimony on direct and cross,
Ward's and Matz' testimony, the exhibits, and logical consistency of facts, I
credit the composite testimony of Ward and Matz to the facts as set forth
As to part of Haderly's testimony, I found him to be unobjective and at-
tempting to build a case . However, considering the totality of the evidence,
I am persuaded that Haderly had not specifically promised to furnish a list
of union members by July 18, 1974. Further, I am persuaded that the refer-
ence to such promise in Respondent 's July 19, 1974, letter was self-serving
and set forth to justify in part Respondent's intended refusal to meet with
the Union
17 As noted previously, Ward in his testimony pointed out that he always
used the word "meeting" and not "negotiations "
Is Haderly testified to other attempts to talk to Ward and Matz over the
telephone It is sufficient to say that I credit the composite effect of Ward's
and Matz' testimony to the effect that they did not try to avoid conversa-
tions with Haderly Haderly very well may have telephoned on an occasion
or two when both Ward and Matz were out of the office and been so told by
the receptionist
STAR MANUFACTURING CO.
sues . The Respondent concedes that it withdrew recogni-
tion of the Union on July 30, 1974, and contends that it did
so because it had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's
majority status.
Considering the issues encompassed in determination of
whether there has been a refusal to bargain, I find it proper
to summarize the effect of other evidence.
During the relevant period of time from June 18 through
July 30, 1974, the facts reveal that there were around 83 or
84 employees in the appropriate bargaining unit; that the
unit had increased in size from approximately 70 employ-
ees to around 83 or 84 in the past 2 years; that during the
year of 1972 there had been terminations of 288 employees
who had been employed in the bargaining unit; that during
the first 7 months of 1974 there had been terminations of
133 employees employed in the bargaining unit; that dur-
ing the life of the contract up to July 30, 1974, no formal
written grievance had been processed beyond the first step
of the grievance procedure; that the only two formal griev-
ances filed as of July 30, 1974, were filed in June 1974; that
the first-step dispositions of such grievances were unfavor-
able to the employees, and the Union did not pursue such
grievances via the grievance procedure thereafter; that a
formal grievance filed in August 1974 was processed simi-
larly; that Union Steward Hayden was not familiar with
how to properly process grievances ; that the Respondent's
general practice of overtime assignment was inconsistent
with the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement and
no grievances were filed; that an employee named Gaffga
had spoken to Respondent's officials in 1973 concerning
the procedure of how to get out of the Union;19 that on
June 18, 1974, Union Steward Hayden expressed opinions
to the effect that the Union was not up to date, was not a
strong union, and that he was going to get out at a proper
time before the expiration of the contract;20 that approxi-
mately 22 of the bargaining unit employees had authorized
the Respondent to check off their dues for the Union; that
in late July 1974 Respondent estimated that there were ap-
proximately 20 of its bargaining unit employees who were
members; and that Respondent erroneously believed its
records showed 19 of its bargaining unit employees who
were on checkoff.
G. The Union's Majority Status
As has been set forth, the Union has been the certified
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit since
1942. From 1942 to the date of the pertinent events in this
case, the Union has been in contractual relationship with
the employing enterprise. Such certified and contractual
status creates a presumption that a majority of the employ-
ees in the appropriate bargaining unit have designated and
continues to designate the Union as their collective-bar-
19 The evidence as to the discussions does not reveal that Gaffga ex-
pressed an interest in getting out of the Union, that he merely inquired
concerning the procedure . Even if Gaffga had expressed an interest in get-
ting out of the Union , such fact would not change the ultimate findings of
facts , conclusions , and recommendations in this case.
20 Hayden also told one of the Respondent 's officials that the Union was
going to try to get a closed shop if it signed up over half of the employees.
589
gaining agent. Such presumption can be overcome by (1)
proof that the Union does not enjoy the support of a ma-
jority of the employees in the appropriate unit, or (2) a
good-faith doubt of majority based upon objective criteria.
The facts in this case do not support either a finding (1)
that a majority of the employees do not support the Union,
or (2) that there existed a good-faith doubt of majority
status based upon objective criteria.
The facts reveal that there were 83 or 84 employees in
the appropriate collective-bargaining unit. There is direct
evidence that around 22 employees expressly revealed their
support of the Union by checkoff and union membership.
As to the other 62 employees, the evidence of employee
dissatisfaction is minimal and insignificant. The presump-
tion, under such circumstances, is that, absent expressions
of dissatisfaction or significant changes in the unit, a ma-
jority of the employees supported the Union. As to the
other 62 employees, the facts reveal that one employee
around 8 months preceding the events raised a question on
the procedure of how to get out of the Union, and another
employee (the union steward) expressed an opinion that
the Union was weak and that he was going to withdraw.
The evidence as to these two employees is too insignificant
to overcome the presumption of majority status. Nor does
the totality of the evidence, presented by the Respondent
as bearing upon the question of objective criteria, over-
come the presumption of majority status. Thus, an increase
in the size of the bargaining unit from 70 to 84 is an insig-
nificant factor. Similarly, the number of terminations of
employees on a yearly basis does not appear unusually
high. In the absence of employee expressions of dissatisfac-
tion, the evidence relating to the handling of grievances
offers no persuasive value as to the question of majority
status. The Union's failure to furnish the Respondent a list
of its current union members does not constitute evidence
of objective criteria to cast a good-faith doubt as to the
Union's majority status.21 Thus, at least the Respondent
would have to know that such list would reveal at least 16
to 19 members. Again the critical point is that under the
circumstances of this case, in the absence of expressed dis-
satisfaction of employees, the presumption of majority
from the Union's certified status prevails.
In sum, there is no evidence to reveal that a majority of
the employees in the appropriate unit did not support the
Union. Nor is there evidence of significant change or sig-
nificant employee dissatisfaction to reveal objective criteria
to overcome the presumption of majority status accorded
the Union by virtue of its certified and contractual status. 22
In sum, the Union is entitled to the presumption of ma-
jority status based upon its certification and contractual
status, and, accordingly is and has been at all times materi-
al herein the exclusive bargaining representative of the em-
ployees in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit.
H. Alleged Good-Faith Doubt
The General Counsel contends in effect that the Respon-
dent withdrew recognition from the Union on June 18,
21 Especially where the Respondent is engaging in unfair labor practices
as revealed in this case.
22 Terre!! Machine Company, 173 NLRB 1480 (1969)
590 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1974, and thereby has refused to bargain in good faith with
the Union since that date, and that the Respondent further
bargained in bad faith with the Union on July 15, 1974, by
conditioning bargaining upon the withdrawal of certain
unfair labor practices. The Respondent contends that it
withdrew recognition from the Union on July 30, 1974,
because of a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a
majority of the employees in the appropriate collective-
bargaining unit.
As to the question of whether the Respondent had a
good-faith doubt as to the Union's majority status on July
30, 1974, I find from a preponderance of the evidence that
the Respondent did not have a good-faith doubt of the
Union's majority status but in fact was bargaining in bad
faith and using as a pretext for doing so the Union's failure
to furnish a list of its current membership in accordance
with the current contract.
As has been indicated with reference to the question of
the Union's majority status, the facts do not reveal objec-
tive criteria upon which a good-faith doubt of the Union's
majority status can be based. The facts do not reveal that
the Respondent was aware of significant dissatisfaction
among the employees upon which to base a doubt that the
majority of the employees supported the Union. Dues
checkoffs and membership in the Union do not negate the
fact that employees who are not members of the Union
may desire the Union to be their representative. Absent
significant changes in the unit or evidence of dissatisfac-
tion among such employees, a doubt as to their desires is
not created. Such doubt is not created in this case. The
facts in this case, moreover, reveal that the Respondent has
engaged in unfair labor practices , including in part unlaw-
ful interrogation, discriminatory reduction of overtime and
wages of an employee because of his union beliefs, and
threats of loss of benefits and implied promises of benefits
to dissuade employee support of the Union. Such evidence
reveals a design to destroy and undermine union support.
Further, the Respondent's requests for written notification
of who was the union steward, lists of employees who were
union members, and lists of union officers, all occurred
after the Respondent became upset with the filing of unfair
labor practice charges.
Although the current contract accorded the Respondent
the right to receive a list of the current union members, no
legitimate need for the purpose of collective bargaining has
been shown. Thus, the objective criteria does not reveal a
basis for a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status.
Nor does the evidence reveal that the Respondent needed a
list of the union members for use in negotiation of a new
contract. Rather, considering the Respondent's unfair la-
bor practices and the foregoing, the evidence preponder-
ates for a finding that the Respondent was using its request
for a list of the union members as a pretextuous means to
avoid negotiations.
In sum, the preponderance of the evidence reveals that
the Respondent did not, on June 18, 1974, or any time
thereafter have a good-faith doubt as to the Union's major-
ity status but in fact was bargaining in bad faith.
1. Refusal To Bargain
The facts are clear that the Union requested negotiations
on June 11, 1974, and that the Respondent has refused to
meet and bargain with the Union since June 18, 1974, first
on the conditioning of "meeting" upon the receipt of a list
of current union members, and as of July 30, 1974, on the
basis of an alleged good-faith doubt of majority status.
As has been indicated, the facts do not reveal that the
Respondent had a good-faith doubt as to the Union's ma-
jority status on June 18, 1974, or any date thereafter. The
facts also reveal that the Respondent was engaged in con-
duct to destroy and undermine the Union and was using
the request for and failure to receive a list of union mem-
bers as a pretext to refuse to bargain. Under such circum-
stances, it is clear that the Respondent has refused to bar-
gain in good faith with the Union since June 18, 1974.23
Such conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act. It is so concluded and found.
The facts also reveal that the Respondent, on July 15,
1974, conditioned further meetings upon the withdrawal of
unfair labor practice charges. Although the evidence re-
veals that the Respondent thereafter continued to request
the union list of union members before "meeting," such
evidence does not mean that the Respondent was indicat-
ing a willingness to bargain if such a list were received. As
indicated, Ward testified to the effect that he always used
the word "meeting" rather than "negotiate ." The overall
facts reveal that the Respondent had decided not to bar-
gain with the Union and was seeking information to justify
a refusal to bargain . Under such circumstances, the
Respondent's conditioning of meetings on July 15, 1974,
upon the withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges also
constitutes conduct violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. It is so concluded and found.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's op-
erations described in section I, above, have a close, inti-
mate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices, it will be recommended that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion to effectuate the policies of the Act.
23 As has been indicated , the contract accords the Respondent the right to
a list of the current union members . Its recourse to failure to receive such
list would appear to be by enforcement of the contract. If objective criteria
had existed to support a good- faith doubt of the Union's majority status, the
Respondent could have refused to bargain with the Union until there was
proper proof of majority status . Without a good-faith doubt , or proof of
lack of majority , the Respondent can not utilize such contract right to sup-
port its refusal to bargain.
STAR MANUFACTURING CO. 591
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily re-
duced the amount of overtime work assigned to Jim Scott
and that the Respondent discriminatorily reduced the wage
rates of Jim Scott, it will be recommended that the Respon-
dent make Jim Scott whole for loss of pay suffered as a
result of such discrimination.24
Having found that the Respondent has refused to bar-
gain collectively with the Union, it will be recommended
that the Respondent , upon request , bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of its employees in the ap-
propriate unit.
Because of the character and scope of the unfair labor
practices herein found , the recommended Order will pro-
vide that the Respondent cease and desist from in any
other manner interfering with , restraining, and coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in the case , I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star
Forge , Inc., the Respondent , is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Metal Polishers , Buffers , Platers , and Allied Workers
International Union, Local 74, AFL-CIO; District No.
122, International Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers , AFL-CIO; the Metal Trades Department
of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations ; Local No. 1600, International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers , Iron Shipbuilders, Black-
smiths , Forgers and Helpers; and Local No. 369, Interna-
tional Molders and Foundry Workers Union of North
America, each is, and has been at all times material herein,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By reducing the hours of overtime assigned to Jim
Scott and by reducing the rates of pay for Jim Scott, the
Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. At all times material herein , the following employees
at the Respondent 's facility at 2 East Main Street , Carpen-
tersville , Illinois , have constituted a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All factory employees employed by Respondent at its
Carpentersville, Illinois, facility, excluding office em-
ployees, company executives , shop clerks , foremen
and others in a supervisory position or in confidential
relations with management.
5. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and after
June 18 , 1974, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practic-
es within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
6. By the foregoing and by interfering with , restraining,
24 Scott is no longer an employee . Thus, the remedy will be limited as
indicated.
and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 25
Respondent, Star Manufacturing Company, Division of
Stare Forge, Inc., Carpentersville, Illinois, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
1J Cease and desist from:
(at) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union membership, activities, and sympathies.
(li) Threatening its employees with the loss of benefits
and',other reprisals in order to discourage employee mem-
bership in and support of any labor organization.
(c) Promising benefits to employees in order to discour-
age employee membership in and support of labor organi-
zations.
(4) Encouraging and soliciting employees to withdraw
their membership from labor organizations.
(e) Reducing the assignment of overtime to and the
wage rates of employees in order to discourage employee
me bership in and support of labor organizations.
(f) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, the
Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as the ex-
representative of the employees in the unit herein
found to be appropriate. The appropriate collective-bar-
gaining unit is:
All factory employees employed by Respondent at its
Carpentersville, Illinois, facility, excluding office em-
ployees, company executives, shop clerks, foremen,
and others in a supervisory position or in confidential
relations with management.
(g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing, its employees in the exercise of their rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that
such rights may be affected by lawful agreements in accord
with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain with the Metal Trades De-
partment of the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations as the exclusive represen-
tative of its employees in the unit herein found appropriate
and embody any understanding reached in a signed agree-
ment.
(b) Make Jim Scott whole for any loss of pay suffered
by reason of the discrimination against him with respect to
25 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes
592 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the reduction of overtime assignments and the reduction of
his wage rates.
(c) Preserve, and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms
of this recommended Order.
(d) Post at Respondent's place of business at Carpen-
tersville, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix.- 26 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by
26 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
the Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly
signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by
it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it here-
by is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices
not found herein.
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."