St. Lukes Episcopal Presbyterian Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 13, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 761 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 761
St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospitals, Inc. and
Textile Processors, Service Trades, Health Care,
Professional and Technical Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 108

St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospitals, Inc. and
Textile Processors, Service Trades, Health Care,
Professional and Technical Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local 161. Cases 14–CA–25025,
14–CA–25142, and 14–RC–11921
July 13, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND HURTGEN
On May 7, 1999, Administrative Law Judge George
Aleman issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief to the Respondent’s
exceptions, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.
1. The judge found, inter alia, that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by creating the impres-
sion of surveillance of employee Carol Hollowood’s pro-
tected activity. We disagree.
On March 19, 1998,2 Hollowood was called into the
office of the Respondent’s patient care manager, Janet
Gunn. Gunn told Hollowood that Supervisor Patricia
Geldbach reported to her that Hollowood had solicited
petition signatures in the hospital’s outpatient care area
(in violation of the Respondent’s policy). Hollowood
denied soliciting in the outpatient area, but admitted to
having solicited another nurse outside the hospital. Hol-
lowood also stated her belief that it must have been fel-
low employee Debbie Buschol who reported her. Gunn
responded by expressing her hope that Hollowood was
not soliciting in the outpatient area, adding that it was
against hospital policy and that Hollowood knew better.
That was the end of the conversation.
Later that day, Hollowood confronted Geldbach about
the report. Geldbach admitted to Hollowood that the
entire matter had been a misunderstanding, explaining
that although Buschol reported seeing Hollowood “get-
ting petitions,” she had not, in fact, reported that Hol-
lowood solicited in the outpatient recovery area. At this
point, the entire matter was dropped.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 All dates herein are 1998 unless otherwise stated.
The judge found that Hollowood could reasonably be-
lieve from Gunn’s remarks that the Respondent was
keeping a watch on her union activities. In support, the
judge noted that Gunn made this accusation without in-
vestigating the matter to ascertain whether it was true. In
addition, according to the judge, Gunn’s failure to ac-
knowledge the validity Hollowood’s belief that Buschold
was responsible for the report could reasonably have led
Hollowood to believe that the Respondent was utilizing
certain employees to report on Hollowood’s union activi-
ties.
Contrary to the judge, we find that Gunn’s statements
did not create the impression that Hollowood’s union
activities were under surveillance. Gunn’s comments to
Hollowood only communicated the Respondent’s con-
cern that Hollowood not solicit in patient care areas.
Gunn made no comments about any of Hollowood’s
other union activities, even after Hollowood volunteered
to her that she had solicited an employee outside of the
facility. Further, once it became clear that there had been
a misunderstanding about the location of Hollowood’s
solicitation, the matter was immediately dropped. In
these circumstances, Gunn’s comments reasonably con-
veyed nothing more than a misunderstanding about
whether Hollowood had violated the Respondent’s rule
against solicitation in the outpatient care area. Indeed, to
the extent there existed any confusion on Hollowood’s
part about Gunn’s comments, that confusion was clearly
laid to rest by Geldbach’s statement later that day that the
whole thing had been a misunderstanding.
We disagree with the judge that the impression of sur-
veillance was created by Gunn making an accusation
about Hollowood without investigating the report. The
credited testimony establishes that Gunn was investigat-
ing the report by directly asking Hollowood if it was
true. Gunn’s statement, that he hoped Hollowood was
not soliciting in the outpatient area, indicates that the
Respondent had not reached any conclusion about the
report. Finally, we disagree with the judge that by failing
to confirm or deny that Buschold was the source of the
report, Gunn reasonably suggested to Hollowood that the
Respondent had employees watching over Hollowood’s
union activities. In these circumstances, where Gunn
was in the process of investigating the report, it is under-
standable that Gunn would not reveal the source of the
report at this time.
In sum, we find that Gunn’s comments to Hollowood
did not create the impression of surveillance, and we
shall accordingly dismiss this portion of the complaint.
2. We agree with the judge that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging
Hollowood following her appearance on a local newscast
about the Respondent’s changes in its OB/GYN depart-
331 NLRB No. 87
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 762
ment. The newscast noted that both doctors and nurses
were concerned about these changes and that some of the
Respondent’s nurses were fighting for collective bargain-
ing as a way to insure adequate patient care and working
conditions. During the broadcast, Hollowood made
statements about the inadequate staffing level of the
medical teams in the department. In addition, certain
statements were attributed to her by the reporter which
accused the Respondent of cutting the nurses’ shifts in
order to replace them with less qualified employees, and
of jeopardizing the health of mothers and babies by in-
creasing the responsibilities and shortening the shifts of
the OB/GYN nurses.
The judge found, and we agree, that Hollowood’s June
1 television appearance constituted protected activity.
See Hacienda de Salud-Espanola, 317 NLRB 962, 966
(1995) (“Section 7 of the Act encompasses employee
communications about labor disputes with newspaper
reporters.”). Further, nothing Hollowood said during the
interview exceeded the bounds of the protection of the
Act. Indeed, the statements made by Hollowood during
the interview were neither disloyal, recklessly made, nor
maliciously false.
Finally, to the extent the Respondent purports to de-
fend the termination of Hollowood based on its assertion
that Hollowood’s fellow employees did not want to work
with her because they were angry about the comments
she made during the interview, we find this defense
without merit. As set forth above, the activity at issue
here is protected by the Act. That activity does not lose
the Act’s protection merely because it angered her fellow
employees or her superiors. Indeed, the subjective feel-
ings of Hollowood’s coworkers are not a relevant con-
sideration in determining whether the Respondent’s dis-
charge of Hollowood was unlawful. Accordingly, we
agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Sec-
tions 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Carole
Hollowood because of her protected activity.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, St.
Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospitals, Inc., Chester-
field, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.
1. Delete paragraph 1(b) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT discharge Carol Hollowood or any
other employee for engaging in union or other protected
concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, offer Carol Hollowood full reinstatement
to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
WE WILL make Carol Hollowood whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits resulting from her unlaw-
ful discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful discharge of Carol Hollowood, and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that
this has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against her in any way.
ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN
HOS-PITALS, INC.

Lynette K. Zuch, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Andrew J. Martone, Esq. (Bobroff, Hesse, Lindmark, Martone,
P.C.), for the Respondent.
John D. Watson, for the Charging Parties.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE ALEMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in St. Louis, Missouri, on consecutive days between
August 11 and 13, 1998.1 The initial charge, Case 14–CA–
25025, was filed by Local 108 of the Textile Processors, Ser-
vice Trades, Health Care, Professional, and Technical employ-
ees International Union (Local 108) on March 16, and amended
on May 19. On June 8, Local 108 and Local 161 of the same
International Union jointly filed a second charge, Case 14–CA–
25142, which was amended on July 14. Pursuant those
charges, the Regional Director for Region 14 of the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued a consolidated
amended complaint and notice of hearing on July 21 (see GC
Exh. 1[p]),2 alleging that St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian

1All dates herein are in 1998, unless otherwise indicated.
2 General Counsel’s Exhibits and Respondent’s Exhibits are identi-
fied herein as “GC Exh.” and “R. Exh.” respectively, followed by the
exhibit number. Reference to oral testimony is identified by transcript
(Tr.) and page number.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 763
Hospitals, Inc. (the Respondent) had in various manner violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act).3 On or about August 3, the Respondent filed an answer to
the complaint admitting some, and denying other, allegations
contained therein, and denying it had committed any unfair
labor practices. All parties were thereafter afforded a full op-
portunity to appear at the hearing, to call and examine wit-
nesses, to submit oral as well as written evidence, and to argue
orally on the record.
On the basis of the entire record in this proceeding, including
my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after
considering posthearing briefs filed by the General Counsel and
the Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Missouri corporation, with an office and
place of business in Chesterfield, Missouri, is engaged in the
operation of an acute care hospital at that location.4 During the
12-month period ending April 30, a representative period, the
Respondent’s gross revenues from the conduct of its business
operation exceeded $250,000, and during that same period it
purchased and received in the course of its business operations
goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points outside the State of Missouri. I find, based on admis-
sions in its answer and stipulations at the hearing, that the Re-
spondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that Locals
108 and 161 are labor organizations within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act (Tr. 10–11).
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
The complaint alleges that the Respondent committed nu-
merous violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Spe-
cifically, it alleges that the Respondent, through its managers
and supervisors, violated Section 8(a)(1) by: unlawfully inter-
rogating employees about their union membership, activities, or
sympathies; soliciting an employee to remove his name from a
union card or representation petition; threatening to discharge
supervisors and employees because of the employees’ union
activities; threatening to decrease employee wages and to re-
place employees if they chose to be represented by a union;
creating an impression that it was keeping its employees’ union
activities under surveillance; and discriminatorily removing
union literature from a bulletin board. It further alleges that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging employee
Carolyn Hollowood for engaging in union and other protected
concerted activity, and to discourage employees from engaging
in such activities (GC Exh. 1[p]).

3 The Regional Director also consolidated for hearing certain objec-
tions to an election filed by Local 108 in Case 14–RC–11921, as the
conduct being alleged as objectionable paralleled several of the unfair
labor practice allegations in the complaint (GC Exh. 1[g]).
4 The Respondent is part of a group of hospitals known as the unity
group.
B. The facts
1. Respondent’s operations and change from 24-hour to a
12-hour shift
The Respondent, as noted, operates an acute care hospital.
Part of its facilities include an obstetrical (OB/GYN) unit or
department containing two operating rooms where some 60
cesarean-type (C-section) deliveries per month are performed.
Prior to August 1997, eight registered nurse first assistants
(RNFA), of which Hollowood was one, were assigned to the
operating rooms on 24-hour shifts. The RNFA’s responsibility
is to “first assist” the surgeon in performing C-sections, tubal
litigations, and hysterectomies. In August 1997, the Respon-
dent decided to change from a 24-hour to a 12-hour shift as-
signment for RNFAs, and met with the RNFAs to discuss the
change. The meeting was conducted by Respondent’s vice
president of patient services, Gail Wagner, director of nursing,
Susan Winchester, and patient care manager for the labor &
delivery (L&D) and OB/GYN units, Janet Gunn. The reason
for the change, according to Respondent, was to make more
efficient use of the staff and to provide better care for the unit.
The RNFAs were told that they would be trained and expected
to assist in the care of patients on the L&D floor when not as-
sisting in the operating room, but that their duties would be
such that they would be able to immediately leave their patient
care responsibilities in the event they were needed for a C-
section operation. All RNFAs were then offered the opportu-
nity to transfer to the new 12-hour shift schedules.
2. The RNFA opposition to the shift change
This schedule change was not well received by Hollowood
and the seven other RNFAs assigned to the OB/GYN depart-
ment who felt the change would possibly result in a decline in
the quality of patient care and in a loss of three RNFA posi-
tions. Regarding the latter, Hollowood testified that she and
other RNFAs were concerned that three of them would lose
their positions and be replaced by untrained personnel (Tr. 58).
On August 20, 1997, Hollowood and seven other RNFAs, be-
lieving that their views were not being heard, sent a letter to
“The Obstetricians of St. Luke’s Hospital” explaining their
reasons for opposing the shift change. The RNFAs collectively
identified themselves in the letter as the “24-hour C-Section
Team of St. Luke’s” (GC Exh. 3). The letter reads as follows:

This letter is to express our concerns and make you
aware of the proposed changes regarding the C-Section
Team at St. Luke’s. The changes are as follows:

Change the 24 hour shift to two 12 hour shifts
Eliminate 3 RNFA positions
Replace eliminated RNFA positions with unli-
censed assistive personnel.

Administration believes that these changes are neces-
sary to reduce cost. They have expressed to us “no other
hospital in the St. Louis area has a C-Section team, and St.
Luke’s must conform to remain competitive in the market
place today.”
We feel by making these changes, the quality of ser-
vice that you have come to know and expect will cease to
exist. We have been told by physicians that the present C-
Section team has set the standards by which other hospi-
tals in the metropolitan areas are judged in malpractice
suits. Over the years, we have developed an efficient team
to respond to your needs in crisis situations. It is our opin-

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 764
ion that the safety of your patients will be compromised
with the above changes.
We know you have been told that the C-Section team
coverage will still be available. However, with the above
stated changes, very few, if any of the present RNFAs will
remain in Labor and Delivery. Since there is a shortage of
RNFAs in the area, we know the likelihood of finding
qualified assistants for the OB department is very doubt-
ful. When we expressed a concern regarding this probable
situation, we were told that they would train the staff
nurses to assist you in the surgical suite.
At the scheduled meeting on August 25th, we would
appreciate it if you would express your concerns to Dr.
Rigg and administration regarding this matter. It has been,
and always will be our intention to maintain the best qual-
ity of care for your patients, and to provide you with a ser-
vice “that no other hospital in the St. Louis area has.”

Hollowood testified that she helped draft the letter, and that
copies of the letter were also sent to Respondent’s president,
Dr. George L. Tucker, to Dr. Lee Rigg, the chief of the
OB/GYN department, and to Wagner (Tr. 59). Explaining why
she and the other RNFAs decided to write the letter, Hollowood
stated, “We were concerned about three RN first assists losing
their position; and we were also concerned about untrained
assistant personnel taking the places of our position” (Tr. 58).
On December 17, 1997, Gunn sent Hollowood a letter asking if
she would be interested in applying for either a full-or part-time
position (both 12-hour shifts) on the night shift in the LDRP
unit as a staff nurse. Hollowood declined the offer stating that
she preferred to remain in the L&D unit until the 24-hour shifts
were totally eliminated (R. Exhs. 5, 6).
By early February, only four RNFAs remained in the
OB/GYN department presumably as a result of the change in
shift schedule (Tr. 61). On February 9, three of the four
RNFAs—Hollowood, Richard Fiehler, and David Keune—sent
a letter to Respondent’s administrators including Tucker, Wag-
ner, Rigg, Winchester, and Gunn, and to chairman of the board,
Richard Batrum (Tr. 62), in which they complained that man-
agement had not been communicating with them regarding the
changes occurring at the OB/GYN department, and “voicing
[their] frustration and concerns over the inexperience and the
training of the people that were going to be [their] replace-
ments“ (GC Exh. 4; Tr. 61). The letter states that “few of the
newly hired or the in-house trainees come close to meeting any
of the criteria” set forth in Respondent’s own job descriptions
or the standards set for RNFAs by the association of operating
room nurses (AORN), that unsafe working conditions had been
observed in the L&D operating room, and documented, which
were directly related to the inexperience of their replacements,
and that “obstetrical surgeons share[d] their concerns.” The
February 9, letter then proceeds to discuss the impact the
change was having on the RNFAs’ terms and conditions of
employment. The letter in this regard, in relevant part, states:

In August 1997, we were advised that the transition
from 24 hour coverage to 12 hour coverage in L&D would
occur by December 1, 1997. This date was then extended
to March 1, 1998 [sic]. We agreed to stay. At this time
management is not prepared to give us a transition date.
Due to the insecurity of our positions, we are requesting a
written one-year contract, signed by administration, for the
time period of April 1, 1998 through April 1, 1999, with
compensation based on the same grade level and salary
scale as the RNFA that work in the O.R.
Since our negotiated transfer positions are in jeopardy
due to our loyalty to the obstetrical patients, the surgeons,
and St. Luke’s Hospital, we feel our job security needs to
be addressed. This one-year time period will give L&D
time to properly train some of the surgical technicians, al-
though to meet AORN standards of as [sic] RNFA the
process takes at least two years.

Director of surgical services, Patricia Geldbach, testified that
on receiving the letter, she, Wagner, and Gunn met with Hol-
lowood and the other signatories, RNFA Keune and Fiehler, to
respond to their concerns. Those concerns, according to Geld-
bach, included “job security” issues raised by the RNFAs, such
as whether jobs would still be available for them after the shift
change, and whether their vacation requests would still be hon-
ored. Geldbach also recalled the RNFAs asking to have their
salaries adjusted upward to compensate them for participating
in a training program intended to prepare them to take on the
additional duties.
3. The Unions’ organizational drives and Hollowood’s
union activities
In early 1998, around the time that Hollowood and other
RNFAs were voicing their concerns to management about the
changes in the OB/GYN department, Local 108 began a cam-
paign to organize Respondent’s maintenance employees. To
this end, Local 108, on February 20, petitioned the Board for an
election.5 On February 22, Hollowood and other RN’s met
with several maintenance employees and Local 108’s secre-
tary/treasurer, John Watson, at Hollowood’s home to discuss
how the RN’s might be able to assist Local 108 in its organiza-
tional efforts, and to strategize on how the RN’s might also
obtain union representation (Tr. 63).
Hollowood testified that several other union meetings were
held among RNs after February 22, including one on March 4,
during which those in attendance signed a petition authorizing
Local 161 to represent them for collective-bargaining purposes.
Between March 5 and April 23, she solicited some 42 signa-
tures from employees, and openly distributed union flyers noti-
fying them of upcoming union meetings (Tr. 68; GC Exh. 5).
The Respondent acknowledges knowing of Hollowood’s union
activities (Tr. 70; R. Exhs. 8–9).
She further testified to an incident that occurred on March
19, regarding her activities. Thus, around 10 a.m. on March 19,
according to Hollowood, she was called to Gunn’s office and
told that Geldbach reported that Hollowood was seen soliciting
signatures in the hospital’s outpatient recovery area. When
Hollowood denied being in the outpatient recovery area, Gunn
repeated that this is what Geldbach had told her, and cautioned
Hollowood against soliciting in that area. Hollowood admitted
engaging in solicitation, but claims she told Gunn her activities
had been conducted outside Respondent’s facility, not in a pa-
tient care area. Gunn responded, “Well, I hope that you are not

5 The bargaining unit sought to be represented by the Union in-
cluded:
all full-time and regular part-time skilled maintenance employees
employed at the Employer’s Chesterfield, Missouri hospital facility,
excluding employees employed in the Urgent Care and Surrey Place
operations, bio-med technicians, office clerical and professional em-
ployees, guards, supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other em-
ployees.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 765
soliciting names in patient care areas, you know better” (Tr.
64–65). Hollowood again denied the allegation. Around 1
p.m. that same day, Hollowood confronted Geldbach about
Gunn’s accusation and Geldbach admitted a mistake had been
made, noting that Buschol, a staff nurse in the outpatient recov-
ery area, had only reported seeing Hollowood “getting peti-
tions,” not that she had been soliciting in the outpatient recov-
ery area. Geldbach, Hollowood admits, stated that the entire
incident had been a misunderstanding (Tr. 66).
Gunn recalls speaking with Hollowood following receipt of a
report from Geldbach that Hollowood was seen soliciting in a
patient care area, conduct purportedly prohibited by hospital
policy. Hollowood, according to Gunn, admitted having solic-
ited in an employee smoking area, but denied doing so in the
outpatient recovery area. Gunn claims she apologized to Hol-
lowood at this point, assured her she would follow up on the
report, and then “simply referred it back to Geldbach” who
“took care of it” (Tr. 255).6
Geldbach claims she received a report from head nurse, De-
nise Kelly, that Hollowood had been soliciting in the outpatient
recovery area. Kelly, however, did not witness the solicitation
firsthand but rather, according to Geldbach, received the infor-
mation from Debbie Buschol, a staff nurse in the outpatient
recovery area. Geldbach reported the incident to Gunn. She
claims that after meeting with Hollowood, Gunn called her
back and explained that Hollowood denied soliciting in the
outpatient recovery area. Geldbach claims she then investi-
gated the matter further and learned that Buschol had in fact not
seen Hollowood soliciting in the outpatient care area but in-
stead had only seen her soliciting an outpatient care employee
in a smoking area. She recalls telling Hollowood, when the
latter questioned her about the matter, that the entire incident
had been a misunderstanding and resulted from a “miscommu-
nication.”7 The matter was apparently dropped at this point
(Tr. 329–331).
On March 6, a Board election pursuant to Local 108’s peti-
tion was held which Local 108 lost by a vote of 16–4. Local
108 thereafter timely filed 15 objections to the election claim-
ing that the Respondent had engaged in conduct which inter-
fered with the unit employees’ free choice in the election, re-
quiring that the election be set aside and that the Board either
issue a bargaining order or direct that a new election be held
(GC Exh. 1[g], Exh. 1). The merits of those objections are
currently before me for resolution and will be discussed below.

6 Although both Hollowood and Gunn agree that their meeting cen-
tered on Hollowood’s union solicitation, their accounts of how the
meeting was conducted vary in certain respects. Gunn, for example,
proffered a more benign version of the meeting, testifying, as noted,
that she asked Hollowood to sit down, apologized when Hollowood
denied having solicited in the outpatient recovery area, and agreed to
follow up on the matter. Hollowood’s version, however, suggests the
meeting had a more confrontational tone, with Gunn twice accusing,
and Hollowood twice denying, that she had solicited in a patient care
area. Hollowood’s account makes no mention of being asked to sit
down, or of Gunn apologizing for the incident and agreeing to look
further into the matter. Hollowood, as noted, recalls mentioning
Buschol as the person who might have seen her engaged in solicitation
in the smoking area, and identifying employee Ramsey as the individ-
ual she was soliciting. There is no indication in Hollowood’s account
of Gunn admitting or denying that Buschol was the source of the report,
and Gunn, in her version, makes no mention of Buschol’s or Ramsey’s
name having been brought up by Hollowood. I credit Hollowood’s
more detailed account of her meeting with Gunn.
7 Geldbach’s testimony that this conversation with Hollowood oc-
curred “a few days, within a week later” of the incident is inconsistent
with Hollowood’s assertion that the conversation took place just three
hours after her meeting with Gunn. I believe Geldbach was mistaken
as to the timing of this conversation and have thus accepted Hol-
lowood’s version that the conversation occurred at 1 p.m. on March 19.
Hollowood meanwhile continued with her organizing efforts,
including talking to nurses and soliciting their signatures on
union support petitions, the purpose of which, she testified, was
so that “we could have a say in the safe environment for our
patients and the working conditions that were deteriorating”
(Tr. 64). In mid-May, Hollowood distributed to employees a
letter signed by 13 physicians expressing their support for the
RN’s organizational drive, and their “efforts to refocus patient
care back to optimal staffing conditions rather than trendy busi-
ness practices” (GC Exh. 6.) In the letter, the physicians state
that they “support your movement towards collective bargain-
ing to promote quality working conditions to insure safe patient
care!” (GC Exh. 6). Hollowood also distributed another letter,
received in evidence as General Counsel’s Exhibit 7, informing
employees of the existence of a “Core group” of RNs, of which
Hollowood was a member, who were working towards obtain-
ing union representation.8
4. The June 1 telecast
On June 1, Hollowood, joined by RN Mike O’Neil, another
“core group” member, and a Dr. David Gearhart, were inter-
viewed by a local channel 5 television reporter regarding
changes the hospital was making in its OB/GYN section, in-
cluding the change from a 24-hour to 12-hour shift. Hol-
lowood’s comments during the interview, which, according to
Respondent was the catalyst for her discharge, followed some
brief comments by channel 5 reporter, Ruth Ezell.9 The follow-
ing is a verbatim account of the interview:

ANCHOR: Good evening. Thank you for joining us.
Our top story at ten, some doctors and nurses at St. Luke’s
Hospital are angry about changes they say threaten the
health of expectant mothers in the delivery room.
ANCHOR 2: The changes effect the medical teams
that perform C-sections at St. Luke’s. Newschannel 5’s
Ruth Ezell joins us now with the story. Ruth?
REPORTER: Well Rick and Karen there are eight
specially trained nurses that assist staff obstetricians with
C-sections at St. Luke’s. They each have anywhere be-
tween 15 to 23 years of seniority with the hospital and a
whole lot of experience. Until recently, the nurses worked
on a system of 24 hour shifts they say was essential to the
care of mothers ready to deliver. Well now the RNs ac-
cuse the hospital of cutting their shift in order to replace
them with less qualified employees.
Registered nurse first assistant Carol Hollowood says
when a patient comes into the delivery room at St. Luke’s,
8 The core group consisted of some five–seven nursing employees
who would meet with Union Representative Watson to discuss organiz-
ing strategies. In effect, the core group appears to have served as the
in-house organizing committee.
9 Hollowood testified that someone other than herself was scheduled
to do the interview but when the person couldn’t make it, she went in
that person’s place (Tr. 115). Gearhart was one of the 13 doctors who
signed the support letter Hollowood distributed to employees in mid-
May. Unlike Hollowood and O’Neil, Gearhart was not an employee of
the Respondent but instead had a contractual relationship with the
Hospital.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 766
she’s treated like a member of the family. But Hollowood
accuses the powers that be of jeopardizing the health of
mothers and babies by offering her and her counterparts
short shifts and more responsibilities.
CAROL HOLLOWOOD RN (ST. LUKE’S
HOSPITAL): Initially two years ago we had three people
on a 24 hour shift, because, as we said before, Dr.
Gearhart said, that labor and delivery you have emergen-
cies that can happen not one at a time but possible two at a
time where we needed a crew of people that were qualified
to assume the responsibility of these emergencies for
mother and baby. And then two years ago they reduced to
two and didn’t allow us to do two sections at one time or
two cases at one time in labor and delivery. And now
what they’re trying to do is have one person cover what
three people did two years ago.
REPORTER: Hollowood opted to transfer to another
section of the hospital. She’s certain that her replacement
won’t have her qualifications. In February the RN first as-
sistants wrote to St. Luke’s administrative staff detailing
their concerns. Some staff doctors are worried too. They
include Dr. David Gearhart, the former Missouri section
chairman for ACOG, the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists.
DR. DAVID GEARHART: I’m not going to be as a
good a quarterback with seven rookies as I was with seven
all star offensive linemen. We are seeing nurses replaced
with patient care technicians, less than an optimal situa-
tion. And I think equally important in our particular de-
partment we’ve seen great surgical assistants being re-
placed with nurses that are not trained to do the job they
have.
REPORTER: Dr. Gearhart was among more than a
dozen doctors who put their support for the nurses in writ-
ing. Some of the nurses are fighting for collective bar-
gaining as a way to insure adequate patient care and work-
ing conditions.
MIKE O’NEIL RN: There’s been so many nurses in
healthcare across the country that have gotten turned off to
the non-responsiveness of administrators since the bottom
line now controls their responses to us. Nurses are turned
off to that. We are going to refocus the issues back on the
patient and fight for their rights for adequate staffing. We
have to do this.
REPORTER: Spokesmen for St. Luke’s say there are
no cutbacks taking place. In fact there’s a job fair coming
up in June 8th for the entire Unity Healthcare System, of
which St. Luke’s is a part. But…there are concerned
nurses. They worry about the quality of those applicants
and how they’re going to be utilized if they’re hired.
ANCHOR: No cutbacks in terms of manpower, in
terms of hours or both?
REPORTER: Officials were not clear on that. No one
is supposed to be losing their job. According to the
nurses, the nurses in the C-section unit, they have the op-
tion to transfer to another department. So there should be
no job cuts in terms of personnel.

Hollowood explained that she did the interview “because we
were responding to some patient care issues and we wanted to
bring out the fact that in order to correct these patient care is-
sues and to make a work place a safe environment, that we had
to bring it to the public.” She testified that she decided to go
public because “we couldn’t get anybody else . . . in
administration” to listen to us, and that when she and others
tried to do so through the letter, it only served to guarantee that
they would be transferred out of OB/GYN. Her intent, she
claims, was to “bring out working conditions, unsafe
conditions, and that we could benefit by collective bargaining
and make things better” (Tr. 115).

5. The alleged opposition to Hollowood’s remarks
According to Respondent, Hollowood’s June 1 remarks
caused “a pronounced reaction” among hospital employees and
physicians. Thus, Wagner, Tucker, and Gunn testified that
following the interview they received numerous oral and writ-
ten complaints from the nursing staff and physicians expressing
disapproval of Hollowood’s remarks and stating that they no
longer wished to work with her. Geldbach also provided some
testimony regarding comments she overheard being made by
certain physicians and staff nurses a day or so after the June 1
interview.
Wagner testified that soon after the interview, two physi-
cians, Dr. Pearce and Dr. Leidenfrost, and employee Susan
Browning, one of the RNFA replacements, personally com-
plained to her about Hollowood. Pearce, she claims, expressed
concern that if Hollowood were allowed to remain in the oper-
ating room suite, “she would be looking for problems to talk to
other people about,” that this “was not a conducive way to
work in the operating room,” and that it was “risky to have a
person who was looking for problems when we are trying to
take care of patients.” Leidenfrost purportedly told her that “it
was terrible that [Hollowood] would say disparaging things
about the Hospital and that patient care was poor” because “he
knew . . that we have good quality patient care.” Leidenfrost,
Wagner claims, further added that “he didn’t want to work
with” Hollowood, and didn’t want her in his operating room.10
Wagner also recalls Gunn reporting that she, Gunn, had re-
ceived complaints from the “nursing staff” about the interview,
and that the nursing staff was “very upset about what Carol
[Hollowood] said on TV and felt that they didn’t want to work
with her.”
Browning, according to Wagner, called her on the phone and
complained about feeling “uncomfortable” around Hollowood,
and that working conditions with Hollowood in the L&D unit
were not workable. Browning also purportedly complained that
the comments Hollowood had been making about the RNFA
replacements not being well trained and making it unsafe for
patients were not true, and purportedly told Wagner that she
took personal offense at Hollowood’s views in this regard.
Wagner, however, admitted uncertainty as to whether Brown-
ing’s remarks were made in response to Hollowood’s June 1,
10 Although Wagner claims that Leidenfrost complained to her only
about not wanting to work with Hollowood, a letter purportedly sent
from Leidenfrost to Tucker, received in evidence as R. Exh. 10, shows
that Leidenfrost was in fact refusing to work with two of the three
individuals who gave the interview, presumably Hollowood and
O’Neil, and not just the former. I am inclined to believe that if Lei-
denfrost, as shown in the letter, objected to working with both Hol-
lowood and O’Neil, he would have mentioned this fact to Wagner, and
not have limited his complaint to Hollowood, as testified to Wagner.
Ironically, Hollowood testified, without contradiction, and credibly in
[my] view, that she had last worked with Leidenfrost in 1991, some 7
years prior to her discharge. Why Leidenfrost would have made such a
remark when Hollowood had not worked with him in so many years is
somewhat of a mystery.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 767
comments or was simply an expression of views regarding the
working conditions she shared with Hollowood. Wagner fur-
ther testified that Browning was the only staff employee to
complain to her about Hollowood. (Tr. 32–34.)
Pearce and Leidenfrost were not called to testify, leaving un-
corroborated Wagner’s claim of what they may have said to
her, and rendering her testimony in this regard nothing more
than hearsay. Although Browning did testify, she makes no
mention in her testimony of having spoken to Wagner about
Hollowood. Rather, she testified only that after hearing Hol-
lowood's June 1, remarks, she became “very upset” and ranted
and raved to her patient care assistant, whom she identified
only as Nancy, about the telecast. Her failure to make refer-
ence to any conversation between herself and Wagner regard-
ing Hollowood leads me to believe that no such conversation
took place, and that Wagner’s claim to the contrary is a mere
fabrication.
Browning, nevertheless, testified, but only in very general
terms, that days after the June 1 interview, people remained
“amazed” and felt insulted about Hollowood’s remarks, point-
ing out that the entire obstetrical team, including the surgery
team, shared this view. However, as found above, she never
reported these complaints to Wagner who, as more fully dis-
cussed below, claims to have been involved in Hollowood’s
eventual termination. Nor she did report these complaints to
Tucker, who was also responsible for the discharge, for Brown-
ing does not mention having done so and Tucker, in his testi-
mony, likewise makes no mention of having received any such
complaints from Browning. It is further worth noting that de-
spite her above testimony, Browning never testified that the
obstetrical or surgical teams had expressed an unwillingness to
continue working with Hollowood.
Browning, however, did testify regarding her own personal
unwillingness to work with Hollowood and apparently sent
Respondent’s personnel department a letter on June 5, pre-
sumably a few hours before Hollowood was discharged, ex-
pressing her views in this regard.11 In her letter, Browning
states, inter alia, that she has had difficulty working with Hol-
lowood for the past 6 months, and that working conditions with
Hollowood had become so untenable that she, Browning,
would no longer be able to work with Hollowood (R. Exh. 12).
In fact, at the hearing, Browning was adamant that she did not
even want to be in the same building with Hollowood (Tr. 311).
Browning, however, struck me as a highly biased witness hav-
ing a personal gripe against, as well as deep resentment and
animosity towards, Hollowood. This became quite evident not
just from her demeanor, but also from her testimony that
transferring Hollowood to a department some three floors from
the L&D unit, resulting in Browning having virtually no
contact with Hollowood, would not be satisfactory to her, and
that she would instead prefer not to be in the same building
with Hollowood. I am convinced that her testimony regarding
er, was colored by her Hollowood, as well as her June 5, lett
lowood, as well as her June 5, letter, was colored by her dislike
for Hollowood and, consequently, give it no weight.
11 Browning’s June 5 letter could not have played any role in Hol-
lowood’s discharge since both Wagner and Tucker testified that the
decision to terminate Hollowood was made either on June 3 or 4 (Tr.
24, 292). Further, while Browning claims to have delivered her letter
to personnel a few hours before Hollowood was notified of the termina-
tion, there is no indication that Wagner ever received a copy of that
letter before she effectuated the discharge. Wagner, in fact, testified to
having received nothing in writing from Browning (Tr. 34). Tucker,
likewise, makes no mention of having seen Browning’s letter. Accord-
ingly, Browning’s letter is of no relevance here and is given no weight.
Gunn also testified to receiving numerous complaints from
staff members and “many physicians” regarding the interview,
and described them as being “outraged, very angry and emo-
tional, unable to believe what had occurred, and fearful that
what had been said had messed up with their patients . . . that
wanted to come to St. Luke’s to have their baby.” However,
when asked to name which of the “many physicians” com-
plained to her, Gunn could only name three—Drs. Pearse, Re-
instein, and Kline—adding, “I just don’t remember the names.”
She subsequently admitted that she never actually spoke to
Reinstein but had, instead, learned of the latter’s complaint
through some unnamed associate. Asked if any of these “many
physicians” had expressed to her a reluctance to work with
Hollowood because of her June 1 remarks, Gunn could only
recall that “perhaps one” might have done so.
Gunn did not corroborate Wagner’s claim that she, Gunn,
had reported to her that the “nursing staff” no longer wanted to
work with Hollowood. Rather, Gunn testified only that staff
members had been angry and upset by Hollowood’s remarks,
but never claimed to have heard the nursing staff expressing a
refusal to work with Hollowood, making it highly unlikely that
she would have made such a statement to Wagner. I am in-
clined to believe that Wagner simply embellished, if not out-
right fabricated, what Gunn might have told her, as she did with
Browning. This is not to suggest that Gunn was a credible
witness for there is evidence to suggest that she too was prone
to prevarication. Gunn, for example, testified that she had not
documented any of the complaints received from the purported
“many physicians” who contacted her. In an effort to establish
that some complaints had been documented, the Respondent
showed Gunn a June 4 letter purportedly from Pearce, and
asked if the letter had refreshed her recollection “as to whether
written documentation was provided.” Gunn promptly replied
that the letter had indeed refreshed her recollection in this re-
gard. However, during voir dire examination by the General
Counsel, Gunn was asked if she recalled who Pearce had given
the letter to. Her response, that she did not recall who Pearse
might have given it to, suggests she had prior knowledge but
was simply unable to recall on the witness stand if Pearce gave
the letter to her or to someone else (Tr. 276). When pressed on
the issue, Gunn conceded that she had never seen the Pearce
letter before it was shown to her by Respondent’s counsel at the
hearing. Gunn’s misleading claim of being unable to recall
who Pearce gave the letter to, when she in fact had never before
seen the letter, revealed a predisposition on her part to say
whatever was necessary, even if untrue, to assist the Respon-
dent’s case. Her blatant attempt in this regard to mislead casts
doubt on her entire testimony, and convinces me that her fur-
ther claim of having received complaints from “many physi-
cians,” including Pearse, Kline, and Reinstein was, if not fabri-
cated, clearly exaggerated, and unworthy of belief.
Tucker’s limited testimony regarding complaints he may
have received was so vague and devoid of specificity as to be
entitled to little or no weight. Tucker, for example, testified to
receiving written complaints from Leidenfrost (whom he often
mistakenly referred to as “Lydencross”) and Respondent’s chief
of surgery, David Krajcovic, and to have spoken with both of
them, as well as with Pearce and a Dr. Ramas, an orthopedic
surgeon. Regarding the written complaints, the Respondent
offered into evidence, without objection from the General

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 768
Counsel and the Charging Party, a handwritten note, dated June
2, purportedly from Leidenfrost, complaining about two “dis-
loyal employees,” presumably Hollowood and O’Neil, and
suggesting that they be fired or kept out of his work area be-
cause they were “poison to this organization.” (R. Exh. 10.)
While the letter, as noted, was not objected to by the opposing
parties, it was never properly authenticated as having been
prepared or signed by Leidenfrost. Tucker, for example, testi-
fied only that on arriving at work the day after the June 1 tele-
cast, he found the letter sitting on his desk and assumed it was
meant for him. There is no evidence to indicate how the letter
got there. Nor was Tucker ever asked if he recognized the
handwriting or the signature on the letter as belonging to Lei-
denfrost. Indeed, Tucker’s repeated reference to Leidenfrost as
“Lydencross” suggests he may not have been so familiar with
Leidenfrost as to have been able to identify the latter’s hand-
writing or signature.
Although Tucker claims to have spoken with Leidenfrost fol-
lowing receipt of the letter, and further claims that during the
conversation Leidenfrost essentially reiterated what had been
said in the letter, I view his testimony in this regard with a high
degree of skepticism. From a demeanor standpoint, Tucker was
not a very convincing witness, and inconsistencies between his
testimony and that provided by Wagner regarding Hollowood’s
discharge, as will be shown below, cast doubt not just on how
the discharge decision was made but also on his, as well as
Wagner’s entire testimony. Thus, I am not convinced that
Tucker in fact had a conversation with Leidenfrost after pur-
portedly finding the letter on his desk. Leidenfrost, as noted,
was not called to corroborate Tucker in this regard or, for that
matter, to authenticate Respondent’s Exhibit 10 as his own, and
there is no indication in the record or claim being made by
Respondent that he was unavailable to do so. Accordingly, I
give no weight to Respondent’s Exhibit 10, nor credit Tucker’s
claim of having spoken to Leidenfrost soon after receiving the
letter.
Tucker’s testimony, that he received a letter, dated June 4,
from Krajcovic complaining about Hollowood, suffers from the
same or similar infirmity as did his testimony regarding Lei-
denfrost. The letter in question, received in evidence as Re-
spondent’s Exhibit 11, again without objection from the Gen-
eral Counsel or the Charging Party, was not authenticated as
having been prepared, sent, or signed by Krajcovic. Rather,
Tucker testified that he asked some unidentified person, who
may or may not have been someone named Brenda, to solicit a
letter from Krajcovic on learning that Krajcovic had been upset
by the June 1 interview. Tucker received the letter not from
Krajcovic but from this unidentified person. Tucker was never
asked if he recognized the signature as belonging to Krajcovic,
and Krajcovic, like Leidenfrost, was not called to confirm that
he wrote and sent the letter. As with Leidenfrost, the Respon-
dent does not contend, nor does the evidence show, that Kra-
jcovic was unavailable to testify. Respondent’s failure to prop-
erly authenticate the Krajcovic letter as having been authored
and sent by him, I find, renders the document unreliable.
However, even if the letter had been properly authenticated,
it would nevertheless be entitled to little or no weight, for
Tucker was unable to recall if he received the letter before or
after Hollowood’s June 5 discharge date, admitting it could
very well have been received after June 5 (Tr. 291). Thus, if
Tucker received the letter after the decision to discharge Hol-
lowood was made, then it is reasonable to assume that Tucker
had no knowledge of Krajcovic’s written complaint when he
discharged Hollowood. It should be noted that while Tucker
claims to have heard that Krajcovic was upset about the inter-
view, and that it was this information which purportedly
prompted him to solicit a statement from Krajcovic, Tucker
does not claim to have known what Krajcovic was upset about
prior to requesting the letter. In light of these facts, I give no
weight whatsoever to the Krajcovic letter and find it had no
bearing on the decision to terminate Hollowood. Although
Tucker also claims to have spoken with Krajcovic before Hol-
lowood was discharged, he offered no specifics as to what
might have been discussed or when precisely this alleged con-
versation took place. It is therefore not known if Hollowood
was the subject of that discussion or, for that matter, whether
the conversation occurred before or after the June 1 telecast.
Thus, while Tucker’s claim that he had a conversation with
Krajcovic before Hollowood was discharged does not ring true,
even if I were credit his testimony in this regard the vague and
ambiguous nature of said testimony renders it of little or no
value to the issue of Hollowood’s discharge.
Tucker, as noted, also claims to have received complaints
from Pearce and Ramas. Pearce purportedly told him that “the
staff in the delivery area was in a high state of shock, anxiety,
and . . . were extraordinarily angry,” and “strongly” advised
Tucker “not to have Carol [Hollowood] report back there to
work.” Ramas, Pearce claims, “was very angry” and “raised
the issue . . . even more forcefully” than did Pearce, and went
so far as to “threaten physical violence” (Tr. 283–284). Again,
Tucker’s testimony as to his alleged conversations with these
two physicians rang hollow. Tucker, for example, offered no
clue as when these alleged conversations might have taken
place. It is not known, for example, if they occurred before or
after the decision to terminate Hollowood was made. More
importantly, they were not corroborated by Pearce or Ramas,
neither of whom testified. Accordingly, I do not credit
Tucker’s testimony that he received complaints from Pearce
and Ramas. Further, even if I were to believe that such conver-
sations took place, it cannot be said that they played any role in
the decision to terminate Hollowood, as it is unclear from
Tucker’s testimony just when they occurred.
Finally, Geldbach testified to having had separate conversa-
tions with physicians Kim, Freidrich, and Druck, Respondent’s
chief of medical staff, on June 2, in which they expressed being
angry and upset by the telecast and concerned about the impli-
cations it might have on patient care and the Hospital in gen-
eral.12 Their anger, according to Geldbach, was directed at all
three individuals who participated in the interview, not just
Hollowood. She made no mention in her testimony of these
three physicians having expressed an unwillingness to work
with Hollowood. Geldbach further claims to have spoken with
Leidenfrost, possibly on June 3, and that he, unlike the other
three physicians, was adamant about not wanting Hollowood to
be assigned to his operating room (Tr. 332–333, 337). She also
testified to having heard Staff Nurses Kathy Sempler, Donna

12 On redirect examination by Respondent’s counsel, Geldbach men-
tioned, almost in passing, that Krajcovic had also “requested not to
have Carol in his room either” (Tr. 346). Yet, when asked by Respon-
dent’s counsel on direct examination who she had spoken to her regard-
ing the June 1 incident, or about Hollowood in particular, Geldbach
never mentioned Krajcovic. Thus, it is unclear from her testimony if
Geldbach on redirect was asserting that Krajcovic made this remark
directly to her, or whether she heard it from some other source.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 769
Weber, and Mary Spencer engaged in a general discussion of
the June 1 telecast but could not recall what was said by any of
the three (Tr. 338). Geldbach admits she did not report the
alleged complaints made to her by Physicians Kim, Freidrich,
Druck, and Leidenfrost, or the unspecified comments purport-
edly made by nurses Sempler, Weber, and Spencer, to Tucker
or Wagner. Rather, she claims to have passed on what she was
told and heard to her immediate supervisor, Associate Hospital
Administrator Brenda Kelley (Tr. 346).
I give no weight to Geldbach’s above testimony, for even if I
were to believe her claims as to what the above-four physicians
may have told her, or what she might have overheard from the
three nurses, there is simply no evidence to suggest that Tucker
and/or Wagner knew of, or considered, such comments when
they made the decision to terminate Hollowood or, for that
matter, at any time thereafter. Thus, by her own admission,
Geldbach only reported what she purportedly had heard or been
told to her supervisor, Kelley. Kelley was not called to cor-
roborate Geldbach in this regard or to explain whether such
information was passed on to Tucker or Wagner. Nor, as
noted, did either Tucker or Wagner claim to have received any
such information from Kelley. Geldbach’s testimony as to
what she may have heard or been told regarding the June 1
interview or Hollowood in particular is, therefore, of no real
relevance here as no showing has been made that such informa-
tion played a role in Hollowood’s discharge.
6. Hollowood is fired
Both Wagner and Tucker agree that the decision to terminate
Hollowood was made either on June 3 or 4. Their testimonies,
however, conflict on the question of how that decision was
made, and who took part in that decision. Wagner’s testimony
is somewhat confusing and at times self-contradictory. Thus, at
one point in her testimony, Wagner claims that she, Gunn, and
Tucker were “involved” in the decision. However, she also
testified that the actual decision to terminate was made by
Tucker, and not her or Gunn. Yet, when asked elsewhere in her
testimony if she had reviewed the videotapes of the TV inter-
view, Wagner replied that she had, and believed Dr. Tucker had
also done so “before we decided to fire Hollowood (Tr. 37).
Similarly, asked if she had relied on “any other documents in
making the determination to fire Hollowood,” Wagner replied,
“Basically, it was based on the complaints from the staff and
physicians about working with Carol and the concern for pa-
tient setting” (Tr. 37–38).13 Clearly, her use of the pronoun
“we,” as well as her description of what she relied on in making
the decision, suggests some involvement by her in the decision,
and would appear to contradict her prior assertion that the deci-
sion was made by Tucker alone. Wagner further claims that
she, Gunn, and Tucker were not together when the decision was
made, and that she first met with Gunn, and then met separately
with Tucker, without Gunn, to discuss the discharge (Tr. 23).
Wagner claims that in her meeting with Tucker, she told him
of the complaints she and Gunn had received from staff and
physicians regarding Hollowood’s June 1 remarks, stating that
these individuals “were very upset about the things that were
said, disparaging people who worked there, that they weren’t
competent and that things were unsafe for the patients.” Ac-
cording to Wagner, she asked Tucker for an opportunity to
convince the staff to work with Hollowood, but Tucker de-
clined to do so because “you can’t make people work in a good
setting in a tense situation.” (Tr. 52.) She further claims that
she, and presumably Gunn and Tucker, reviewed Hollowood’s
personnel file prior to making the decision to fire her.

13 She subsequently added that Hollowood’s personnel file was re-
viewed in connection with the discharge. While she did not specifically
mention that Gunn and Tucker took part in reviewing the file, given
her, albeit confusing, claim that she, Tucker and Gunn all took part in
the discharge decision, her testimony that “we looked over her . . .
personnel file” clearly suggests that all three perused the file before
discharging Hollowood.
Tucker, however, confirmed none of what Wagner said.
Thus, he testified that he decided to discharge Hollowood after
consulting with Respondent’s attorney, John Thomas, and its
chief operating officer, Jim Hobbs. He makes no mention in
his testimony of ever having met with Wagner and/or Gunn to
discuss Hollowood’s discharge or of consulting with either or
both of them regarding the dismissal. Nor did he corroborate
Wagner’s claim that she reported to him the complaints she had
received from hospital staff and physicians about Hollowood.
Rather, Tucker in his testimony only discussed the complaints
he purportedly received directly from Leidenfrost, Krajcovic,
Pearse, and Ramas. He never stated that these complaints had
been forwarded to him through Wagner. In fact, Tucker makes
no mention whatsoever of Wagner or Gunn in his testimony.
Thus, he did not confirm Wagner’s further assertion that she
asked him for an opportunity to convince the staff employees to
work with Hollowood. Gunn, for her part, provided no testi-
mony as to her involvement, if any, in Hollowood’s termination
and, consequently, corroborated neither Wagner’s nor Tucker’s
version of the discharge.14
I found neither Tucker nor Wagner’s version of the discharge
particularly credible, especially in light of the inconsistencies in
their respective accounts. From a demeanor standpoint, both
seemed less than candid in their recitation of events, Wagner
more so than Tucker, in my view. Thus, I do not believe Wag-
ner’s claim that she asked Tucker for an opportunity to con-
vince staff employees to continue working with Hollowood, for
it would appear to be inconsistent with her own testimony that
she did not try to counsel Hollowood because “it would not
have been helpful.” (Tr. 51.) Nor could she have told Tucker
that the “nursing staff” was refusing to work with Hollowood,
for her claim of having received this information from Gunn, as
noted, is not corroborated by the latter. The only staff nurse
shown in the record to expressed opposition to working with
Hollowood was Browning. However, as found above, Brown-
ing does not claim to have told Wagner about her views in this
regard. Notwithstanding her overall lack of credibility, I do
believe that Wagner had some involvement in the decision to
terminate Hollowood for, as noted below, it was she who pre-
pared the discharge letter and who on June 5, implemented that
decision.
On or about June 5, Wagner prepared a letter of termination
that was to be given to Hollowood later that day. The letter, in
pertinent part, reads as follows:

This is to notify you that your Salary Agreement and
employment with St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hos-
pitals are terminated effective immediately. By your ac-
tions and behavior, you have created an atmosphere of dis-
14 Gunn, at one point, was asked by the General Counsel if she was
involved in the discharge. While I overruled the Respondent’s objec-
tion to the question, for reasons unknown the General Counsel did not
solicit a response to the question.

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 770
trust and enmity, and physicians and nurses have now re-
fused to work with you as a result of your wrongfully dis-
paraging their professionalism and performance. [GC Exh.
2.]

That same day, Wagner called Hollowood at home and left a
message for Hollowood to call her back. On returning home
around 1:30 p.m. and getting Wagner’s message, Hollowood
called Wagner who said she wanted to speak with Hollowood.
Hollowood went to the hospital shortly thereafter and met with
Wagner. Jeannette Taafe, from human resources, was also
present at this meeting. Wagner claims she read the above
letter to Hollowood, gave it to her, and asked if she had any
questions. Hollowood purportedly asked only when she would
be receiving her last paycheck. Wagner also recalls that Hol-
lowood asked to make a phone call, and was given permission
to do so, and also asked about retrieving her personal belong-
ings. (Tr. 52–55.)
Hollowood provided a more detailed and, in my view, credi-
ble version of the discharge meeting. Thus, she testified that on
arriving at Wagner’s office, Wagner asked her to have a seat,
then commented, “First of all, I want to tell you that this is not
negotiable.” When Hollowood replied she understood, Wagner
told her she had a letter for Hollowood, gave her a copy, and
stated, “As of right now, your employment with St. Luke’s
Hospital is terminated.” Wagner than asked Hollowood for her
locker combination stating she would have Gunn retrieve her
belongings. Hollowood responded that she had no problem
going upstairs herself to pick up her own belongings, but Wag-
ner replied, “No, I just don’t think you want to go up there.”
When Hollowood repeated that she had no problem going by
herself, Wagner insisted that Gunn would retrieve her belong-
ings, at which point Hollowood agreed. Wagner then asked
Hollowood to wait outside while she waited for Gunn to return,
at which point Hollowood asked, and was given permission, to
use the phone. Approximately 10 minutes later, according to
Hollowood, she came out of the office and when she asked
Gunn about her belongings, the latter replied that it would take
a little more time. Hollowood protested that she did not want to
sit there on display waiting for her personal things to arrive,
and asked if a security officer could bring the things to her
house just over a mile from the Hospital. Wagner responded
that while it was not standard procedure, she would be willing
to do so. Hollowood then asked about her final paycheck and
was told the Hospital had not had enough time to get it pre-
pared. Wagner assured Hollowood they would call her when
the check was ready, and Hollowood said “OK,” and left. (Tr.
82–83.)
O’Neil was not discharged nor disciplined in any manner for
his part in the interview because, according to Respondent, he
was simply “tout[ing] the benefits of unionization” and “spoke
only of union organizing issues” (R. Exhs. 9, 26). According to
Tucker, he did not fire O’Neil because “[h]e didn’t say any-
thing disparaging about the abilities or the training of any of
our St. Luke’s employees, nor did he say anything disparaging
about the care patients received at our hospital” (Tr. 286). In
contrast, Hollowood, the Respondent claims, “provided false
information to the reporter and made false statements disparag-
ing the qualifications of the other RNFAs, which were only
designed to cast doubt on the Hospital’s quality of patient care”
(R. Exh. 9). As to Dr. Gearhart, Tucker testified that he had
breached three provisions of his contract with Respondent, one
of which pertained to the TV interview, was given 30 days to
correct the purported contract violations, and then had his con-
tract terminated when he failed to do so (Tr. 288).
Hollowood received no advance warning of her termination.
On June 7, 2 days after being fired, Hollowood received a call
from a friend at another hospital associated with the unity
group, who suggested that Hollowood dial Respondent’s update
phone line to hear a message that Dr. Tucker had recorded for
hospital employees regarding the television interview. The
message stated as follows:

I am sure that most of you have either heard of or saw
on television some of St. Luke’s staff, including both
nurses and doctors, publicly stating that we do not provide
good patient care. I am personally insulted and offended.
I take this as an insult not only to St. Luke’s, but to all of
us who work hard everyday to provide top notch care for
our patients. It makes us look bad and that threatens all of
our jobs. That a couple of people would do such a thing
apparently to further their own agendas, regardless of the
facts or the costs to their friends, co-workers, and to the
hospitals, should make all of us angry.
For people who have legitimate concerns about the
hospital or our patients, we have always encouraged and
mandated the staff to address these concerns. In this case,
we looked into the matters in question and found there
were no basis for the claims. It appears some people have
forgotten our mission, our values, and why we are here,
and have decided to trade the respect of their co-workers
and the confidence of our patients for their apparent per-
sonal interests.

The record reflects that Hollowood had been employed by
Respondent for some 20 years before being discharged. Hol-
lowood testified that during that period, she received one warn-
ing in 1995 for an attendance-related problem, and a write up
sometime in 1996, but that she had never before been disci-
plined for misconduct. She claims that at one point or another
she had worked with the 100 or so OB/GYN staff doctors at the
Hospital, and last worked with Dr. Leidenfrost in 1991. She
also recalls having worked with Dr. Pearce approximately once
or twice a month, but no mention was made as to when she last
worked with him. As to Dr. Ramas, Hollowood recalls she last
worked with him some 8 years prior to her discharge. Hol-
lowood testified that she had been an active union supporter for
many years. The Respondent, as noted, readily concedes
knowing of her involvement in union activity.
C. Analysis and Findings
1. The 8(a)(1) allegations
a. The alleged unlawful conduct directed at employee
Timothy Brewer15
The complaint alleges at paragraph 5(A) through (F), the
General Counsel contends, and the Respondent denies, that on
separate occasions in late February and early March, the Re-
spondent, through Director of Plant Operations Dave
McLaughlin, Assistant Director of Plant Operations Bill Bitter,

15 Brewer was employed by Respondent as a grade one mechanic in
the maintenance department until discharged on March 13, allegedly
for insubordination. His termination was alleged as unlawful in the
charge filed in Case 14–CA–25025. The Regional Director subse-
quently dismissed that portion of the charge pertaining to Brewer’s
termination, which dismissal was upheld on appeal (Tr. 8, 164).

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 771
and Supervisor Kurt Krog, all admitted 2(11) supervisors,
unlawfully interrogated Brewer about his activities on behalf of
Local 108, unlawfully solicited him to remove his name from
the Union’s support petition he signed, and threatened to fire
the entire staff, hire new personnel, or replace them with Ser-
vice Master, a subcontractor. It further alleges that McLaughlin
unlawfully removed union literature posted by Brewer on a
bulletin board while permitting other nonunion literature to
remain posted.
The General Counsel relies on Brewer’s testimony to support
of the above allegations. Thus, Brewer testified that after Local
108 filed its petition with the Board, different supervisors, in-
cluding McLaughlin, Krog, and Bitter met individually with
employees to determine how they stood on the union issue (Tr.
141). Brewer recalls that during one such February 20 meeting,
Bitter stated that on advice from Respondent’s legal depart-
ment, “[T]he supervisors were going to be talking to everyone,
to see where they stand on the issue of organizing the Union.”
Bitter then purportedly asked Brewer if he was involved with
Local 108, how he felt about it, and where he stood on the sub-
ject of bringing in a union or any kind of collective bargaining
(Tr. 143–144). Brewer replied that he “was for the Union . . .
and that [he] hoped it would never come between us and our
immediate supervisors because we were all like one big family
in the maintenance shop.” Bitter then asked Brewer if he had
signed the Union’s support petition, and when Brewer re-
sponded affirmatively, Bitter remarked that “it was possible and
maybe probable that they would replace the supervisors if they
couldn’t kill the Union or the organizing activity.” He added
that “it is never too late to withdraw your name from the peti-
tion” but that if Brewer chose not to do so, he was still “free to
vote no if there was in fact an election” (Tr. 145–146).
Brewer testified that Krog made similar remarks about em-
ployees and supervisors losing their jobs if the Union were to
come in. He claims he and Krog were “very close” and often-
times would just sit and “shoot the breeze.” During one such
conversation held in Krog’s office around March 2, Brewer
recalls Krog discussing how he had once worked at another
hospital in Iowa, and that when employees tried to organize
themselves the hospital fired the entire staff and hired new
employees, and that at another facility he worked at, the em-
ployer reclassified the employees’ jobs when a union came on
the scene resulting in a loss of pay and benefits. When Brewer
asked if the same thing could happen at St. Luke’s, Krog re-
sponded, “It’s likely.” Brewer claims that Krog’s comments
upset him and that he became concerned he might lose his job
because of his union involvement.
Brewer further testified that a few days later, around March 5
or 6, he asked Krog about a rumor he had heard that Respon-
dent was thinking about firing the entire staff and retaining an
outside contractor like Service Master to replace them. Krog
purportedly responded, “It’s very possible,” that this was “one
of the many possibilities” the Respondent could explore, adding
that “something would definitely happen if we did get the Un-
ion . . . into the shop,” that “there would be changes, and it
would be negative.” (Tr. 148–149.)
Finally, Brewer testified that at around 6 a.m. on March 12,
he posted an anonymous letter to employees on a employee
bulletin board generally used by employees and supervisors
alike to post personal and company-related items of interest to
employees. Brewer stated he wrote the letter in response to
what he described as the “misinformation [about the Union]
that the rest of the fellows in the shop was [sic] being fed” by
the Hospital (GC Exh. 13). Approximately one-half hour later,
as employees were reading his letter, McLauglin, according to
Brewer, came to work and removed the letter from the bulletin
board. Asked if the Respondent’s practice was to remove on a
daily basis all the previous postings from the bulletin board,
Brewer replied, “Uh, it depends on what it was,” explaining
that “time-sensitive” postings having an expiration date were
removed when the time expired, but that items such as cartoons
might remain posted a little longer. As to antiunion propaganda
posted by Respondent, Brewer claims the Respondent put up a
new one every day, but did not immediately remove the old
ones from the bulletin board (Tr. 179–180).
On March 13, Brewer went to McLaughlin’s office after
hearing rumors that he was being accused of defacing some of
Respondent’s “Vote No” signs. When Brewer entered
McLaughlin’s office, the latter asked Bitter to be present during
the meeting. During the meeting, McLaughlin told Brewer that
he had a witness who had seen him changing the “Vote No”
signs. When Brewer denied the accusation, McLaughlin asked
him how he stood “on the issue of getting a union” at the Hos-
pital. Brewer replied that he did not feel comfortable answer-
ing the question, and simply told McLaughlin that he “was on
the fence about it or something like that, that I didn’t know yet
how I was going to vote.” Asked if he recalled what else might
have been said at this meeting, Brewer answered, “Uh, nothing
of any significance to this, just general, it was just general
stuff,” and that he “wouldn’t be able to recall it sufficiently to
do it under oath, and testify.” However, when instructed that it
was not for him to determine what was or was not relevant, he
reluctantly admitted that during the conversation he and
McLaughlin and/or Bitter began cursing at each other, and that
when Bitter stated to him, “You cuss a lot, don’t you,” he re-
plied, “Only when I am being called a liar or when I am being
accused of something I did not do.” Brewer, as noted, was ter-
minated that same day for insubordination.
Bitter and Krog both testified regarding Brewer’s assertions,
but McLauglin did not. Bitter admits he held individual meet-
ings with all employees, including Brewer, and that during such
meetings he simply mentioned to them that Local 108 had filed
a representation petition with the Board, and read to Brewer, as
he did to all other employees, a list of what a supervisor may or
may not due from a document entitled, “Supervisor Do’s and
Don’t’s During a Union Organizational Drive” (Tr. 209; R.
Exh. 3 attributed to him by Brewer). He also recalled the
March 13 meeting held in McLaughlin’s office but denied that
he or McLaughlin ever accused Brewer of defacing any of the
hospital’s postings (Tr. 218–219).
Krog denied ever having a one-on-one conversation with
Brewer in which he made the comments attributed to him by
Brewer. However, he admitted having been employed at an
Iowa hospital as a mechanic, and telling one or possibly two
employees that soon after he began working at the Iowa hospi-
tal, some employees were reclassified and that this occurred
during a union organizational drive. Krog explained that he
discussed his prior experience at the Iowa hospital because the
employees with whom he was speaking asked if he knew of any
“situations” or “examples” regarding unions, and that the list
“do’s” and “don’ts” for supervisors allowed him to discuss such
matters provided he did not tell employees that this “would or
could happen” at St. Luke’s (Tr. 192), which he denied doing.
He also denied ever telling Brewer that if the Union won the

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 772
election the Respondent would fire all of the employees and
hire a new staff, that it might replace them with Service Master,
that supervisors would be the first to go, or that the hospital
could legally reclassify all jobs to entry level jobs and cut em-
ployee wages (Tr. 190–191).
Having considered the testimony of all three witnesses in
light of their demeanor, consistency, biases, and inherent prob-
abilities, I credit Bitter’s and Krog’s denial that they made the
statements attributed to them by Brewer. Brewer was simply
not a very credible witness. His overall demeanor on the wit-
ness stand was poor. His nervousness was quite apparent, evi-
denced by frequent nervous laughter and lipbiting. However,
his anxiety did not appear to stem from the mere act of testify-
ing, as is often the case with witnesses, but rather from what I
am convinced was his lack of candor. Thus, his claim that he
was not to be “used to this,” e.g., testifying (Tr. 142), while
maybe true, was not, in my view, a credible explanation for his
nervousness. Brewer often rambled on when responding to
questions put to him, and at times seemed too eager to provide
information not requested of him. Brewer was also evasive
when asked about the contents of a warning, and admitted to
the assertions made therein only when presented with the warn-
ing itself (Tr. 174–175). In short, his testimony simply was not
believable, particularly his denial at being angry with Respon-
dent for firing him. In fact, his testimonial demeanor was that
of a person who was not merely hurt by what had occurred to
him, as he suggests, but rather quite upset at having been termi-
nated. My observation of his comportment as a witness leads
me to believe that Brewer was not being truthful and may have
fabricated the above accounts as a way of getting back at Re-
spondent. Accordingly, I reject Brewer’s testimony and find
that Bitter and Krog never made the remarks attributed to them
by Brewer, and which are alleged in the complaint as violative
of Section 8(a)(1). I shall therefore recommend that complaint
paragraphs 5(A)–5(C), and their respective subparts, be dis-
missed. Complaint paragraph 5(E) alleges that McLaughlin
unlawfully interrogated Brewer about his union activities dur-
ing the March 13 meeting. While McLaughlin, as noted, did
not testify, leaving Brewer’s testimony in this regard unrefuted,
Brewer’s testimony regarding this alleged interrogation was
simply not credible, particularly in light of his deliberate at-
tempt to provide only what he deemed to be relevant about that
conversation. Accordingly, this allegation shall also be dis-
missed.
Regarding the bulletin board issue, there is no disputing that
Brewer posted the letter for all employees and that it was sub-
sequently removed by McLaughlin, as admitted to by Bitter.
Contradicting Brewer, Bitter testified that all postings regard-
less of subject matter are routinely removed from the bulletin
board on a daily basis. While testifying that Brewer’s letter had
been posted for a day when it was taken down, Bitter did admit
that he first saw the letter on the bulletin board when he arrived
for work at 7 a.m. on the day it was removed, presumably
March 12, and that by 9 or 10 a.m., Brewer’s notice along with
all other notices which had been there since the day before, was
removed in keeping with what Bitter claims is Respondent’s
stated practice. He further admits having asked a group of
employees if anyone wanted the anonymous letter back, ex-
plaining he did so because he was not sure if the person who
posted letter wanted it back or whether it should be discarded.
The General Counsel, as noted, contends that the removal of
the Brewer letter from the bulletin board was unlawful. I do
not agree. First, Brewer’s testimony that his letter was re-
moved within one-half hour of being posted, while other litera-
ture, including Respondent’s own anti union propaganda, was
allowed to remain is contradicted by Bitter, who, as noted, testi-
fied that all such postings are removed on a daily basis. As
previously found, Brewer was not a credible witness. As such,
I do not credit his testimony. Rather, I find, in agreement with
Bitter, that the Respondent’s practice is to remove all postings,
regardless of their origin or content, from the bulletin board on
a daily basis, and that this particular practice was followed on
March 12 when, according to Bitter, all postings, including
Brewer’s letter, were removed from the bulletin board around 9
or 10 a.m. that day.
The General Counsel suggests that Bitter’s assertion that he
first noticed the Brewer letter posted on the board at 7 a.m. on
March 12, supports Brewer’s claim that the letter was posted on
the morning of March 12, and had not been posted 1 full day, as
further claimed by Bitter. The General Counsel, in my view,
reads too much into Bitter’s testimony, for the fact that Bitter
first noticed Brewer’s letter on the bulletin board on the morn-
ing of March 12, does not establish that the letter was in fact
posted that morning, for it might very well have been posted on
March 11, and not, as claimed by Brewer, on March 12, even
though Bitter first saw it that same morning. Although Bitter
did testify that the letter had been on the board for 1 day, he
was never asked to explain how he knew this (Tr. 221). While
at first blush Bitter’s testimony in this regard appears to be at
odds with his claim of having first noticed Brewer’s letter on
the morning of March 12, Bitter could very well have been
informed of its posting the day before but never noticed it until
March 12. The plain fact is that he was never asked to explain
how he knew when Brewer’s letter was posted and the only
evidence contradicting Bitter in this regard is Brewer’s discred-
ited claim that he posted the notice on the morning of March
12. I note that Brewer’s own testimony as to his preparation
and posting of the letter was hardly a picture of clarity. Asked,
for example, when he first typed the letter, Brewer replied that
he believes it was “put up the first or second week of March,”
adding that he is “almost positive that it was put up right before
I was fired.” (Tr. 150–151.) When reminded that the question
put to him was when the letter had been “typed” and not when
it was “put up,” Brewer replied that he had typed up the letter
“the night before.” He did not, however, explain what he
meant by “the night before.” Thus, it is not clear if he was
referring to “the night before” he was discharged or “the night
before” he posted the letter. Only when asked by the General
Counsel, in a somewhat leading fashion, if he had “posted this
letter on about March 12th” did Brewer reply that he had. In
sum, I do not believe Brewer’s testimony as to when he first
posted the letter or his claim that other items were left on the
bulletin board for more than 1 day. Accordingly, I find that the
Respondent did not act unlawfully when it removed Brewer’s
letter from the bulletin board on March 12, as alleged in com-
plaint paragraph 5(D), and shall consequently, recommend
dismissal of this allegation.16

16 The General Counsel on brief argues that Bitter’s attempt to ascer-
tain who the letter belonged to amounted to an unlawful interrogation
(GC Exh. 17). Bitter’s conduct in this regard was not alleged as a
separate violation in the complaint, and the General Counsel at the
conclusion of the hearing did not ask to have the pleadings conform to
the proof. Accordingly, I make no finding on whether Bitter’s inquiry
constituted unlawful conduct under the Act.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 773
b. The impression of surveillance allegation
The complaint further alleges, at paragraph 5(F), and the
General Counsel contends, that the Respondent created an
unlawful impression of surveillance when Gunn told Hol-
lowood she had been seen soliciting employee signatures in the
hospital’s outpatient recovery area. I find merit in the allega-
tion.
The test for determining whether an employer has created an
impression of surveillance is whether the employee would rea-
sonably assume from the statement in question that his or her
activities had been placed under surveillance. United Charter
Service, 306 NLRB 150 (1992). From her credited version of
that March 19 meeting, I am convinced that Hollowood could
reasonably have believed from Gunn’s remarks that the Re-
spondent was keeping a watch on her union activities. Thus,
Hollowood’s credited account of that meeting makes clear that
Gunn did not merely inquire into whether Hollowood had been
soliciting in a patient care area but rather accused her of doing
so, without first investigating whether or not the information
she had received was true. The information, as it turned out,
was not accurate, a fact that could have easily been ascertained
by Gunn through simple investigation. Gunn’s apparent failure
to acknowledge one way or the other Hollowood’s belief that
Buschold was in all likelihood the one responsible for the false
report could reasonably have led Hollowood to believe that the
Respondent might have been utilizing Buschold and/or other
employees to report on her union activities around the Hospital.
Such conduct is clearly coercive. The fact that Hollowood was
open about her activities and made no effort to conceal them, or
that she was a known union supporter and activist, would not
have rendered Gunn’s conduct or remarks any less coercive.
Simmons Industries, 321 NLRB 228, 234 (1996); Tupo Whole-
sale Dairy, 320 NLRB 896, 903 (1996). Accordingly, I find
that the Respondent created an unlawful impression of surveil-
lance, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, when
Gunn falsely accused Hollowood soliciting in the Hospital’s
outpatient care area.
2. The 8(a)(3) and (1) allegations
a. Hollowood’s discharge
The complaint, as noted, also alleges that Hollowood was
unlawfully discharged for her union and other protected con-
certed activities. Specifically, the General Counsel contends
that Hollowood was discharged because of her activities on
behalf of Local 161, and for her appearance at, and remarks
made during, the June 1 television interview. The Respondent
denies that Hollowood was terminated either for her union ac-
tivities or specifically for her June 1 remarks. Rather, it con-
tends that Hollowood was lawfully terminated because her
comments created such “an atmosphere of distrust and enmity”
between her and other hospital staff members and physicians
that they “refused to work” with Hollowood, rendering her
“unemployable” (R. Exh. 42). The Respondent further con-
tends that Hollowood’s conduct and statements were not, in any
event, protected by Section 7 of the Act because she acted
purely out of self-interest, and not for the mutual aid and pro-
tection of other employees. Finally, it argues that any protec-
tion her comments may have enjoyed under Section 7 was nev-
ertheless lost by virtue of the false and disparaging nature of
her remarks. The Respondent’s contentions are without merit.
Under Section 7 of the Act, employees have the right to en-
gage in “concerted” activities for their “mutual aid or protec-
tion,” and an employer violates the Act if it interferes with,
restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of that right.
Among the activities protected by Section 7 is the right of em-
ployees to communicate their concerns to the public, provided
that the communication is part of, and related to, an ongoing
labor dispute.17 Hacienda de Salud-Espanola, 317 NLRB 962,
966 (1995); Cordin Transport, 296 NLRB 237, 243 (1989);
Reef Industries, 300 NLRB 956, 959 (1990), enfd. 952 F.2d
830 (5th Cir. 1991). The protection afforded such communica-
tions includes, as here, employee communication with televi-
sion reporters. Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley, 220
NLRB 217 (1975), enfd. 538 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1976).
Hollowood’s June 1 television appearance and remarks were
clearly concerted as well as protected. Initially, Hollowood’s
June 1 conduct and remarks cannot be viewed in a vacuum but
must be considered in light of the events which led up to the
interview. Emarco, Inc., supra at 834. As shown by the above
factual recitation, prior to appearing on the June 1 interview,
Hollowood and other RNFAs were engaged in an ongoing labor
dispute with Respondent over its August 1997, decision to
switch the RNFA work schedule from a 24-hour to a 12-hour
work shift. The RNFAs, as noted, opposed the change believ-
ing it would adversely affect not only the quality of patient care
but also their own working conditions. Their concerns in this
regard were first publicly expressed in the August 20, 1997
open letter to the Hospital’s obstetricians, then formally
brought to Respondent’s attention in the February 9, 1998 letter
to hospital administrators and discussed in a subsequent meet-
ing between administrators and RNFAs, including Hollowood.
Hollowood testified, credibly and without contradiction, that it
was Respondent’s failure to address these very concerns which
prompted “a couple of us” to publicly air their grievances at the
June 1 television interview (Tr. 115).
Thus, it is patently clear that the June 1 interview, along with
the remarks made and views expressed therein by Hollowood,
O’Neil, as well as Gearhart, was simply part and parcel, and a
continuation, of this long-running labor dispute between the
RNFAs and the Respondent regarding their shift schedule
change. Thus, as she and others had been doing for almost ten
months prior to the interview, Hollowood at the interview
voiced concern that the change from a 24-hour to a 12-hour
shift would adversely affect patient care and employee working
conditions at the Hospital, and was clearly speaking not just for
herself but for all other RNFA and nursing personnel who were
or had been impacted by the change. Hollowood’s June 1 con-
duct and comments were therefore protected by Section 7 of the
Act as they clearly were part of and related to a labor dispute as
defined by Section 2(9) of the Act.
That Hollowood may have been acting out of some self-
interest does not, as claimed by the Respondent, deprive her
conduct of the Act’s protection, for “the motives of an em-
ployee who takes an action related to working conditions is
irrelevant in determining whether the action is protected.”
NLRB v. Parr Lance Ambulance, 723 F.2d 575, 578 (7th Cir.
1983), citing to Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d
320, 328 at fn. 10 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Mike Yurosek &
Son, Inc., 310 NLRB 831, 832 (1993) (“How an employee
subjectively characterizes his or her own actions is not
ployee has engaged in determinative . . . of whether that em
17 A “labor dispute” under Sec. 9 includes any controversy concern-
ing employee terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Emarco,
Inc., 284 NLRB 832, 833 (1987).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 774
native . . . of whether that employee has engaged in protected,
concerted activity.”). While it may be true that Hollowood
hoped to achieve some personal gain by joining with other
RNFAs to protest Respondent’s shift change, it is not all that
uncommon for employees who engage in concerted action to
have some personal goals in mind, for employees often engage
in such conduct as a means of obtaining improvements in their
own individual working conditions that might not be gotten
were they to act alone. Indeed, that is the underlying premise
of concerted activity, to wit, to achieve some form of personal
gain at the workplace, such as an increase in wages, benefits,
etc., through the power of collective action. To this extent,
therefore, employees who participate in group action are not
only seeking a general improvement in the lot of their fellow
employees, but are, to a certain degree, also acting out of self-
interest. Here, Hollowood was clearly acting in concert with
other RNFA and with O’Neil and Dr. Gearhart when she ap-
peared at the June 1 interview to discuss and express her oppo-
sition to Respondent’s shift change. Her actions and words,
made in furtherance of an ongoing labor dispute, therefore re-
mained protected regardless of whatever else may have moti-
vated Hollowood to act.
Nor do I agree with the Respondent that Hollowood’s June 1
remarks were “maliciously false” and “disparaging” and there-
fore not entitled to the Act’s protection. It is well settled that
the mere falsity of a communication does necessarily deprive it
of its protected character. Rather, only those communications
that are not related to an ongoing labor dispute and which are
disloyal, recklessly made, or maliciously false are deemed to
fall outside the Act’s protection. See, e.g., Cordin Transport,
supra, also Diamond Walnut Growers, 316 NLRB 36, 47
(1995); Kinder-Care Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171
(1990); Cincinnati Suburban Press, 289 NLRB 966, 967
(1988); Emarco, Inc., 284 NLRB 832, 833 (1987); and Mitchell
Manuals, 280 NLRB 230, 231 (1986).
As discussed above, Hollowood’s June 1 remarks were in-
tended to draw public attention to Respondent’s failure to ad-
dress the RNFA concerns regarding the effects the shift change
was having on patient care and employee working conditions,
and were therefore part of an ongoing labor dispute between the
RNFAs and the Hospital. Regarding the truthfulness of Hol-
lowood’s remarks, certain evidence of record, more particularly
the December 17, 1997 letter which Gunn sent to Hollowood
inquiring of her interest in a full- or part-time transfer to a 12-
hour night shift, and Gunn’s own testimony, appears to cor-
roborate at least some of the assertions made by Hollowood
during the interview. Hollowood’s June 1 claim, for example,
that 3 years earlier the Respondent had maintained a staff of
three RNFAs per 24-hour shift, which it subsequently reduced
to two, and then to one RNFA per 24-hour shift on switching
from a 24-hour to a 12-hour shift schedule, was not false as in
her December 17, 1997 letter Gunn appears to have made this
very point when she mentioned to Hollowood that Respondent
intended to “begin staffing the scrub team on 24-hour shifts
with one (1) person on duty instead of two (2) commencing
Sunday, January 18, 1998.” Further, Respondent’s assertion on
brief that the Respondent currently mans the C-section unit
with “one RNFA,” one scrub technician, and one circulatory
nurse also serves to corroborate Hollowood’s June 1 assertion
that only one RNFA would be used on the 24-hour shift sched-
ule (R. Exh. 33). Thus, it cannot be said that Hollowood’s
comment about the number of RNFAs having been reduced
from three to one on a 24-hour shift was untruthful.
Nor do I find Hollowood’s further remark about emergencies
in the L&D unit happening “not one at a time but possibly two
at a time” to have been palpably false. First, it should be noted
that Hollowood prefaced her remarks with the words, “because
as we said before, Dr. Gearhart said . . .” suggesting that Hol-
lowood was simply making reference to something Gearhart
might have said to her on the subject. If Gearhart was indeed
the source of her information,18 as appears to be the case, then
her remarks, if untrue, would clearly have been based on a mis-
taken belief as to their accuracy, and can hardly be viewed as a
maliciously false statement.19
I also do not agree with Respondent’s claim on brief that
Hollowood made false statements about, and disparaged the
qualifications of, the RNFA replacements by claiming that that
she was certain the replacements would not have her qualifica-
tions (R. Exh. 34). First, the actual remark about Hollowood
believing she had greater qualifications was expressed not by
Hollowood, but rather by the reporter, although the latter in her
remark does suggest that this sentiment may have been ex-
pressed to her by Hollowood. While Hollowood testified that
she in fact believed herself to be more qualified than the re-
placements, she did not recall having made such a remark to the
reporter, and testified only that while she could have made the
remark, it could just as well have been made by Dr. Pearce or
O’Neil, the other interview participants. The Respondent, as
noted, never questioned Hollowood about the remarks made by

18 The Respondent at the hearing was of the view, one with which I
am inclined to agree, that the transcript of the June 1 interview received
in evidence as GC Exh. 8 does not reflect the entire interview con-
ducted by the reporter of Hollowood, O’Neil, and Dr. Gearhart (Tr. 77).
Hollowood’s reference to statements made by Dr. Gearhart which were
not aired during the news broadcast, and which consequently do not
appear in GC Exh. 8 tends to support Respondent’s position.
19 Nor is it clear from Hollowood’s remarks what type of “emergen-
cies” she was referring to when she commented that such emergencies
could “possibly” occur “two at a time.” The Respondent assumes that
Hollowood was making reference to emergency unscheduled C-section
operations that would have to be performed while other C-sections that
had been scheduled were in progress. However, it is quite possible that
Hollowood could have been referring to “emergencies” in a more ge-
neric sense, and not just to the performance of unscheduled C-section
operations. Relying on its assumption that Hollowood was referring to
emergency unscheduled C-section operations, the Respondent points to
Gunn’s testimony, that there has never been “a need for two emergency
C-sections while one was already scheduled,” and to Hollowood’s
testimony that the Respondent has not had “three C-sections at the
same time,” as proof that Hollowood’s statement about two “emergen-
cies” occurring at the same time was untrue (R Exh. 31–32; Tr. 237,
100). Contrary to Respondent, I decline to speculate as what Hol-
lowood may have meant by her “emergencies” remark for she was
never asked to explain her remarks at the hearing, nor for that matter
given an opportunity to do so prior to being fired. Regarding her ad-
mission that there have not been three C-sections at the same time at
the Hospital, Hollowood was simply responding to a question by Re-
spondent’s counsel on whether she “ever had a situation where there
were three [C-sections] being performed at the same time,” and not, in
my view, attempting to explain the meaning of her remark, as that
question was never put to her. It is quite possible therefore that while
the Respondent may have never had two nonscheduled emergency C-
sections at one time, other types of emergencies might have occurred
with greater frequency. If so, then Hollowood’s claim would not have
been false. In short, the Respondent has not shown that Hollowood’s
remark regarding “emergencies” were maliciously false.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 775
her at the interview before firing her, and thus could not have
known if the reporter had accurately quoted Hollowood or
made a mistake.
But even if I were to believe that Hollowood indeed made
the comment which the reporter seems to attribute to her, the
remark reflected nothing more than Hollowood’s own personal
belief that she was better qualified than her replacements to be
a RNFA in the Hospital’s L&D unit. Indeed, it does not appear
that Hollowood was too far off the mark in this regard, for
Gunn readily admitted that the change from a 24- to a 12-hour
shift, and subsequent replacement of existing RNFA with
trained replacements in the L&D unit, did result in an overall
reduction in the skills and experience of RNFA (Tr. 264).
Gunn’s further testimony that the Respondent had to institute a
training program to train individuals to perform the work that
was being done by Hollowood and other RNFA, because it was
having difficulty recruiting qualified individuals for the posi-
tion, also lends credence to Hollowood’s belief that she was
better qualified than the replacements to perform RNFA duties
in the Hospital’s L&D unit. Unlike the replacements, Hol-
lowood, with 8 years experience as a RNFA in that unit, needed
no training to perform her duties and could therefore reasonably
be viewed as being more qualified than the replacements to
perform such duties. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the
remarks attributed to Hollowood by the reporter were palpably
false or disparaging.
In sum, I find that Hollowood’s June 21 remarks were nei-
ther false, misleading, or disparaging. However, even if some
aspect of her remarks could be viewed as not wholly accurate, I
would nevertheless find them to be protected by Section 7 as
the Respondent has not shown that Hollowood’s remarks were
deliberately or maliciously false. The fact that Respondent
characterizes it as such does not make it so, as its subjective
views in this regard cannot substitute for affirmative evidence
of malice. Cincinnati Suburban Press, supra. The Respondent,
who bears the burden of establishing that the remarks were
maliciously made, has, in my view, not done so here. Bituma
Corp., 314 NLRB 36, 44 (1994). Accordingly, Hollowood’s
June 1 remarks, as previously found, remained protected by
Section 7 of the Act.
Having found that Hollowood was engaged in protected con-
certed activity when she appeared at the June 1 interview and
made her remarks, the question remaining is whether she was
unlawfully discharged for making such remarks and for her
union activities. The evidence supports a finding that she was
discharged for such activities.
As an initial matter, I find that the General Counsel has, as
required by the Board’s holding in Wright Line, 251 NLRB
1083 (1980),20 made a prima facie showing that Hollowood’s
activities on behalf of Local 161, as well as her above-
described protected June 1 conduct, were the motivating factors
behind her discharge. Hollowood, as noted, was an open and
active Local 161 supporter, having solicited some 42-employee
signatures on Local 161 support petitions, attended their meet-
ings, distributed literature in nonpatient care areas of the Hospi-
tal, and served as part of the core group, Local 161’s in-house
organizing committee. The Respondent, as noted, concedes
knowing of her activities. Finally, Respondent’s unlawful at-
tempt to convince Hollowood that her union activities were
being kept under surveillance convinces me that the Respon-
dent was not too happy with her activities on behalf of Local
161, and may have harbored some animosity towards her. Ac-
cordingly, I find that the General Counsel made out a prima
facie case under Wright Line, and that the Respondent, as called
for under Wright Line, now bears the burden of showing by a
preponderance of credible evidence that it would have dis-
charged Hollowood even if she had not engaged in any pro-
tected conduct. The Respondent, in my view, has not met its
burden in this regard.

20 Enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982). Under Wright Line, the General Counsel bears an initial burden
of presenting sufficient evidence to support an inference that an em-
ployer’s decision to discharge or otherwise discipline an employee was
motivated by the employee’s union or other protected concerted activ-
ity. Once such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the same action would have been taken even without
regard to any union or other protected concerted activity the employee
may have engaged in. The employer does not meet its burden simply
by presenting a letigimate reason for its actions, but rather must per-
suade by a preponderance of credible evidence that the same action
would have been taken even in the absence of protected conduct.
However, where an employer’s reason for its actions are found to be
pretextual, that is the reason either does not exist or was in fact not
relied upon, then the employer will not have met its Wright Line bur-
den, and the inquiry is logically at an end. Berg Product Design, 317
NLRB 92, 95 (1995).
I do not, for example, believe Respondent’s persistent claim
at the hearing and on brief that it received such a large number
of complaints from employees and physicians refusing to work
with Hollowood that it became virtually impossible to resched-
ule her for work, thus rendering her “unemployable” and
thereby compelling her discharge (Tr. 16, 282; R. Exh. 42). In
this regard, I find significant that the two management officials
responsible for the discharge, Tucker and Wagner, at most
identified only four physicians (Wagner named Pearce and
Leidenfrost, and Tucker naming the same two plus Krajcovic
and Ramas) as having purportedly stated that they would no
longer work with with Hollowood. While I have, as noted,
found them not to be credible, it bears noting that even if I were
to believe that these four physicians in fact complained to
Wagner and Tucker about Hollowood, their complaints hardly
come close to approximating the tidal wave of opposition to
Hollowood’s June 1 remarks being depicted by the Respondent.
There were, to be sure, other Respondent witnesses, e.g.,
Gunn, Geldbach, and Browning, who claimed to have received
similar complaints from physicians and staff nurses. However,
Gunn, as previously discussed, was not certain if she had re-
ceived any complaints from physicians, and testified only that
“perhaps one” physician, whom she did not identify, might
have expressed some problem about working with Hollowood.
While she claims to have heard some criticism from staff
nurses about the comments made by Hollowood during the
June 1 interview, she never claimed to have heard staff nurses
expressing a refusal to continue working with Hollowood.
Geldbach, as noted, testified only to having heard three physi-
cians and three nurses complain about the remarks made not
just by Hollowood, but also by O’Neil and Gearhart, but never
testified that any of these six expressed an unwillingness to
work with Hollowood. Browning offered similar testimony, for
while claiming that the entire obstetrical and surgical teams
expressed amazement at, and felt insulted by, Hollowood’s
remarks, she never claimed to have heard any physician or staff
nurse state they would not work with Hollowood. Browning,
like Gunn, did not identify by name which physicians she had

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 776
heard expressing such complaints. Nor is there any evidence to
suggest that these alleged complaints were ever passed on to
Tucker or Wagner. In sum, the above testimony by Gunn,
Geldbach, and Browning provides no support for Respondent’s
claim that there was such a groundswell of opposition by phy-
sicians and nurses alike to working with Hollowood in particu-
lar because of her June 1 remarks that it was forced to dis-
charge her.
Further, the views expressed by Hollowood during the June
1 interview regarding patient care, safety, and staffing issues
stemming from a 24-hour to a 12-hour shift, which the Respon-
dent contends triggered the avalanche of complaints against
Hollowood from angry physicians who viewed her comments
as offensive and disparaging, were no different from the com-
ments expressed by Hollowood and other RNFAs in the August
20, 1997 letter to all of the hospital’s obstetrecians. Yet, the
August 20, 1997 letter caused no similar uproar by obstetricians
or any other physicians. In fact, the converse appears to have
occurred for, as noted, at least 13 physicians threw their support
behind Hollowood’s and the RNFAs “efforts to refocus patient
care back to optimal staffing conditions” and to “promote qual-
ity working conditions to insure safe patient care” by organiz-
ing themselves (GC Exh. 6). The only distinguishing feature
between the comments contained in the August 20, 1997 letter
to hospital obstetricians, and the remarks made by Hollowood
during the June 1 interview, is the manner by which the mes-
sage was conveyed, with the former comments appearing in a
public letter to hospital obstetricians, and the latter addressed to
the public at large via a television newscast. The apparent lack
of opposition by physicians to the comments contained to the
August 20, 1997 letter, leads me to doubt that the same or simi-
lar-type comments made months later by Hollowood during the
June 1 interview would have caused the onslaught of com-
plaints which the Respondent claims occurred following the
June 1 telecast. To the extent such complaints occurred, which
I doubt, I am convinced they resulted not from any particular
comments Hollowood may have made, but rather from Hol-
lowood’s decision to publicly air the RNFAs dispute with Re-
spondent.
In sum, I find little, if any, credible evidence to substantiate
the Respondent’s claim that large numbers of physicians and
employees refused to work with Hollowood because of her
June 1 remarks. There is, in this regard, no indication that the
Respondent ever bothered to inquire if the views expressed by
Hollowood during the June 1 interview enjoyed support among
members of the nursing staff or other physicians. Had it done
so, I am inclined to believe it would have found such support.
In this regard, it is more likely than not that those nurses who
were solicited by Hollowood and who expressed an interest in
being represented by Local 161 would have approved of Hol-
lowood’s comments, as would the 13 physicians (one of whom
was Gearhart) who expressed their support for Hollowood’s
and the RNFAs organizational efforts in their April 1998 letter
(GC Exh. 6). The Respondent’s failure to make any such in-
quiry leads me to believe that it was intent on discharging Hol-
lowood for June 1 television appearance and comments, regard-
less of whatever support she may have enjoyed. Indeed, I am
convinced that it was Respondent’s fear of such support for
Hollowood that led to the decision to discharge her, and that its
claim of having received large numbers of complaints regard-
ing Hollowood, a claim which as noted has not been estab-
lished, is nothing more than a pretext concocted by Respondent
to justify the discharge.21 When an employer’s explanation for
its decision to discharge an employee is found to be false or, as
noted, pretextual, an inference is warranted that the true reason
is one which the employer seeks to conceal. Shattuck Denn
Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1960); Berg
Products Design, supra. Here, the only other possible explana-
tion for having discharged Hollowood is because of her activi-
ties on behalf of Local 161, and because of her appearance on
the June 1 newscast, conduct which, as previously found, was
protected by Section 7 of the Act.22
There is yet other evidence pointing to an unlawful discrimi-
natory motive for the discharge. The record reflects that prob-
lems often occurred between physicians, nurses, and employ-
ees, including situations where nurses and physicians have
difficulty working together, and that Respondent’s practice in
such cases is to try to get the parties to mutually resolve their
differences or to accommodate the working schedules if the
parties are unable to agree. However, even when no accommo-
dation can be reached, the parties are nevertheless expected to
work together. So testified Wagner and Gunn (Tr. 42, 267).
The Respondent does not deny the existence of such a practice.
Wagner and Tucker admitted that no employee has ever been
disciplined or discharged because of a physician’s refusal to
work with that individual (Tr. 40, 292). The Respondent, how-
ever, failed to adhere to this past practice in dealing with Hol-
lowood for, rather than trying to resolve whatever differences
Leidenfrost, Krajcovic, or Pearse may have had with Hol-
lowood or attempting to reach some other reasonable accom-
modation, it summarily dismissed Hollowood, a 20-year em-
ployee, without any prior warning. The Respondent’s failure to
follow its past practice, or to offer a credible explanation for
treating Hollowood differently from the way other employees
were treated under similar circumstances, provides strong evi-
dence of a discriminatory motive, Sunbelt Enterprises, 295
NLRB 1153 (1987), a finding rendered even more compelling
by the fact that no employee had ever before been terminated
for having a difficult working relationship with other staff
members or physicians.
In addition to treating Hollowood disparately vis-à-vis past
employees, Hollowood was also accorded harsher treatment in
comparison to O’Neil, who received no punishment whatsoever
for the comments he made, and Gearhart, who was allowed 30
days in which to correct his certain behavior and discharged
only after he failed to do so (Tr. 288). Hollowood, as noted,
was afforded no such opportunity but was instead summarily
dismissed without any prior warning or opportunity to rectify
any perceived misconduct. The Respondent did not explain

21 Indeed, Tucker’s admission that he solicited a letter of complaint
from Krajcovic raises a suspicion that he did so in order to build a case
against Hollowood. His conduct in this regard raises a further suspi-
cion that the Leidenfrost letter, which Tucker claims mysteriously
appeared on his desk one morning, may also have been solicited by
Tucker. As to the Pearse letter, the Respondent, as noted, offered no
explanation regarding its acquisition. As previously indicated, any
doubts in this regard could have been resolved by Respondent by call-
ing these individuals to corroborate the letters and the circumstances
surrounding their preparation.
22 The fact that O’Neil, also a longtime union activist, was not dis-
charged along with Hollowood does not negate a finding that Hol-
lowood was singled out for discriminatory treatment, for it is settled
that “an employer’s discriminatory motive is not disproved by evidence
showing that it did not weed out all union adherents.” Sawyer of Napa,
300 NLRB 131, 152 at fn. 46 (1990), and cases cited therein.

ST. LUKE’S EPISCOPAL-PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITALS 777
why Gearhart, but not Hollowood, was afforded such an oppor-
tunity.23 Tucker did explain that O’Neil was not discharged
because his remarks, unlike Hollowood’s, were not disparaging
but rather dealt with the “unionization of employees,” a subject
he disagreed with but nevertheless believed O’Neil had a right
to express. The explanation, however, lacks merit for, as found
above, Hollowood’s remarks, like O’Neil’s, were neither false
nor disparaging, rendering specious Respondent’s explanation
for drawing such a distinction between the two.24 Significantly,
Tucker’s further assertion, that it was the alleged disparaging
nature of Hollowood’s remarks which led it to treat Hollowood
differently from O’Neil, clearly supports the General Counsel’s
position, and my finding herein, that Hollowood was dis-
charged not because of the alleged numerous complaints the
Respondent claims Tucker and Wagner received regarding
Hollowood, a claim which, as noted, I find to be unsupported
by the credible evidence of record, but rather, as stated, for
going public about the RNFAs labor dispute with Respondent,
and because the latter wrongly viewed her remarks as disparag-
ing. For all of the above-stated reasons, I find that the Respon-
dent has failed to rebut the General Counsel’s prima facie case
and, consequently, further find that its discharge of Hollowood
on June 5, violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act as it was
unlawfully motivated by her Union other protected concerted
activities.

ct.
23 Ironically, comments made by Gearhart and aired during the June
2 telecast could reasonably be viewed as being more offensive than
anything Hollowood may have said during the interview. Thus, in his
remarks, set forth in GC Exh. 10, Gearhart accuses the Hospital of
using people with “a minimal of training,” identifying those people as
former janitorial staff employees who are now being used to admit
patients, draw blood, and take over nursing functions, and commenting
that “[w]e’ve seen some real disasters with that.” Clearly, it would
appear that Gearhart was criticizing the credentials and qualifications of
some staff employees, just as Hollowood purportedly had done and
which, according to Respondent, was what led to her discharge. Yet,
Gearhart was allowed to stay on for 30 days in the hopes he would
make amends. Hollowood was not.
24 Several factors seem to undermine the Respondent’s explanation
for sparing O’Neil but not Hollowood. Thus, in its June 7 telephone
hotline message to employees, Tucker makes clear that he was “per-
sonally insulted and offended” by what “both nurses and doctors,” e.g.,
Hollowood, O’Neil, and Gearhart, had said during the interview (GC
Exh. 12). He drew no distinction between Hollowood’s and O’Neil’s
remarks, labeling both as “an insult not only to St. Luke’s, but to all of
us who work hard everyday to provide top notch care for our patients.”
In his telephonic message, Tucker does not link O’Neil’s June 1 re-
marks to simply union organizational rhetoric, as he did at the hearing.
Further, Geldbach’s testimony, as noted, reveals that the complaints she
received from physicians and nurses alike related to the conduct of all
three individuals who took part in the interview, and was not limited to
Hollowood. Finally, the Respondent, as noted, claims that Hol-
lowood’s discharge was prompted by the refusal of physicians, includ-
ing Leidenfrost, to work with her. However, according to the Lei-
denfrost letter, Leidenfrost purportedly objected to working with two of
the employees, presumably Hollowood and O’Neil, who took part in
the interview. Despite Liedenfrost’s purported refusal to work with
either Hollowood or O’Neil, the Respondent took action only against
Hollowood. Incredibly, Tucker’s only explanation for not discharging
O’Neil was because Leidenfrost had not seen the telecast! (Tr. 290.)
Yet, that very fact was not an obstacle to Tucker’s discharge of Hol-
lowood. These inconsistencies render untenable Tucker’s explanation
for why it chose to discharge Hollowood and retain O’Neil.
The Objections
Following the election in Case 14–RC–11921, Local 108
timely filed 15 objections to the election alleging that the Re-
spondent-Employer had engaged in conduct which interfered
with the employees’ free choice in the election requiring that
the election be set aside and that the Respondent be required to
bargain with the Union or that a new election be held (see at-
tachment to GC Exh. 1[g]). Local 108 subsequently withdrew
Objections 1, 2, 5–7, and 9. The remaining objections, as
noted, were consolidated for hearing in this matter as they par-
allel the unfair labor practice allegations contained in complaint
paragraph 5, subparts A through E. Having found no merit to
the allegations contained paragraph 5 and its subparts, I further
find that remaining Objections 3,4, 8, 10, 11, and 13–15, also
lack merit and shall accordingly recommend that they be over-
ruled.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian
Hospitals, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the A
2. Locals 108 and 161 of the Textile Processors, Service
Trades, Health Care, Professional and Technical Employees
International Union are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By falsely accusing Carol Hollowood of soliciting em-
ployee signatures on union petitions, the Respondent unlaw-
fully created the impression it was keeping her union activities
under surveillance, and has thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. By discharging employee Carol Hollowood for engaging
in union and other protected activity, the Respondent has en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5. The above-described unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
6. Except for the above-described unfair labor practices, the
Respondent has not violated the Act in any other way.
7. The Respondent has not engaged in any of the conduct al-
leged as objectionable in Case 14–RC–11921.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
To remedy its unlawful discharge of employee Carol Hol-
lowood, the Respondent shall be required, within 14 days from
the date of the Order in this case, to offer her immediate and
full reinstatement to her former job or, if that position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to her seniority or any other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed. The Respondent will also be required to make Carol
Hollowood whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
she may have suffered due to her unlawful discharge as pre-
scribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with
interest on such amounts to be computed as prescribed in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The Re-
spondent shall also be directed to remove from its files, within
14 days from the date of the Order, any reference to Carol Hol-
lowood’s unlawful discharge, and to notify Carol Hollowood

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 778
within 3 days thereafter, in writing, that it has done so and that
the discharge will not be used against her in any way. Finally,
the Respondent will be required to post an appropriate notice to
employees.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended25
ORDER
The Respondent, St. Luke’s Episcopal-Presbyterian Hospi-
tals, Inc., Chesterfield, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist
(a) From discharging employee Carol Hollowood, or any
other employee, for engaging in union or other protected con-
certed activity.
(b) Creating the impression it is keeping Carol Hollowood’s
or any other employee’s union or protected concerted activities
under surveillance.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Carol
Hollowood immediate and full reinstatement to her former job
or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Carol Hollowood whole for any loss of wages and
benefits she may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against her in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this
decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of the Order, remove from
its files any reference to Carol Hollowood’s unlawful discharge
and, within three days thereafter, notify her in writing that it has
done so and that the discharge will not be used against in any
way.

25 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of records if stored in electronic form,26 neces-
sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of
this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Chesterfield, Missouri, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”27 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to [employees] [members] [employees and mem-
bers] are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since June 5, 1998.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found,
and that Case 14–RC–11921 be severed from this proceeding
and remanded to the Regional Director for the issuance of an
appropriate certification.

26 See, Bryant & Stratton Business Institute, 327 NLRB 1135 (1999).
27 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”