Stanley S. Oh, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 21, 2007
0120063168 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 21, 2007)

0120063168

09-21-2007

Stanley S. Oh, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Stanley S. Oh,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200631681

Hearing No. 340-2005-00415X

Agency No. 4F-900-0284-04

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's April 12, 2006 final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29

U.S.C. � 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS

the agency's final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked

as a Letter Carrier at the agency's Nat King Cole Station postal facility

in Los Angeles, California. On November 1, 2004, complainant filed an

EEO complaint alleging that he was discriminated against on the bases

of race (Asian) and age (61) when:

On August 23, 2004, complainant received a Notice of Termination during

probation from his part-time flexible (RTF) Letter Carrier position.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested

a hearing. Over complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case

granted the agency's motion for a decision without a hearing and issued

a decision without a hearing on April 3, 2006.

In his decision, the AJ found that complainant had failed to establish a

prima facie case of race or age discrimination. Specifically, while

complainant established that he was a member of protected classes

(complainant is Asian and over 40 years of age), complainant failed to

present evidence that other employees, not in his protected classes,

were treated better than he was under similar circumstances. The AJ

noted that the evidence shows that complainant's job performance was

unsatisfactory and that complainant had conduct issues as well, during his

probationary term. None of the employees identified by complainant were

similarly charged with poor performance and unacceptable behavior during

their probationary terms while serving in similar positions. Further,

the AJ noted that no material facts remained in dispute and drawing every

inference in complainant's favor, complainant failed to show that his age

or race motivated the agency's decision to terminate his employment.

The agency subsequently issued a final order on April 12, 2006, fully

implementing the AJ's decision and adopting the AJ's finding that

complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to discrimination as

alleged.

On appeal, complainant argues that his average route times were the same

or better than other part-time flexible carriers and again argues that

he approached his work with enthusiasm despite suffering from personal

challenges, including the death of his wife, during his probationary

term. Complainant argues that his supervisor commented that complainant

would not be able to do the work because he was getting too old when

comparable employees were thirty to forty years younger than he was.

Complainant requests that the Commission return the complaint for a

hearing before the AJ.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

In the instant case, we concur with the agency and the AJ that the

material facts are not in dispute. We further find that substantial

evidence supports the AJ's conclusion that no discrimination occurred

as alleged. Specifically, we note that complainant failed to identify

other similarly situated employees who, while serving a probationary

term, performed comparably to complainant's performance, who were not also

removed from their positions. We note that complainant's route times were

not the sole reason cited for complainant's failure to pass probation,

but that undisputed evidence showed that, unlike any of the identified

comparative employees, the agency received multiple complaints from

postal customers. We consider that complainant disputes the agency's

conclusions that his work was slower than other carriers, but even so,

we observe that the agency's decision to remove complainant was based

on his overall performance and his conduct which the agency found to

be below acceptable levels. We find no reason to disturb the AJ's

determination that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record including the arguments

raised on appeal, we AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no

discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 21, 2007

__________________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, the Commission has redesignated the instant

case with the above referenced appeal number.

??

??

??

??

2

0120063168

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

5

0120063168