Standard Oil Co. of California

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 343 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

STANDARD OIL COMPANY
Standard Oil Company of California , Westerns
Operations , Inc. and Oil , Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union , Richmond , Califor-
nia, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO. Case 20-CA-3663
June 30, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
FANNING, AND ZAGORIA
On November 2, 1966, Trial Examiner Marion
C. Ladwig issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that Respondent had not en-
gaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the
complaint and recommending that the complaint be
dismissed, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. Thereafter the General Counsel
and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Deci-
sion and supporting briefs, and Respondent filed a
reply brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The National Labor Relations Board has
reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire
record in the case, and finds merit in the exceptions.
Accordingly, the Board adopts the findings of the
Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are con-
sistent with the following.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent had
not violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to furnish
the Union a list of the unit employees' home ad-
dresses. In making this finding the Trial Examiner
noted that the General Counsel had made no effort
to prove bad faith on the part of Respondent, and he
concluded that the relevance of the requested infor-
mation to the Union's bargaining and contract ad-
ministration responsibilities had not been
established. We find, however, that the data sought
is relevant to the Union's performance of its func-
tion as collective-bargaining representative and that
Respondent's refusal to furnish the requested infor-
mation, was therefore unlawful. The reasons for our
disagreement with the Trial Examiner are set forth
below:
Respondent operates an oil refinery complex at
Richmond, California, which employs approximate-
ly 2,600 persons in an area covering 4 square miles
on San Francisco Bay. The Union is the bargaining
representative for a unit of production and main-
343
tenance employees in the manufacturing, purchase,
and stores departments of this complex, including
the San Pablo Tank Farm. The Union has occupied
this position since 1950.
The collective-bargaining agreement in effect at
the time of the events in question had no union-shop
clause, but did contain a maintenance-of-member-
ship provision which permitted members of the
Union to leave it during an annual 30-day "escape"
period.
The production and maintenance unit consists of
1,500 employees. Union membership therein has
varied: At the time of the hearing in this case ap-
proximately 50 percent of the unit employees were
members. Recently, Respondent has experienced
considerable personnel turnover in the unit. In 1965
it hired 155 new unit employees to fill job vacan-
cies. In 1966, to the date of the hearing in July, it
added 150 employees to the payroll, or at the rate
of approximately 20 new employees per month.
The refinery complex is composed of machinery
units, called "plants," which range in size from
operations requiring the oversight of a single person
to those attended by 400 employees.
Employees enter the refinery through four
guarded gates. Most of them come to work by au-
tomobile; many start their daily journey from points
in a five- or six-county area in the vicinity of the
plant.
New employees attend a number of orientation
meetings conducted by one of Respondent's labor
relations representatives. At these meetings infor-
mation concerning work rules, hours, wages,
benefits, and company history and policy is commu-
nicated to the employees. In addition, the represen-
tative makes a statement about the Union. He tells
them the Union's name, that there is a copy of the
collective-bargaining contract in the packet dis-
tributed to all new employees, that membership in
the Union is not a condition of employment, and
that employees will not receive any benefit or suffer
any detriment because of membership in the Union.
At one of the meetings new employees are exposed
more fully to Respondent's general outlook, includ-
ing its labor relations philosophy. At this time the
company representative reads the contents of a 23-
page booklet prepared by Respondent and entitled
"What We Believe." The -section on labor relations
states:
We sincerely believe that good employee
relations can be maintained and essential em-
ployee needs fulfilled through sound manage-
ment administration without the necessity of
employee organization and representation. We
respect an employee's right to present his
grievances, regardless of whether or not he is
represented by a labor organization. Whenever
a group of employees does desire organization
and representation, we are willing to discuss
with individual employees or with representa-
166 NLRB No. 45
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tives of the group any pertinent matters affect-
ing them. We are opposed to any provision
requiring that an individual either join or
refrain from joining any labor organization as
a condition of employment. We willingly ac-
cept the obligation to bargain with any bona
fide labor organization legally selected by the
employees as their agent, and we intend to
make every effort to maintain the best possible
relationship with the elected representatives of
a bargaining unit. In any agreement reached,
however, we feel management must retain the
rights and authorities necessary to direct and
control the Company's operations effectively
and efficiently.
New employees also receive, through the mail, a
50-page booklet, styled "You and Your Company,"
which contains several paragraphs under the head-
ing, "What about Unions." These paragraphs state,
inter alia:
... Your Company's wages, hours, and
working conditions are among the best in the
industry, and its employee relations policies
are designed to promote fair play and mutual
respect. Policies like these are essential for
43,000 people to work together effectively.
This also requires a great deal of cooperation
and understanding, and a healthy regard for the
rights of others.
As for union membership, it is your Com-
pany's belief that representation by an outside
organization is not necessary in order for em-
ployees to enjoy fair treatment and good work-
ing conditions. However, this is something that
all employees should decide for themselves
after careful consideration of all the facts.
While your Company recognizes your right to
join a union, it does not believe that you should
be forced to join a union as a condition of em-
ployment and is opposed to all forms of com-
pulsory unionism.
No part of the second booklet is read to em-
ployees at any of the orientation meetings. Regular
employees also hear Respondent's labor relations
philosophy in the course of annual training pro-
grams. The Union does not participate in the orien-
tation or training sessions.
Union access to unit employees has been pro-
vided to some extent by contract and to some ex-
tent by the Union's efforts. The recently expired
contract required Respondent to furnish seniority
lists to the Union "at reasonable times." This list
did not include home addresses of unit employees
and was supplied to the Union twice a year.
Although the effective dates on the lists were
January 15 and July 15, the lists have not actually
been available to the Union until 1 to 6 months after
their compilation. The longest delays occurred for
the most recent lists because Respondent had some
difficulty while switching compilation of the lists to
a computer.
Another provision of the collective-bargaining
agreement allowed the Union to appoint "at least
one steward for each unit in each section." Pur-
suant to that contract, the Union designated 72
stewards who were concentrated in areas with a
high proportion of union members. The contract
also permitted the Union to have bulletin boards at
locations approved by Respondent, if the Union
bore the expense of construction, installation, and
maintenance. All these boards were placed in regu-
lar locker rooms, but, because other locker rooms
are available in work areas where there are no union
bulletin boards, and because of the small amount of
"change time" allowed employees who use the
regular locker rooms, this is not an effective means
for communicating with the unit employees.
Respondent has its own bulletin boards spread
throughout the refinery.
Apart from the avenues of communication whose
source is the contract, the Union endeavored to
reach its unit employees by handbilling at two of the
four gates through which both unit and nonunit em-
ployees enter the refinery. The handbilling efforts
were limited to two gates because of the danger to
distributors from cars passing too close to them.
These efforts were further impeded because the
Union had no way of knowing who, among the em-
ployees going through the gates, were the em-
ployees it represented.
On April 5, 1965, the Union made its first written
request for home addresses of unit employees. The
request was a broad one, asking for the names and
addresses of all employees. It referred to the
Respondent's ability to talk to employees about the
Union at orientation programs and the Union's
need to "at least ... counter the company
propaganda by mass mailing," in support of its
request. On April 14, the Union asked Respondent
for the opportunity to appear at the orientation
meetings. The next day the Union made its second
written request for addresses. It cited Respondent's
mailing to employees of the booklet "You and
Your Company" and asked for a "complete mailing
list of Standard Oil employees so that we may send
them counter documentation and statements."
On April 15, Respondent rejected the Union's in-
itial request. Respondent stated that its contractual
and legal obligations were satisfied by furnishing
the Union with periodic seniority lists showing the
name, classification, and seniority date of all unit
employees. Eleven days later Respondent rejected
the Union's second request for the reason previ-
ously stated. The next day Respondent denied the
Union's request to appear at the orientation
meetings..
In May 1965, the parties began to bargain over
certain amendments to the collective-bargaining
contract proposed by Respondent. After four bar-
gaining sessions, the parties entered into an agree-
ment in July. Prior to the execution date, Respond-
STANDARD OIL COMPANY
ent distributed to all unit employees a statement of
its position on the subject of the negotiations. At-
tached thereto was a summary of Respondent's
proposed changes and a statement expressing its
hope that an agreement could quickly be reached.
The statement was read to the Union at one of the
bargaining sessions. The Union did not circulate to
the unit employees a reply to Respondent's account
of its position. Thereafter, in February 1966, the
collective-bargaining agreement was renewed for
another year,
On March 8, 1966, after the renewed agreement
went into effect, the Union made its final written
request for a list of addresses. This time the Union's
request was limited to the addresses of unit em-
ployees. On March 16, Respondent rejected the
request upon the ground that the collective-bargain-
ing agreement did not require anything more than
seniority lists.
The complaint alleges that from April 5, 1965,
the Union has requested "and is requesting"
Respondent to furnish the names and addresses of
the employees in the unit, and that this information
is "relevant to collective bargaining and the ad-
ministration of the current collective bargaining
contract," and that by refusing to make the
requested information available to the Union,
Respondent has not bargained in good faith with the
Union. Respondent contends that there is no
obligation under Section 8(a)(5) to furnish informa-
tion where the sole purpose of the request is to ena-
ble a union to propagandize employees on the vir-
tues of belonging to the union.
Although in its letters to Respondent requesting
the names and addresses of employees in the unit,
the Union said that it needed this information to
counter Respondent's antiunion propaganda, the
complaint alleged that the Union had requested and
was still requesting this information because it was
relevant to collective bargaining. At the hearing and
in the brief to the Trial Examiner, the General
Counsel explained that the information was neces-
sary if the Union was to perform its duty as statuto-
ry representative of the employees in the ap-
propriate unit. An official of the Union gave
testimony as to why the Union needed the address
list if it was to properly perform the duties it owed
to employees in the unit. Notwithstanding the
i American Boilers Mfrs Assn v. N.L R.B, 366 F.2d 815, 821 (C A.
8).
2 (A) Individual earnings, Whitin Machine Works, 108 NLRB 1537,
enfd. 217 F.2d 593 (C.A. 4); (B) Job rates and classifications, Taylor
Forge & Pipe Works v. N.L R.B., 234 F 2d 227 (C.A. 7); (C) Merit in-
creases, N.L.R B. v. J. H. Allison & Company, 165 F 2d 766 (C.A 6);
(D) Pension data, Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, 101
NLRB 360; (E) Timestudy data, Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 NLRB 1582,
enfd. 399 F.2d 801 (C.A. 2); (F) Incentive earnings, Dixie Mfg. Co., 79
NLRB 654, enfd. 180 F.2d 173 (C A. 6); (G) Piece rates, Vanette
Hosiery Mills, 80 NLRB 1116, enfd. 179 F.2d 504 (C.A. 5); (H) Opera-
tion of incentive system, Dixie Mfg. Co., supra, (I) Administration of pen-
sion plan, Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v N.L.R.B., 223 F.2d 58 (C.A.
345
foregoing developments at the hearing, Respondent
refused and continues to refuse to furnish the
requested information. We find, therefore, that the
issue of whether the information requested is rele-
vant to the Union's performance of its statutory
duty is properly before the Board for determina-
tion.'
Both the Board and the courts have found viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(5) in unsatisfied requests for
information which has a direct bearing on the
negotiation of wages and fringe benefits or the bar-
gaining representative's ability to administer the
agreement.2 Such information is "presumptively
relevant" to the performance of the Union's functi-
ons.3 Some information is not so obviously related
to the Union's bargaining and contract administra-
tion responsibilities. Where this relationship is not
clear, the Union is obliged to produce more precise
evidence of its relevance.4 Once the relevance of
the information sought is established, the Em-
ployer's good-faith refusal to supply it is not a
defense. A statutory violation is committed by the
refusal to furnish relevant information.
In this case the relevance of the unit employees'
address list is apparent from a comparison of the
Union's statutory duty of fair representation 5 with
the difficulties it faced in attempting to reach those
to whom it owed such duty. The Union's duty ex-
tends to nonunion unit employees as well as to
union members. Because of the relatively low union
membership in the unit, the absence of a union-
security clause in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, the residential dispersion of unit employees
over a five- or six-county area, the apparent ineffec-
tiveness of the steward system, the lack of adequate
exposure of unit employees to union bulletin
boards, and the inefficiency of handbilling efforts,
the Union could not in any effective manner com-
municate with the beneficiaries of its statutory
obligation. On the other hand, the possession of an
address list would enable the Union to poll the unit
employees as to their preferences and priorities in
contract negotiations, their experience and recom-
mendations with respect to the operation of the
grievance-arbitration machinery, and their thoughts
on the wisdom of striking over a particular issue. In
this sense, and in the context of this case, including
the Employer's failure to furnish a reasonable
1). See also N.L R.B. v. Fitzgerald Mills Corporation, 313 F 2d 260, 265
(C.A. 2), cert. denied 375 U.S. 834; John F Swift Company, 133 NLRB
185, enfd. 302 F 2d 342 (C.A 7); J. I. Case Co. v N L.R.B., 253 F.2d
149 (C.A. 7).
3 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v N.L.R.B , 347 F.2d 61, 69 (C,A. 3).
4 Ibid.
5 Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U.S 192; Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman 345 U S. 330, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335; Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S 171 (decided February 27, 1967); Miranda Fuel Com-
pany, Inc., 140 NLRB 181, enforcement denied on grounds not here
material, Hughes Tool Company, 147 NLRB 1573; Local 12, Rubber
Workers v. N L.R.B., 366 F 2d 821 (C.A. 5), enfg. 150 NLRB 312.
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
justification for withholding the information," we
find that a unit employee address list was relevant
to the Union's performance of its responsibilities in
collective bargaining and contract administration.
We are unable to agree with our dissenting col-
league that an 8(a)(5) finding is foreclosed in this
case because the Union initially based its request
on its desire to "counter the company propaganda."
As we have already noted, it was alleged in the
complaint, and the Union at the hearing made clear,
that the address list was needed by the Union to aid
it in properly performing its collective-bargaining
duties. Nevertheless, Respondent has continued to
refuse to provide the requested information, insist-
ing that the Union has no right to such information
regardless of the purpose for which it is sought.
Moreover, we find that the fact that the Union's
initial request for the names and addresses revealed
that it would use this information to counter the
Respondent's propaganda did not eliminate
Respondent's obligation to furnish the information.
As we have indicated above, the names and ad-
dresses of unit employees were needed by the
Union to assist it in properly performing its collec-
tive-bargaining duties. As bargaining agent, the
Union had the statutory duty not only to represent
all employees in the unit, but to seek to do so effec-
tively. The Union's effectiveness as an employee
representative was necessarily dependent on its
bargaining strength, and this in turn was dependent
on continued employee adherence and support. The
company appeals, which the Union desired to
answer, sought to persuade employees that union
representation was not needed by them to assure
fair treatment and working conditions. Respondent
was of course privileged thus to express its view.
But the Union was justified in inferring that
Respondent's purpose was to weaken employee
support of the Union and thereby to reduce, if not
indeed to destroy, the Union's strength and effec-
tiveness as a bargaining agent. The Union, there-
fore, in the discharge of its representative responsi-
bilities to all employees in the unit whom it was
statutorily required to serve, had a legitimate in-
terest in responding to Respondent's arguments by
communicating to the unit employees its side of the
bargaining story- to attempt to show, for example,
why the employees needed the Union, how the
Union had served them in the past, and how it might
in the future, why its contract adminstration actions
and its bargaining proposals deserve their backing,
and why it was in the employees' interest to provide
membership and other support to their bargaining
agent. But in order to be able effectually to counter
Respondent's repeated statement of views, the
Union needed first to know which employees were
6 The Respondent offered no evidence that compliance with the
Union 's request would be unduly burdensome Indeed, the record reveals
that it had an address list and used it for sending mailings to its employees.
in the bargaining unit and where they could be
reached. As the full information thus required lay
exclusively in Respondent's possession, and was
not otherwise available to the Union for reasons
earlier stated, the Union had a right to demand this
information from Respondent, and Respondent, we
hold, had a correlative obligation to furnish it.
Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Ex-
aminer, that by its refusal to provide such a list
upon request, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act. 7
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent had engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order that it
cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirm-
ative action deemed necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Standard Oil Company of California, Westerns
Operations, Inc., is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna-
tional Union, Richmond, California, Local 1-561,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees
on the classified payroll of the manufacturing and
purchase and stores departments in the Employer's
Richmond refinery, including San Pablo tank farm,
but excluding sheet metal workers, their ap-
prentices and head and lead mechanics; carpenters,
their apprentices and head and lead mechanics; can-
vassmen, saw filers; bricklayers, their apprentices
and head and lead mechanics; plumbers and pipefit-
ters, their apprentices and head and lead mechanics
and regularly assigned pipefitters' helpers and lead
burners; employees covered by contract with the
International Association of Machinists, Boiler-
makers Union, and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers; and employees covered by
separate contracts with the Independent Union of
Petroleum Workers; guards, groundsmen, and
gatemen; and supervisors as defined in the Act,
constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
4. Since July 1950, and at all times thereafter,
the above-named labor organization has been and
is the bargaining representative of all employees in
the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of
7 Compare Kenai Packers, 144 NLRB 1122, with McCulloch Corpora-
tion, 132 NLRB 201.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY -347
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about April 15, 1965, and
at all times thereafter, to furnish the above-named
labor organization, upon request, a list of home ad-
dresses of employees in the appropriate unit,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By the aforesaid refusal to bargain, Respond-
ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced,
and is interfering with, restraining, and coercing,
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
to them in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby en-
gaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respond-
ent, Standard Oil Company of California, Westerns
Operations, Inc., Richmond, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth below:
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the aforesaid- Regional Director, in
writing, within, 10 days from the date of this Order,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith.
Member Zagoria, dissenting:
I agree with the Trial Examiner that the facts of
this case do not establish a violation of Section
8(a)(5) by Respondent. The Union's request for the
list of employees' names and addresses was based
solely on its desire to "counter the company
propaganda." The Union's stated reason thus
negates any suggestion that the list was sought for
bargaining purposes. My colleagues apparently rely
on the allegation in the complaint to the effect that
the list was requested "because it was relevant to
collective bargaining" as supplying the essential in-
gredient to a violation of the Act. But the General
Counsel's post hoc rationalization scarcely suffices,
in my opinion, to give the Union a reason it did not
advance, and which was not before the Respondent
when it refused the Union's request. Indeed, the
Respondent does not claim that such a list is never
required to be furnished, only that on the facts here
it was not sought for bargaining purposes. As I
agree that it was not, I would dismiss the complaint.
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment, with Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, Richmond,
California, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO, by refusing to
furnish it, upon request, a list of unit employees'
home addresses.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Bargain collectively with the above-named
labor organization by furnishing it, upon request, a
list of home addresses of employees in the ap-
propriate unit.
(b) Post at its plant premises in Richmond,
California, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after
being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted
by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to an Order of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board , and in order to effectuate the policies
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL bargain collectively with Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union, Richmond , California , Local 1-561,
AFL-CIO, by furnishing it, upon request, a list
of unit employees' home addresses.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain , or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
The appropriate unit is:
All production and maintenance em-
ployees on the classified payroll of the
manufacturing and purchase and stores de-
partments in our Richmond refinery, in-
cluding San Pablo tank farm, but excluding
sheet metal workers, their apprentices and
head and lead mechanics ; carpenters, their
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, En-
forcing an Order."
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
apprentices and head and lead mechanics;
canvassmen, saw filers; bricklayers, their
apprentices and head and lead machanics;
plumbers and pipefitters, their apprentices
and head and lead mechanics and regularly
assigned pipefitters' helpers and lead bur-
ners; employees covered by contracts with
the International Association of Machin-
ists, Boilermakers Union, and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers;
and employees covered by separate con-
tracts with the Independent Union of
Petroleum Workers; guards, groundsmen,
and gatemen; and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
Dated By
(Title)
STANDARD OIL COM-
PANY OF CALIFORNIA,
WESTERNS OPERATIONS,
INC.
Employer
(Representative)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions, they may
communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36047, San
Francisco, California 94102, Telephone 556-0335.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARION C. LADWIG, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
was heard before me at San Francisco, California, on July
7 and 8, 1966, pursuant to a charge filed by the Union
(Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,
Richmond, California, Local 1-561, AFL-CIO) on June
28, 1965, and amended on May 5, 1966, and a complaint
issued on May 6, 1966. The case involves primarily the
issue whether the Respondent (also called the Company)
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, by refusing to furnish the Union a list of
the bargaining unit employees' home addresses.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses , and after due considera-
tion of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the
Company, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY AND THE LABOR OR-
GANIZATION INVOLVED
The Company is a Delaware corporation, which is en-
gaged in the refining and sale of petroleum and petroleum
products at its Richmond, California, refinery from which
it ships annually goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points outside that State. The Company ad-
mits, and I find, that it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is
a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Requests for Employees' Home Addresses
On April 5, 1965, about a month after the Company
and the Union signed a new collective-bargaining agree-
ment, the Union wrote the Company, requesting a list of
the names and addresses of the bargaining unit em-
ployees. Citing the Company's "orientation" programs
(in which the Company talked to employees about unions
without a representative of the Union being present), the
Union requested the mailing list "so that the Union at
least can counter the company propaganda by mass mail-
ing." Again on April 15, the Union requested the names
and addresses. Quoting a provision in a company
brochure (that unions were considered unnecessary in the
refinery), and pointing out that the Company had mailed
the booklet to the employees, the Union requested a
complete mailing list "so that we may send them counter
documentation and statements." The Company answered
both requests by letters, stating that the semiannual
seniority lists (without addresses) fulfilled the Company's
contractual and legal obligations.
About a month later, the Company proposed some im-
provements in its benefit plans (incorporated by reference
in the agreement), and began negotiating with the Union
concerning the changes. Although the Company mailed
each employee a letter, outlining the changes proposed by
the Company and advising the employees of the current
status of the negotiations, the Union did not again request
the mailing list, nor advise the Company that the list was
needed in connection with the bargaining. (The parties
reached an agreement on the benefits in July.) Thereafter,
in February 1966, the collective-bargaining agreement
was renewed for another year, without the Union
requesting the employees' names and addresses for pur-
poses of assisting it in negotiations.
Finally, on March 8, 1966, after the renewed agree-
ment went into effect, the Union wrote the Company
another letter, repeating the request for "a list of all the
names and addresses of the employees in the collective
bargaining unit," without stating any further reason for
the request. The Company again answered that the agree-
ment did not require home addresses on the seniority list,
and refused to furnish the addresses.
A company witness credibly testified that at no time
did the Union express any reason for requesting the mail-
ing list other than the stated purpose of wanting to mail
out counter propaganda.
B. No Issue of "Good Faith"
The General Counsel contends that the refusal to
furnish the home addresses is a per se violation of Section
8(a)(5), asserting that "the issue here transcends good
faith because fundamental rights of employees are in-
volved, so that whether or not Respondent denied the
Union the list in good faith is irrelevant."
Because of this position , the General Counsel does not
rely on what evidence there is in the record which might
indicate bad faith on the part of the Company. This
testimony (largely given by the Union 's financial secreta-
STANDARD OIL COMPANY 349
ry when cross-examined by company counsel) concerns
some of the Company's purported conduct, in the context
of the Company's year-round efforts to persuade em-
ployees that union representation is unnecessary, and its
actions in publicizing the contractual rights of employees
to withdraw from union membership. The union
representative asserted: (1) the Company, for pretextual
reasons, repeatedly delayed furnishing all and/or a large
part of the seniority lists for months,'thereby depriving
the Union of even the names of the bargaining unit em-
ployees. (2) The Company interfered with the Union's
use of the steward system for obtaining employee ad-
dresses and contacting employees, by intimidating the
stewards, thereby precluding full union representation in
the refinery. (3) The Company has undermined the
Union's contact with employees through the use of union
bulletin boards, first, by refusing to allow union bulletin
boards to be placed inside the plants (although the Com-
pany denied such a prohibition at the hearing), and
secondly, the Company has quoted the price of $45 or
$50 to the Union for inexpensive ($4 or $5) bulletin
boards, thereby making the cost prohibitive (although a
company witness indicated that the Company has agreed
to permit the Union to build its own bulletin boards, if
certain reasonable specifications are met). In view of the
failure of both the General Counsel and the Union
(whose counsel withdrew from the hearing because of a
conflicting commitment) to develop this evidence or to
rely specifically on it, the Company presented little
evidence in contradiction, and the matter was not fully
litigated. Therefore, I do not make any findings thereon.
C. Contentions of the Parties
The General Counsel contends that the Company is
legally obligated to furnish a list of the employees' home
addresses to the employees' collective-bargaining
representative in order for the representative to fulfill ef-
fectively its statutory duty to represent the employees. In
making this contention, the General Counsel relies
primarily upon the reasoning of the Board in its recent
decision in Excelsior Underwear Inc., and Saluda
Knitting Inc., 156 NLRB 1236, in which the rule was an-
nounced that the failure of the employer to furnish the
names and addresses of the eligible voters before a
representation election would be grounds for setting aside
the election. The General Counsel argues that "clearly
the principles annunciated in that case would apply afor-
tiori to a union that, as here, is designated as the bargain-
ing representative of employees, because this union now
owes responsibility to employees, whereas in a union or-
ganization campaign no such obligation is owed.... By
its requests for home addresses of employees it
represents, the Union is only asking permission to carry
out its function as a representative of Respondent's em-
ployees. It can hardly begin to effectively and intel-
ligently represent these employees unless it can establish
and maintain a dialogue with them." "Of similar concern
is the right to seek employees' support for the statutory
bargaining representative by, in effect, maintaining its or-
ganizing effort among the employees. The Union is thus
attempting to strengthen its position in the interest of em-
ployees.... Providing the Union with a list of home ad-
dresses ... does afford the Union a better opportunity for
communicating its reason for joining to the employee."
The likelihood of reaching all the employees with other
methods of communication is "problematical," as in
Excelsior.
The Company, on the other hand, argues that under the
facts of this case, the Company's statutory obligation to
bargain in good faith does not require the Company to
furnish the home address "(a) where at no point did the
Union indicate to the Company that the list of home ad-
dresses was necessary to enable it to bargain intelligently
or to administer the collective-bargaining agreement, and
(b) where the Union's sole stated purpose for requesting
the information was to enable it to make a mass mailing to
company employees to counter what it believed to be
company `propaganda' in employee orientation pro-
grams." Later in its brief, the Company adds • "Nor do we
say that an employer could not be required, in a proper
case, to furnish a union with employee home addresses
where this information was demonstrated to be relevant
and necessary to meaningful collective bargaining con-
cerning wages, hours and working conditions." Intriguing
as such a question might be, the Company contends,
"There is not a shred of evidence that the Company
in this case was presented with a request for information
which the Union indicated it needed for bargaining
purposes."
D. Concluding Findings
Where no effort has been made to prove bad faith on
the part of the Company in refusing to provide the Union
with the home addresses of the bargaining unit em-
ployees, the issue of whether the Company violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to furnish the addresses
turns on a question of relevancy. Under the decided
cases, the requested information must be relevant to the
Union's role as bargaining representative in the negotia-
tion or administration of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 61, 68
(C.A. 3); The Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
325 F.2d 746, 750 (C.A. 6).
The only reason the Union gave the Company for
requesting the home addresses was to answer the Com-
pany's propaganda by mailing the employees "counter
documentation and statements." At no time did the
Union seek the addresses in connection with -negotia-
tions, or in connection with policing or administering the
agreement. Although the complaint asserts that the
requested information "constituted information relevant
to collective bargaining and the administration of the cur-
rent collective bargaining contract," I agree with the
Company that "There is not a shred of evidence that the
Company in this case was presented with a request for in-
formation which the Union indicated it needed for bar-
gaining purposes." I also agree that "the legal obligation
to bargain in good faith under Section 8(a)(5) does not ex-
tend to union requests which seek information, not for
bargaining purposes, but solely for the purpose of
propagandizing employees on the virtues of the Union."
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Company did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by refus-
ing the Union's requests for the employees' home ad-
dresses where the requests were not made in connection
with the negotiation or administration of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The complaint herein should be, and hereby is,
dismissed.