Standard Register Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 1988

288 N.L.R.B. 1409 (N.L.R.B. 1988)

STANDARD REGISTER CO 1409
Standard Register Company and Dayton Typo-
graphical Union No. 57, an affiliate of Commu-
nications Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case
9-CA-24286
May 31, 1988
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND
CRACRAFT
On December 9, 1987, Administrative Law
Judge Thomas A. Ricci issued the attached deci-
sion. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, and the Charging Party filed an an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority- in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions 2 and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified.3
The judge found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by insisting to
impasse on a contract proposal altering the descrip-
tion of the bargaining unit. We agree for the rea-
sons that follow.
The Respondent and the Union were parties to a
series of collective-bargaining agreements, the most
recent of which expired on February 28, 1986.
That agreement provided in relevant part:
The Employer hereby recognizes the Union
as the exclusive bargaining representative of
all employees covered by this agreement. The
words "employee" and "employees" when
used in this contract apply to journeymen and
apprentices.
. . . .
Jurisdiction of the Union and the appropri-
ate unit for collective-bargaining is defined as
including all composing room work and in-
cludes classifications such as: Hand composi-
tors; typesetting machine operators . . . . [List
of other job classifications omitted.]
On February 18, 1986, the parties commenced
bargaining for a new contract. Twenty-one negoti-
I The judge failed to make any specific findings regarding the 8(a)(5)
allegation of the complaint that the Respondent unlawfully implemented
its entire final offer, although the judge discussed the Issue in the remedy
section of his decision In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt
this aspect of the judge's decision.
2 We specifically disavow the discussion contained in the remedy sec-
tion of the judge's decision concerning the filing of a unit clarification
petition to redefine the bargaining unit
3 The judge's recommended Order and notice have been modified to
conform with the violation found, as alleged in the complaint
ation sessions were conducted during a 14-month
period. At the first session the Respondent submit-
ted to the Union its bargaining proposals, which in-
cluded the following provisions:
ARTICLE II—RECOGNITION
2.1 The Employer hereby recognizes the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of all employees covered by this Agree-
ment. The words "employee" and "employ-
ees" when used in this contract apply to jour-
neymen and apprentices.
ARTICLE III—JURISDICTION
3.1 The jurisdiction of the Union is defined as
the work assigned by the Employer to the
Composing and Markup and Proof Reading
Departments.
The Respondent insisted throughout the negotia-
tions that its proposed jurisdiction clause be includ-
ed in a new contract in place of the established ju-
risdiction-unit language contained in the parties' ex-
pired collective-bargaining agreement.
The Respondent took the position that it needed
flexibility in assigning work and equipment. The
stated purpose of the proposal was to give the Re-
spondent flexibility to assign work to or reassign
work away from the bargaining unit employees.
In December 1986 the Union proposed a new
Unit-jurisdiction clause, which stated:
Jurisdiction of the Union begins with the
mark-up and preparation of copy and contin-
ues until the material is ready for the printing
press (except for the making of plates and
offset preparatory work), and the appropriate
collective bargaining unit conists of , all em- _
ployees performing such work.
The Respondent rejected the Union's proposal be-
cause it did not want to combine the assignment of
work with the description of the bargaining unit.
Norman Young, the Respondent's vice president of
industrial relations and principal collective-bargain-
ing spokesman, testified that "all along we've had a
problem of combining the assignment of work with
the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. We've
repeatedly told the [U]nion throughout the negotia-
tions that we saw those as two different subjects."
In February 1987, the Union withdrew its juris-
diction-unit proposal and insisted on the jurisdic-
tion-unit clause contained in the expired contract.
The Respondent declared impasse on April 21,
1987. Both parties testified that the jurisdiction-unit
issue was the major obstacle to reaching an agree-
ment. The Respondent implemented its final offer,
including the jurisdiction-unit provision, on April
288 NLRB No. 150
1410 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
26, 1987. At the time of the hearing, the Respond-
ent had not reassigned any work pursuant to its ju-
risdiction proposal. However, the Respondent con-
ceded that the proposal gives it the right "tomor-
row" to take work away from the composing room
for any reason.
Although the pertinent section of the contract is
entitled "Jurisdiction," we find, contrary to the Re-
spondent's contention, that the parties bargained to
impasse over the unit description and not work ju-
risdiction alone. The Respondent's impasse propos-
al deletes the appropriate unit language from the
existing jurisdiction-unit clause. Thus, the Respond-
ent's impasse proposal does not on its face include
a unit description. In its brief in support of excep-
tions, the Respondent argues, quoting the recogni-
tion clause (sec. 2.1) and the jurisdiction clause
(sec. 3.1) of the impasse proposal, that its impasse
proposal contains a unit description and that the
proposal did not change the unit description con-
tained in the expired agreement. This argument is
inconsistent with the position taken by the Re-
spondent throughout the negotiations that unit de-
scription and jurisdiction should not be defined in
the same 'clause.
In Columbia Tribune Publishing Co., 201 NLRB
538, 551 (1973), enfd. in relevant part 495 F.2d
1384 (8th Cir. 1974), the Board held that a union is
entitled to have a description of the appropriate
unit it represents incorporated into any contract
reached by the parties. In that case the respondent
was found to have precluded good-faith bargaining
by refusing to include the traditional jurisdiction-
unit clause of prior contracts. Both its asserted
need for flexibility in changing from hot to cold
type and the fact that jurisdiction and unit defini-
tion were combined in one clause were rejected as
defenses.
Assuming arguendo, as the Respondent contends,
that the impasse proposal does include a unit de-
scription, we reject the Respondent's assertion that
"[t]he unit employees described in both the prior
agreement and the impasse proposal are the em-
ployees in the composing and markup and proof
reading departments." We find that the language in
section 3.1 of the impasse proposal, if construed to
include a unit description, must reasonably be read
to define the unit as consisting of all employees
performing "work assigned by the Employer to the
Composing and Markup and Proof Reading De-
partments." Pursuant to the language of the im-
passe proposal, employees in the composing room
would not be in the unit if they are not assigned
work by the Respondent. Such a description repre-
sents a significant variation from the traditional
unit description that, as conceded by the Respond-
ent, included all employees in the composing and
markup and proofreading departments. The juris-
diction-unit clause proposed by the Respondent
would give the Respondent unfettered discretion to
redefine the unit at any time by changing the as-
signment of work.
In another newspaper industry case, Newspaper
Printing Corp., 232 NLRB 291 (1977), enfd. 625
F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 911
(1981), the Board found that a jurisdiction-unit pro-
posal that gave the employer unilateral control
over the scope of the unit was tantamount to a re-
fusal to include a unit description. The Board fur-
ther found that even if the proposed jurisdiction-
unit clause did not contain this fatal flaw because
the definition of an existing appropriate unit is not
a mandatory subject of bargaining, an employer
cannot lawfully insist to impasse on a modification
of the existing clause.4
Accordingly, we find under the rationale of Co-
lombia Tribune and Newspaper Printing that the Re-
spondent's insistence to impasse on its proposed ju-
risdiction-unit clause constituted a refusal to bar-
gain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.
Our determination is consistent with the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Newspaper Printing Corp. v.
NLRB, 692 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1982), denying enf.
250 NLRB 1144 (1980). In that case, the parties'
expired contract defined jurisdiction of the union
and appropriate unit for collective bargaining as in-
cluding "all composing room work." The court
concluded that the employer did not violate Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) when it bargained to impasse and sub-
sequently implemented its proposal defining juris-
diction and appropriate unit as including "all work
performed in the composing room."
In Newspaper Printing, the Sixth Circuit looked
beyond the wording of the unit description to de-
termine whether the unit described in the impasse
proposal was the same unit described in the expired
agreement. The court stated that if the language of
the impasse proposal submitted by the company
had not incorporated almost the identical language
of the expired agreement, it might be inclined to
hold that the Board could find a violation on the
face of the proposal. In the present case, the juris-
diction clause in the impasse proposal did not in-
corporate the language of the jurisdiction-unit
clause of the expired agreement. Most notably, the
4 In that case, the employer insisted to Impasse on modification of the
contract's jurisdiction-unit clause, which defined the appropriate bargain-
ing unit in terms of "all composing room work" to provide that the bar-
gaining unit Include "only those employees engaged in all work which
the Employer may from time to time designate to be performed in the
Composing Room."
STANDARD REGISTER Co. 1411
impasse proposal deletes the phrase "the appropri-
ate unit for collective bargaining is . . . ." Under
the court's analysis, it is unnecessary in this case to
look beyond the face of the impasse proposal to de-
termine whether the Respondent sought to change
the unit.
Upon examination of the record in Newspaper
Printing, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the em-
ployer had preserved the unit description in its im-
passe proposal while changing the work jurisdic-
tion clause about which it did have a right to bar-
gain to impasse. In so finding, the court focused on
the language contained in the impasse proposal
itself and stated (692 F.2d at 621):
By including the provision that "composing
room work shall include work performed in
the classifications of electronic technicians, Ad
Make-up machine operators, Paste Make-up
and all other composing room employees" the
proposal under challenge here is saved from
the fatal defect found by the Tenth Circuit in
Newspaper Printing Corp v. NLRB, 625 F.2d
956 (1980) Members remain "composing room
employees" and, thus, remain part of the unit
regardless of whether all of the work is trans-
ferred to editorial employees or elsewhere.
The impasse proposal in the subject case does not
contain similar saving language. Rather, as dis-
cussed above, the Respondent's proposal contains
the defect termed "fatal" by the Sixth Circuit: it
grants the Respondent "the right to change unilat-
erally the scope of the unit itself." 692 F.2d at 621.
For these reasons as well, we conclude that the
Respondent insisted to impasse on a contract pro-
posal altering the established unit description, a
nonmandatory subject of bargaining, in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Standard Register Company, Dayton,
Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.
1. Delete paragraphs 1(b) and 2(a) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(d).
"(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing
within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT insist to impasse in our bargaining
with Dayton Typographical Union No. 57, an affil-
iate of Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, upon inclusion of a contract proposal
altering the established bargaining unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with
Dayton Typographical Union No. 57, an affiliate of
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO
as the exclusive representative of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit as defined in the
most recent collective-bargaining agreement, with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement_
STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY
Damon W. Harrison Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel.
Donald C Henson, Esq. (Ford and Harrison), of Atlanta,
Georgia, for the Respondent.
Richard Rosenblatt, Esq., of Colorado Springs, Colorado,
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Administrative Law Judge. A hear-
ing was held in this proceeding on 6 October 1987 at
Dayton, Ohio, on complaint of the General Counsel
against Standard Register Company (the Respondent or
the Company). The Complaint issued on 22 June 1987,
on a charge filed on 7 May 1987, by Dayton Typo-
graphical Union No. 57, an affiliate of Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the Union or the
Charging Party). The question presented is whether the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by insist-
ing to impasse on a contract proposal that did not in-
volve a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and
by unilaterally implementing its final offer in contract
settlement including the particular clause in question.
Briefs were filed by all three parties after conclusion of
the hearing.
1412 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, an Ohio corporation, with an office
and place of business in Dayton, Ohio, is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of printed paper forms. During the
12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint in
the course of its business, it purchased and received at its
Dayton, Ohio facility products, goods, and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside
the State of Ohio. I find that the Respondent is an em-
ployer within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I fmd that Dayton Typographical Union No. 57, an af-
filiate of Communications Workers of America, AFL-
CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
This Union has for a number of years represented the
employees who work in what has long been referred to
as the Respondent's composing room. The group in-
cludes a number of diversified classifications of skilled
workmen From time to time over the years, as methods
of printing changed and new techniques evolved, the
classifications changed, and a number of skilled crafts
ceased to exist. Because of the many classes of employ-
ees, and the varying kinds of work performed in that
composing room, the unit description as set out in the
successive contracts between the parties kept changing.
In the last contract signed by the parties in 1983—due to
expire on 28 February 1986—the agreed-on unit descrip-
tion included the following paragraph.
Jurisdiction of the Union and the appropriate unit
for collective bargaining is defmed as including all
composing room work and includes classifications
such as: hand compositors; typsetting machine oper-
ators; makeup men; bank men; lockup and lineup
men; proofpress operators; proofreaders; machinists
for typsetting machines; operators and machinists
on all devices which cast or compose type, or slugs,
or compose type or film or sensitized paper; opera-
tors of tape perforating machines and recutter units
for use in composing or producing type; operators
of all phototypsetting machines (such as Fotosetter,
Pheton, Linofilm, Monophoto, Coxhead Liner, Fil-
motype, Typro, and Hadego); employees engaged
in proofing, waxing and paste-makeup with repro-
duction proofs, processing the product of phototyp-
setting machines, including development and
waxing; paste makeup of all type, hand-lettered, il-
lustrative, border and decorative material constitut-
ing a part of the copy; ruling; photo-proofmg; cor-
rection, alteration, and imposition of the paste-
makeup serving as the completed copy for the
camera used in the plate-making process. Paste-
makeup for the camera as used in this paragraph in-
eludes all photostats and prints used in offset or let-
terpress work and includes all photostats and posi-
tive proofs of illustrations (such as velox) where
positive proofs can be supplied without sacrifice of
quality or duplication of efforts. The Employer
shall make no other contract covering work as de-
scribed above, especially no contract using the
word "stripping" to cover any of the work above
mentioned.
On 18 February 1986, 10 days before that contract ex-
pired, the parties, as always in the past, started to bar-
gain for a new contract. They met, and discussed their
different demands for contract changes, at no less than
21 negotiation sessions, over a period of 14 months. The
last of those meetings was held on 21 April 1987, where
it was clear to all that an impasse had been reached. At
the close of that meeting the Company told the union
agents it would implement its last bffer and the next day
it did that.
The complaint, issued 2 months later, alleges that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by such
unilateral action because there was in its last offer one
clause, among the many that had been exhaustively dis-
cussed, which pertained to description of the bargaining
unit, a subject on which the Union was not obligated
either to discuss or to accept.'
At the first bargaining session, on 18 February 1986,
the Company proposed a new unit description for the
new contract to take the place of the old one, the one set
out here above. The Company's proposal was stated in
the following language:
The jurisdiction of the Union is defmed as the work
assigned by the Employer to the composing and
Markup and Proof Reading Departments.
Throughout all the bargaining that followed the Re-
spondent never relented from its insistence that that
clause be included in a new contract in place of the old
unit description. Its publicized announcement to the em-
ployees in April 1987 was that the new working condi-
tions, precisely spelled out in its last offer refused by the
Union, was to include that clause. Actually, during the
entire 6 months between that day and the time of the
hearing in this case in October 1987, there was no
change in the conditions of employment based on that
contract clause or in the Union's representation status in
consequence of that new contract language. No work of
any kind was removed from the coverage of the bargain-
ing unit, and no employees were denied work. Also, no
new work was added to that performed by the bargain-
ing unit. Insofar as the bargaining unit description affect-
ed the contract or the Union's representative status is
concerned, no change has taken place.
The Respondent defends on the ground that its pro-
posed language did not affect the bargaining unit, or at-
tempt to alter it in any way. It asserts instead that all it
touched on was the question of union jurisdiction. From
See Newspaper Printing Corp, 232 NLRB 291 (1977); Bozzuto's, Inc.,
277 NLRB 977 (1985).
STANDARD REGISTER CO. 1413
the testimony of Norman Young, the Respondent's prin-
cipal spokesman throughout the meetings: "I specifically
stated we were not trying to change definition of the
bargaining unit, but only, and the word only is under-
lined, the work jurisdiction. . . we said we don't want
to change the bargaining unit definition, only the defini-
tion of jurisdiction itself." This was no more than a play
on words, a conclusionary statement at variance from
the facts.
Young also testified as follows: "The purpose of our
proposal was very simple, that we were going to attempt
to regain, through these negotiations, the right to decide
what work was going to perform by—be performed by
employees in this bargaining unit; that we wanted, as
clearly stated in that proposal as far as I'm concerned,
the right to assign work to them or re-assign work away
from them, as the case may be." "We wanted to be re-
lieved of those restrictions and have the ability to assign
the work as we deemed necessary, and, particularly,
when it would relate to and result in efficiencies or eco-
nomics . . . they [the Union representatives] were just
interested in preventing us from taking work away from
their—the employees they represent."
Continuing his testimony Young then commented on a
proposal to alter the unit description, offered during the
bargaining sessions by the Union in an effort to settle the
disagreement between the parties. This was a proposal
that later during the bargaining sessions the Union with-
drew. Again, from Young's testimony: "It would totally
have tied our hands and we would have not—we would
not have been able to re-assign any of that work that
was performed, had we agreed to this proposal. . . . we
responded that we had considered the proposal, although
it was substantially simplified compared to what we had,
that it fell short of the company goal, which was to
maintain our right to assign or re-assign work in that unit
. . . . We reiterated it was a diminishing work force, a
dying trade, we can't have our rights restricted, we want
the right to assign work as the—as we feel is appropri-
ate."
John Speranza, the plant manager, gave like testimony:
Q. That [the Company's proposal] gives the em-
ployer the discretion to decide, at any time, where
that work is going to be performed, is that correct?
A. That's correct.. . .
Q. So, under this proposal that you've now im-
plemented, it would give you the right tomorrow to
take it away if that's what you desire to do?
A. If it were economically and efficiently and ef-
fectively, yes.
Clearly the Respondent insisted throughout the bar-
gaining that it had a right to take work out of the bar-
gaining unit and have it performed elsewhere, by em-
ployees not represented by the Union, i.e., outside the es-
tablished bargaining unit. I find that by insisting to the
point of impasse on such a modification of the contract
with the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Given the technological changes that have altered the
character of the printing industry in recent years, it is
equally clear that the unit description of the employees
appropriately to be represented by the Typographical
Union (Communications Workers of America) presents a
difficult problem. This is the question that separated the
parties during the bargaining in this case. The Respond-
ent had a right to ask that the unit description in the old
contract—four or five paragraphs in addition to the de-
tailed one set out above here—be brought into line with
the realities of today's production process in this indus-
try. There is no contradiction of the testimony that at
least 17 of the jobs specified in the old contract no
longer exist. For an employer to try to have the contract
bargaining unit description brought into line with the
present method of operations is a perfectly legal request
and understandable. Although it may not just take work
away from the unit employees, it may insist on a clarifi-
cation of the true bargaining unit_
In his brief the General Counsel asks that the Re-
spondent be ordered to cease and desist from insisting to
the point of impasse on changing the bargaining unit It
is a proper request. The Respondent has not in any way
put any such modification in effect. It told the employees
it would have a right to do that, but it has never hap-
pened—yet.2
But the General Counsel also asks—as a remedy for
that very limited unfair labor practice—that the Re-
spondent be ordered to cease giving effect to all those
other changes in employment conditions that were also
implemented following the general impasse reached by
the parties on 19 April 1987. Most of these changes had
been to the monetary advantage of the employees; only a
few were against their interests. The General Counsel
asks that the advantages—improvements in employment
conditions—be retained and continued to the benefit of
the employees, and that only the disadvantages be
stopped. What the position ignores is that by April 1987
the parties had exhausted the collective-bargaining proc-
ess as to all the proper subjects of negotiations—i.e., all
except that one question of unit description. Twenty-one
sessions over a period of 14 months is very extended bar-
gaining. How long must an employer keep talking before
it changes conditions the union refuses to accept? Al-
though there was frequent talking about the unit, or ju-
risdictional question—however put, most of the discus-
sions concerned matters of money, and all the regular
2 From the testimony of Paul Stewart, the president of the local union:
"Q. To date, has the company taken away work nom that bar-
gaming unit?. . .
THE WITNESS: I don't know that it has. I haven't heard of any,
since I don't work in the plant . . .
Q. Can we agree that you would have heard about It if work had
been taken away, Mr. Stewart?
A. Yes"
From the testimony of Speranza.
"Q. Since the beginning of this year, 1987, have there been any
changes in work assignment to the composing room employees?
A. No.
Q. Have any additional responsibilities or functions been added to
the department?
A. No."
1414 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
subjects of the proper collective-bargaining process. If,
for the moment, that question of the unit description be
ignored, this record warrants a finding that the parties
were really in agreement on all the other questions that
arose between them. The very fact that most of the
changes resulting from the Respondent putting its last
offer in effect were to the advantage of the employees
supports this appraisal of the record as a whole. I think it
clear that it was that one question—freedom to the em-
ployer to put work in or out of the bargaining unit—that
precipitated this whole case.
Asked was there an impasse on 19 April 1987 between
the parties as to all the regular subjects of collective bar-
gaining, the General Counsel equivocated. From his
statement on the record: "there was an impasse. It was
an impasse on—the General Counsel's position is that it
was an impasse over a permissive subject of bargaining
and, therefore, it was an improper or illegally based im-
passe. I'm not intending to say that there was not an im-
passe . . . There was an impasse, but the impasse was
reached because of a—on a permissive or nonmandatory
subject of bargaining . . . . That's General Counsel's es-
sential position, yes, your honor, that the impasse was
over that."
This position is supported by the testimony of Stewart,
who spoke for the Union, "On April 21 we reached im-
passe on the jurisdiction clause. . jurisdiction was the
sticky point, was the main problem we had."
And finally, that the Union was not unhappy with
what the Respondent had done in implementing its last
offer is shown by the further fact that the parties met
again later, on 12 June 1987, and bargained again, as the
General Counsel also said, "Bargaining even continued
into 1987, to April 21, and even a session, I believe, on
June 12 1987." There is no question, therefore, that
throughout that long period—from February 1986 into
June 1987—the Respondent in any way acted in bad
faith in its recognition of the Union as the established
bargaining agent. No question of representation exists
today.
I think, in the light of the special facts of this case,
that the remedy must be pinpointed exactly to the unfair
labor practice committed and found. The Respondent
must stop insisting to impasse on any modification of the
bargaining unit. It must not give effect to the clause it
insisted on with the Union. And, as there is no contract
in effect, and as the Union is still the statutory represent-
ative of the employees involved, it must now bargain in
good faith with the Union towards reaching an agreed-
on new contract.
The question of how to resolve the dispute about how
correctly to define the bargaining unit now that printing
techniques long used in a composing room have changed
radically still remains. There is a method, perfectly legal,
to put an end to that dispute between the parties. The
Company could, and I think should, file a unit clarifica-
tion petition with the Board. Section 102.60(b) of the
Board's Rules and Regulations reads as follows:
Petition for clarification of bargaining unit or peti-
tion for amendment of certification upon Section
9(b) of the Act; who may file; where to file; with-
drawal.—A petition for clarification of an existing
bargaining unit or a petition for amendment of certi-
fication, in the absence of a question concerning
representation, may be filed by a labor organization
or by an employer.
The very objective of this entire statute is, and has
always been, to help resolve labor disputes and to en-
courage the lawful procedures of collective bargaining in
the place of acrimonious quarrels that do damage to all
parties involved in labor disputes. This case fits squarely
into that proper objective.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations
of the Respondent, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.By insisting to impasse on a permissive and nonman-
datory contract provision in its negotiations with the
Union, the Respondent has violated and is violating Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) of the Act.
2. By informing its employees represented by the
Union that it intends to implement a modification of the
bargaining unit description in its contract with the estab-
lished bargaining agent, the Respondent has violated and
is violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
3.By such conduct the Respondent has violated and is
violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
eda
ORDER
The Respondent, Standard Register Company,
Dayton, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
/ 1. Cease and desist from
,(a) Insisting to the point of impasse in its bargaining
with the Union on inclusion in its contract with that
union of a clause altering the description of the bargain-
ing unit.
(b) Informing its employees represented by the Union
that it intends to implement a modification of the bar-
gaining unit description in its contract with their estab-
lished bargaining agent.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the 'exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findmgs, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
STANDARD REGISTER CO. 1415
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Inform its employees that it will not unilaterally
implement its proposal to their union that the Employer
have freedom to remove work from the scope of the es-
tablished bargaining unit or to add work to that unit.
(b) On request, bargain with Dayton Typographical
Union No. 57, affiliated with Communications Workers
of America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive representative of
its employees in the appropriate bargaining unit as de-
fmed in its most recent collective-bargaining agreement
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement
(c) Post at its Dayton, Ohio place of business copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."4 Copies of the
4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being signed by the Respondent's author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecu-
five days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."