Stage Employees Iatse Local 659 (Paramount Pictures)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 1985

276 N.L.R.B. 881 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE LOCAL 659 (PARAMOUNT PICTURES) 881
International Photographers Guild, Local 659 , Inter-
national Alliance of Theatrical- Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Operators of the United
States and Canada , AFL-CIO (Paramount Pic-
tures Corporation) and Michael Dean . Case 31-
CB-5783
30 September 1985
DECISION AND ORDER REMANDING
PROCEEDING
-By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND JOHANSEN
On 6 March 1985 Administrative Law Judge Jay
R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Gen-
eral 'Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs' and
has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,
and conclusions only to the extent consistent- with
this decision.
The'judge found that the complaint, which al-
leges that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
and (2) of the Act by causing the discharge of Mi-
chael Dean, an employee of Paramount Pictures
Corporation,2 is time-barred by Section 10(b) of
the Act.3 For reasons given below, we do not
agree with the judge.
'Paramount . and the Union are parties to a
number of collective-bargaining agreements all of
which include a valid union-security clause. Dean,
a member of the Union who worked for various
employers as a camera operator from 1972 'until
1976, and 'as a director of photography4 since 1976,
received from the Union about 10 January 1984 a
"final notice" to the following effect: Because of
Dean's failure to pay his 1983 dues ($324) and in-
surance premiums ($31.20), he was suspended from
the Union and was no longer in good standing, and
if he did not "rectify this delinquency" by 8 Febru-
ary 1984,5 employers would 'be notified' that he
could not be employed "within the Union's juris-
diction as a result of his lack of good standing."
' 'As we find that the General Counsel's exceptions meet the Board's
requirements for specificity set forth in-Sec 102 46 of its Rules and Regu-
lations, .we deny the Union' s motion that the exceptions be stricken
S Herein Paramount
3 Sec 10(b) of the Act provides in pertinent part that "no complaint
shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with' the Board ."
* The Union's bylaws provide that directors of photography must pay
higher dues than camera operators
6 All dates below refer to 1984 unless otherwise specified .
276 NLRB No. 91
Dean promptly sent the Union a check for, $100
along with a letter, dated 10 January, stating that
he could not afford to pay any more at that time
because "the industry has been slow recently," and
requesting that he be reclassified from the position
of director of photography to that of camera:oper-
ator which provided "more promising" job oppor-
tunities. 6 Dean received no response from the
Union until 8 April at the earliest.7
About 30 June Dean obtained employment with
Paramount as a camera operator. On 1 August, the
Union filed a grievance against Paramount for
using Dean' as a camera operator despite his classi-
fication as a director of photography. On 8 August
Paramount discharged Dean, who was told by its
production manager that Paramount was no longer
allowed to employ him because the Union objected
to his working "out of classification" as a camera
operator.
On 29 August, Dean filed a charge alleging that
"within the last 6 months [the Union] has failed 'to
fairly represent [Dean] by discriminating against
him with regard to a request to change his job clas-
sification . . . thereby preventing his referral to
and employment with at least Paramount Pictures."
In Postal Service Marina Center, 271. NLRB '397
(1984), the Board dealt with the interpretation and
application of Section 10(b) of the Act. The Board
held that it would focus on the date of the alleged
unlawful act and unequivocal notice thereof, rather
than on the date its consequence becomes effective,
in deciding whether the period for filing a charge
under Section 10(b) of the. Act has expired, and
that "[w]here a final adverse employment decision
is made and communicated to an employee .. .
[he] . . . must [file an unfair labor practice charge]
within 6 months of that time rather than wait until
the consequences of the act become most painful."
The judge relied on Postal Service Marina Center
in finding that the complaint filed on 19 October
was time-barred by Section 10(b) of the Act on the
ground that the 6-month limitation period began on
10 January, the date Dean received the Union's
notice, and expired almost 2 months prior to. the
6 The record .shows that in 1983 and preceding years the Union had a
policy of allowing members who were having problems meeting their fi-
nancial obligations to ask for and receive an extension of time for pay-
ment of their dues - '
'n a letter dated 14 August, Dean complained to the Union that he
had "received no correspondence" from it since 10 January and stated
that he therefore "assumed" that his partial payment of $ 100 and his re-
quest "to drop back" to the classification of camera operator were "ac-
ceptable" to the Union In its reply 3 days later ,. the Union stated that it
had sent Dean a letter on .8 April requesting him to contact the Union
concerning his financial obligations , and that Dean had not done so In
addition , the Union acknowledged receipt of the partial payment which it
credited to Dean's "delinquent account " (The record contains no copy
of that letter )
882 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
-filing of Dean's charge on 29 August. Thus, the
• judge held that the Union's notice was unequivocal
and that Dean's letter received by the Union on 16
January did not toll the "statute of limitations" be-
cause the Uniori, which did not reply thereto, nev-
ertheless did not withdraw its notice or give any
indication that it was no longer effective.
We disagree with the judge because he improp-
erly applied to this, situation Postal Service Marina
Center, which was limited to unconditional and un-
equivocal decisions or actions. Contrary to the
judge,- we find that the Union's notice was condi-
tional rather than unequivocal because it did not
announce a "final [unconditional] adverse employ-
ment 'decision." Instead, the Union's notice stated
employers would be informed of Dean's loss of
good standing in the Union and his ineligibility for
employment only upon the happening of a certain
event, namely, a failure on the part of Dean to pay
his dues and insurance, premium by a specified
future date. We further find for the following rea-
sons that the terms of the notice were at least par-
tially satisfied and' the Union's lack of response en-
titled Dean to believe that there was no outstand-
ing adverse decision against him and hence there
was' no need or basis for a charge: (1) the Union's
admission that it had accepted and credited Dean's
partial' payment; (2) the Union's historic policy of
leniency•,in permitting installment payments over
an extended period;8 and (3) the Union's failure to
respond -to Dean's 10 January letter until well after
the -February deadline. We therefore find that the
10(b) period did not commence as of the date of
the''Union's conditional notice and that the- event
which initiated that period was the discharge of
Dean on 8 August.
- Accordingly; we shall remand this case to the
judge for a decision on the merits.
ORDER
It is ordered- that the above-entitled proceeding
is remanded to Administrative Law Judge Jay R.
Pollack for the purpose of preparing and issuing
with respect to,'the unfair labor practice allegations
in the complaint a supplemental,, decision, setting
forth credibility. resolutions, findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and a recommended Order in light
of such findings and conclusions. Following service
of the supplemental decision on the parties, the
provisions of Section 102.46' of the Board's Rules
and Regulations shall be applicable. -
8 As already noted; the Union 's letter of 8 April indicated that it was
still willing at that time to discuss Dean's financial obligations
Rina E. Wallack, Esq., . of Los Angeles, California, for
the General Counsel.
Anita Knowlton, Esq. (Taylor, Roth, & Hunt), of Los An-
geles, California, for the Respondent Union.
DECISION -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge I heard
this case in trial at Los Angeles, California, on January
17, 1985. Pursuant to a charge filed against International
Photographers Guild; Local 659, International Alliance
of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Op-
erators of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO (Re-
spondent or the Union) by Michael Dean on August 29,
1984,' the Regional Director for Region 31 of -the Na--
tional Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and
notice of hearing against Respondent on October 19, al-
leging••that Respondent committed certain violations of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). In sub-
stance,• the complaint alleges that Respondent, by causing
the discharge of Dean, an employee of Paramount Pic-
tures Corporation, engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the
Act. Respondent filed a timely answer denying the com-
mission of the alleged unfair labor practices -and affirma-
tively alleging that the complaint is time-barred"by Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Act. -
On the-entire record, from my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and having considered the post-
trial briefs of the General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. JURISDICTION
Paramount is a Delaware corporation with an office
and place of business in Los Angeles, California, where
it is engaged in the production of motion pictures-for tel-
evision and theaters. During the 12 months prior to the
issuance of. the complaint, Paramount purchased and re-
ceived goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 di-
rectly,from suppliers located outside the State of Califor-
nia. Accordingly, Respondent- admits and I find -that
Paramount is an employer engaged in commerce and in a
business affecting commerce within the meaning ofSec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 1
.1
-
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that Respondent is a labor orgaiiization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. , ' -
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
At all times material herein, Respondent has been the
properly designated representative for collective bargain-
ing of an appropriate unit of employees in a multiem-
ployer bargaining unit represented by the Alliance of
Motion Picture & Television Producers (AMPTP). Para-
mount is an employer-member of the AMPTP miiltiem-
ployer unit and thereby bound to a collective-bargaining
' Unless otherwise stated , all dates refer to calendar year 1984
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE LOCAL 659 (PARAMOUNT PICTURES)
agreement with Respondent covering certain of Para-
mount's employees including Dean. Respondent and
Paramount are parties to a local collective-bargaining
agreement, a supplemental videotape agreement and a
basic multiemployer/multiunion collective-bargaining
agreement. All these agreements include wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment for the multi-
employer bargaining unit including the employees of
Paramount. All three agreements were in effect during
-'the time material herein and include a valid union-securi-
ty clause.
Dean has been a member of Respondent" for approxi-
mately 13 years. He has worked as a camera operator
from 1972 until 1976,. and as director of photography
since 1976. Prior to this case, Dean had a history of late
dues payments 'to the Union: About January 10, 1984,
Dean received the following notification from Respond-
ent that he had failed to pay his 1983 financial obligation
to the Union:
Dear Brother Dean:
This is your FINAL notice for NONPAYMENT
of your financial obligation to INTERNATIONAL
PHOTOGRAPHERS GUILD, Local 659.
In accordance with the Local 659 Constitution &
By-Laws Article 9,-Section 17(d), you have thereby
FORFEITED ALL RIGHTS and claims to any of
the benefits of this organization , including the right
to work within Local 659's jurisdiction , and you are
hereby notifed that you are SUSPENDED and no
longer in good standing in Local 659.
If you have not rectified this delinquency by the
time of the Executive Board meeting to be held on
February 8, 1984 , employers will also be notified
that you are NO LONGER A MEMBER IN
GOOD STANDING and cannot be employed
within the jurisdiction of Local 659.
Your delinquent financial ' obligation is:
Dues delinquent
in the amount of $324.00
Insurance payments
delinquent in the
amount of 31.20
TOTAL NOW
= DELINQUENT
AND
PAYABLE $355.20
This does not include your financial obligation
for 1984.]
Upon receipt of this delinquency notice, Dean sent the
Union a check for $100 and a letter stating that he could
not afford to pay any more at that time . Further, Dean
requested that he be reclassified from the position of di-
rector of photography to that of camera operator. The
director of photography is a higher paid job than camera
operator and under the Union's bylaws , a director of
photography pays higher - dues than a camera operator.
Dean had secured casual employment with Paramount as
a camera operator, thereby meeting the requirements
necessary for reclassification to camera operator , but did
not notify the Union of that employment. Dean received
883
no response from the Union to his $100 payment or his
request for reclassification.
About June 30, Dean again obtained employment with
Paramount as a camera operator for. the production of a
television show entitled "Anything for Money." On
August 1, the Union filed a grievance against Paramount
for using Dean "as an Operator-when he is classified as a
Director of Photography, Group 1." .The portion of the
grievance dealing with Dean requested payment to the
Union of, the camera operator wage rate (plus fringes)
for each day Dean worked. On August 8, Paramount dis-
charged Dean. Dean was told by Paramount's represent-
ative that he was discharged as a result of the Union's
grievance. -
After his dismissal by Paramount , Dean called Re-
spondent and spoke to Neil Manning , an associate execu-
tive director of the-Union. Manning did not have the in-
-formation necessary to answer Dean's questions about
the, Union's actions. Thereafter, on August 14, Dean
wrote Respondent requesting reclassification to camera
operator, retroactive to January 16, and enclosing pay-
ment of $255.20. Dean further requested a "current bill-
ing. of the amount I owe in dues for 1984, and a 30-day
period in which to pay these dues." On August 15, Re- -
spondent's executive board voted "to deny Michael
Dean's request to work until such a time that he pays his
delinquent dues in the amount of $355.20 at which time
[the executive-board] would establish him as a member in
good standing." -
- On- August 17, Respondent notified • Dean that its exec-
utive board had denied- his request of a reclassification
from director of photography to camera operator: • Ac-
cording to this letter, it was Dean's failure to pay his fi-
nancial obligations that resulted in the refusal to reclassi-
fy him. Dean was notified that if he paid $355.20 he
would be reinstated to membership as a director of pho-
tography and could reinstate his request for a classifica-
tion to camera operator.
While attempting to straighten out his problems with
the Union, Dean also attempted to obtain reclassification
by, applying to the multiemployer.group. On August 20,
Dean wrote the Contract-Services Administration Trust
Fund (CSATF) which administers the industry experi-
ence roster system , requesting reclassification as a
camera operator retroactive to January 1984.2 On Sep-
tember 11, CSATF notified the Union of Dean's request
for reclassification and indicated that it would reclassify
Dean unless the Union objected within 10 days. On Sep-
tember 18, the Union wrote CSATF protesting Dean's
reclassification. No action on' Dean's request has been
taken pending the outcome of this case.
On November 5, the Union notified Paramount that it
would not take any action against Paramount for hiring
Dean either as a director of photography or as a camera
operator "until such time as the dispute of the appropri-
2 The industry experience roster as administered by CSATF grants
preference in hiring based on experience in the multiemployer bargaining
unit The Union does not administer the roster system . This roster system
differs from a hiring hall in that no referrals are made Further, employ-
ers are free to hire any employee in the relevant experience grouping
rather than hiring on a first-m first-out basis.
884 DECISIONS OF' NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ate classification for Mr. Dean and his standing within
the Union has been resolved." -
At the hearing, Respondent offered three explanations
for why Dean had not been granted his request for re-
classification. First, as mentioned above, Respondent
stated it had denied Dean's request because he was-not in
good standing and thus not entitled to be reclassified as
eligible to work in any classification. Respondent's auto-
matic response to Dean's request was to ignore it be--
cause Dean was not in good standing. Second, Eugene
Leonard; Respondent's executive director, testified that
he had an oral agreement with the AMPTP that as a
courtesy to the employers, an employee who was in vio-
lation of the union security clause would not be reclassi-
fied because that employee -would be subject to immedi-
ate dismissal . To allow the employer to hire an employee
and then immediately request termination of the employ-
ee would be unfair to the employer. Third, Leonard tes-
tified that Dean did not notify the Union of his employer
when requesting the reclassification. In this regard,
Leonard testified that. the request for reclassification
must come from the employer.
B. The 10(b) Issues
Section 10(b) of the Act provides "[t]hat no complaint
should issue based upon any unfair labor practice occur-
ring more than six months prior to the 'filing of the
charge with the Board. .. ." Respondent contends that
the 6-month limitation period began to run on January 10
when it notified Dean that if he failed to meet his finan-
cial obligation (including the insurance premium) by
February 8, he would forfeit his right to work and that
the employers would be so notified. The General Coun-
sel contends that the Respondent independently violated
the Act in August when it caused Dean's dismissal by
Paramount . Further, the General Counsel contends that
even if the initial refusal or denial of reclassification was
outside the 10(b) period, "it is clear from the evidence
presented that the violation was continuing and was- not
discovered until August, when Respondent first notified
Mr. Dean that they had denied his re-rating request
which led to his discharge from Paramount." The issues
posed by Respondent are more difficult than that ad-
dressed by the -General Counsel because the grievance
filed by Respondent, which resulted in Dean's dismissal
by Paramount, -makes no reference to Dean's union-secu-
rity obligation or lack of good standing in the Union.
Rather, the grievance was addressed to Paramount's
hiring of Dean as a camera operator while he was classi-
fied as a director of photography.
As the Supreme Court stated in Machinists Local 1424
v. NLRB), 362 U.S. 411, 416-417 (1960):
[D]ue regard for the purposes of Section 10(b) re-
quires that two different kinds of situations be dis-
tinguished. The first is one where occurrences
within the six-month limitation period in and of
themselves may constitute, as a substantive matter,
unfair labor practices. There, earlier events may be
utilized to shed light on the true character of mat-
ters occurring within the limitations period; and for
that purpose Section 10(b) ordinarily does not bar
such evidentiary use of anterior events. The second
situation is that where conduct occurring within the
limitations penod can be charged to be an unfair
labor practice only through reliance on an earlier
unfair labor practice. There the use of the earlier
unfair labor practice is not merely. "evidentiary,"
since it does not simply lay bare a putative current
unfair labor practice. Rather, it serves to cloak with
illegality that which was otherwise lawful. And
where a complaint based upon that earlier event is
time-barred, to permit the event itself to be so used
in effect results in reviving a legally defunct unfair
labor, practice. -
In the instant case, the General Counsel did-not, allege
Respondent's January 10 notice to Dean or the denial of
reclassification to camera operator as unfair labor prac-
tices, because those matters were time-barred. The unfair
labor practice alleged is that Respondent, by filing the
grievance, caused Paramount to discharge Dean "for rea-
sons other than Dean's failure or refusal to tender the
periodic-dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
by the Respondent as a condition of acquiring or retain-
ing union membership."
Respondent, relying on-the recent case of Postal Serv-
ice Marina Center,- 271 NLRB 397 (1984), argues that the
limitations period commences to run on the date the
charging party receives unequivocal notice of a decision
to take an adverse action, even if the act occurs at a later
date. In the Postal Service case the Board overruled its
prior decisions construing the 10(b) period to begin not
from the time an employee receives unequivocal notice
of 'an adverse employment action, but instead from the
time the action becomes effective. The Board noted that
the United States Courts of Appeals for both the Ninth3
and Second Circuits' had held that the time limit of Sec-
tion 10(b) should begin running when the employee can
first file an unfair labor practice charge to protect his in-
terests. Next the Board noted two Supreme Court cases,
Delaware State College v. Ricks," involving Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Chardon v. Fernandez,6
involving 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which the Supreme Court
held that the statute of limitations begins to run from the
time "the operative decision was made-and notice
given-in advance of a designated date on which em-
ployment terminated" and that for limitations purposes
the relevant fact is the time of the alleged discriminatory
act rather than its effective date.
Thus the Board overruled its; earlier decisions and
stated: - -
S See NLRB v. California School of Profesional Psychology, 583 F 2d
1099 (9th Cir. 1978). See also NLRB v. Longshoremen ILWU Local 30,
549 F 2d 698 (9th Cir 1977) (holding that the time penod for filing a
charge against a union for unlawfully imposing a fine on an employee
commenced on the date the employee received notice of the fine's impo-
sition) -
4 See Nazareth Regional High School v NLRB, 549 F 2d 873 (2d Cir.
1977).
S 449 U . S 250 (1980).
6454US 6( 1981). -
STAGE EMPLOYEES IATSE LOCAL: 659 (PARAMOUNT PICTURES) 885
[T]he Board will henceforth focus on the. date of
the alleged unlawful act rather than on the date its
consequences become effective, in deciding whether
the period for filing a charge under Section 10(b)
has expired. When a final adverse employment deci-
sion is made and communicated to an employee-
whether the decision is nonrenewal of an employ-
ment contract, termination, or. other alleged dis-
crimination-the employee is in a position to file an
unfair labor practice charge and must do so within
6 months of that time rather than wait until the con-
sequences of the act become most painful. [271
NLRB at 399.]
More recently, in Harvard Folding Box Co., 273 NLRB
841 fn. 1 (1984), the Board reiterated its well-established
principles that the 10(b) period does not start to run until
the charging party has notice of the events underlying
the charge and that the proponent of the 10(b) defense
has the burden of establishing notice. Citing Strick Corp.,
241 NLRB 210 (1979); Amcor Division, 234 NLRB 1063
(1978).
Application of the above legal principles to the instant
case presents a difficult question. First, Respondent's
grievance against Paramount makes no reference to
Dean's union-security obligations. Rather, the grievance
is directed at the preference for hiring accorded to em-
ployees classified as camera operators and the fact that
Dean was not so classified. There is no evidence that
Paramount was ever notified of Dean's dues delinquency.
Thus, a finding of a violation with respect to Respond-
ent's conduct within the 10(b) period can be made only
through reliance on Respondent's earlier conduct. The
issue resolves itself into when the limitations period
began to run on Respondent's denial of a reclassification
to Dean: on January 10, when Respondent notified Dean
that if he did not pay the delinquent amount it would
notify employers that he had forfeited his right to work;
or in August, when Dean learned that Respondent had
refused to reclassify him because of his dues and insur-
ance arrearages. The issue can also be stated whether
Respondent's notice of January 10 was notice sufficient
to start the 10(b) period running.
The notice of January 10 notified Dean that he had
forfeited "his right to work" is sufficient to start Section
10(b) regarding an unlawful threat to involve the union
security provisions. Moreover, the notice indicated that
if Dean "[had] not rectified this delinquency by . . .
February 8, employers will also be notified that you are
NO LONGER A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING
and cannot be employed within the jurisdiction of Local
659." That notification seems sufficient under the Postal
Service case to begin the 10(b) period. The next question
is whether Dean's letter, received by the Union on Janu-
ary 16, changed matters.
As stated earlier, Dean sent the Union a $100 partial
payment and a request for reclassification. The Union ig-
nored the request for reclassification because Dean was
in arrears in his dues and insurance payments. While the
Union never notified Dean that his request was denied,
the Union also never withdrew the January 10 notice or
gave any indication that it was no longer effective. Even
if the Union was obligated to respond to Dean's letter,
that failure to respond and to reclassify Dean occurred
more than 6 months prior to the filing of the charge.'
Under the Postal Service case Dean's reliance on the
Union's lack of a response is not sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations. Although the Postal Service case
involved an alleged unlawful termination by an employ-
er, the rationale of the case and the application of Sec-
tion 10(b) must equally apply to a case against a union.8
Under this rationale, Dean was obligated to file a charge
within 6 months of the Union's unequivocal notice that it
would notify employers that he had forfeited his right to
work in Local 659's jurisdiction. A fair reading of that
notice indicates interference with Dean's ability to work
as either a camera operator or a director of photography.
Accordingly, I am constrained to find that the unfair
labor practice alleged is time-barred by Section 10(b) of
the Act.
The General Counsel appears to assume that the gnev-
ance which caused Dean' s dismissal by Paramount was a
separate unfair labor practice beginning a separate 10(b)
period. However, since the Union did not enforce the
union-security clause, the grievance is lawful on its face
and can only be shown to be unlawful by reliance on the
Union's pre 10(b) period unfair labor practices. The most
difficult fact is that Dean did not receive actual notice of
the Union's failure to reclassify him. However, the notice
of January 10 indicates that the Union would not permit
Dean to work in its jurisdiction. Clearly, Dean could
have filed an unfair labor practice charge to protect his
interests. Under the Postal Service case, Dean had to file
a charge to protect his rights rather than await the con-
sequences of the Union's conduct. The fact that the
Union interfered only with Dean's ability to work as a
camera operator, and not as a director of photography,
seems to be a lesser included offense which was part and
parcel of the Union's pre-10(b) conduct.9 Accordingly,
without resolving the issue of whether Respondent did
commit an unfair labor practice, I shall recommend that
the complaint be dismissed.
I further note that Respondent's interference with
Dean's reclassification by the multiemployer group in
August may well be a separate unfair labor practice
within the 10(b) period. However, that conduct was not
alleged in the complaint and I , therefore, make no find-
ings or conclusions regarding that matter.
On the basis of the above findings of fact and conclu-
sions, I make the following
7 Both January 10, the date of the letter, and February 8, the effective
date of the penalty , are outside the 10(b) period created by the August 29
charge
8 The Postal Service case, at 398, cites NLRB v Longshoremen ILWU
Local30,'supra, for the proposition that the 10(b) penod for an employee
to file a charge against his union starts on the date he received notice of
the fine imposed against him
9 The situation seems analogous to where an employer notifies an em-
ployee of discharge and then imposes a lesser form of discipline Under
the Postal Service case , the 10(b) penod would run from the notice and
not begin anew by virtue of the lesser penalty
886 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Paramount Pictures Corporation is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. International Photographers Guild, Local 659, Inter-
national Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Operators of the United States and
Canada, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint is
time-barred by Section 10(b) of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
edio
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings , conclusions, and recommended
Order shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses