St. Joseph Ambulance Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 4, 2006

346 N.L.R.B. 1311 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

ST. JOSEPH AMBULANCE SERVICE
346 NLRB No. 110
1311
Angotti Healthcare Systems, Inc. d/b/a St. Joseph
Ambulance Service and International Associa-
tion of EMTs and Paramedics, SEIU–NAGE.1
Cases 20–CA–32436 and 20–RC–18009
May 8, 2006
DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION
OF REPRESENTATIVE
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, KIRSANOW, AND WALSH
On December 29, 2005, Administrative Law Judge
Burton Litvack issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions,3 to
adopt the recommended Order as modified,4 and to issue
a certification of representative.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Angotti
Healthcare Systems, Inc. d/b/a St. Joseph Ambulance
Service, San Rafael, California, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).

1 We have amended the caption and notice to reflect the disaffiliation
of the SEIU from the AFL–CIO effective July 29, 2005.
2 The Respondent excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing the findings.
3 We find no merit in the Respondent’s argument in its exceptions
that the judge placed the burden of proof on it to establish the eligibility
of voters whom the Union had challenged. In sustaining the challenges
to the ballots of Jamie Larripa and Jeffrey Leonard, the judge relied on
the testimony of the four witnesses presented by the Union, whom he
credited. The judge’s determination not to credit the rebuttal testimony
of the Respondent’s witnesses was legitimately based, in part, on its
failure to produce payroll records corroborating the assertions of these
witnesses.
The election was conducted pursuant to a Stipulated Election
Agreement. No party excepted, however, to the judge’s failure to apply
Caesar's Tahoe, 337 NLRB 1096 (2002), in analyzing the ballot chal-
lenges.
In the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the judge’s find-
ings sustaining the challenges to the ballots of Norma DelaFuente and
Isis Laland.
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language.
“(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in San Rafael, California copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”23 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 20, after being signed by the Respondent's author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since January 11,
2005.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid ballots have
been cast for International Association of EMTs and
Paramedics, SEIU–NAGE, and that it is the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the following appropriate unit:
All full-time and regular part-time EMTs and Paramed-
ics employed by the Employer at its facility located at
1418 Lincoln Avenue, San Rafael, California; exclud-
ing all managers, clerical and office personnel, guards,
and supervisors as defined in the Act.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1312
WE WILL NOT threaten you with more onerous working
conditions if you select International Association of
EMTs and Paramedics, SEIU–NAGE, as your collective-
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you as to how you intend to
vote in the NLRB representation election.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
set forth above.
ANGOTTI HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC. D/B/A
ST. JOSEPH AMBULANCE SERVICE
Lucile Lannan Rosen, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert G. Hulteng, Esq. and Michael G Pedhirney, Esq. (Lit-
tler, Mendelson), of San Francisco, California, for Re-
spondent/Employer.
Marc Pinkas, Western States Director of Organizing, of Ven-
tura, California, for the Charging Party/Petitioner.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
BURTON LITVACK. Administrative Law Judge. On December
27, 2004, International Association of EMTs and Paramedics,
SEIU–NAGE, AFL–CIO (the Union), filed the representation
petition, seeking to represent certain employees of Angotti
Healthcare Systems, Inc. d/b/a St. Joseph Ambulance Service
(the Respondent), in Case 20–RC–18009; on January 11, 2005,
the parties entered into a Stipulation Election Agreement, ap-
proved by the Regional Director for Region 20 of the National
Labor Relations Board (the Board); and, on February 11, 2005,
an agent of the Board conducted a representation election
among a voting unit of Respondent’s full-time and regular part-
time EMTs and paramedics. The tally of ballots for the repre-
sentation election showed that there were approximately 24
eligible voters; that 11 votes were cast for the Union and 9
votes were cast against the Union; and that 6 votes were chal-
lenged.1 On February 18, 2005, Respondent timely filed objec-
tion to the conduct of the election. The unfair labor practice
charge in Case 2–CA–32436 was filed by the Union on March
30, 2005, and, after an investigation, on May 31, 2005, the
Acting Regional Director for Region 20 of the Board issued a
complaint, alleging that Respondent had engaged in, and con-
tinues to engage in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
Respondent timely filed an answer to the complaint, essentially
denying the unfair labor practice allegations. On June 10,
2005, the Acting Regional Director for Region 20 of the Board
issued a report on objections and challenged ballots, dismissing
Respondent’s objections and consolidating four of the chal-

1 Three voters, Norma DelaFuente, Isis Laland, and Kendall Wil-
liams, whose names were not on the voter eligibility list, were chal-
lenged by the Board agent. Respondent challenged the ballot of Jessica
Lefebvre on grounds she had resigned her position as an EMT on Janu-
ary 19, 2005, and the Union challenged the ballots of Jamie Larripa and
Jeffrey Leonard on grounds that neither was a voting unit employee.
lenged ballots2 for hearing with the aforementioned unfair labor
practice allegations. As scheduled, a hearing on these matters
was held before me on August 16, 2005, in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia. At the hearing, each party was afforded the opportunity
to call witnesses in its own behalf, to cross-examine the wit-
nesses of the other parties, to offer into the record all relevant
documentary evidence, to argue legal positions orally, and to
file a posthearing brief, which document was filed by each of
the parties. Accordingly, based upon the entire record, includ-
ing the posthearing briefs and my observation of the testimonial
demeanor of the several witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, maintains an office and principle
place of business in San Raphael, California, and has been en-
gaged in the business of operating an ambulance service. During
the calendar year immediately preceding the issuance of the in-
stant complaint, Respondent purchased and received at its San
Raphael, California place of business goods, valued in excess of
$50,000, directly from suppliers located outside the State of Cali-
fornia. Respondent admits that, at all times material, it has been,
and is now, an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
Respondent admits that the Union is now, and has been at all
times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ISSUES
The instant complaint alleges that Respondent engaged in
conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, on unknown
dates during the week of February 11, 2005, by interrogating
employees regarding how they intended to vote in the represen-
tation election and by threatening employees with more oner-
ous working conditions if they selected the Union as their rep-
resentative for proposes of collective bargaining. Respondent
denies that it engaged in the above-described unfair labor prac-
tices. With regard to the representation election, the challenges
to the ballots of four voters are at issue—two whose names did
not appear on the voter eligibility list and two who, the Union
alleges, were not voting unit employees.
IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Respondent, a corporation, operates a fleet of ambulances in
northern California, providing its services primarily in Marin
and San Francisco Counties and in the northern portion of San
Mateo County, and maintains its principle office and ambu-
lance depot in San Raphael, which is located in Marin County.
Richard Angotti is Respondent’s owner and is its president and
chief operating officer; Frank Lemus is the communications
manager for Respondent and oversees its daily operations; and
Respondent admits each is a supervisor and its agent within the
meaning of the Act. Respondent employs approximately 24

2 These were the challenged ballots of DelaFuente, Laland, Larripa,
and Leonard. The remaining two challenges were sustained by the
Acting Regional Director.
ST. JOSEPH AMBULANCE SERVICE 1313
individuals, classified as emergency medical technicians
(EMTs) and paramedics,3 to operate its ambulances. For each
work shift, Respondent normally dispatches five or six ambu-
lances, each with a crew comprised of two unit employees—
either two EMTs or one EMT and one paramedic,4 and the
choice of an ambulance team for a response depends upon the
serious nature of the call.
Christina Ratola, who worked for Respondent for 2-1/2 years
as an EMT until she voluntarily quit her employment on or about
March 23, 2005, testified with regard to two conversations with
Richard Angotti prior to the February 11 representation election.
Notwithstanding the allegation in the complaint, she placed the
first of these as occurring approximately a month before the elec-
tion in a storeroom closet, located in the back of Respondent’s
San Raphael facility. According to Ratola, who admitted being
upset with Respondent concerning cutbacks in the number of her
work shifts and three written disciplinary letters and a delay in
the receipt of her final check,5 she was in the closet, a small 10-
feet-by-4-feet area, collecting supplies for her ambulance when
Angotti appeared in the doorway—“He came up and just said . . .
there’s a union going on. And was talking about how we can
continue working out our problems as we had in the past. There
would be an open door policy as there had [been]. And there was
no more flexible schedules if there was a union.” Ratola, who
averred that she “always felt intimidated by Mr. Angotti,” stated
that the entire conversation consumed 10 minutes and that she
did not reply to A6 Angotti, who testified that he had been in-

3 According to Lemus, the difference between EMTs and paramedics
is the degree of their training. The former receive “basic life support
training” and the latter have received “advanced life support training.”
Paramedics are dispatched to more “critical type” calls which require
possible usage of such life support intervention as intravenous infusion,
cardiac drug administration, and advanced airway management.
4 At least one ambulance team per shift is always comprised of an
EMT and a paramedic.
5 Nevertheless, rather than appearing voluntarily, Ratola testified
pursuant to a subpoena.
6 Angotti testified that, during the preelection period, he made a
point of reminding the voting unit employees that Respondent had
always been flexible in scheduling work in order to accommodate the
requirements of employees who were attending school. In this regard,
during the preelection period, dispatcher, Jamie Larripa, distributed a
letter to her coworkers in which she exhorted them to “please vote no,”
emphasizing that Respondent had been very “flexible with all of this
staff” in “. . . giving people what they want such as ideal school sched-
ules . . . .” Angotti admitted being aware of the existence of the letter
prior to its distribution during the preelection period. Also, with regard
to the issue of flexible schedules, Paul Corso, who was terminated by
Respondent from his EMT position in March 2005, testified that, one
morning about 2 or 3 weeks prior to the election, as he and another
employee, Alexander Stephenson, were preparing their ambulance for
work, Angotti leaned into the back of the vehicle and began speaking to
them about their flexible work schedules. According to Corso, who
was then enrolled in a paramedic training program, during the course of
his comments, Angotti said that, because of his flexibility with sched-
ules, employees were allowed to take tests and do other things and
added “. . . that if we voted for a union . . . he wouldn’t be able to be as
flexible with students like us.” Angotti recalled this conversation and,
while conceding that “. . . I brought up the fact that it’s nice that we can
have employees that can go to school and also work at the same time,”
volved in two prior NLRB representation elections and had re-
ceived advice from counsel as what he could lawfully say to
employees during the campaigns, recalled the same incident,
stating, “I said, good morning Christina, as you know, we are
going to have an election coming up, and I started to talk to her,
but I got very negative body language. So I didn’t pursue any
further conversation.” He specifically denied saying the com-
pany would be less flexible with regard to scheduling if the em-
ployees voted for the Union and, during cross-examination, ex-
plained that, by Ratola’s body language, he meant she never
turned to look at him.
With regard to the second of her preelection conversations
with Richard Angotti, Ratola testified that it occurred one morn-
ing during the week prior to the representation election She
recalled that Respondent had scheduled an employee barbeque
for later in the day and that she was about to begin her work shift
when Angotti approached and said “you’re up” and he wanted to
speak to her in his office about the Union.7 After entering An-
gotti’s office, Ratola and the former spoke for “about a half hour
to forty-five minutes” about the Union with the office door
closed. According to Ratola, Angotti did most of the speaking,
mainly about Respondent’s competitors, American Medical Re-
sponse (AMR) and Redwood Empire Life Support (RELS), the
latter of which had recently ceased doing business. With regard
to AMR, Angotti said that it was a union ambulance company
but that “he would never be able to keep . . . . their wages and
that he could never be AMR.” As to RELS, Angotti said it “had
recently gone out of business and [it] had just gone union.” Con-
tinuing, Angotti said that the prospect of his company becoming
a union ambulance service “feels like his eight year old child is
being kidnapped from him.” Then, according to Ratola, “at the
very end of the meeting, he asked me which way I was going to
vote, and I told him that I wanted to hear both sides and wasn’t
sure which way I was voting yet.” Angotti likewise recalled this
conversation and recalled the subject was the upcoming election.
According to him, he told Ratola that, as the owner of the com-
pany, he did not feel the employees needed a union to represent
them. Angotti added that a union might be good for a large com-
pany like AMR, but “we didn’t need a union since we were a
small company.” Continuing, he told Ratola he believed that he
and his employees could work things out on their own and that
“we didn’t need a third party.” Angotti, who recalled similar
one-on-one conversations with other employees, specifically
denied asking which way Ratola was going to vote.
As to the alleged unfair labor practices, counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel argues that, during the initial conversation, Angotti
threatened Ratola with more onerous working conditions if the
employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining rep-
resentative and that, during the second conversation, he interro-
gated Ratola concerning how she was going to vote in the immi-
nent representation election—both acts allegedly violative of

he denied saying he wouldn’t be as flexible with regard to schedules if
a union was selected by the employees.
7 Ratola, who was aware that other employees had been called into
Angotti’s office for union-related conversations, recalled she replied,
“Lucky me” because she did not want to have a conversation about the
Union with Angotti.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1314
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Given the state of the record evi-
dence, resolving the credibility of the witnesses is essential to
determining the merits of the unfair labor practice allegations,
and, in this regard, based upon the testimonial demeanor of each,
I found Christina Ratola, who testified involuntarily pursuant to a
subpoena, to have been significantly more credible than Richard
Angotti. Thus, she impressed me as being a candid and trustwor-
thy witness; while, in contrast, Respondent’s owner appeared to
be guileful and demonstrated a lack of probity in his responses to
questions. In particular, I believe he was disingenuous in assert-
ing that Ratola failed to turn and look at him when he addressed
her during their supply room closet encounter. As to this, she did
not appear to be an impudent individual, or one who, when ad-
dressed by him, would insolently turn her back to the owner of
the company, for which she worked. Accordingly, I shall rely
upon Ratola’s version of events whenever their respective testi-
mony conflicts.8
Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, I find that
many of Respondent’s voting unit employees were students; that,
in order to accommodate their school responsibilities Respondent
had been flexible in scheduling such individuals for work; that
Angotti had stressed this flexible scheduling during the preelec-
tion period, and that Respondent’s dispatcher, Jamie Larripa, had
also emphasized this policy in a letter to her co-workers, in which
she urged them to support Respondent. I further find that, one
morning a month before the election, while Ratola was in the
supply room closet collecting supplies for her ambulance, An-
gotti appeared in the closet doorway, mentioned the advent of the
Union and began speaking about the employees and management
continuing to work out problems as they had in the past in accord
with Respondent’s open door policy. Thereupon, he warned that
there would be “no more flexible schedules if there was a union.”
Herein, given Respondent’s policy of flexibility in scheduling
work assignments for employees, who were students at school,
and the emphasis placed upon the issue by Angotti during the
preelection campaign, flexible scheduling clearly was a benefit
provided to its voting unit employees by Respondent. The Board
has continually held that “an employer’s preelection statement to
employees that, should they choose union representation, they
will automatically lose a fringe benefit . . . violates Section
8(a)(1).” DynCorp, 343 NLRB 1197, 1199 (2004); Federated
Logistics & Operations, 340 NLRB 255, 256 (2003); Hertz
Corp., 316 NLRB 672 at fn. 2 (1995). Counsel for Respondent
argues that no violation of the Act should be found as Angotti’s
threat was isolated or de minimus. However, contrary to counsel,
I find that Angotti engaged in almost the identical conduct a
week or two after uttering his threat to Ratola when, one morn-
ing, he leaned into the rear of the ambulance, which was operated
by Paul Corso and Alex Stephenson,9 and, after mentioning that,

8 Counsel for Respondent argues that I should credit Angotti because
he had participated in two prior NLRB elections and received advice
from counsel regarding what he could and could not say to employees.
Contrary to counsel, history teaches just the opposite lesson. Thus, the
in excess of 340 Board volumes are replete with examples of employers
who, for whatever reason, disregard the advice of counsel and engage
in violations of the Act when involved in election campaigns.
9 As between Paul Corso and Richard Angotti, notwithstanding his
termination by Respondent and any resulting animosity, the former
because of his flexibility with scheduling, employees were al-
lowed to take tests in school and do other things, said, “[T]hat, if
we voted for a union . . . he wouldn’t be able to be as flexible
with students like us.” Moreover, as will be discussed below,
Angotti engaged in another unfair labor practice prior to the rep-
resentation election. Accordingly, I find that, by threatening
employee Ratola with more onerous working conditions, the loss
of flexible scheduling, if its employees selected the Union as
their collective-bargaining representative, Angotti acted in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.10 Transportation Repair &
Service, 328 NLRB 107, 112 (1999).
Next, I find that, one morning approximately a week before
the election, on the day of a company barbeque for its employ-
ees, Angotti requested that Ratola accompany him to his office
so that they could speak about the Union; that, inside Angotti’s
office with the door closed, they spoke for between 30 and 45
minutes; that Angotti, who did most of the talking, spoke about
two of Respondent’s competitors AMR and RELS and com-
pared the possibility of his employees selecting a union to rep-
resent them to having his 8-year-old child being kidnapped; and
that, at the end of the meeting, he asked Ratola which way she
was going to vote. Board law is clear that interrogations of
employees are not per se violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
but, rather, whether such acts may be unlawful depends upon
“whether under all the circumstances, the interrogation rea-
sonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guar-
anteed by the Act.” Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177
(1984). Herein, I note that Angotti’s questioning of Ratola
occurred in the former’s office behind closed doors, that An-
gotti is the owner of Respondent, that there is no record evi-
dence that the employee was an open and avowed supporter of
the Union, that Respondent offered no evidence establishing the
necessity for Angotti’s conduct, and that Angotti offered Ratola
no assurances against reprisals for an affirmative answer.
Counsel for Respondent again, in defense, asserts the isolated
nature of the aforementioned interrogation. However, I have
already concluded that Angotti previously had unlawfully
threatened Ratola that Respondent would no longer be flexible
in scheduling work assignments for employees, who were stu-
dents, if its employees selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative. In these circumstances, I find that
Angotti’s interrogation of Ratola was coercive and violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 325 NLRB
280, 285 (1998).

impressed me as the more credible witness. Thus, in contrast to An-
gotti, Corso’s demeanor was that of a frank and veracious witness, and
I rely upon his version of events herein.
10 I have considered the fact that the complaint alleges that this un-
fair labor practice occurred in the week prior to the election. While not
accurate in that regard, the substance of the allegation is reflected by
the evidence. Moreover, Respondent was afforded an opportunity to
prepare to rebut the allegation, and Angotti testified as to his version of
events. Significantly, while, of course, denying the alleged unfair labor
practice, he did recall the incident. Thus, while the complaint may
have been erroneous as to the timing of the incident, Respondent was
afforded due process in meeting the allegation.
ST. JOSEPH AMBULANCE SERVICE 1315
V. THE CHALLENGED BALLOTS
A. Norma DelaFuente and Isis Laland
During the February 11, 2005 representation election, the
Board agent challenged the ballots cast by Norma DelaFuente
and Isis Laland as neither individual’s name appeared on the
voter eligibility list. In these regards, the record establishes that
DelaFuente worked as an EMT for Respondent and that, on
September 8, 2004, she injured her right knee while lifting a
patient into her ambulance. Thereafter, according to Frank
Lemus, who was uncontroverted, “she was [on] . . . light duty
status doing some clerical and some communications center
responsibility.” Then, in “late November,” DelaFuente had a
conversation with Lemus during which “she . . . stated to me
that she was anticipating having knee surgery in December.
And that she was going to be attending the paramedic program
at City College of San Francisco, spring semester, which was
going to start in February. And then she was going to be apply-
ing to the San Francisco Fire Department. . . . She says ‘I won’t
be returning to St. Joseph’s.’” Lemus added that DelaFuente
performed no work for Respondent after November and that he
has not heard from her since the above conversation. During
cross-examination, he testified that Respondent had received
regular status reports from DelaFuente’s doctor until she
stopped working for Respondent in November.
As to Isis Laland, Lemus, who was uncontroverted, testified
that she worked as an EMT for Respondent through December
2004 and that Laland ceased working because she had been
accepted into a paramedic internship program at AMR, which
was going to start in January. Lemus further testified that he
had a conversation with Laland regarding her future plans on or
about December 21 in the communications center,11 and “she
wanted us to no longer have her on the schedule, and she no
longer was going to be called for any shifts. She wanted to
devote her entire time to the paramedic . . . program at
[AMR].” Lemus, who testified he understood Laland as saying
she no longer desired to work for Respondent, replied to Laland
that, if she wanted to work for Respondent in the future, “she
would have to reapply for a position.” Laland performed no
more work for Respondent after this conversation.12
Respondent contends that, in the above circumstances, nei-
ther DelaFuente nor Laland was an eligible voter as each had
resigned her employment with Respondent prior to the date of
the representation election, February 11, 2005. In these re-
gards, Lemus was uncontroverted that DelaFfuente resigned her
position with Respondent to enter a college paramedic program
and that Laland resigned her position with Respondent to enter

11 During cross-examination, Lemus said that, in October, Laland
had asked to be placed on “on-call” scheduling basis as she was in a
hospital training program.
12 According to Lemus, this is Respondent’s “standard practice” with
employees, who leave it to do the AMR paramedic program.
In late March 2005, Angotti gave Lemus a letter, dated March 20, to
Angotti from Laland. In the document, the latter made several asser-
tions regarding a conversation with Lemus in February 2005 and em-
ployment commitments from him. With regard to the contents of the
letter, Lemus denied having any conversations with Laland since De-
cember 2004.
the AMR paramedic training program. I find nothing ambigu-
ous in the comments of either employee to Lemus. The Board
has long held that “. . . an employee’s actual status as of the
eligibility date and the date of the election governs the em-
ployee’s eligibility to vote, irrespective of what occurs after the
election,” and, when an employee quits his employment and
stops working prior to election day, he is not eligible to vote.
Dakota Fire Protection, 337 NLRB 92 at 92 (2001); Columbia
Steel Casting Co., 288 NLRB 306 at fn. 4 (1988); Roy N.
Lotspeich Publishing Co., 204 NLRB 517, 518 (1983). Based
upon the uncontroverted record evidence, I find that DelaF-
fuente and Laland each voluntarily resigned her position with
Respondent prior to the date of the election and, therefore, nei-
ther was an eligible voter. Orange Blossom Manor, 324 NLRB
846, 847 (1997). Accordingly, I sustain the Board agent’s chal-
lenges to their ballots.
B. Jamie Larripa and Jeffrey Leonard
The Union challenged the ballots of Jamie Larripa and Jef-
frey Leonard on grounds that neither individual is a voting unit
employee. With regard to Larripa, the Union offered the testi-
mony of Christina Ratola, Paul Corso, Alexander Stephenson,
and Kendall Williams, each of whom worked for Respondent
during the preelection period and at the time of the election but
is no longer employed by Respondent. They all testified that
Larripa works as Respondent’s dispatcher,13 a position not in
the voting unit. According to Stephenson, in performing her
duties, “Larripa would sit in the dispatch office and her hours
varied. She was usually there in the morning, would take calls
for us when we were out in the field. When we were out in the
field, we radioed to her. She told us where to go.” Corso, who
averred that he was friendly with most of the voting unit em-
ployees and that “I was pretty well informed about the daily
goings-on,”14 testified that, during the preelection period, he
personally was not aware of Larripa ever working on an ambu-
lance15 but, subsequently, was informed she had worked on an
ambulance for one shift prior to the election. Likewise, Ratola,
who worked three 12-hour shifts per week, testified that she
had no recollection of Larripa working on an ambulance prior
to January 2005 and never saw her name on a work schedule.16
She added that, after January, she did see Larripa “one time
riding third” on an ambulance—on the day of the company
barbeque. During cross-examination, she conceded that em-
ployees are sometimes called into work to cover for employees,
who are scheduled to work but are sick or otherwise unavail-
able to work. Stephenson, who began attending school in Sep-

13 According to Paul Corso, Marin County requires company dis-
patchers to be qualified EMTs.
14 According to Corso, he would have been told if either Larripa or
Leonard was taking shifts on ambulances “because it would have been
very unusual for [either one] to work on an ambulance.”
15 Corso stated that, in September 2004, Respondent changed his
work schedule to two 12-hour shifts per week and conceded that, given
his changed work schedule, he was not present at Respondent’s facility
for 5 days a week.
16 Ratola was certain of this as “in the morning when everyone is
cleaning their ambulance and checking it out, we’d see who was doing
their own ambulance.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1316
tember 2004 and, as a result, reduced his work shifts to two 12-
hour shifts on Thursday and Friday of each week, recalled see-
ing Larripa working in an ambulance on just two occasions
prior to the election. In early December 2004, “I remember
vividly going into St. Mary’s, and she was riding with a fellow
named John Hall and someone else” as the third person on an
ambulance crew. Stephenson remembered this incident as
“Jamie would talk about how she was going to get out to the
field.”17 Also, in “probably around January” 2005, he observed
Larripa working in an ambulance, riding with Jeffrey Leonard.
Finally, Williams, who stated that he usually only worked a 24-
hour shift on Sundays and sometimes as a fill-in, testified that
he never observed Larripa, who he knew as a dispatcher, work-
ing on an ambulance while he worked for Respondent.
While Larripa, who was on vacation during the week of the
hearing, was not called as a witness by Respondent, Frank Le-
mus testified that she was employed by Respondent as an
EMT/dispatcher and that he has assigned her to perform EMT
tasks, including “the standard basic life support tasks that every
EMT is assigned to while working on board the ambulance.”
According to him, prior to January 2005, he assigned her to
ambulance work “on average, three to four times a month,”
and, on these occasions, “she would either be scheduled or she
would be called to work.” Subsequent to January, according to
Lemus, she has continued to work on an ambulance team
“probably about the same number, three to four times a month.”
Asked if Larripa ever worked as the third person on an ambu-
lance, he replied, “Not recently. Only when she first started to
ride during her two week orientation period.” Jeffrey Leonard,
Respondent’s driver safety or EVOC instructor, testified that,
between September 2004 and January 2005, he worked “six or
more” 12-hour shifts on an ambulance with Larripa; that, since
January, he worked with her “two or three times;” and that, on
all these occasions, the two of them performed standard EMT
duties. Daniel Hatfield, who, at time of the hearing, had been
employed by Respondent for 11 months as an EMT and knows
Larripa as a dispatcher and EMT for Respondent, initially testi-
fied that he was assigned to perform EMT work on an ambu-
lance with Larripa “a couple of times.” Moments later, he
changed his testimony, stating, “Actually I didn’t mean a cou-
ple. I meant that I . . . probably worked with her about maybe
five, six times.” Then, asked if he meant six times in 11
months, Hatfield answered, “Yes” and defined this as four oc-
casions prior to January 2005 and twice thereafter.
As to Jeffrey Leonard, who is trained as a paramedic, ex-
employees Ratola, Corso, Stephenson, and Williams identified
him as Respondent’s EVOC instructor, which is not a voting
unit position. The record reveals that Respondent’s emergency
vehicle operator course is a state-mandated 10-hour driver
safety course taken by every person who drives an ambulance
for it, Leonard is the course instructor for Respondent, and he
teaches the course usually three times a year or whenever Re-
spondent has a group of six or seven available new hires.
While Ratola had no recollection of ever seeing Leonard work-

17 Stephenson added that, generally, two employees comprised an
ambulance team “unless somebody is being trained in the first couple
of weeks of your probationary period.”
ing as an EMT on an ambulance team for Respondent, Corso,
Stephenson, and Williams each recalled observing Leonard
working as an EMT on an ambulance on the occasion of the
Alcatraz Triathlon in San Francisco in the summer of 2004, and
Stephenson recalled a day in January 2005 when he observed
Leonard and Larripa working together on an ambulance and “a
couple of times” in January or February 2005 when he ob-
served Leonard operating an ambulance for Respondent.
In describing Leonard’s job duties, Frank Lemus stated the
former is an EMT and “also our EVOC instructor and one of
our field training officers.” Leonard himself echoed this job
description, testifying he is an EMT and “I do drivers training
and some marketing at times.”18 Corroborated by Lemus, de-
scribing himself as a regular part-time worker, Leonard, who
has a full-time 42-hour-per-week job with the Shell Oil Com-
pany with a 14 days on and 8 days off schedule, testified that,
during September 2004 through January 2005, he performed
EMT work on an ambulance crew for Respondent three to four
times a month, working mainly 12-hour shifts, and that, since
January 2005, he has continued his EMT duties at “about the
same rate.” As to his work schedule, Leonard stated that some-
times his shifts were scheduled and “sometimes on call. Typi-
cally, I call a week before and find out what’s available and try
and pick shifts that way.” Daniel Hatfield testified that, besides
Larripa, he also has performed EMT work on an ambulance for
Respondent with Leonard “quite a bit.” According to Hatfield,
he worked with Leonard a total of 10 to 12 times—8 times
between September 2004 and January 2005 and “about five”
times thereafter.19 Finally, Respondent failed to offer any
documentary evidence, including payroll records, to substanti-
ate its claims regarding Leonard’s or Larripa’s EMT work on
ambulances from September 2004 through the date of the elec-
tion, February 11, 2005.20 In this regard, during the hearing,
counsel for Respondent merely averred “we don’t have the
records from that period of time.”
Based on the foregoing, the Union contends that neither Lar-
ripa nor Leonard worked sufficient hours in the capacity of an
EMT to warrant inclusion in the voting unit. At the outset, in
determining whether an individual is a regular part-time em-
ployee, the Board considers such factors as regularity and con-
tinuity of employment, tenure of employment, similarity of
work duties, and similarity of work duties, and similarity of
wages, benefits, and other working conditions—in short,

18 Leonard estimated that he performs drivers’ training work “ap-
proximately” three times a year” and when asked to evaluate a driver
while working as an EMT on an ambulance.
19 Hatfield was able to recall the number of times he worked with
Larripa and Leonard as they were “good partners” and “I always re-
member good partners that I work with.”
20 At the hearing, counsel for Respondent asserted that Respondent’s
payroll records would be unavailing as both Leonard and Larripa are
paid at the same rate for EMT and non-EMT work. But, assuming
counsel’s statement is correct, at least as to Leonard, given that his
EVOC work for Respondent was sporadic, such records would estab-
lish if he worked on other days. Moreover, as to Larripa, there is no
record evidence to establish that any EMT work, which she may have
performed, was instead of her dispatching work or in addition to such.
If the latter, payroll records would certainly establish increased wages
for any additional days of work for Larripa.
ST. JOSEPH AMBULANCE SERVICE 1317
whether the individual shares a community of interests with the
employees in the voting unit. Arlington Masonry Supply, 339
NLRB 817, 819 (2003); Pat’s Blue Ribbons, 286 NLRB 918
(1987); Muncie Newspapers, 246 NLRB 1088, 1089 (1979).
Pursuant to Davison-Paxon Co., 185 NLRB 21, 24 (1970), “any
contingent or extra employee who regularly averages 4 hours or
more per week for the last quarter prior to the eligibility date
has a sufficient community of interests for inclusion in the unit
and may vote in the election.” In this regard, based upon the
respective testimony of the Union’s witnesses Ratola, Corso,
Stephenson, and Williams, each of whom impressed me as
being a candid and forthright witness, I find that, from Sep-
tember 2004 through January 2005, while Larripa’s name may
never have appeared on a weekly shift schedule, she apparently
did work on an ambulance for Respondent on, at most, two
occasions—once, in December 2004, as a third person and
once, in January 2005, with Leonard and that Leonard worked
on an ambulance at the Alcatraz Triathlon in San Francisco in
the summer of 2004, once with Larripa, and on just two other
occasions prior to the election. While, based upon the forego-
ing, one may reasonably conclude that neither Larripa nor Leo-
nard worked enough to be classified as a regular part-time vot-
ing unit employee, it is also true that each may have performed
work as an EMT at times when the Union’s witnesses were
unaware of his or her work. However, I specifically credit the
testimony of Corso that he “was pretty well informed about the
daily going-ons” and would have been told if Larripa and Leo-
nard were taking shifts “because it would have been very un-
usual for them to work on an ambulance.” Moreover, I am
hesitant to rely upon the unsubstantiated assertions of Respon-
dent’s witnesses as to the significantly greater extent of Lar-
ripa’s and Leonard’s EMT work than attributed to them by the
Union’s witnesses. Thus, while Lemus and Leonard asserted
that, during the period September 2004 through January 2005,
the latter and Larripa each worked, on average, three or four
12-hour shifts per month, performing EMT work on its ambu-
lances, I find it telling that Respondent failed to produce any
documentary evidence, including payroll records, substantiating
the respective testimony of Lemus and Leonard.21 Moreover,
the proffered and asserted corroborative witness, Daniel Hat-
field, failed to impress me as being entirely candid. He exhib-
ited a less than certain memory and, in particular, most cer-
tainly dissembled as to the number of times he worked on an
ambulance with Larripa, initially stating “a couple of times”
and later changing his testimony to “maybe five, six times.”

21 Contrary to Respondent’s counsel, while the Union challenged the
ballots of Larripa and Leonard on grounds that neither is a voting unit
employee and clearly had a burden of proof in that regard, in addition
to rebutting the Union’s witnesses as to the extent of EMT work per-
formed by the two individuals, Respondent’s counsel asserted the legal
position that they were regular part-time employees. In these circum-
stances, Respondent certainly understood the necessity to offer payroll
records, which, I believe, may have been conclusive, as corroborative
evidence for its own witnesses’ assertions, and its failure to do so is
rather forcible. Absent such evidence, and noting that neither Lemus
nor Leonard was as persuasive as the witnesses, who testified on behalf
of the Union, I place no reliance upon the assertions of each regarding
the amount of ambulance work performed by either Larripa or Leonard.
Further, Hatfield stated that he worked with Leonard eight
times between September 2004 and January 2005, and the lat-
ter, who never mentioned working at all with Hatfield, asserted
he worked with Larripa six times during that four month period.
Thus, if one is to believe Respondent’s evidence, this shift total
(14) for Leonard probably is greater than the number of EMT
shifts, which Leonard himself claimed he worked (12 to 16),
and, during the above-time period, Leonard would have per-
formed EMT work exclusively with Hatfield and Larripa, a
rather dubious coincidence to which I find impossible to give
credence. In sum, while Leonard and Larripa each undoubtedly
performed some EMT work on ambulances for Respondent
prior to the February 11 election, I can not be sanguine as to the
extent of each individual’s EMT work so as to find each was a
regular part-time employee prior to the election. Therefore, I
rely upon the Union’s persuasive evidence that neither Larripa
nor Leonard worked the requisite number of hours per week to
be considered a regular part-time or eligible voter and sustain
its challenges to the ballots of both individuals.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening its employees with more onerous working
conditions if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, Respondent engaged in conduct vio-
lative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By interrogating its employees regarding how they in-
tended to vote in the NLRB representation election, Respondent
engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The above-described unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain serious un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist from engaging in such conduct and to take
certain affirmative actions, including the posting of a notice to
its employees, designed to effectuate the purposes and policies
of the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended22
ORDER
The Respondent, Angotti Healthcare Systems, Inc., d/b/a St.
Joseph Ambulance Service, San Rafael, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening its employees with more onerous working
conditions if its employees selected the Union as their collec-
tive-bargaining representative.

22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1318
(b) Interrogating its employees as to how they intended to
vote in the NLRB representation election.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in San Raphael, California copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”23 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable

23 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since January 11, 2005.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in Case 20–RC–18009, the chal-
lenges to the ballots of Norma DelaFuente, Isis Laland, Jamie
Larripa, and Jeffrey Leonard be sustained and their ballots not
be opened or counted. Inasmuch as the tally of ballots showed
that a majority of the valid votes cast were cast in favor of the
Union, the Region should issue a Certification of Representa-
tive.