Stanley Furnite Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 23, 1979

244 N.L.R.B. 589 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

STANLEY FURNITURE COMPANY
Stanley Furniture Company, Division of the Mead
Corporation and United Paperworkers International
Union, AFL-CIO. Case 5 CA 9716
August 23, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
ANt) PENtil.O
On April 19, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be-
low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Stanley
Furniture Company, Division of the Mead Corpora-
tion, Stanleytown. Virginia, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order, as so modified:
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. II is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr- Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
With respect to the Administrative Law Judge's finding of an 8(a) I) vi}-
lation as to Respondent's discriminatory enforcement of its bulletin board
rule, which we herein adopt, we rely only on the first portion of the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's rationale. Disparity of treatment between prounion
and other employee notices violates the Act. and we need not consider
whether disparity between employee prounion notices and Respondent's an-
tiunion ones also is a violation. The Order and notice are modified accord-
ingly.
2 The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently omitted citing Isis Plumh-
ing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 1962), fr the rationale for interest pay-
ments.
For the reasons set forth in Hickmoit Foods. Inc. 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
we find that a broad injunctive order as recommended by the Administrative
Law Judge is not arranted. Respondent, insofar as the record shows has
engaged in this single violation of Sec. 8(a)3) and two violations of Sec.
8(aX I). Since Respondent has not been shown to have a proclivity to violate
the Act" or to have engaged in "such egregious or widespread misconduct as
to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees' fundamental statutory
nghts." we find. under the facts of this case, that a narrow "in any like or
related manner" order will effectively protect those rights.
I. Substitute the following for paragraph l(c):
"(c) Discriminatorily enforcing its bulletin board
rule by immediately removing prounion notices while
permitting other employee notices to remain posted
for periods as long as 1 week."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph l(d):
"(d) In any' like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act."
3. Substitute the attached notice tor that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NoiI( I To EMil.OYui s
POSIEI) BY ORI)IR ()I 1111
NArIONA LABOR Ri.AIIi)NS BOARI)
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board, having found.
after a hearing, that we violated the law with respect
to the rights of our employees to engage in union
activities, has ordered us to post this notice. We in-
tend to abide by the following:
WL wl.l. NOT discourage membership in
United Paperworkers International Union.
AFL CIO, or in any other labor organization of
our employees, by discharging an5 of our em-
ployees because of their membership in, support.
or activities in favor of the above-named or any
other labor organization.
WE WIll. NoT maintain a plant rule prohibit-
ing union solicitation or distribution on the job.
WI: wl.l. N()I discriminatorily enforce our bul-
letin board rule by immediately removing pro-
union notices while permitting other employee
notices to remain posted for as long as I week.
Wi will. NT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE wILL offer Sharon Hall immediate and full
reinstatement to her former job, or, if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges, and w wii. make her
whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of
the discrimination against her, with interest.
SIANLEY FURNIIURE COMPANY. DIVISI()N
OF rtIE MFAD CORPORATION
DECISION
SIAIIM11NI ()1 1111 ASI
TiIOMAS A. RI((C'i. Administrative Law Jidge: A hearing
in this proceeding was held in Martinsville, Virginia, on
244 NLRB No. 96
589
DI)ECISIONS 01 NATIONAL LABOR REI.AIIONS BOARI)
February 13. 1979, on complaint of the General Counsel
against Stanley Furniture Company, Division of' the Mead
Corporation. here called Respondent or the Company. The
complaint issued on September 15, 1978, based upon a
charge filed on August 3, 1978, by United Paperworkers
International Union, AFILCIO. here called the Charging
Party or the Union. The principal issues of the case are
whether Respondent discharged Sharon Hall in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, and whether it committed other
coercive acts in violation of Section 8(a)( ). A brief' was
filed by the General Counsel after the close of the hearing.
Upon the entire record in the case and fromi my observa-
tion of the witnesses I make the following:
FINt)IN(S o)t FA(' I
I. tiF BUSINESS ()I RESPONI)ENI
Respondent is an Ohio corporation engaged in the manu-
facture and sale of furniture at its Stanleytown, Virginia,
facility. During the 12 months preceding issuance of the
complaint, a representative period, it sold and shipped from
this location products valued in excess of $50,000 to points
located outside the Commonwealth of Virginia. I find that
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. IIF L.ABOR OR(;ANI.AIlION INVO()IVD
I find that United Paperworkers International Union.
AFLCIO,. is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. rile UNFAIR ABOR PRA( I('S
A. A Picture ofthe (se
In spring 1978 an organizational campaign was carried
on by the Union among the approximately 400 employees
in this plant of Respondent. The Company was opposed to
such activities and passed that message to the employees by
posted notices and by management speeches to that effect.
Towards that end it also enforced a no-solicitation rule.
called too restrictive and therefore unlawful in the com-
plaint. Sharon Hall was a leading activist in the union
movement, and management had notice of that fact.
The plant was closed from July I through 9 for vacation
purposes. In the morning of Friday, June 30. while a group
of employees was having coffee in the cafeteria before the 7
a.m. work starting time Hall distributed 25 to 30 union
authorization cards among the employees, and she obtained
some signatures. She also told her supervisor, Nelson Stone.
that she had gone to the union meeting the night before.
and that she was fully supporting the Union. One of the
persons whom she solicited unsuccessfully was Barbara
Martin. A few days after the plant reopened on July 10. the
Company posted notices on all the bulletin boards through-
out the plant, telling the employees, among other things.
that a union was not necessary, that it would resort to all
legal means to keep it out, and that it would not "tolerate
union campaigning" which might interfere with work. On
'I hursday. July 13. the managers spoke to all the employees
in small assembled groups, explaining again the details of!
its posted antiunion notice. I'he next day. at the end of her
shift at 4 p.m. Hall was called to the office and, with no
advance notice, was summarily discharged.
I'he complaint says that Hall was dismissed because of
her union activities. )enying the charge. Respondent as-
serts that she was discharged for having violated company
rules. Proof of the misconduct thus attributed to Hall was
offered. on behalf of the ('ompany, via the testimony of'
Barbara Martin. a witness it called in defense. lall's stor\
conflicts with that of Martin: there is therefore presented a
direct question of credibility between the two did I all do
what Martin now says she did? But there is another ques-
tion of credibility of' even greater imlportanlce. Did the
Company ire her because, as Plant Manager Bob Flora
said. of what H1all did that day ift'she did it or did it send
her away for some other reason. a prohibited one? lHere
Flora's personal credibility is put in question not because
another witness gave him the lie as to what was in his mind.
but because his total testimony tends to discredit his final
assertion, whatever it ima bhe.
B. I'iolioI oSel ioS t()(l3)
The best place to start is with the testimons of( Martin.
the star witness in support of' the affirmative defense of' dis-
charge for cause. She said that at 9 a.m. n July 14. while
she was at work at her machine. Hall came to her from
about 60 feet away where Hall worked and said something
upsetting to her; Hall said something about "you tell Ocie
to keep her damn mouth off of Nancy": Martin refused.
and Hall repeated that Martin should do that. Whatever
these words were intended to refer to not clarified on the
record is of' no consequence in this case. What is clear is
that not even by the remotest hint did Martin suggest that
Hall was making any reference at all to the Union or to
union activity in any form. Martin went on to testify that
she came upset "because I just hate for anybody to interfere
with me when I'm working on my job, because I knew I
was there to do my job and that was it." The witness then
said that she repeated this to her immediate supervisor,
Ziegler. Somehow the word went higher up to Supervisor
Stone and then to the plant manager himself:
At 10 a.m. Martin was in Flora's office to tell him what
had happened: Stone was also present. "I just told them
what Sharon had said to me. and it had upset me . . . that I
just didn't like anyone to interfere with me whenever I was
doing my job . . . Because I just like to stay continuous on
my job and try to do the best I can." Flora told her that he
would think about it, and Martin went back to work.
At I p.m. Flora called her back to his office, and again
Stone was present. This conference, still according to Mar-
tin. "lasted approximately 30 minutes, I guess, him [Flora]
talking to me ... Bob and them was just asked me what she
[Hall] said to me and everything, and I told them." Martin
then wrote out a statement at Flora's request about what
had happened. It was received into evidence.
Hall's testimony is that after unsuccessfully soliciting
Martin's signature to a union card on June 30. she never
again mentioned the Union to her. Hall said that before 7
590
STANLt'Y FURNITUREI( COMPANY
a.m.. on the morning of July 14. while sitting at a table in
the cafeteria with Martin, she told her "... if you have anll
thing to say about her [Ocie]. to say it to her and not to bhe
talking about her to her friends . . ." and Martin responded
only with. "okay." Hall added that she never again spoke a
word to Martin.
We come to Flora's tcstirnony: he said many things. but
there is no way of making sense of them when put together.
At one point he said that all had violated company
rules "interference with fellow workers" [the language
from a printed company handbook]. lie said: "She was
bothering somebody else and keeping them from working."
Without rational explanation, at other points in his testi-
mony Flora reached into other areas. Asked "about whhat"
was Hall "bothering" Martin at work, he just said. "Union
activities." Flora also said that Hall's offense constituted a
violation of management's antiunion regulations publicized
only 3 days before the discharge which. in part, read: We
won't tolerate union campaigning, which results in a ne-
glect of work, or interference with work of others." But
Martin had reported nothing to anyone in management
about union activity by her, by lall. or by any body else.
and it is her testimony upon which Respondent relies to
justify the discharge. There was absolutely nothing in an5-
thing that Martin reported to the supervisors joining the
concept of work interference with the concept of unionism.
In fact, while recalling that Hall had invited her to a union
meeting some days before July 14. Martin repeated clearly
that Hall had not even mentioned the Union to her that
day. With this, the statement which Flora had Martin sign
at I o'clock that day becomes the determinative evidence of
illegal conduct in the case. Written in her own hand, it
reads as follows:
Friday July 14, 1978 at around 9 o'clock a.m. I was
harassed by Sharon Hall while I was on my job. She
came to my work station during working hours and
harassed me because I would not attend a union meet-
ing with her or would not sign a union card which she
gave to me.
Martin testified that she wrote this thing after Flora had
asked her "what she [Hall] said to me . . . and I told them."
Asked were the words she used her's or "somebody else's,"
she answered: "I asked Bob would they sound right if I
wrote it like that." How did the word "harass" get into her
statement? "Bob told me to put that, he told me to put in
that word." Finally. in the face of the assertion that Hall
was fired for interfering with another employee at work and
nothing more 5 days after the discharge (on July 19), the
personnel supervisor wrote on a report to the Virginia Em-
ployment Commission that the reason for the dismissal was
that an employee had reported that Hall "was harassing her
during worktime about not attending a meeting the night
before and for not signing a card...."
The finding is compelling that the statement Martin
wrote that day was dictated by Flora, conceived entirely by
Flora-unrelated to facts in any way-for the purpose of
creating a false basis to give colorable justification for an
intended unlawful discharge. It stands completely apart
from what Martin said had happened, indeed even from
what she repeatedly said that she told the supervisors. And.
incredibly. it conflicts completely with what Flora hinmlelf
testified was reported to him by the woman. With the lady
herself having written it and with Flora himself having used
it to defend the discharge, both of them as witnesses in this
case stand absolutely discredited. Where there is contlict
between their testimonies and those of other witnesses I do
not believe a word of' what the> said. I ind that Hall did
not go near Martin during work, and I ind that Flora never
for a moment thought that she did. Where. when. or how
Flora caused Martin to write thile statecent in question I
have no idea. Ihere is no credible proof that I all ever
"harassed" Martin when askinig her to sign a union card.'
The u ord w as put into Martin's mouth., or into her pen, by
the plant manager and proves nothing il truth. In fact, the
yer! use of her statement b Respondent to explain its rea-
son for the discharge could well constitute sufficient proof
that its real reason was to punish tHall for her union solici-
tation actis ities. The atteimpt to color her acti ities with the
ord "harass" is utterly unconvilicing.
The conclusion which I reach that Hlall's discharge was
part of Respondent's program to stitle union activity among
all the employees is further stregthened bh other relevant
considerations. While the plant rules say that a person is
subject to discharge if she misbehaves within 6 months of
her last recorded reprimand, the dismissal is not automatic
but is at the discretion of management. hall had been for-
mally reprimanded 2 months earlier but not for miscon-
duct. She had improperly lifted a load of stock her first da)
back on the job after a 10-day illness.
No investiga;tion was made to learn Hall's story about the
alleged incident upon which Respondent nov, rests to justi-
fy her discharge. The decision to let her go was made with
finality even before a word was spoken to her. ter advance
severance check was ready when she was called to the of-
fice, and when she immediatelx denied Flora's accusation
her denial was ignored without comment.
Finall 5. there is the unquestioned opposition of manage-
ment to an', form of union activity. Supervisor Stone kne\&
that she was a union ringleader: he did not appear as a
witness. I find that by discharging Hall Respondent vio-
lated Section (a)(3) of the Act.
('. 'iolfios of Section (a)()I
In Respondent handbook of employee rules of conduct
appears the following prohibition:
Solicitations-Except by permission of the Manage-
ment. there shall he no solicitation for membership in
or financial support of any funds or organizations on
the job. There shall be no distribution of literature of
any nature during working time except by written per-
mission of your supervisor.
As stated above, during the week of July 10 14. which
ended with the illegal discharge of Hall, the (Company
posted a special and prominent new set of rules aimed at
curbing the developing organizational campaign. One of
the restrictions set out there reads:
I Compare L R RB , Burnup and .ai,1 I,. 379 ' S. 21 (1964)
591
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Solicitations-Except by express permission of the
Management, there shall be no solicitation for mem-
bership in or financial support of any funds or organi-
zations on the job. There shall be no distribution of
literature of any nature during working hours except
by express written permission of your Supervisor.
I find, as alleged in the complaint, that each of these
limitations, in that they prohibit union solicitation "on the
job," was too restrictive in terms of Board law and therefore
coercive upon the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(I)
of the Act. As the Board said when commenting upon the
phrase "working hours" in a no-solicitation rule, such lan-
guage "is reasonably calculated to mean the employees are
prohibited from engaging in any form of union solicitation
or distribution of union literature from the time they 'clock
in,' or begin their work shift, until the time they 'clock out,'
or end their work shift." Essex International, Inc., 211
NLRB 749 (1974).
Respondent also maintains a discriminatory rule against
the posting of notices on the bulletin boards: in every de-
partment there are one or more such boards. As already
explained, during the week of Hall's discharge the Com-
pany posted its detailed antiunion printed notices on all
bulletin boards. In May. while the organizational campaign
was starting, Samuel Helten, an employee, wrote in long-
hand an invitation to all employees to support the Union
and to "vote union." He posted copies on five or six of the
bulletin boards: within 30 minutes all had been removed by
the supervisors.
Respondent's contention that because the employees
were prohibited at all times from posting notices of any
kind on the bulletin boards the prohibition revealed in this
case must be excused is unpersuasive. It is not true that
employees were prohibited from posting other kinds of no-
tices. Several employees testified, quite credibly, that all
kinds of notices were always posted-revival notices, re-
quests for car sales, notice of yard sales, and thank you
notes by employees who had received gestures of kindness
from fellow workers for one reason or another. Some of
these notices stayed on the boards for as long as I week
before they were taken off. Flora's attempted explanation
that thank you notes always involved an employee express-
ing gratitude to management for gifts management had
made to employees, I do not believe, if only because by the
time he was through he virtually admitted the contrary. In
any event, the disparate use of the bulletin boards to cam-
paign against the Union by the Company while simulta-
neously denying use of those boards to the employees for
their protected concerted activity suffices for finding an un-
fair labor practice in this case. See Liberty Nursing Homes.
Inc., 236 NLRB 456 (1978). 1 find that by prohibiting the
posting of union notices by its employees on the plant bul-
letin boards while itself utilizing those boards to post anti-
union notices Respondent violated and is violating Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTI('CIS UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set out in section III. above,
occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent
described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
CON(I ISIONS ()F LAW
I. By discharging Sharon Hall Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. By the foregoing conduct, by maintaining a plant rule
which prohibits union solicitation and distribution "on the
job." and b discriminatorily enforcing a rule against the
posting of prounion notices on the plant bulletin boards
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( 1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact. conclusions of law.
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I issue the following recommended:
ORDER2
The Respondent, Stanley Furniture Company. Division
of the Mead Corporation, Stanleytown, Virginia, its offi-
cers, agents. successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in United Paperworkers
International Union. AFL-CIO. or any other labor organi-
zation of its employees by discharging employees or other-
wise discriminating against them in their employment con-
dition because of their membership in or activities on behalf
of the above named or any other labor organization.
(b) Maintaining a plant rule which prohibits union so-
licitation and distribution on the job.
(c) Discriminatorily enforcing a plant rule against the
posting of prounion notices on the plant bulletin boards by
employees while Respondent itself posts antiunion notices.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the rights to self-or-
ganization, to from, join, or assist the above-named labor
organization or any other labor organization. to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Sharon Hall immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights and privileges. and make her whole
2 In the event no eceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
findings. conclusions. and Order, and all objections thereto shall he deemed
waived for all purposes.
592
STANLEY FURNITURE COMPANY
for any loss of pay or benefits she may have suffered by
reason of Respondent's discrimination against her, with in-
terest thereon to be computed in the manner proscribed in
I .W oolworth ('otpatl'. 90 NLRB 289 (1950). and Flor-
ida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 661 (1977).
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents. for examination and copying. all pay-
roll records, social security payment records. timecards.
personnel records and reports. and all other records neces-
sary or appropriate to analyze the amount of backpa due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Stanleytown, Virginia. copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said
' in the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a nited States
court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted hb Order of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 5. after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and he maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered. defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in rit-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board "
593