St. John's Mercy Medical Center

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 2005

344 N.L.R.B. 391 (N.L.R.B. 2005)

ST. JOHN’S MERCY MEDICAL CENTER
344 NLRB No. 44
391
St. John’s Mercy Health System d/b/a St. John’s
Mercy Medical Center and United Food &
Commercial Workers Union Local 655, AFL–
CIO, CLC. Case 14–CA–27851
March 31, 2005
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND SCHAUMBER
On December 6, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Paul
Bogas issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel
filed an answering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, St. John’s Mercy Health Sys-
tem d/b/a St. John’s Mercy Medical Center, St. Louis,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Catherine L. Ventola, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Caryn L. Fine, Esq. (The Lowenbaum Partnership), of St.
Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent.
Karl Sauber, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PAUL BOGAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried
in St. Louis, Missouri, on September 14, 2004. The United
Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 655, AFL–CIO,
CLC (the Union) filed the original charge on April 22, 2004,
and the amended charge on June 16, 2004. The Regional Direc-
tor for Region 14 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued the consolidated complaint on June 24, 2004.
The complaint alleges that St. John’s Mercy Medical Center
(the Respondent), violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
failing to give effect to a provision in its labor contract that
requires the discharge of unit employees who fail to pay union
dues and fees. The Respondent admits that, despite repeated
requests by the Union, it has declined to comply with this pro-

1 In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to give effect to the parties’ con-
tractual union-security provision, Chairman Battista notes that the
Respondent was obligated to abide by the collective-bargaining agree-
ment that it had negotiated and that, in any event, the Respondent, on
the facts of this case, failed to show that adherence to the contract’s
union-security provision would have caused it to violate public policy
by failing to meet state-mandated staffing levels for nurses.
vision in the contract. The Respondent argues, however, that a
violation should not be found because the employees at issue
are registered nurses and discharging them pursuant to the un-
ion-security provision would compromise patient care in viola-
tion of public policy.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the parties, I make the following1
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a not-for-profit corporation, with its princi-
pal offices and place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, oper-
ates a full-service hospital (the hospital), from which it annu-
ally derives gross revenues in excess of $250,000, and pur-
chases and receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly
from points outside the State of Missouri. The Respondent
admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7), and a health
care institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
The Respondent further admits, and I find, that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background2
The Respondent operates a hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. It
employs approximately 1400 registered nurses (RNs) who,
since July 27, 1999, have been represented by the Union.3 After

1 The General Counsel and the Union rested their cases entirely on
written stipulations of fact agreed to by all parties. (GC Exh. 1(L).) The
Respondent bases its case on those stipulations plus the trial testimony
of three witnesses.
2 The Respondent’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript,
made in its brief, is granted.
3 The RN unit is defined as follows:
All full-time and regular part-time RNs employed by Respon-
dent as Clinical Nurses, Clinical Nurses Per Diem, RN First Assis-
tants, Trauma Service Coordinators, Care Coordinators, Lactation
Consultants, RN Practitioners, Cardiovascular RNFAs, RN Child-
birth Instructors, Natural Family Planning Practitioners, Practice
Perinatal Coordinators, Cancer Information Center Nurses, Quality
Management Coordinators, Natural Family Planning Coordinators,
Coordinators of Reproductive Endocrinology, Mercy Heartprint
Coordinators, NICU Family Support Coordinators, NICU Follow-
Up Coordinators, Pediatric Education Coordinators, Perinatal Edu-
cation Coordinators, Infection Control Specialists, Care Path Coor-
dinators, Oncology Nurses, Neonatal Nurse Practitioners, Neonatal
Nurse Practitioner Coordinators, Advanced Nurses Clinicians,
Nurse Clinicians, Transplant Coordinators, Program Coordinators-
Behavioral Health, RN Instructors, Case Management Specialists,
Program Coordinators-Rehabilitation, Combined Decongestive
Therapists, Peer Review Coordinators, Team Leaders—OR, Para-
medic Education Coordinators, Stemcell Transplant Coordinators,
Team Leaders-Donor Room, Quality Improvement Coordinators,
Perinatal Outreach Coordinators, Pre-Admission Assessment
Nurses, Staff Development Coordinators employed in the St.
John’s Mercy Medical Center acute care hospital buildings, Edge-
wood building, Skilled Nursing building, Doctors buildings, Sports
Rehabilitation building, Pain Center building, Child Development
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD392
extensive negotiations, the Respondent and the Union entered
into a collective-bargaining agreement that became effective on
October 23, 2001. Among the agreement’s provisions is a un-
ion-security clause, which provides that RNs are required to
pay union dues and fees and that the Respondent will, upon
written request by the Union, discharge RNs who fail to do so.4
As of March 2002, union dues ranged from $15 to $35 per
month, depending on the number of hours the particular RN
was working.
In early 2002, the Union notified the Respondent that a num-
ber of RNs were not paying these monthly dues. Since February
2002, the Union has repeatedly requested that the Respondent
discharge such RNs pursuant to the union-security provision.
The Respondent has refused all of these requests. On two occa-
sions, once on April 16, 2003, and once on April 2, 2004, arbi-
trators mutually selected by the Respondent and the Union
ruled that the Respondent’s failure to discharge the defaulting
RNs was a violation of the collective-bargaining agreement.
Each arbitrator issued an award directing the Respondent to
terminate the defaulting RNs pursuant to the contract. Despite
these decisions, which are final and binding pursuant to the
collective-bargaining agreement, the Respondent has persisted
in its refusal to give effect to the union-security provision. To
the contrary, in an April 2003 letter, the Respondent told the
defaulting RNs that, regardless of the recent arbitrator’s deci-
sion, it did not intend to discharge any of them for failing to

Center building and the JFK and Meacham Park Clinics,
EXCLUDING all office clerical employees, other professional em-
ployees, guards supervisors as defined in the Act, physicians, tech-
nical employees, nonprofessional employees, business office cleri-
cal employees, skilled maintenance employees, and all other em-
ployees.
4 The union-security clause is contained in art. 4 of the collective-
bargaining agreement, which states as follows:
Section 4.1 Conditions of Employment. As a condition of con-
tinued employment, all RNs included in the collective bargaining
unit shall, prior to ninety-one (91) days after the start of their em-
ployment with the Medical Center, or the effective date of this
Agreement, whichever is later, become members of the Union and
pay to the Union the periodic monthly dues and initiation fees uni-
formly required of all Union members. The Union shall certify to
the Medical Center the Amount that constitutes periodic monthly
dues.
Section 4.2 Discharge of Non-Members. The failure of any RN
to become or remain a member of the Union at such required time
by paying initiation fees and regular monthly dues uniformly re-
quired as a condition of membership shall obligate the Medical
Center, upon written notice from the Union to such effect and to
the further effect that Union membership was available to such RN
on the same terms and conditions generally available to other
members, to discharge such RN within ten (10) working days fol-
lowing the receipt of such notice.
Section 4.3 Hold Harmless. The Union recognizes and accepts
sole responsibility for any action arising out of any Union demand
for the discharge of any RN pursuant to the terms of this Agree-
ment. In any and all cases where the Medical Center complies with
the Union demand in reliance upon a written notice respecting
membership in the Union, the Union shall indemnify and hold the
Medical Center harmless for any resulting liability, including, but
not limited to, back pay, lost benefits, other damages, interest,
costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
pay their union fees and dues.5 One year later, after the second
arbitrator’s decision, the Respondent again informed the de-
faulting RNs, in writing, that despite the results of the arbitra-
tion it did not intend to discharge them. The Respondent also
informed union officials that it would refuse to terminate any
RNs for failing to pay. On April 23, 2004, the Union filed an
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Missouri, Eastern Division (Case No. 4
04CV00480CDP), seeking enforcement of the second arbitra-
tor’s award.6
Subsequent to the time period covered by the second arbitra-
tor’s award (May 2003 to December 15, 2003), a number of
other RNs have refused to pay their union dues. In letters to
these employees, the Union stated the amount of dues owed,
the months for which the dues were owed, and the method used
to compute the amount. Each letter gave the defaulting RN at
least 2 weeks in which to comply, and stated that after that time
the Union would seek the RN’s discharge. The Union also pro-
vided these RNs with union membership applications that ad-
vised them of their rights and obligations under Communica-
tions Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), and NLRB v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). Since December 19,
2003—i.e., during the time period covered by the complaint—
the Union has asked in writing that the Respondent discharge
14 RNs who failed to pay dues after receiving one of these
letters. Those 14 are the only RNs among the 1400 employed
by the hospital, who the General Counsel is asking me to order
the Respondent to discharge, although a prospective order
could require additional discharges in the event that other RNs
refused to pay their dues in the future. The Respondent states
that there are a total of 50 defaulting RNs currently in its em-
ploy who the Union is requesting that it discharge;7 however,
the Respondent’s summary document listing these individuals
confirms that only 14 of the RNs are individuals regarding
whom the Union has sought enforcement of the union-security
provision during the time period covered by the complaint. (R.
Exh 11(a).)8
During the period from the beginning of 2002 to the time of
trial, the Union has on two occasions agreed to effectively par-
don RNs for past failures to pay the required dues. In settlement
of a ULP charge filed by the Respondent in 2002, the Union
withdrew the requests that it made in February and March 2002
for the discharge of defaulting RNs. Then, on May 5, 2003, in
settlement of the first arbitration award, the Union agreed to

5 The letter also asked RNs “to consider to start paying . . . required
monthly dues.” (Emphasis added.)
6 The federal action to enforce the arbitrator’s award is pending. In
its brief the Respondent renews its motion, which I denied at the start of
the trial, to hold the instant proceeding in abeyance pending the out-
come of the district court action regarding the arbitrator’s award. I
reaffirm my decision denying the Respondent’s motion.
7 Fifty-one are listed by the Respondent, but the name of one—
Aurora Miller—appears twice.
8 Since December 19, 2003, the Union has made written requests
that the Respondent discharge the following 14 RNs: Julie Boschert,
Elizabeth Drumm, Nancy Eckhard, Karen Elders, Susan Faust, Aurora
Miller, Dorothy Markiewicz, Michelle Mueller, Gloria Newman, Dale
Philpot, Tracey Rahn, Marra Spell, Andrea Weber, and Joan Weisberg.
ST. JOHN’S MERCY MEDICAL CENTER 393
waive the discharge of the RNs covered by the award, and in-
stead accepted a cash payment from the Respondent to be cred-
ited towards those RNs’ delinquencies. However, after those
pardons the Respondent still refused to give prospective effect
to the union-security provision, or even to warn RNs that it
might discharge them in the future if they failed to comply.
There is no way of telling, based on the record before me,
whether a significant number of RNs would choose not to pay
their union dues if the Respondent made clear that discharge
would result from failure to do so. However, I believe it is fair
to infer that a number of the defaulting nurses would have cho-
sen to pay their union dues rather than sacrifice their positions,
and that the Respondent’s declarations that it would not punish
noncompliance increased the number of RNs who defaulted.
The Respondent argues that its refusal to give effect to the
contract is justified by a severe shortage of RNs in the St. Louis
area. In support of this position, the Respondent introduced
testimony concerning the RN vacancy rate—i.e., the number of
vacant RN positions at the hospital expressed as a percentage of
the number of RNs that the hospital had determined it needed to
properly care for patients. The testimony was that the overall
RN vacancy rate for hospitals in the State of Missouri has re-
cently been about 9 to 12 percent. The same vacancy rate is
seen for hospitals in the St. Louis area. The Respondent’s va-
cancy rate during the year prior to trial has typically been
somewhat lower than those statewide and St. Louis averages—
between 7 and 9 percent most months. The Respondent’s va-
cancy figures, moreover, may have been inflated during some
months by its decision to add a significant number of hospital
beds in January 2004, thereby increasing its staffing needs. The
Respondent’s vacancy rate at the time of trial had declined to
between 4 and 6 percent.9 Discharge of the 14 RNs identified
by the General Counsel in this case would result in an increase
of approximately 1 percent in the Respondent’s vacancy rate,
still leaving the Respondent in a considerably better position
than is generally the case for hospitals in the St. Louis area and
across Missouri. The Respondent states that it is required under
Missouri’s Hospital Licensing Law and Missouri Department
of Health guidelines to maintain adequate nurse staffing, but
the record does not show that terminating the 14 defaulting
RNs would bring it out of compliance with any such require-
ments, and indeed such a result seems unlikely given the evi-
dence regarding the higher vacancy rates in the Respondent’s
own recent past, and at other hospitals across the State.10

9 Christine Craine, the Respondent’s chief nurse executive, initially
testified on direct examination that the hospital’s current RN vacancy
rate was 6 percent. Tr. 36. Then on cross-examination she stated that
the vacancy was now “around 5 or 6 percent.” Tr. 69. Later during
cross-examination she conceded that at a recent meeting of the profes-
sional nursing practice committee in August 2004 she “might” have
reported that the Respondent’s RN vacancy rate was only 4 percent. Tr.
75–76.
10 Moreover, the Respondent has not shown that violating its obliga-
tions under the collective-bargaining agreement and federal labor law is
the only way to maintain the necessary staffing levels. Certainly it has
other, lawful, means available to do that, such as improving the terms
and conditions of employment for RNs.
B. Complaint Allegation
The complaint alleges that since about December 19, 2003,
the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by refusing to give effect to the section in its collective-
bargaining agreement with the Union that requires the Respon-
dent, upon notice from the Union, to discharge unit members
who fail to meet the contractual requirement to pay union dues
and fees as a condition of continued employment.
Analysis
The Board has repeatedly held that an employer’s refusal to
honor a union-security provision and discharge defaulting unit
members constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Wire Products Mfg. Corp.,
329 NLRB 155, 163 (1999); McIntyre Engineering Co., 293
NLRB 716, 717 (1989); Litton Systems, 283 NLRB 973, 976
(1987), enf. denied on other grounds 868 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1989); Spear Meat Co., 256 NLRB 117, 119 (1981). As was
recognized in Montgomery Ward & Co., 162 NLRB 369, 381
(1966), a union-security provision is “as much a condition of
employment as wages,” and an employer can “no more alter
legally the union-security provision by unilateral action than it
could, "for example make unilaterally” a mid-term contract
modification by reducing contract wage rates.” In this case, it is
undisputed that the Respondent refused repeated requests by
the Union that it terminate unit members who were not paying
their union dues pursuant to a lawful union-security provi-
sion.11 By doing this, the Respondent unilaterally altered the
union-security provision in the contract in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Respondent argues that it is having difficulty recruiting
and retaining RNs because of a nursing shortage, and therefore
should be granted a public policy exemption from its obliga-
tions under the collective-bargaining contract provision, and
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. On the record in this case, it
is highly unlikely that the Respondent’s compliance with the
union-security provision would have significant implications
contrary to public policy, much less any implications serious
enough to outweigh the public policy in favor of meaningful
collective bargaining and industrial peace. See Mimbres Memo-
rial Hospital & Nursing Home, 342 NLRB 398 (2004) (remedy
against hospital justified by Act’s policy of “fostering meaning-
ful collective bargaining and industrial peace”). However, the
more important point is that the Board has never recognized the
type of generalized public policy exemption sought by the Re-
spondent. The Respondent does not cite a single case that even
suggests such an exemption exists under Board law. The best
the Respondent can do is point to a case in which the Board
held that employees discharged for misconduct observed by

11 The Respondent does not appear to dispute that the collective-
bargaining agreement’s terms provide that defaulting RNs will, upon
written notice by the Union, be discharged. At any rate, I rely on the
two arbitration decisions, both of which interpreted the contract as
requiring the Respondent to comply with union requests that defaulting
RNs be discharged. See American Commercial Lines, 291 NLRB 1066,
1075–1076 (1988) (Board relies on arbitration board’s interpretation of
contract in resolving unfair labor practice question.).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD394
surveillance camera would not be ordered reinstated even
though installation of the cameras was an unlawful unilateral
change. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 342 NLRB 560 (2004). Not
only do those facts bear no resemblance to the ones at issue
here, but the holding was based on a specific exception in Sec-
tion 10(c) of the Act, which states that, “[n]o order of the Board
shall require the reinstatement of any individual . . . suspended
or discharged for cause.” Slip op. at 2. There is no similar pro-
vision in the Act providing that health care providers, or any
other employers, may abrogate portions of a collective-
bargaining contract because the employer considers what it
agreed to excessively burdensome.12 If the Respondent wants to
add such an exception to the Act, it must make its plea to the
legislative branch,13 not in this forum.
For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that, since De-
cember 19, 2003, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by refusing to give effect to article 4, section
4.2 of the collective-bargaining agreement, which requires it,
upon request of the Union, to terminate unit RNs who have not
met the contractual requirement of paying dues or fees to the
Union.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act since December 19, 2003, by refusing to give effect to the

12 Indeed, the Board has previously rejected assertions that a nursing
shortage, or concerns about patient care, should trump the operation or
purposes of the Act. In Abbott Northwestern Hospital, 343 NLRB No.
67, slip op. at 2 (2004), the Board held that the respondent’s refusal to
hire nurses who were on strike from another hospital was an unfair
labor practice despite the respondent’s concern that, “given the nursing
shortage in the relevant labor market, ” hiring such nurses would
strengthen nurses’ bargaining position and negatively affect the respon-
dent’s “ability to retain or hire nurses” at lower wage rates. In Waters of
Orchard Park, 341 NLRB 642, 643–644 (2004), the Board held that
employee action to protect patient welfare at a nursing home was not
protected by the Act, even though this action had taken place in the
context of a state relicensing hearing. The Board explained: “The Act
protects employees’ interests as employees. The interests of nursing
home residents are not protected by the Act.” The Board has also re-
peatedly held that an employer’s claim of economic hardship is not a
valid defense, or even a relevant consideration, when evaluating the
legality of an employer’s unilateral repudiation of a union-security
provision or other obligation in a labor contract. See Controlled Energy
Systems, 331 NLRB 251, 256 (2000); Endicott Forging & Mfg., 319
NLRB 1, 2 (1995); R. T. Jones Lumber Co., 303 NLRB 841, 843
(1991); McIntyre Engineering Co., 293 NLRB at 716–717. See also fn.
10, supra.
13 Congress has demonstrated that it knows how to create an exemp-
tion to union-security requirements when it wishes to do so. Sec. 19 of
the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 169, contains a religious exemption, but “the
express language . . . limits exemptions from union-security require-
ments to those employees whose religious objections . . . are based on
the tenets of a bona fide religion, body, or sect.” Transit Union Local
386 (Grand Rapids Coach), 293 NLRB 581 fn. 1 (1989). The record
evidence does not show that any RN in this case based his or her refusal
to make the required payments on religious objections.
provision in its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union
that requires the Respondent, upon written notice from the Un-
ion, to discharge unit members who have not met the contrac-
tual requirement of paying dues or fees to the Union.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.14
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended Order15
ORDER
The Respondent, St. John’s Mercy Health System d/b/a St.
John’s Mercy Medical Center, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to comply with article 4, section 4.2
of the collective-bargaining agreement, which requires it, upon
written notice from the Union, to terminate unit RNs who have
not met the contractual requirement of paying dues or fees to
the Union
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Comply with article 4, section 4.2 of the collective-
bargaining agreement by discharging the following employees:
Julie Boschert, Elizabeth Drumm, Nancy Eckhard, Karen Eld-
ers, Susan Faust, Aurora Miller, Dorothy Markiewicz, Michelle
Mueller, Gloria Newman, Dale Philpot, Tracey Rahn, Marra
Spell, Andrea Weber, and Joan Weisberg.

14 The General Counsel asks that I order the Respondent to honor the
Union’s discharge requests regarding the 14 defaulting employees, but
neither the General Counsel nor the Union has asked that I order the
Respondent to reimburse the Union for required dues or fees. Absent a
request for the latter relief, I will not consider whether such relief is
appropriate in this case. Similarly, although the record shows that the
collective-bargaining agreement was set to expire on October 22, 2004
(after the close of the trial, but before the submission of posttrial
briefs), the Respondent has not claimed that any remedy should end as
of that date. Given that, and the possibility that the union-security pro-
vision has been extended or renewed, I will not consider whether the
remedy should be confined to the period ending on October 22.
15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
ST. JOHN’S MERCY MEDICAL CENTER 395
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at St.
John’s Mercy Medical Center in St. Louis, Missouri, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re-
ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since December
19, 2003.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to comply with article 4, section
4.2 of the collective-bargaining agreement, which requires us,
upon written notice from the Union, to terminate unit RNs who
have not met the contractual requirement of paying dues or fees
to the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL comply with article 4, section 4.2 of the collective-
bargaining agreement by discharging the following employees:
Julie Boschert, Elizabeth Drumm, Nancy Eckhard, Karen Eld-
ers, Susan Faust, Aurora Miller, Dorothy Markiewicz, Michelle
Mueller, Gloria Newman, Dale Philpot, Tracey Rahn, Marra
Spell, Andrea Weber, and Joan Weisberg.
ST. JOHN’S MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A ST. JOHN’S
MERCY MEDICAL CENTER