SSA Pacific

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 3, 2018

366 NLRB No. 51 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

366 NLRB No. 51
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
SSA Pacific, Inc. and Roni Simisola and John Stubbe
and Alan Couch
Pacific Maritime Association and Roni Simisola and
and John Stubbe and Alan Couch
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Lo-
cal 18 and Roni Simisola and John Stubbe and
Alan Couch. Cases 20–CA–151433, 20–CA–
156741, 20–CA–156786, 20–CA–153169, 20–CA–
-156732, 20–CA–156792, 20–CB–151490, 20-CA-
156767, and 20–CB–156787
April 3, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS PEARCE, MCFERRAN, AND EMANUEL
On September 13, 2016, Administrative Law Judge
Mara-Louise Anzalone issued the attached decision. The
General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
the Respondents each filed an answering brief, and the
General Counsel filed a reply brief. In addition, the Re-
spondents each filed cross-exceptions and a supporting
brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and
the Respondents each filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and record in
light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs and
has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and
conclusions as clarified below and to adopt the judge’s
recommended Order as modified and set forth in full
below.2

1
There are no exceptions to the judge’s dismissal of the allegations
in the amended consolidated complaint (complaint) that Respondents
SSA Pacific, Inc. (SSA Pacific), and Pacific Maritime Association
(PMA) violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act by suspending Roni
Simisola, and violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging John Stubbe
and suspending Alan Couch. There are also no exceptions to the
judge’s dismissal of the complaint allegations that Respondent Interna-
tional Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 (Local 18), violated
Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by restraining or coercing Stubbe and Couch, and vio-
lated Sec. 8(b)(2) by causing SSA Pacific and PMA to discharge
Stubbe and suspend Couch.
The General Counsel has implicitly excepted to some of the judge’s
credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule
an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We have modified the judge's recommended Order to conform to
our findings. Complaint pars. 9, 15, and 18 allege, inter alia, that SSA
We adopt the judge’s dismissal of the complaint alle-
gations that SSA Pacific and PMA violated Section
8(a)(1) by suspending Roni Simisola for exercising Sec-
tion 7 rights. Initially, we emphasize that Simisola’s
request to review the dispatch list was activity protected
by Section 7. And, in affirming the judge, we assume
arguendo that the General Counsel established a prima
facie case under Wright Line.3 We find, however, that
the evidence establishes that the Respondents met their
rebuttal burden by proving that they suspended Simisola
not because she requested dispatch records, but rather
because she disrupted the dispatch process.
We further adopt the judge’s dismissal of the com-
plaint allegations that Local 18 violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by suspending Simisola for the conduct de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph and Section 8(b)(2)
by causing SSA Pacific and PMA to suspend her for that
conduct. The judge applied both a duty-of-fair-
representation and a Wright Line analysis to these allega-
tions, and we agree with her, for the reasons explained in
her decision, that Local 18 did not violate the Act under
either framework.4
Finally, we adopt the judge’s dismissal of the com-
plaint allegations that SSA Pacific and PMA violated
Section 8(a)(1) and Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by suspending Simisola pursuant to Rule 12 of the Iden-
tified Casuals Dispatch Rules, which provides that
“[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or
at any other job-related area shall have their dispatch

Pacific and PMA violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and Local 18 violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A) by jointly maintaining Rule 12 of the Identified Casuals
Dispatch Rules, which provides that “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at
the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-related area shall have their dis-
patch privileges permanently revoked.” We shall sever the above-
described allegations from the complaint and retain them for further
consideration.
3 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 445 U.S. 989 (1982). The judge’s decision could be interpreted
as misstating the General Counsel’s initial burden under Wright Line.
Contrary to the judge’s suggestion, “proving that an employee's pro-
tected activity was a motivating factor in the employer's action does not
require the General Counsel to make some additional showing of par-
ticularized motivating animus towards the employee's own protected
activity.” T-Mobile USA, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 15, slip op. at 1 fn. 1
(2017), quoting Libertyville Toyota, 360 NLRB 1298, 1301 fn. 10
(2014) (emphasis in original), enfd. 801 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2015).
4 Although the judge did not separately analyze the complaint alle-
gation that Local 18 violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by disciplining Simisola
for engaging in activity protected by Sec. 7, we find that dismissal of
that allegation is appropriate for the same reasons that she dismissed
the related 8(b)(2) allegation against Local 18.
Member Pearce agrees that Local 18 did not violate the Act under a
duty-of-fair-representation analysis and would not analyze the allega-
tions under Wright Line.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
privileges permanently revoked.”5 As the judge ob-
served, the general rule is that discipline imposed pursu-
ant to an unlawfully overbroad rule is unlawful. See
Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 112 fn. 3
(2004), enfd. 414 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied 546 U.S. 1170 (2006). “Nevertheless, an employer
will avoid liability for discipline imposed pursuant to an
overbroad rule if it can establish that the employee's con-
duct . . . actually interfered with the employer’s opera-
tions, and that the interference, rather than the violation
of the rule, was the reason for the discipline.” Continen-
tal Group, Inc., 357 NLRB 409, 412 (2011).6 Assuming,
without deciding, that Rule 12 is unlawfully overbroad,
we agree with the judge that the Respondents proved that
Simisola’s conduct actually interfered with the work of
others, and that this interference (which, as the judge
found, the Respondents cited in suspending Simisola),
and not her violation of the unlawful rule, was the reason
for her suspension.7 See id.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the allegations that Respondents
SSA Pacific and PMA violated Section 8(a)(1) and Re-
spondent Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by jointly
maintaining Rule 12 of the Identified Casuals Dispatch
Rules, which provides that “[c]asuals causing a disturb-
ance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-related area
shall have their dispatch privileges permanently re-
voked,” are severed and retained for further considera-
tion.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
severed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 3, 2018

5 Although the judge did not separately analyze the 8(b)(1)(A) alle-
gation against Local 18, we find that dismissal of that allegation is
appropriate for the same reasons that she dismissed the related 8(a)(1)
allegations against SSA Pacific and PMA.
6 As the Board explained in Continental Group, supra:
It is the employer's burden, not only to assert this affirmative defense,
but also to establish that the employee's interference with production
or operations was the actual reason for the discipline. In this regard, an
employer's mere citation of the overbroad rule as the basis for disci-
pline will not suffice to meet its burden. Rather, assuming that the em-
ployer provides the employee with a reason (either written or oral) for
its imposition of discipline, the employer must demonstrate that it cit-
ed the employee's interference with production and not simply the vio-
lation of the overbroad rule.
357 NLRB at 412.
7 In light of our finding, we find it unnecessary to pass on the Re-
spondents’ argument that they also avoid liability under the Double
Eagle rule because Simisola’s conduct was “wholly distinct” from
activity protected by Sec. 7. See Continental Group, 357 NLRB at 412.
Mark Gaston Pearce, Member
Lauren McFerran, Member
William J. Emanuel, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
David B. Reeves, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert S. Remar, Esq. (Leonard Carder, LLP), for Respondent
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18.
Jonathan C. Fritz and Nicole Buffalano, Esqs. (Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius LLP), for Respondent Pacific Maritime Associa-
tion.
Joseph M. Galosic, Esq., for Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARA-LOUISE ANZALONE, Administrative Law Judge. I
heard this case over the course of 9 days between January 20
and April 8, 2016, in San Francisco, California. This case was
tried following the issuance of an order consolidating cases,
consolidated amended complaint, and notice of hearing (the
complaint) by the Regional Director for Region 20 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board on November 30, 2015. The
complaint was based on a number of original and amended
unfair labor practice charges, as captioned above, filed by
Charging Parties Roni Simisola, John Stubbe and Alan Couch
(collectively, the Charging Parties or the discriminatees). The
General Counsel alleges that Respondent International Long-
shore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 (the Union or Local 18)
violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) and Respondents Pa-
cific Maritime Association (PMA) and SSA Pacific, Inc. (SSA)
(collectively, the Employer-Respondents) violated Section
8(a)(1), (3) and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. Sec. 151, et. seq. (the Act). Each Respondent filed a
timely answer to the complaint denying the commission of the
alleged unfair labor practices alleged against it.
At trial, all parties were afforded the right to call, examine,
and cross-examine witnesses, to present any relevant documen-
tary evidence, to argue their respective legal positions orally,
and to file posthearing briefs.1 Posthearing briefs were filed by
the General Counsel, PMA and Local 18, and each of these
briefs has been carefully considered.2 Accordingly, based upon

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for tran-
script; “GC Exh.__” for General Counsel’s Exhibit; “U Exh. __” for
Local 18’s Exhibit; “PMA Exh. __” for PMA’s Exhibit; “Jt. Exh. __”
for Joint Exhibit; “GC Br. at __” for the General Counsel’s posthearing
brief; “U Br. at __” for Local 18’s posthearing brief; and “PMA Br. at
__” for PMA’s posthearing brief.
2 On February 29, 2016, I granted counsel for the General Counsel’s
unopposed motion to correct the transcript, which was filed the day
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 3
the entire record herein, including the posthearing briefs and
my observation of the credibility of the witnesses, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT3
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges that SSA, a California corporation, is
engaged in the business of providing stevedoring and longshore
services at the Port of West Sacramento. SSA is an employer-
member of PMA, a California corporation with its principal
place of business in San Francisco, California, and a branch
office at Oakland, California. PMA is an association of em-
ployers whose approximately 50 employer-members are en-
gaged in business in California, Oregon and Washington as
stevedore companies, operators of marine terminals, and
equipment maintenance and repair contractors. On behalf of its
employer-members, PMA negotiates and enters into collective-
bargaining agreements with various unions including the Inter-
national Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and its Lo-
cal 18.
The complaint alleges and PMA admits that the employer-
members of PMA annually derive gross revenues in excess of
$50,000 from the transportation of goods and passengers be-
tween California and other States or foreign countries. PMA
and its employer-members are thus engaged in commerce with-
in the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Accordingly,
I find that SSA and PMA are employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.4 I
additionally find that Local 18 Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects com-
merce and that the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
has jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the
Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case involves actions taken against three longshore

prior. The record is therefore amended to reflect the proposed changes
set forth in that motion.
3 I have based my credibility resolutions on consideration of a wit-
ness’ opportunity to be familiar with the subjects covered by the testi-
mony given; established or admitted facts; the impact of bias on the
witness’ testimony; the quality of the witness’ recollection; testimonial
consistency; the presence or absence of corroboration; the strength of
rebuttal evidence, if any; the weight of the evidence; and witness de-
meanor while testifying and the form of questions eliciting responses.
Credibility findings need not be all-or-nothing propositions, and it is
common for a fact finder to credit some, but not all, of a witness’ testi-
mony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 622 (2001).
4 Since PMA is admittedly subject to the Board’s jurisdiction, SSA
is also deemed to be an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. See Pace Industries,
Inc., 320 NLRB 661, 667 (1996) (where one entity of single-employer
is subject to the Board’s jurisdiction, all entities part of that single
employer are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction); Insulation Contrac-
tors of Southern California, 110 NLRB 638 (1955) (all members of a
multiemployer group who participate in, or are bound by, multiemploy-
er bargaining negotiations are considered as a single employer for
jurisdictional purposes).
workers at the Port of West Sacramento (the Port). The Gen-
eral Counsel contends that the Employer-Respondents issued
unwarranted discipline to John Stubbe (Stubbe), Roni Simisola
(Simisola) and Alan Couch (Couch) in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, because they protested the operation of Re-
spondents’ jointly operated dispatch hall. In addition, it is al-
leged that discriminatee Simisola’s discipline was motivated by
her filing unfair labor practice charges, in violation of Section
8(a)(4) of the Act. In each case, Local 18 is alleged to have
violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act by causing the
Employer-Respondents to take the adverse action in question.
The General Counsel additionally alleges that Simisola’s disci-
pline was based on the application of an overbroad rule main-
tained by Respondents, which rule is separately alleged as an
independent violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) of the
Act. Finally, the General Counsel alleges that Local 18 violat-
ed Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by refusing to provide Si-
misola with access to dispatch hall records.
A. Factual Background
1. Respondents’ officers, supervisors and representatives
SSA’s terminal manager at the Port is Frank Patalano. David
Robinson is PMA’s labor relations administrator. Since Sep-
tember 2015, William Bartelson has been PMA’s senior coast
director of contract administration and arbitration; this position
(albeit with a different job title) was held previously held by
Richard Marzano. Todd Amidon is senior counsel for PMA.
(Tr. 377, 858, 1206–1207, 1286)5
Tim Campbell has been Local 18’s President since May
2014. Sean Farley was president of ILWU Local 15 (which
represents marine clerks at the Port) during 2015. Justin Deed
and Joey Schaffer are joint dispatchers at Local 18. (Tr. 217,
1647, 2006, 2079)6
2. The longshore bargaining unit
Since the 1930s, the ILWU has represented West Coast
longshore workers; that representation currently consists of a
single multiemployer/multiport coastwise unit, the origins of
which can be traced to an order of the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) issued over 75 years ago. Shipowners’ Assn. of
the Pacific Coast, 7 NLRB 1002 (1938).7 Longshore workers
on the West Coast, including the workers involved in this case,
are subject to the terms of the Pacific Coast Longshore Contract
Document (PCLCD), a portion of the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the ILWU and its employer counter-

5 At hearing, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the
complaint to allege Todd Amidon and Richard Marzano as agents of
PMA. Insofar as these individuals at various times took positions on
behalf of PMA regarding certain aspects of the parties’ grievance and
arbitration machinery, I find that they did act as its agents.
6 At hearing, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the
complaint to allege joint dispatchers Justin Deed and Joey Shaffer as
agents of all Respondents. Based on the record as a whole, I find that,
insofar as they carry out their dispatching duties, Deed and Schaffer did
act as agents of Local 18. I cannot find any support in the record, how-
ever, for finding either of them to be an agent of SSA or PMA.
7 The West Coast longshore industry has a storied organizational his-
tory which is set forth in detail in this decision.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
part, the PMA. (Tr. 860)
3. The parties’ joint dispatch hall operation
The origins of the dispatch hall system at the core of this
case predate the Act and can be traced to 1934 award by the
National Longshoremen’s Board. This award ordered the crea-
tion of joint dispatch halls in West Coast ports and at least one
joint port labor relations committee (JPLRC) in each port. See
Shipowners’ Assn. of the Pacific Coast, supra. Each JPLRC
has a local union and management component with equal vot-
ing power. PMA serves as the spokesperson for each commit-
tee’s employer component and provides additionally adminis-
trative support for the committee. (Tr. 1209, 1319; GC Exh. 2
at 84.)
JPLRCs, including one established at the Port (referred to as
the SJPLRC), are charged with establishing and maintaining
registered lists of longshore workers eligible for dispatch to
available jobs. They are also authorized to establish rules gov-
erning the operation of the parties’ joint dispatch halls. One of
these rules (discussed in more detail, infra) prohibits workers
from “causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other
job-related area.” (GC Exh. 14) JPLRCs, including the
SJPLRC, are also charged with investigating and adjudicating
claims of employee misconduct, including that occurring at the
dispatch hall. Such a claim, when brought by a PMA employer
against a longshore worker, is referred to as an “employer com-
plaint.” (Tr. 1209–1211, 1788; GC Exh. 2 at 85, § 17.125.)
4. The Port’s registration system
Three classifications of longshore workers work at the Port,
and each are afforded different dispatch rights: fully registered
Class A workers, limited-registered Class B workers and unreg-
istered identified casuals. Each of the discriminatees in this
case was classified as an unregistered identified casual (also
referred to as “ID casuals” or simply “casuals”) during the rele-
vant period. (Tr. 1657–1658)
The PCLCD dictates that casuals, who are not Local 18
members, are dispatched only after all local and visiting Class
A and Class B registered longshore workers and marine clerks
have been offered work. (Tr. 1648, 1670–1673; GC Exh. 2 at
51–52, § 8.41.) The PCLCD also provides that casuals, as un-
registered longshore workers, are “subject to greater penalties”
than registered longshore workers; as Respondents’ witnesses
credibly testified, throughout the industry, casuals are effective-
ly treated as probationary employees subject to heightened
discipline. (GC Exh. 2 at 103, § 17.861; Tr. 899–900, 960–
961, 1517–1519.) Casuals are also subject to a jointly negotiat-
ed set of rules, discussed infra, called the “Identified Casuals
Dispatch Rules,” which include the rule alleged by the General
Counsel as unlawfully overbroad, as well as an additional (un-
alleged) rule stating that casuals who are the subject of an em-
ployer complaint “will be placed on the Non-Dispatch List and
will not be dispatched until their grievance has been adjudicat-
ed by the [JPLRC].” (GC Exh. 14.)
ID casuals may eventually progress to registered longshore
worker status. (Tr. 1236, 1241.) Specifically, when there is a
demand for additional Class B members, casuals are advanced
(or “elevated”) in descending order by work experience, i.e.,
the hours each has been paid for work. (GC Exh. 40 at 2.) It is
undisputed that elevation to Class B status brings with a guar-
antee of work, benefits and significantly higher earnings. (Tr.
1016, 1072–1073)
5. The 2014 registration grievances
In March 2014, Local 18 conducted a “registration” process,
whereby it elevated a number of ID casuals to Class B long-
shore worker status. Stubbe, Simisola and Couch, who were
not selected, each filed a grievance in March 2014, alleging that
the selection process was tainted by the practice of “chiseling”
(i.e., cheating at the dispatch hall) in favor of certain, favored
employees and that their prior ID casual work performed out-
side of the Port should have been considered in the registration
process. Similar grievances were filed by 8 other ID casuals on
the same date. Each of the grievances was heard by the
SJPLRC on June 24 and December 9, 2014. (Tr. 160–162, 432,
771–772; GC Exh. 15.)
Discriminatee Couch testified that, during one of the two
hearing dates, Union President Campbell took him as well as 4
other grievants aside for a caucus. According to Couch, Camp-
bell told the group that, if they did not drop their grievances,
[I]t would be a lot harder for us because they were going to
bring some more people in, make a new list and we would be
more or less SOL, because when they do that we’re going to
be rotating with another 30 or 40 people.
(Tr. 434) Couch testified that he understood this to mean that
Respondents would create a new ID casual list, thereby diluting
the hours for the current ID casuals. According to him, Camp-
bell next told the workers that, if they did not drop the griev-
ances, “you’re going to be on your own,” but that if they with-
drew them he would “take care” of them. Counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel only called one other employee-witness to this
conversation, ID casual Peter Bianchini (Bianchini). Like
Couch, Bianchini testified that Campbell told the grievants that,
if they did not drop their grievances, 30–40 more ID casuals
would be added to the casual rotation and they could be stuck
rotating with these individuals. (Tr. 434, 1072)8
Campbell admitted having a conversation with the group in
the hallway outside the June grievance meeting, but his recol-
lection was markedly different. Campbell testified that, during
a break in the meeting, Biancini asked him about the likelihood
of further registration, to which Campbell responded that there
would be more registration because Respondents were having a
hard time filling gangs. Biancini then asked whether there
would be more casuals added to the casual list, and Campbell
said that yes, there would be more casuals added as well.
Campbell specifically denied asking any of the grievants to
withdraw their grievance regarding the 2014 registration, or
telling them that they would either get stuck in a larger casual
rotation or be “on their own” if they failed to do so. (Tr. 2084–
2085.)
On December 9, 2014, each of the 11 grievances was denied;
Stubbe and Couch each elected not to pursue his grievance

8 On the date of the June grievance meeting, 3 of the 11 grievants in
fact withdrew their registration grievances; 2 of those 3 were subse-
quently “elevated” in a later 2015 registration. (Tr. 435–436, 2101–
2102.)
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 5
further. Simisola appealed her grievance, and it was pending
arbitration decision as of the close of the record in this matter.
(Tr. 432, 772, 774–775; GC Exhs. 21, 40.)
6. ID Casual Rule 12 and the Port’s dispatch process
Posted at the dispatch hall are the Port’s “ID Casual Rules,”
which were jointly negotiated by Respondents several decades
ago. The rules address both the conduct of the dispatch itself,
as well as the conditions under which individual casuals will be
considered eligible for dispatch.
As noted, the General Counsel alleges that one of these rules,
referred to as “ID Casual Rule 12,” is unlawfully overbroad in
violation of the Act. This rule, put in relevant context, states:
IDENTIFIED CASUALS DISPATCH RULES
The following rules are for the dispatch of Identified Casuals,
and shall be posted in clear view at the Joint Dispatch Hall.
. . .
12. Casuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at
any other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges
permanently revoked.
(GC 14) It is undisputed that Respondents maintain similar
rules barring disruption of dispatch by the other classes of long-
shore workers at the Port. (Tr. 1216–1221; PMA 8.)
The day-to-day operation of the Port’s dispatch hall is the re-
sponsibility of Local 18 member-dispatchers who are elected
by the membership. (Tr. 1209–1211; GC Exh. 2 at 85, §
17.121.) The dispatch process begins with SSA sending job
orders to the dispatcher assigned to the shift in question. This
dispatcher then dispatches by telephone the class A workers
registered in the Port; he then moves on to workers, including
casuals, physically present in the hall. During this portion of
the dispatch, the dispatcher stands behind a podium and calls
jobs and workers in sequence. A yellow line is painted on the
floor of the dispatch hall in front of the podium where dispatch-
ing takes place. According to Respondents’ witnesses, the
purpose of the yellow line is to keep order in the dispatch hall,
and, in particular, to enforce ID Casual Rule 12.
While individuals may occasionally cross the yellow line
(even when not being dispatched), the dispatcher may order a
worker behind the line if she is disrupting dispatch. (Tr. 1661–
1662, 1687; U Exh. 20.) Failure to comply with an order to
retreat behind the yellow line may result in the worker receiv-
ing a “citation” (the Union’s version of an employer com-
plaint). According to dispatcher Justin Deed (Deed), this de-
vice is typically used to prevent workers from “rushing” the
podium when particular jobs are being dispatched, as well as to
keep groups of workers from being loud, distracting the dis-
patcher and thereby interfering with the dispatch process. As
Deed explained, “[i]f I instruct them to get behind the yellow
line, they need to get behind the yellow line.” (Tr. 1893–1895,
1898.)
After dispatching in the hall, the dispatcher returns to the
dispatch office, where he does additional dispatching by phone,
which consists of filling late job orders, correcting clerical er-
rors and duplicate assignments and making any required last-
minute changes in job assignments. Some of these tasks re-
quire the dispatcher to coordinate with the dispatcher for the
Port’s marine clerks, who are represented by ILWU Local 15.
The dispatcher then completes the paperwork necessary to doc-
ument each worker’s assignment and generates a running tally
of the hours worked in order to ensure, per the dispatch rules,
that the registered longshore workers are dispatched in the or-
der of “lowest hours” first. (Tr. 1679–1685)
B. Facts Relevant to the General Counsel’s
Individual Allegations
1. Roni Simisola
Simisola has been an ID Casual longshore worker at the Port
since approximately May 22, 2008. The JPLRC suspended her
from April 30 through June 2, 2015 based on her conduct at the
Port’s joint dispatch hall. (Tr. 767.)
a. Simisola’s protected conduct
As noted, Simisola filed a grievance in March 2014 alleging
that she was not elevated in the 2014 registration because of
inappropriate dispatching, and she appealed the denial of her
grievance (and that of another grievant) in December 2014.
(Tr. 772, 774; GC Exhs. 21, 40.) Prior to Respondents’ June
2015 decision to suspend Simisola, she also filed several Board
charges regarding the operation of the Port’s dispatch opera-
tion, including a January 28, 2015 charge against the Union and
an April 13, 2015 charge against PMA. (GC Exhs. 22, 23.)
b. Simisola’s conduct at the dispatch hall9
Simisola regularly photographed dispatch sheets to support
her grievance claim that Local 18 dispatchers were cheating in
the dispatch. Until mid-March 2015, the dispatchers left these
dispatch sheets at the podium following dispatch where they
were available for inspection or photographing. Deed testified
that, around this time, five longshore workers complained that
Simisola violated their privacy by photographing them and
their dispatch sheets. There was no action taken against Si-
misola, but it appears that the dispatchers ceased their practice
of leaving the dispatch logs on the podium following the dis-
patch. (Tr. 441, 985–986, 1688–1689; U Exh. 10.)10
On April 9 and 10, 2015, Simisola attempted to photograph
the sheets during the dispatch when she herself was called to
the podium. On each occasion, Deed instructed her to return
behind the yellow line. (Tr. 982; PMA Exh. 22 at 4.) Simisola
admitted at hearing that she has been aware of the “yellow-

9 While the testimony regarding these events was not significantly
inconsistent, I have generally credited the testimony of Respondents’
witnesses where it contradicted that of Simisola. I found Deed particu-
larly credible, in that he clearly worked hard to recall details, was care-
ful in listening to and answering questions and generally seemed con-
cerned with testifying truthfully as opposed to “candy coating” any
aspect of Local 18’s case. Simisola, for her part, had significant diffi-
culty recalling even basic facts regarding her conduct in the dispatch
hall on the dates she was accused of disrupting dispatch, April 29 and
30; as such, her testimony was far less reliable. (See Tr. 796–797, 801,
805–806, 809–819.)
10 The Union brought up these complaints at an April 14, 2015
SJPLRC meeting, at which time SSA’s representatives suggested that
the Union remind Simisola about rule 12’s prohibition on disrupting
dispatch. It is unclear from the record whether the Union did so.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
line” rule since at least June 2014, and had been warned by a
dispatcher as of that date to return behind the line or risk dis-
charge. (Tr. 976–977.)11
(i) April 29
On April 29, 2015, Simisola again attempted to document
what she considered to be evidence of cheating in dispatch. On
this occasion, when Deed called her to the podium to receive
her assignment, she began making a video recording (using her
cell phone) of him and the dispatch sheets. Deed asked Si-
misola not to take photographs or videos while he was dis-
patching; she did not respond, but simply stared at him, at
which point Deed repeated his request. After another period of
silence, Simisola turned around and walked away. According
to Deed, this entire interaction took approximately 2 minutes.
(Tr. 1726–1727.)
After Deed had finished dispatching the ID casuals, he gath-
ered up the dispatch sheets and went into the dispatch office to
complete his dispatching duties (i.e., making follow-up phone
calls and documenting the details of the dispatch into a daily
log). A minute later, Simisola appeared at the office; standing
in an entryway near where Deed sat working, she asked if she
could photograph the dispatch sheets. According to Deed, he
told her no, explaining that he was still working on the dis-
patch, and then ordered her back behind the yellow line in the
hall. Simisola did not comply, instead insisting that he must
not still be dispatching, because the hall was empty. She then
said she wanted to see where she was in the order of dispatch.
Deed gave in, showing her the dispatch sheet containing her
name. Simisola then stated she wanted to photograph all of the
day’s dispatch sheets, to which Deed responded he was still
working and he had already shown her where she stood in the
dispatch. After more back-and-forth, Deed finally threated to
call Local 18 President Tim Campbell (Campbell), saying “I’m
not going to go through this with you anymore. I’ve got work
to do.” (Tr. 1729–1733.)
While not complying with Deed’s order to get behind the
yellow line, Simisola did back away from the entryway where
she had initially stood. Deed called Campbell, who was out of
state at the time. Agreeing that Simisola needed to leave the
office, Campbell in turn reported the situation to SSA’s then-
terminal manager Frank Patalano (Patalano), saying that Deed
was being “harassed” and Patalano was needed at the hall.12
Patalano arrived within minutes; after consulting briefly with
Deed, Patalano confronted Simisola about her conduct. Ac-
cording to Patalano, Simisola admitted she had entered the
dispatch office and acknowledged that she wasn’t supposed to
disrupt dispatch. Meanwhile, Deed returned to his office to
complete the dispatch paperwork. (Tr. 1411, 1416, 1418,
1739–1740, 1733, 1743.)
It is undisputed that, as a result of the incident with Simisola,
Deed’s dispatching was delayed; specifically, he was unable to

11 While Simisola initially testified that, as of April 2015, she had
never actually seen Rule 12, she was impeached by her Board affidavit
which stated that she had. (Tr. 968–969.)
12 As Patalano testified, his position as terminal manager made him
responsible for the safety of all individuals at SSA’s operations at the
Port. (Tr. 1417.)
contact two workers in sufficient time for them to make it to the
Port to accept job assignments, instead resorting to continuing
down the dispatch list and offering the assignments to workers
out of order. After Simisola had left the hall, Campbell con-
ferred with Robinson and they agreed that, since the problem
appeared resolved, they could address it at the next regular
SJLRC meeting. (Tr. 1419–1420, 1521, 1534, 1739–1740,
1758, 1760, 1763–1764, 1785.)
(II) APRIL 30
The following morning (approximately 13 hours after she
had left the hall the prior day), Simisola appeared at the dis-
patch office while Deed was completing his dispatch paper-
work and asked if she could take photographs of the dispatch
sheets. Deed said he was still dispatching, and instructed her to
return behind the yellow line. Once again, instead of comply-
ing, Simisola asked Deed to confirm that she was not allowed
to photograph the dispatch sheets. Deed responded, “I’m not
telling you that. I’m just telling you that you need to get back
behind the line until I’m finished dispatching.” (Tr. 1768–
1769.)
Simisola complied, only to return 25 minutes later again de-
manding to photograph the dispatch sheets. As Deed again
ordered her behind the yellow line, Class A longshore worker
and Union sergeant-at-arms Alphonso Valdez (Valdez) entered
the office. Deed yet again asked Simisola to leave, but she
remained, asking whether she was being refused access to the
dispatch sheets. After Deed again explained that he was still
working, Valdez asked Simisola to leave, saying Deed needed
to finish his job. When she did not respond, Valdez ordered her
to leave, this time identifying himself as the sergeant-at-arms.13
Simisola questioned whether Valdez did, in fact, hold that posi-
tion, but then she retreated to the dispatch hall. This time, Si-
misola’s appearance at the dispatch office resulted in a delay of
dispatch to the point at which Deed was late reporting for his
own longshore work assignment that day. (Tr. 1421–1423,
1522–1523, 1771–1777, 1783–1785, 1997.)
(iii) Respondents suspend Simisola
When Simisola refused to leave the dispatch office on April
30, Deed sent a text14 to Campbell and Patalano, the tone and
language of which reflected his frustration with Simisola’s
repeated disruptions: “This is bullshit. I’m trying to work. I
want something done about this harassment.” (U Exh. 14; Tr.
1779.) Campbell (who was still out of town) and Patalano
spoke briefly, and Campbell asked Patalano to go the hall and
assess the situation. (Tr. 1421.) Patalano soon arrived, where
he was briefed by Deed and Valdez; after conferring, Deed and
Patalano agreed they would each report Simisola’s conduct to
the SJPLRC, on behalf of Local 18 and SSA, respectively.
Patalano testified that he decided to file an employer complaint
after conferring with PMA’s David Robinson (Robinson),

13 Valdez corroborated Deed’s version of these events, albeit testify-
ing in what appeared not to be his first language and without the assis-
tance of a translator. (Tr. 1997–1999, 2001.)
14 Patalano recalled getting a “call” from Deed; considering that
Deed’s text was authenticated at the hearing, I believe Patalano simply
confused the means by which Deed contacted him. (Tr. 1421.)
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 7
based on the fact that she had knowingly violated the very rule
she had been warned about the day prior.
At an emergency SJPLRC meeting that afternoon, Robinson,
Patalano, Deed and Campbell (who telephoned in) discussed
the situation. They agreed that Simisola appeared prepared to
continue disrupting dispatch, and Patalano announced that he
was going file an employer complaint against Simisola. The
committee then decided, pursuant to the ID Casual Rules, to
suspend Simisola from dispatch pending the adjudication of
Patalano’s complaints. On April 30, 2015, the JPLRC in-
formed Simisola that she was barred from entering the dispatch
hall pending investigation of her conduct. On May 1, 2015,
Patalano filed two employer complaints against Simisola stat-
ing that she had disrupted dispatch and refused to get behind
the yellow line when ordered. Deed filed corresponding Union
citations accusing Simisola of disrupting dispatch on the days
in question. (Tr. 1421–1423, 1522–1526, 1771–1777, 1783–
1788; GC Exhs. 14, 24, 34, U Exh. 15, 16; PMA Exh. 21.)
On June 2, 2015, the complaints about Simisola’s conduct on
April 29 and 30 were heard by the SJPLRC.15 In attendance
were Simisola, Deed and representatives of all three Respond-
ents. Patalano, Deed, Simisola and Valdez testified regarding
the events at the dispatch hall on the two days in question.
While initially denying being warned about crossing the yellow
line during dispatch, Simisola eventually admitted that, prior to
April 29, 2015, she had been warned that disrupting dispatch
violated Rule 12 and that she knew that crossing the yellow line
or entering the dispatch office during dispatch was a violation
of the dispatch rules. While she downplayed the amount of
time she spent in the office on the occasions in question, she
did not deny entering the office or refusing to return behind the
yellow line as repeated ordered. After the witnesses testified
about each Simisola’s conduct on each of the 2 days in ques-
tion, the witnesses were excused and the committee deliberat-
ed16 for at least 45 minutes. (Tr. 1527; 1533–1542, 1791–1792;
U Exh. 17; PMA Exh. 22.)
Ultimately, the committee concluded that Simisola was
guilty of disrupting dispatch, in that, despite being aware of
Rule 12, she had repeatedly refused to follow the dispatcher’s
instructions to leave the dispatch office and return behind the
yellow line. Despite the fact that Rule 12, by its terms, calls for
immediate removal from the dispatch list, the committee in-
stead issued Simisola a final and binding last chance agree-
ment, which stated that if she were to disrupt dispatch again,
she would be removed. In addition, the SJPLRC decided that
Simisola’s penalty was “time served” (i.e., the 43 days she had
been placed on nondispatch while her complaint was adjudicat-
ed. (Tr. 1541–1544; GC Exh. 25; PMA Exh. 22)
1. John Stubbe
Stubbe worked as an ID casual at the Port from 2008 until

15 imisola’s case was originally scheduled to be heard at an earlier
SJPLRC meeting; Simisola, however, was not available and Campbell
assisted her in being excused from appearing on that date and resched-
uling her appearance for June 2, 2015. (Tr. 1525–1527, 2098; GC Exh.
24; PMA Exh. 22.)
16 Deed, who was a union representative on the SJPLRC, was
recused from these deliberations. (Tr. 1536, 1544, 1803–1804.)
April 2015. Prior to that, he had worked for approximately 15
years at another West Coast port. On or about April 20, 2015,
following an arbitration regarding alleged sexual harassment by
Stubbe, Respondents implemented an arbitration award order-
ing him permanently removed from ID casual dispatch list.
(Tr. 131–132; GC Exhs. 3, 4.)
a. Stubbe’s protected conduct
Stubbe testified that, in addition to filing his own grievance
over the 2014 registration, he assisted two other ID casuals,
Couch and Peter Bianchini, in drafting similar grievances; there
is no evidence, however, that any Respondent had knowledge
of this. (Tr. 164–166; GC Exh. 15–16) Stubbe also claims
that, in the fall of 2014, Union dispatcher Joey Schaffer (Schaf-
fer) told him that he was “making enemies out there.” (Tr. 219)
Immediately after relating this comment, Stubbe testified as
follows:
I’m not—I don’t have any friends, and I never did any—I
never took the city to task about my vessels that they confis-
cated and basically, you know, primarily about the—about
not having any friends. Basically that was the gist of it.
(Tr. 219) No further testimony was elicited from Stubbe to
clarify his putting the alleged threat in this context.
b. Stubbe’s interaction with “Ms. X”
In December 2014, Stubbe had two interactions with a fel-
low ID casual identified in the record as “Ms. X.” First, on
December 6, 2014, X asked Stubbe to perform a strenuous task
that had been assigned to her, explaining that she needed the
help because she was pregnant, and asked him to keep that
information confidential. Agreeing to help, Stubbe added that,
should anyone ask why he was doing her work, she should tell
them that she had sex with him in exchange. Shortly after this
conversation, X informed the walking boss,17 Pauly Rhodd
(Rhodd), about the conversation. Rhodd told Stubbe to apolo-
gize to X, which he did. (Tr. 195, 349–353; 662; Jt. Exh. 4)
Four days later on December 10, Stubbe entered a restroom
while X occupied one of its stalls, despite having being warned
by a coworker (discriminatee Couch) that a female worker was
present.18 As Stubbe entered the restroom, Couch (who was
standing in the doorway) said, “there’s somebody in there.” As
X exited the bathroom stall, Stubbe addressed her, saying,
“how’s it going?” X reported this incident to Rhodd the same
day. (Tr. 365, 1814–1815.)
c. The 13.2 grievance procedure
Section 13.2 of the PCLCD sets forth a procedure for ad-
dressing harassment complaints arising in the longshore work-
force. (GC Exh. 2 at 72–73) Pursuant to guidelines established
jointly by Respondents (the 13.2 guidelines), longshore workers
may individually file grievances to be decided by an area arbi-

17 In longshore parlance, a “walking boss” essentially amounts to a
foreman. (Tr. 1857–1858.)
18 Both Couch and X testified that when a female uses the restroom
in question (which is marked “male” but is occasionally used by wom-
en), it is common practice to leave their hardhat in the doorway or have
a coworker stand there as a signal for men not to enter.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
trator who conducts a formal hearing, determines whether the
grievance has merit and, if so, what remedy is appropriate.
Prior to the hearing, it is not uncommon for the area arbitrator
to order interim relief to ensure the integrity of the process
and/or to protect the grievant; these remedies may include tem-
porary job reassignment, dispatch, transfer, or separation of the
accused from the grievant. (Tr. 1255–1256, 1641; GC Exh. 3.)
According to the 13.2 guidelines, an ILWU local union,
through separate representatives, can represent both the
grievant and accused. Alternately, the grievant and accused
each have the option to have a class A or class B registered
worker represent them. (Tr. 891–892) As Robinson testified, it
is not unusual for the PMA, in order to protect the interest of an
employer-member, to take a position regarding the merits
and/or appropriate remedy in a 13.2 hearing. (Tr. 1289–1294,
1513.)
An employee found guilty of a 13.2 violation is subject to a
penalty ranging from a minimum of seven days off work up to
deregistration from the industry. Any party may appeal the
arbitrator’s decision to a Coast Appeals Officer. (GC Exh. 3)
However, following the issuance of a final award, the 13.2
guidelines provide that the JPLRCs are required to implement
the final award. (Tr. 1260–1261; GC Exh. 3.) While there is
no evidence of a JPLRC vacating a § 13.2 decision, the PMA
did on occasion in 2012 unsuccessfully attempt to convince the
ILWU to do so. In that case, the conduct alleged to violate 13.2
was, in PMA’s view, also arguably protected by Section 7 of
the Act, and the PMA was therefore concerned that the 13.2
award might appear to constitute unlawful retaliation. (See Tr.
384–388, 1262; GC Exh. 12)
d. X’s 13.2 grievance against Stubbe
Within 2 days of the “bathroom incident,” walking boss
Rhodd reported X’s complaints about Stubbe to Local 18 dis-
patcher Deed. The following day, Deed called X; once she had
described the two incidents, Deed stated that conduct like
Stubbe’s “can’t happen out there in the workplace” and that, if
she “felt violated or disrespected or harassed in any way,” she
had options. He then asked if she wanted to file a 13.2 griev-
ance against Stubbe, and X responded that she wanted to think
about it. About a day later, they spoke again, and X said she
wanted to move ahead with the grievance. Deed offered to help
her fill out the grievance form, and she accepted.
X and Deed met on December 14, 2014, along with Local 18
President Campbell. After Campbell read aloud to X the lan-
guage of Section 13.2, Deed filled out a 13.2 grievance form,
reading each line to X and writing down her answers.19 X’s
grievance accused Stubbe of sexual harassment based on the
two above-described incidents, alleging that he had engaged in
verbal harassment and subjected her to “unwelcome romantic

19 According to Deed, in the narrative portion of the form describing
Stubbe’s alleged prohibited 13.2 conduct, he simply wrote down, ver-
batim, what X told him had occurred. (Tr. 1824, 1826.) X confirmed
this, with one exception regarding the bathroom incident. Specifically,
while the written grievance stated that Couch had explicitly warned
Stubbe not to enter the bathroom, X testified that all she actually heard
was him use the phrase, “someone’s in there.” (Tr. 360, 365–371; U
Exh. 2.)
or sexual attention.” With respect to the bathroom incident,
X’s grievance states that, upon seeing X, Stubbe should have
left the bathroom immediately and later should have apologized
for ignoring Couch’s signal. When they got to the part of the
form asking for the identity of the grievant’s representative, X
asked Campbell if he would represent her and he said yes, add-
ing a disclaimer that he had never handled a Section 13.2 griev-
ance before. After X reviewed and signed her grievance,
Campbell filed it. X credibly testified that she was not pres-
sured or coerced by anyone into filing her grievance and like-
wise credibly explained that she personally selected Campbell
as her representative based on her confidence in him. (Tr. 205,
340, 358–364, 704, 1814–1822, 1826–1829, 2088–2091; U
Exh. 2 at 3; Jt. Exh. 4 at 42)
e. Stubbe’s prior 13.2 complaint
X’s complaint was not the first time a coworker had accused
Stubbe of sexual harassment at the Port. In February 2011, a
female Class B longshore worker, identified at hearing as “Ms.
Y,” filed a Section 13.2 complaint against Stubbe alleging that
he sexually harassed her by calling her a “bitch,” and telling
her, “[i]f you hurt me, I will knock your teeth down your
throat.” At a 13.2 arbitration, Stubbe admitted making these
comments, which he characterized as a mistake. The area arbi-
trator in that case found Stubbe guilty, ordered him off work for
7 days (suspended pending any future 13.2 violation) and re-
quired him to attend diversity training. (Tr. 652–653, 656; GC
Exh. 8; PMA Exh. 3.)20
f. Local 18’s pre-arbitration investigation and Respondents’
interim remedy
On either December 18 or 19, 2014, Campbell, along with
Local 15 president Sean Farley (Farley) called Stubbe. Farley
(unlike Campbell) had participated in numerous 13.2 proceed-
ings and was called in to investigate X’s allegations.21 Camp-
bell identified himself as X’s representative and said that a 13.2
grievance had been filed against him, to which Stubbe replied,
“I knew that was coming.” Campbell said they wanted to hear
his side, and Stubbe told them essentially the same story as had
X.22 Campbell then gave Farley contact information for X and
Couch. After interviewing each of them, Farley concluded that
Stubbe was guilty of violating Section 13.2. As he testified, he
reached this conclusion based on his experience with 13.2 hear-
ings. (Tr. 2112, 2114, 2023, 2047–2049, 2058–2059.)
Adjudicating X’s grievance was complicated by the fact that
the PCLCD was expired at the time, and the Union had not
agreed to arbitrate any grievance during the contract hiatus. On

20 Stubbe later filed an appeal of this decision, which was found un-
timely by the coast appeals officer. (GC Exh. 9.)
21 It is undisputed that Farley had participated in over a hundred arbi-
trations and had represented the accused in Section 13.2 hearings at
least 10 times. (Tr. 2006–2007.)
22 I credit Farley and Campbell’s accounts of this conversation.
Stubbe’s recollection was both hazy and inherently implausible; he
could not recall whether Campbell identified himself as representing X,
and claimed that he told the two men he had no “decent recollection” of
the incidents with X, which had occurred only two weeks earlier. (Tr.
183–184.)
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 9
December 19, Local 18 proposed that X’s complaint instead be
heard by the SJPLRC, but PMA disagreed. (Tr. 1563–1566,
2113; GC Exh. 39; U. Exh. 2) Respondents did, however, fash-
ion an interim remedy at a JPLRC meeting held the following
day. At that meeting, Campbell announced that, based on the
witness interviews, the Union had concluded that Stubbe was
guilty of conduct prohibited by 13.2. Campbell and Farley then
each stated that they believed, based on Stubbe’s admitted con-
duct, that X was entitled to interim relief (i.e., separating
Stubbe and X) pending the adjudication of her grievance. Ac-
cording to Campbell, the parties determined that the only effec-
tive interim relief, given the Port’s relatively small size, was to
place Stubbe on non-dispatch pending the outcome of the
grievance. (Tr. 2043–2044, 2095–2096; GC Exh. 10.)
g. The Stubbe 13.2 arbitration
On February 26, 2015, it was determined that all of the Sec-
tion 13.2 complaints that had been filed during the contract
hiatus would be heard by Area Arbitrator Jan Holmes (Arbitra-
tor Holmes) with appeal to Coast Appeals Officer Rudy Rubio
(CAO Rubio). (Tr. 1324; PMA Exh. 20.) X’s complaint was
scheduled to be heard on March 18, 2015. (GC Exh. 37.)
Initially, Stubbe selected Class A marine clerk Kevin
McDonald (McDonald) as his representative at the arbitration.
In early March, McDonald asked Farley for help in preparing
for the hearing, and they decided that, based on Farley’s far
more extensive experience with 13.2 arbitrations, he should
step in and represent Stubbe. McDonald consulted with
Stubbe, after which Farley and Stubbe spoke and agreed that
Farley would defend Stubbe going forward.23 During the fol-
lowing weeks, Farley followed his “normal steps” in preparing
for a hearing, including researching legal issues as well as con-
sulting the well-known Elkouri & Elkouri treatise on arbitra-
tion. He also discussed the case with Stubbe at least six times,
including two sessions that lasted over two hours each, and
spent the weekend before the hearing preparing his closing
statement and procedural arguments. Farley also spoke with X,
as well as with witnesses Couch and Rhodd. (Tr. 2012–2018,
2020, 2023, 2026–2028; U Exh. 19.)
At the arbitration, Campbell appeared for X and Farley ap-
peared on behalf of Stubbe. Appearing for Local 18 were Deed
and Local 18’s Secretary-Treasurer, and appearing for the PMA
were Robinson and another PMA representative.24 According
to Respondents’ witnesses, prior to Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing,
PMA and the Union had not discussed what, if anything, might
be an appropriate remedy for X’s grievance. At the outset of
the hearing, Farley moved to dismiss the grievance on various
procedural grounds, and also requested that Stubbe be awarded
85 days’ back pay for the time he had been placed on nondis-
patch. Arbitrator Holmes denied each of these motions. Next,
X, Stubbe, Couch and Rhodd testified; as detailed infra, Couch
failed to appear in person but was permitted to testify by tele-

23 Once again, Stubbe’s recollection was foggier; to the extent that
he suggested that Farley was somehow involuntarily foisted on him, I
do not credit Stubbe. (Tr. 186.)
24 It is undisputed that the hearing started late because Farley had
misinformed Stubbe about the starting time. (Tr. 2050.)
phone. Farley presented Stubbe and Couch’s testimony, made
objections and cross examined X. (Jt. Exh. 2; Tr. 1512)
Stubbe, for his part, admitted before the arbitrator that he had
advised X to tell others they were “exchanging sex” for him
doing her work, which he alternately characterized as a “gaffe”
and a “big” error for which there was no way to apologize.
With respect to the bathroom incident, Stubbe did not dispute
the basics of the exchange, admitted that Couch had warned
him “there’s someone in there” as he entered the bathroom and
further admitted that he knew that female longshore workers
would post someone at the door to “stand guard” while they
used the men’s restroom. Couch then testified that he was, in
fact, watching the door for X and had warned Stubbe, “some-
body’s in there.” (Tr. 56–63, 67, 73, 545–546.)
Following the witness testimony, PMA’s Robinson argued
that Stubbe had essentially admitted to a second violation of
Section 13.2, and asked the arbitrator to permanently revoke
Stubbe’s dispatch privileges. According to Robinson, PMA’s
concern was that, despite effectively admitting to two 13.2
violations, Stubbe was “not getting it” and was therefore likely
to engage in further prohibited harassment, creating a source
liability for SSA and its member employers. (Tr. 899, 1511–
1512; Jt. Exh. 4 at 94.) He testified:
[a]s the case progressed, it was my opinion that there was no
corrective behavior that could be applied to Mr. Stubbe that
would correct his behavior. I personally did not feel that Mr.
Stubbe, after testifying about knocking a woman’s teeth down
her threat and the subsequent case after that, the case that we
were actually there for, in my opinion, he was blaming every-
body. He was taking no accountability and I did not see an
individual that was going to be reformed by any penalty short
of removal.
(Tr. 1516)
In Stubbe’s defense, Farley argued that the bathroom inci-
dent (which involved no inappropriate comments or body lan-
guage) did not rise to the level of a 13.2 violation. (Jt. Exh. 4 at
86–89) Asked for a closing statement on behalf of X, Camp-
bell stated that Stubbe’s suggestion that she tell people they had
a sexual relationship was “completely out of line,” had made
her “very uncomfortable” and justified Stubbe’s “immediate
removal off the I.D. list.” (Id. at 89–90) In his closing, Farley
argued for leniency based on what he described as a “lax en-
forcement” of the 13.2 rules at the Port, where, he argued sexu-
al jokes were “commonplace.”25 He also cited SSA’s failure to
file its own 13.2 grievance upon learning of X’s complaint as
evidence that his actions were not worthy of losing his dispatch
privileges entirely. (Id. at 91–92)
Arbitrator Holmes let Stubbe have the last word; he stated
that he “had no problem with [X] filing a complaint” but that
PMA was taking advantage of her complaint to retaliate against
him for filing his grievance regarding the 2014 registration
process. After Stubbe had spoken on this issue at some length,
Robinson interrupted, stating that Stubbe was entitled to make
these arguments “in another forum, but not here today in this

25 As Farley explained, he based this argument on information pro-
vided to him by Stubbe. (Tr. 2053.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
form.” Apparently agreeing, the arbitrator asked if Stubbe had
anything else to add, and he said no. (Jt. Exh. 4 at 96; Tr. 925,
2051.) There is no evidence that, prior to this point, Farley was
aware that Stubbe had filed a grievance regarding the 2014
registration process.26
On March 31, 2015, Arbitrator Holmes found Stubbe guilty
of prohibited conduct in violation of Section 13.2, and ordered
him removed from the industry. (GC Exh. 4.) On or around
April 20, 2015, after Stubbe had unsuccessfully appealed this
decision to CAO Rubio, Respondents implemented the arbitra-
tion award against Stubbe, permanently removing him from the
dispatch list. (GC Exhs. 3, 4.)
3. Alan Couch
Couch, who had worked as an unregistered longshore worker
since 1983, became an ID casual at the Port in 2004. On June
2, 2015, Couch was disciplined by the JPLRC for failing to
appear as a witness at Stubbe’s March 18, 2015 hearing. (Tr.
431–432)
a. Couch’s protected conduct
As detailed above, Couch claims that Campbell told him and
four other 2014 registration grievants that they would lose work
to newly hired casuals if they did not abandon their grievances.
I do not credit Couch’s version of this conversation. His man-
ner in testifying about the alleged incident suggested fabrica-
tion, and only corroborating witness, Bianchini, related the
conversation in a rehearsed manner, seemingly “remembering”
the critical threat only after a significant, unexplained pause. I
instead credit Campbell’s version of the conversation instead,
in which, during a break in the grievance hearing, he merely
answered the grievants’ questions about whether further regis-
trations and casual hiring were expected.
Couch also testified that Local 18 President Campbell at
some point “before Christmas” in 2014 spoke to him personally
about his grievance. According to Couch, Campbell asked him,
“how far are you willing to take this?” Then, when Couch
responded, “all the way,” Campbell supposedly replied, “you’re
on your own.” Campbell denied that any such conversation
occurred. (Tr. 445–448, 2086) Once again, Couch’s manner in
testifying and his overall presentation did not convince me that
this conversation actually occurred. Instead, I credit Camp-
bell’s testimony; his demeanor suggested forthrightness and his
denial appeared quite genuine.
The record contains evidence of Couch engaging in addi-
tional protected conduct, but all such conduct occurred follow-
ing his alleged discriminatory discipline.27

26 At most, the record indicates that Stubbe told Farley that he want-
ed to present evidence pertaining to “an elevation” at the hearing. (Tr.
2019)
27 For example, in October 2015, Couch filed his own 13.2 grievance
complaining about women using the men’s bathroom; this grievance
was denied pre-hearing by Arbitrator Holmes (who was later upheld by
CAO Rubio) as lacking merit. Finally, Couch testified that he, like
Simisola, took pictures of the dispatch sheets at the hiring hall and was
instructed on two occasions in the fall of 2015 (by dispatchers Shaffer
b. Couch’s failure to appear at Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing
Stubbe and Farley planned to call Couch as a witness to testi-
fy about Stubbe’s bathroom run-in with X. Farley, who had
initially interviewed Couch shortly after the incident, also
spoke with him on two other occasions. In either January or
February, 2015, Farley interviewed Couch by telephone and
informed him that he would need to be present at an upcoming
hearing. Couch said he would need “a few days’ notice” be-
cause he worked as a an over-the-road truckdriver. According
to Couch, Farley said that should not be a problem.28 Farley
and Couch spoke again on March 7, 2015. According to
Couch, he expressed concern about having to show up at a
hearing, and Farley told him that he would “record” his state-
ment and he “shouldn’t have to be there.” Farley’s account of
the conversation was more detailed. According to him, he told
Couch he was not sure he would need to appear and might in-
stead be allowed to sign an affidavit or testify via telephone.
He denied, however, saying that he was tape recording the con-
versation or that Couch would definitely not need to appear.
(Tr. 473, 466–472, 2020–2026, 2069)
On Friday, March 13, during a telephonic prep session with
Stubbe, Farley suggested that Couch might not be a helpful
witness, but Stubbe disagreed. Farley acquiesced, telling
Stubbe, if he wanted Couch to testify, he needed to call him and
make sure he appeared. (Tr. 2026) According to Couch, on the
Friday in question, he was truck driving out of town when
Stubbe called him; he rather incredibly testified that Stubbe told
him to expect a “cite letter” ordering him to appear at the hear-
ing, but that he probably did not need to appear, because Farley
had said he was going to record his statement. (Tr. 580-91,
879)29 Couch testified that he nonetheless “stay[ed] close” for
the next few days in Southern California and arranged for his
mother to check his mail for a letter from PMA, but decided to
drive to Arizona on Monday, March 16, after she told him no
such letter had arrived. (Tr. 464, 585–586)30
Couch also testified that he contacted the Local 18 hall and
left a message for Campbell to check on whether he needed to
appear. Couch’s testimony about what prompted this call leads

and Deed, respectively) that he should not do so. (Tr. 432, 477–479,
509–510; GC Exh. 28(a), 40.)
28 Present on Couch’s side of the conversation (via speakerphone)
were Stubbe and Couch’s girlfriend, Rose Rojas, but I do not credit
either of them as to this conversation. Stubbe’s recollection was devoid
of details, and Rosas claimed that Couch definitively said he was not
going to attend the hearing, to which Farley supposedly responded “not
to worry about it.” Even Couch himself did not corroborate this. (Tr.
320–321, 720–721.)
29 At hearing, even Couch did not actually appear convinced of his
own story. Initially testifying that Stubbe told him, “keep an eye out
for [a cite letter] because you might have to. . .” he then abruptly cut
off, stating, “I didn’t think I —I wasn’t even home.” (Tr. 584) Nota-
bly, Stubbe was not asked to corroborate Couch’s testimony regarding
this conversation.
30 According to Couch, he gave his mother this instruction on either
the Friday he spoke with Stubbe or the following day. (Tr. 588–589)
This was contradicted by testimony given by his mother who, on cross-
examination, clearly stated that the “only time” Couch ever called her
about getting a cite letter was the following Monday. (Tr. 257.)
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 11
me to believe that, in fact, he received his cite letter around the
same time as his conversation with Stubbe. In his words, he
called the hall “after I got the letter—not the letter. I mean,
after [Stubbe] told me about it, I figured I’d call and see what’s
going on.” (Tr. 591.) He then stated that he called “the number
they gave me on the letter” only to backtrack, explaining that
the “letter” to which he had referred was “a letter I’ve gotten
from [Campbell] before.” (Tr. 592–593) No such letter was
proffered by the General Counsel to corroborate Couch’s rather
shaky explanation of these events.
According to the General Counsel’s witnesses, who included
Couch, as well as his mother and brother, the cite letter arrived
at Couch’s residence the following day (March 17); the cite
letter itself, however, is dated March 9. (U Exh. 1; Tr. 255–
256, 464) Couch’s mother testified that, per Couch’s instruc-
tion, she recognized the letter as being from PMA and opened it
right away; his brother recalled differently, testifying that she
was “hesitant” to open the letter and did not understand its sig-
nificance. (Tr. 292–293) At some time prior to the hearing,
Couch telephoned Stubbe and informed him that there was no
way he would be able to attend, but it is undisputed that Couch
did not inform any of Respondents of this prior to the hearing.
(Tr. 591–594, 2096)
C. COUCH’S INTERACTION WITH ARBITRATOR HOLMES
When Couch did not appear at the hearing on March 18,
2015, Stubbe informed the arbitrator that he had spoken to him
the prior week and told him to watch out for his cite letter.
After Couch was connected to the arbitration via telephone,
Arbitrator Holmes asked him to explain his nonappearance.
Couch admitted he knew he was supposed to be at the hearing,
but said he that he had to make a living. He then became ar-
gumentative, asking, “how long is this gonna be?” and urging
the arbitrator, “let’s get on it, because I’ve gotta get rolling . . . I
mean they ain’t paying me for this.” It is undisputed that the
arbitrator was not impressed; according to Couch himself, she
was “upset” by his failure to appear and “reamed him out” for
being disrespectful to her. (Tr. 533–543, 542, 954–955; Jt.
Exh. 4 at 78) As described, supra, Couch then testified by tele-
phone about the bathroom incident.
Following his testimony, Couch was disconnected from the
arbitration. Farley then stated that Couch’s failure to appear
was improper and that his remarks to the arbitrator were “flip-
pant”; he then suggested that Couch should “at least” be sent a
letter of reprimand. Campbell joined in, calling Couch’s con-
duct “completely rude” and asking that he be penalized. Farley
backed off, stating, “I’m not saying that.” (Jt. Exh. 2 at 81–83)
Robinson weighed in, noting that X had missed a funeral to
appear at the arbitration; Campbell stated that this justified
penalizing Couch and suggesting putting him on nondispatch
for a ship, which would amount to missing roughly 6–8 shifts.
Farley pushed back, suggesting that he was uncomfortable with
the arbitrator fashioning a remedy, considering Couch had no
designated representative in the hearing. Ultimately, Arbitrator
Holmes decided that “a penalty would be appropriate in this
particular case,” and that she would “leave it to [the SJPLRC]
to figure out what would be appropriate.” (Tr. 1550; Jt. Exh. 4
at 84–85)
d. Respondents suspend Couch
On June 2, 2015, the SJPLRC, pursuant to Arbitrator
Holmes’ order, held a hearing over the appropriate penalty.
Couch and Farley testified regarding what Couch had been told
about his need to appear. Couch initially maintained that Far-
ley had excused him from attending, and Farley denied this.
Later during the hearing, however, when Couch was asked why
he had not informed anyone from the JPLRC that he was not
going to attend Stubbe’s arbitration, he admitted that, in hind-
sight, he probably should have done so. (Tr. 475–476, 872,
1550–1552; PMA Exh. 22.)
Following the testimony, the committee determined that
Couch should receive a penalty of fourteen shifts off work, with
seven shifts suspended. According to PMA’s Robinson, be-
cause a nonparty witness had never failed to appear for a 13.2
hearing before, the committee considered the penalties applica-
ble for analogous misconduct, such as 14 days off work for a
failure to appear for work, and concluded that something less
was sufficient to send impress on him the importance of ap-
pearing. On June 2, 2015, the JPLRC issued Couch a “Letter of
Reprimand” setting forth his penalty. (Tr. 1552–1553, GC Exh.
28.)
Analysis
A. The Applicable Statutory Framework
The Act aims “to separate membership obligations owed by
employees to their bargaining representatives from the em-
ployment rights of those employees.” IBEW Local 1547 (Rog-
ers Electric), 245 NLRB 716, 717–718 (1979). Indeed, the
statutory provisions at the core of this case were designed to
constitute a “wall . . . between organizational rights and job
opportunities.” See Lummus Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 728, 734
(D.C. Cir. 1964). This “wall” is policed by two separate mech-
anisms under the Act. First, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
makes it an unfair labor practice for labor organizations “to
restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by section 7 of the Act.” Among those Section 7
rights is “the right to refrain from” forming, joining, or assist-
ing labor organizations (i.e., engaging in dissident union con-
duct). Miranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962), enf.
denied 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
Union conduct that compromises the “wall” separating
membership obligations and employment rights is also ad-
dressed by Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, which makes it an unfair
labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce
(A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 7 . . . [or]; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of [section
8(a)(3)]. . .
Where a union is found to have caused an employer to take
adverse action against an employee, the Board recognizes a
rebuttable presumption that “[the labor organization] acted
unlawfully because by such conduct [it] demonstrates its power
to affect the employees’ livelihood in so dramatic a way as to
encourage union membership among the employees.” Graphic
Communications Local 1-M (Bang Printing), 337 NLRB 662,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
673 (2002) (citing Operating Engineers Local 478 (Stone &
Webster), 271 NLRB 1382, 1385 (1984)). Under Section
8(b)(2), a union that causes employer action against an employ-
ee may be found to have violated the Act even though the ques-
tioned action, if taken by the employer alone, would not consti-
tute a violation of the Act. Thus, the allegations against Local
18 in this case are not dependent on whether PMA or SSA vio-
lated the Act, and, regardless of the Employer-Respondents’
motivation in taking action against the discriminatees, Local 18
will be found to have violated the Act if it caused such action to
be taken. Carpenters Local 2205 (Groves-Granite), 229 NLRB
56 (1977). Accord Town & Country Supermarkets, 340 NLRB
1410 (2004).
Union conduct that compromises the “wall” separating
membership obligations and employment rights is also ad-
dressed by Section 8(b)(1)(A), whereby the Board enforces
unions’ “duty of fair representation,” which stems from the
right of employees under Section 7 “to be free from unfair or
irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining
agent in matters affecting their employment.” Miranda Fuel,
140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962), enf. denied 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). Under this analysis, a violation will be found where a
union takes “action against any employee upon considerations
or classification which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.”
Id.31
B. Individual Allegations
1. ID casual rule 12
The General Counsel alleges that, by maintaining a jointly
negotiated ban on ID casuals “causing a disturbance at the Dis-
patch Hall or at any other job-related area,” the Employer-
Respondents are violating Section 8(a)(1) and Respondent Lo-
cal 18 is violating its duty of fair representation. It is asserted
that the rule is unlawful for two independent reasons. First, the
General Counsel argues that Rule 12 is unlawfully overbroad
pursuant to Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646
(2004).32 Second, it is alleged that the rule, on its face, discrim-
inates against non-Union members. Respondents argue that the
rule would not be reasonably interpreted by employees to pre-
vent Section 7 conduct; Respondent PMA additionally argues
that Rule 12 cannot be found to unlawfully restrict workers’
Section 7 rights, because Local 18 waived any such rights im-
plicated by the rule by agreeing to it. Finally, Respondents
assert that Rule 12 does not discriminate on its face.
As set forth below, I agree with Respondents that Rule 12 is
not facially discriminatory. However, I do find that Rule 12 is
unlawfully overbroad and that its intrusion on individual em-
ployees’ Section 7 rights cannot be waived by the Union.
a. ID casual rule 12 as facially discriminatory
It is well settled that granting preferential terms and condi-

31 A union’s breach of its fair representation duty is also deemed a
violation of Section 8(b)(2), in that any arbitrary union action that
adversely affects an employee by definition tends to encourage or dis-
courage union membership. Miranda Fuel, 140 NLRB at 188.
32 The General Counsel also asserts that the Board’s decision in Lo-
cal 876, 339 NLRB 769 (2003), supports finding Local 18 liable for
Rule 12’s alleged overbreadth. I will address this argument infra.
tions of employment based on employees’ union membership
violates the Act and contractual provisions which operate to do
so are discriminatory on their face. Postal Service, 345 NLRB
1203, 1214 (2005) (contractual provisions granting preferential
treatment to union members in applying for trainer position
unlawful) (citations omitted); Vanguard Tours, 300 NLRB 250,
253 fn. 15 (1990) (unlawful for labor contract to provide for
pension benefits only for union members), enfd. 981 F.2d 62,
67 (2d Cir. 1992). However, as the Supreme Court has made
clear, illegal objects will not be presumed, and the terms of a
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement will not be found un-
lawful merely because they fail to disclaim all illegal objects.
NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); see also
Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
In this case, although the challenged rule does not explicitly
single out non-members, the General Counsel claims that the
term “casual” is a proxy for non-member status. However, as
Respondents established at hearing, certain non-casual long-
shore workers are, like casuals, ineligible for union member-
ship, thus invalidating any automatic equation of the term “cas-
ual” with non-member status. Moreover, the record evidence
indicates that union members subject to the PCLCD are bound
by rules, similar to rule 12, aimed at preventing disruptions of
dispatch. (See Tr. 860–861, 1325, 1648; GC 2 at 85, § 17.125
& 98, § 17.8 and § 17.81.)33 Finally, the record is devoid of
any evidence that rule 12, implemented approximately 40 years
ago, was devised with an eye towards discriminating against
non-members. For these reasons, I cannot find that rule 12, on
its face, is discriminatory.
b. ID casual rule 12 as overly broad
I next examine rule 12 under the Board’s standard for unlaw-
fully overbroad rules. As noted, supra, even if Rule 12 is found
to infringe on individual employees’ Section 7 rights, the rule
would remain lawful if Local 18 validly waived those rights.
As Respondent PMA correctly points out, unions have been
found to have waived the Section 7 rights of bargaining unit
members, the most common example being a no-strike clause
contained in a collective-bargaining agreement.34 However, a
union’s waiver of represented employees’ economic rights is
not comparable to a waiver of those employees’ right to organ-
ize (including their right to engage in union dissident conduct).
For this reason, the Supreme Court has noted that:
a different rule should obtain where the rights of employees to
exercise their choice of a bargaining representative are in-
volved –whether to have no bargain representative, or to re-
tain the present one, or to obtain a new one.

33 To the extent that Rule 12’s wording differs materially from that
of these provisions, there is no evidence that this reflects anything more
than the more stringent standards to which casuals are held. See Pacif-
ic Maritime Assn., 155 NLRB 1231, 1234 (1965) (applying more strin-
gent standard for elevation and registration status based on longshore
workers’ differing registration classes).
34 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)
(a union may “bargain away [an employee’s] right to strike during the
contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line”)
(footnote omitted).
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 13
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). In other
words, no union has the right to bargain away the right of indi-
vidual employees to criticize the manner in which it represents
them.35 In this case, PMA argues that, due to the critical im-
portance of timely dispatch in the longshore industry, rule 12 in
fact amounts to a waiver of employees’ right to strike (in that a
concerted interruption of dispatch would have the same result
as a strike). The problem with this argument is that, to the ex-
tent that rule 12 may be interpreted to apply to employees’
conduct in protest of the Union’s operation of the dispatch hall
in favor of its members, Local 18 lacks the power to waive such
rights. For this reason, the PMA’s waiver defense of rule 12 is
rejected.
In determining whether an employer’s work rules violate
Section 8(a)(1), the Board has held that:
[A]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the ex-
ercise of their Section 7 rights. In determining whether a
challenged rule is unlawful, the Board must, however, give
the rule a reasonable reading. It must refrain from reading
particular phrases in isolation, and it must not presume im-
proper interference with employee rights. Consistent with the
foregoing, our inquiry into whether the maintenance of a chal-
lenged rule is unlawful begins with the issue of whether the
rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7.... If
the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Sec-
tion 7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the
following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the lan-
guage to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promul-
gated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB at 646–647
(citing Lafayette Park Hotel, NLRB 824, 825–827 (1998), enfd.
mem. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Rules that are ambiguous
and could therefore be interpreted to ban Section 7 conduct are
to be construed against the employer; employees “should not
have to decide at their own peril what information is not lawful-
ly subject to such a prohibition.” Hyundai America Shipping
Agency, 357 NLRB 860, 862 (2011). Here, the rule in question
does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activities. Nor is there any
evidence that it was either promulgated in response to protected
concerted activity, or has been relied on to punish employees
for engaging in protected conduct.36 The question then be-
comes whether a reasonable employee would interpret a prohi-
bition on “causing a disturbance” as a restriction on Section 7
conduct or whether the rule’s wording is so ambiguous that it
could reasonably be interpreted that way.
In this regard, it is helpful to read rule 12 in its context (i.e.,
as part of a posted list of “Rules for Identified Casuals”). The

35 As the Court explained, even waivers of individual members’ eco-
nomic rights, such as the right to strike, “rest on ‘the premise of fair
representation’ and presuppose that the selection of the bargaining
representative ‘remains free.’” 415 U.S. at 325 (citing Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956)).
36 As set forth infra, I find that Simisola’s conduct lost the Act’s pro-
tection because she repeatedly interrupted dispatch.
list contains rules governing the conduct of the dispatch itself,
as well as grounds for disqualifying workers from participating
in the dispatch.37 To the extent that Rule 12 governs employ-
ees’ conduct during the dispatch itself, it actually functions as
both rule-types, in that it identifies “causing a disturbance at the
Dispatch Hall” a disqualifying condition for dispatch. I find
that, based on the parties’ long practice of enforcing rule 12
with the yellow-line in the dispatch hall, casuals would reason-
ably understand that, as applied during the dispatch itself: (a)
the rule is aimed at protecting the disruption of dispatch; and
(b) they are permitted to engage in protected conduct during the
dispatch without being found in violation of rule 12, as long as
they abide by the dispatcher’s order to remain behind the yel-
low line.
The problem, however, is that Rule 12 does not merely for-
bid conduct during dispatch, but rather must be read along with
rules listing other conduct disqualifying workers for dispatch
(i.e., “refusal to work as directed” and “damage to company
property”). Indeed, Rule 12 by its own terms applies to dis-
turbances at the dispatch hall during non-dispatch and also
explicitly prohibits causing a disturbance outside the dispatch
hall in any “job-related area.” It is here, without the help of a
yellow line, that an employee would have be left to ponder
whether Rule 12 forbids disrupting the industrial peace at the
Port by criticizing Respondents’ joint dispatch process,38 and
specifically what conduct would cross that invisible threshold.
Would casuals donning anti-Union shirts or chanting anti-
Union slogans as they left their work shift constitute a “disturb-
ance” sufficient to result in their permanent loss of dispatch
privileges? While Local 18 argues that Rule 12 is necessary to
maintain production and discipline and PMA argues that it is
merely an extension of the parties’ no-strike provision, these
rationales cannot justify leaving employees under such circum-
stances to decide—at their own peril—whether or not to exer-
cise their rights under the Act.
Accordingly, I find that, by maintaining rule 12, the Em-
ployer-Respondents are violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
As for Local 18, I do not find this case analogous to the Local
876 case cited by the General Counsel, supra, which dealt with
a union rather unambiguously threatening its members with
internal union discipline based on their protected conduct.
Instead, I find that Local 18, as the operator of the dispatch hall,
has a fiduciary duty to inform the Port’s ID casuals of the rules
governing their dispatch rights and obligations. See Bartenders
Local 165 (Nevada Resort), 261 NLRB 420 (1982); Operating
Engineers Local 324 (Michigan Chapter, NECA), 226 NLRB
587 (1976). I find that, by maintaining Casual Rule 12, an
ambiguous rule that “would chill the exercise of employees’
Section 7 rights,” Local 18 failed to meet this responsibility and
thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. See Electrical

37 The latter-type rules include, inter alia, bans on assault, intoxica-
tion and refusing work.
38 See Glen Berry Mfrs., Inc., 169 NLRB 799, 803 (1968) (“[a]n em-
ployee may disturb the peace and tranquility of a plant by disrupting an
existing harmonious relationship between Company and Union, and in
that sense an employee who is having trouble with the Union is in
trouble with the Company also”).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
Workers IUE Local 444 (Paramex Systems), 311 NLRB 1031,
1040–1041 (1993) (union violates duty of fair representation by
maintaining ambiguous union security clause).
2. The 8(a)(3) and (4) allegations against PMA and SSA
To determine whether an employer’s adverse employment
action violates either Section 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(4), the Board ap-
plies the analysis articulated in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455
U.S. 989 (1982); approved in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). To establish a violation of
Section 8(a)(3), “the General Counsel must show, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that an employee’s union activity was
a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse
action against the employee.” Caravan Knight Facilities
Mgmt., 362 NLRB No. 196, slip op. at 2 (2015) (citing Wright
Line at 1089). For purposes of Section 8(a)(4), the General
Counsel must demonstrate initially that the employee partici-
pated or gave testimony in Board or Board-related proceed-
ings.39 In either case, if the General Counsel makes the re-
quired showing, the burden shifts to the employer to demon-
strate that it would have taken the same action even in the ab-
sence of the employee’s union activity. Id.
a. Allegations regarding Simisola
The General Counsel contends that Respondents PMA and
SSA, through the SJPLRC, agreed to suspend Simisola because
she engaged in protected conduct, including filing and main-
taining individual grievances alleging favoritism and discrimi-
nation in the 2014 registration process and filing Board charges
regarding dispatch hall operations. PMA and SSA argue that
the General Counsel has failed to demonstrate any unlawful
animus against Simisola and additionally that she lost the Act’s
protection by disrupting dispatch. It is undisputed that Simisola
engaged in protected activity as alleged; there is no dispute that
Respondents SSA and PMA were aware of this activity. I find,
however, that the General Counsel failed to establish animus on
the part of either PMA or SSA towards this protected conduct.
The General Counsel offers no credible evidence of animus
against Simisola by the Employer-Respondents. Indeed, the
only evidence he points to is their alleged failure to conduct an
independent investigation of her alleged misconduct. (See GC
Br. at 16, n.14 (citing cases)). I find this argument misplaced,
in that the undisputed evidence reflects that, on both April 29
and 30, SSA’s Terminal Manager Patalano did just that. On the
29th, he interviewed Simisola and confirmed that she under-
stood the yellow-line rule. The following day, it appears that
Simisola had already left by the time Patalano arrived, but he
did interview Deed and Valdez as to what had occurred. More-
over, Simisola was given ample opportunity to present her ver-
sion of events before the JPLRC, which rescheduled its hearing
to fit her schedule. Under the circumstances, the Employer-
Respondents’ lack of animus is fatal to the General Counsel’s
prima facie case under Wright Line.
The General Counsel also argues that Simisola’s suspension

39 The Board applies the elements of the Wright Line standard to al-
leged violations of Section 8(a)(4). See Newcor Bay City Division of
Newcor, Inc., 351 NLRB 1034 fn. 4 (2007).
violated the Act because it was based on: (a) her conduct on
April 29 and 30, which the General Counsel claims was Section
7 conduct; and (b) Respondents’ application of ID Casual Rule
12, which I have found to be unlawfully overbroad. As ex-
plained below, I find merit in neither argument.
(i) Section 7 conduct as basis for the suspension
It is undisputed that the asserted reason for suspending Si-
misola was her conduct at Respondents’ joint dispatch hall on
April 29 and 30. The General Counsel alleges that this conduct
(i.e., her attempts to photograph dispatch logs), was protected
conduct. Unless that conduct is shown to be so opprobrious as
to cost her the protection of the Act, the General Counsel ar-
gues, her suspension amounts to unlawful retaliation.
It is well established that opposition to union officers or pol-
icies, sometimes referred to as “dissident activities” are protect-
ed by Section 7 of the Act. Sheet Metal Workers Local 16
(Parker Sheet Metal), 275 NLRB 867 (1985). However, a hir-
ing hall user’s otherwise protected conduct in “policing” the
operation of a hiring hall, including raising complaints about
the hall’s operation and demanding access to referral records,
may lose the Act’s protection where the user acts in a disorder-
ly or disruptive manner. Teamsters Local 87, 273 NLRB 1838
(1985). In this regard, the General Counsel compares Si-
misola’s relatively “civilized” protest (i.e., repeatedly demand-
ing to see the dispatch sheets and refusing to leave the hall)
with cases in which hiring hall users are found to have lost the
Act’s protection based on more extreme and confrontational
behavior, including yelling and cursing at dispatchers. But a
polite disruption of dispatch has the same effect as rude one; in
either case, the Board has made clear that an employees’ right
to hiring hall job referral records must give way to the need for
an orderly dispatch. Electrical Workers Local 3, 331 NLRB
1498 (2000). It logically follows that even a relatively polite
disruption of dispatch to review or photograph dispatch records
may be considered unprotected.
Here, the credible evidence overwhelmingly indicates that
Simisola’s conduct was disruptive to the dispatch process; after
being explicitly instructed not to interrupt dispatch on April 29,
Simisola came back and did just that fewer than 24 hours later.
I credit Respondents’ witnesses, who made clear that Si-
misola’s suspension was not based on her request for dispatch
records, but rather on the disruptive manner in which she did
so. As such, I find that her suspension was not based on pro-
tected conduct.
(ii) Rule 12’s impact on Simisola’s suspension
The Board has held that that discipline imposed pursuant to
an unlawfully overbroad rule is unlawful. See Double Eagle
Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 112 fn. 3 (2004). This rule,
referred to as the “Double Eagle” rule, recognizes an exception
where the employer can show that the disciplined employee’s
conduct actually interfered with her own work or that of others,
and that this, and “not simply the violation of the overbroad
rule” was the cited reason of the discipline. Continental Group,
Inc., 357 NLRB 409, 412 (2011) (citing Miller’s Discount De-
partment Stores, 198 NLRB 281 (1972), enfd. 496 F.2d 484
(6th Cir. 1974)). I find that Simisola’s suspension qualifies for
this exception. The testimonial and documentary evidence
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 15
amply demonstrate that Simisola’s was cited and penalized for
disrupting Deed’s dispatching work and costing him and others
their longshore work.40 Based on this showing, Respondents
were within their rights to discipline Simisola despite Rule 12’s
invalidity.
While the Board now recognizes another exception to the
Double Eagle rule for employees who engage in conduct
“wholly distinct from activity that falls within the ambit of
Section 7,” I cannot find Simisola’s interruption of dispatch
distinct from her otherwise protected request for dispatch rec-
ords. Put another way, simply because Simisola’s conduct lost
the Act’s protection, this case is not one in which an employee
violates an unlawful rule in the absence of any connection to
Sec. 7 conduct whatsoever. Cf. Continental Group, 357 NLRB
at 413 (employer lawfully terminated employee who violated
an overly broad off-duty access rule because, rather than engag-
ing in protected conduct while on the employer’s property, the
employee was in fact sleeping and living there during his off-
duty hours).
Based on the above, I recommend dismissal of the Section
8(a)(3) and (4) allegations based on Simisola’s suspension.
b. Allegations regarding Stubbe
The General Counsel alleges that Stubbe’s discharge was
caused, at least in part, by Respondents PMA and SSA in that
they (along with Local 18) failed to vacate the arbitration award
against him. PMA and SSA argue that, as mere participants in
the 13.2 proceeding, they cannot be held accountable for its
results and that, in any event, there is no evidence that they
harbored unlawful animus against Stubbe. As a preliminary
matter, I do not agree that the Employer-Respondents cannot,
as a matter of law, be held responsible for Stubbe’s discharge
merely because it resulted from an arbitration process. While
the parties had agreed that Section 13.2 arbitration awards
would be final, technically nothing prevented them from revis-
ing or relaxing this rule in a particular case. In fact, as dis-
cussed below, PMA sought to vacate a 13.2 award on at least
one occasion.
Moving on to the Wright Line test, I note that, while Stubbe
is claimed by the General Counsel to have been the “ringlead-
er” of the 2014 registration grievances, no witness testified to
that effect. That said, there is no dispute that Stubbe engaged
in protected activity by filing his own 2014 registration griev-
ance or that Respondents SSA and PMA were aware of this
activity. However, I find that the General Counsel has failed to
demonstrate animus against Stubbe based on his proven pro-
tected conduct. As with Simisola, the General Counsel argues
that the Employer-Respondents’ failure to conduct an inde-
pendent investigation demonstrates animus. I disagree. While
an employer’s failure to investigate alleged misconduct prior to
issuing discipline has certainly been found to suggest animus,
such a rationale misses the mark where, as here, the discrimi-
natee’s alleged misconduct becomes the subject of a hearing

40 That Respondents were not simply mechanically applying rule 12
is further demonstrated by the fact that the rule, on its face, dictates that
an infraction “shall” result in the permanent revocation of dispatch
rights, not the lesser suspension she actually received.
before an impartial arbitrator. SSA and PMA, in other words,
did not simply “seize” on X’s complaints regarding Stubbe’s
conduct, but rather allowed him to present his side of the story
in a process arguably more thorough and fair than a one-sided,
employer investigation.
With respect to Stubbe’s hearing, the General Counsel
claims that Robinson’s request that the arbitrator impose a dis-
charge remedy demonstrated animus against him, because
PMA’s role in such hearings is to be impartial. Based on Rob-
inson’s credible testimony, however, I find that it is not un-
common for PMA—on behalf of a member-employer—to
weigh in at 13.2 hearings involving alleged coworker harass-
ment. Moreover, it logically flows that an employer faced with
admitted misconduct and a second-time offender such as
Stubbe would act to protect its interests by taking affirmative
action. The General Counsel also argues that Robinson “falsely
represented” to Arbitrator Holmes that a specific provision of
the PCLCD (Sec. 17.86) required a more severe penalty to be
assessed against Stubbe based on his status as an ID casual.
However, the record actually indicates that Robinson simply
cited the provision in question as support for the proposition
that, throughout the parties’ grievance machinery, casuals are
subjected to heightened discipline for offenses. In any event,
there is simply no evidence to indicate that he did so based on
any protected conduct on Stubbe’s part.
The General Counsel argues that the discharge penalty as-
sessed Stubbe—advocated for by Robinson on behalf of the
Employer-Respondents—itself suggests animus. First, the
General Counsel argues that I should consider as “comparators”
first-time 13.2 offenders who received less severe discipline
than Stubbe. In this regard, I adhere to my ruling on the record
that such individuals are not proper comparators. See Diamond
Electric Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 857, 858 (2006) (ALJ erred in
finding disparate treatment, because, unlike his proposed com-
parators, discharged employee had a history of discipline);
Hoffman Fuel Co. of Bridgeport, 309 NLRB 327, 329 (1992)
(no disparate treatment found, because other employees did not
have disciplinary history like the discharged employee). The
General Counsel next argues that I find animus based on the
fact that the 13.2 arbitration process, on another occasion, re-
sulted in a lesser penalty for an accused’s second violation.
However, this lesser penalty—a 2-week suspension—was
handed down not by Arbitrator Jan Holmes, but by another area
arbitrator, significantly detracting from its value as comparative
discipline. Nor is there any indication that the accused in those
cases, identified in the record as “Mr. A” did not himself en-
gage in protected conduct. The General Counsel also suggests
that I consider the facts of a third case, Pacific Maritime As-
soc., 358 NLRB 1184 (2012). However, as that decision was
invalidated by NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014), I
find it inappropriate to do so.41 For all of these reasons, I find

41 The General Counsel argues in his posthearing brief that I should
take an adverse inference based on the PMA’s failure to produce addi-
tional cases involving second offenses of 13.2. Regardless of the mer-
its of that argument, I find that the General Counsel waived it on the
record when, after a lengthy debate over documents offered by PMA to
rebut such an inference, he stated, “I will not make that argument. I
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
that the General Counsel’s proffered “comparator evidence” is
insufficient to establish that Stubbe was treated differently
based on his protected conduct.
Finally, the General Counsel argues that the Employer-
Respondents demonstrated animus against Stubbe by failing to
vacate the arbitration award against him. While it is true that
PMA previously sought to vacate a Section 13.2 award based
on its concern that it might be viewed as unlawful retaliation
against the accused, there has been no showing that Stubbe’s
case presented such a situation. Unlike the accused in that case,
Stubbe’s admittedly inappropriate remarks to a female long-
shore worker are not even arguably protected by Section 7, and
thus it would not be logical or appropriate for the PMA to pro-
pose compromising X’s right to be free of sexual harassment.
There is simply no evidence that, following Stubbe’s unsuc-
cessful appeal of Arbitrator Holmes’ decision, SSA and PMA’s
implementation of the penalty she ordered was motivated by
anything other than a genuine concern for the liability his con-
duct might cause them as employers. For these reasons, I find
that the Employer-Respondents did not violate Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act with respect to Stubbe and recommend the dismissal
of these allegations.
c. Allegations regarding Couch
The General Counsel contends that the Employer-
Respondents agreed, through the SJPLRC, to suspend Couch
because he engaged in protected conduct, including filing a
2014 registration grievance. As with the other discriminatees,
the General Counsel alleges that the Employer-Respondents
demonstrated animus against Couch by failing to independently
investigate his alleged misconduct. This argument has little
force as applied to Couch. The credible record evidence estab-
lishes that Couch admitted to Arbitrator Holmes that he knew
he was supposed to be at Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing, but chose to
work at his truck driving job instead. Asked by the arbitrator to
design an appropriate penalty for his nonappearance, Respond-
ents agreed that he should be allowed to appear before the
JPLRC to explain himself before any penalty was imposed. As
such, not only was there very little to “investigate” with respect
to Couch’s nonappearance, but as members of the JPLRC, the
Respondent-Employers demonstrated a concern for his internal
“due process” rights inconsistent with discriminatory intent.
Because the General Counsel failed to adduce any additional
evidence indicating that the Employer-Respondents took issue
with Couch’s protected conduct, I find, as with the other dis-
criminatees, that the General Counsel failed to establish the
element of animus necessary to establish his prima facie case.
Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of the Section 8(a)(3)
allegations based on Couch’s suspension.
3. Allegations against ILWU Local 18
The General Counsel alleges that Local 18 is responsible for
the suspensions of Simisola and Couch, as well as the removal
of Stubbe from the ID casual dispatch list, because it caused

waive any such argument.” (Tr. 2144, ll. 5–7.) I accepted that repre-
sentation and hold the General Counsel to it now. See Station Casinos,
LLC, 358 NLRB 1556, 1576 (2012). For the same reason, I deny the
General Counsel’s Motion to Strike, filed on June 3, 2016, as moot.
these actions in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, and
violated its duty of fair representation with respect to each of
the discriminatees in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). With
respect to Simisola, the General Counsel additionally alleges
that the Union independently violated its duty of fair represen-
tation by denying her access to dispatch logs. What follows is a
discussion of the two, above-referenced statutory mechanisms
for addressing union conduct that leads to discipline of a bar-
gaining unit member and an analysis of the General Counsel’s
allegations with respect to each discriminatee.
a. Section 8(b)(1)(A) and the duty of fair representation
The Act prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statu-
tory representative capacity, from taking action against any
employee upon considerations or classifications which are ir-
relevant, invidious, or unfair. Miranda Fuel, 140 NLRB 181,
185 (1962), enf. denied 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The duty
requires a union to “represent fairly the interests of all bargain-
ing-unit members,” regardless of whether they are union mem-
bers, Electrical Workers (IBEW) v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47
(1979) (emphasis added), and to do so “without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with com-
plete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). Unions must serve
members and non-members alike. Electrical Workers Local
2088 (Federal Elec. Corp.), 218 NLRB 396 (1975) (violation
of duty found in processing union member’s grievance before
nonmember’s similar grievance). Likewise, failing to ade-
quately represent an employee because he engaged in conduct
considered “disloyal” to the union constitutes a violation of the
duty. NLRB v. Pacific Coast Utilities Serv., Inc., 638 F.2d 73
(9th Cir. 1980).
In interpreting the duty of fair representation, however, the
Board recognizes that unions must enjoy an amount of discre-
tion in serving their represented employees. Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 631 (Vosburg Equip-
ment, Inc.), 340 NLRB 881, 881 (2003). As the Supreme Court
has stated, “[a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a
statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it repre-
sents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of
purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). “Thus it is not every act of
disparate treatment or negligent conduct which is proscribed by
Section 8(b)(1)(A), but only those which, because motivated by
hostile, invidious, irrelevant, or unfair considerations, may be
characterized as ‘arbitrary conduct.’” Steelworkers Local 2869
(Kaiser Steel Corp.), 239 NLRB 982, 982 (1978).
It is well established that a union’s duty of fair representation
extends to its operation of an exclusive hiring hall; where a
union “causes, attempts to cause, or prevents an employee from
being hired or otherwise impairs the job status of an employee,”
the Board draws an inference of unlawful coercion, which may
be rebutted if the union shows its actions were justified. See
Laborers Local 872, 359 NLRB 1076, 1078 fn. 9 (2013) (citing
Stage Employees IATSE Local 412 (Various Employers), 312
NLRB 123, 127 (1993)). However, the Board also recognizes a
union’s
legitimate interest in maintaining order at its hiring hall
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 17
against disruptions by members; in retaining its members’
trust in the fairness of the operation; [and] in protecting its
representatives from unwarranted abuse in the course of their
duties. . . .
New York City Taxi Drivers, 231 NLRB 965, 967 (1977).
Thus, when a represented employee engages in protected activi-
ty—such as protesting hiring hall practices—the legitimate
interests of her bargaining representative in representing its
constituency must be balanced against the interests of the indi-
vidual dissident. Longshoremen Assn. Local 341, 254 NLRB
334, 337 (1981). Ultimately, to show unlawful retaliation for
protesting hiring hall practices, “there must be a showing that
the discipline was because [the employee] was exercising Sec-
tion 7 rights and not because of the manner in which they were
exercised.” Teamsters Local 87, 273 NLRB at 1849.
The duty of fair representation also includes an obligation to
provide hiring hall users access to job referral lists to determine
whether their referral rights are being protected; this duty is
breached when the union arbitrarily denies such a request. A
refusal to provide hiring hall records will be deemed arbitrary
unless the union can show the refusal was necessary to vindi-
cate legitimate union interests. See Operating Engineers Local
12 (Nevada Contractors Assn.), 344 NLRB 1066, 1068 (2005);
Operating Engineers Local 3 (Kiewit Pacific Co.), 324 NLRB
14, fn. 1 (1997); Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employers
Assn.), 317 NLRB 1099, 1105 (1995). However, not every
request to review or photograph dispatch records is protected,
and under certain circumstances, the time and manner in which
a request for such records is made may deem a union’s denial
reasonable and non-arbitrary. Electrical Workers Local 3, su-
pra.
b. Section 8(b)(2)
As the Board has stated, “[a]n 8(b)(2) violation can be estab-
lished by direct evidence that the union sought to have the em-
ployer discriminate, or by sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support a reasonable inference that the union requested that the
employer discriminate.” International Operating Engineers,
Local 12 (Kiewet Industrial), 337 NLRB at 545. Even what
appears to be an “innocent act” by the union will support an
8(b)(2) violation, if it is shown that the union knew that action
would produce the desired result. Quality Mechanical, Inc.,
307 NLRB 64, 66 (1992). For example, in Paperworkers Local
1048 (Jefferson Smurfit Corp.), a union was found to have vio-
lated Section 8(b)(2) when one of its officials, in retaliation for
protected activity, reported to the employer that a dissident
member had made racial slur. Although the official did not
specifically request that member be disciplined, it was suffi-
cient that he knew the employer imposed severe discipline
against those who engaged in racial harassment. 323 NLRB
1042 (1997). There must, however, “be some evidence of un-
ion conduct; it is not sufficient that the employer’s conduct
might please the union.” Avon Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 312
NLRB 499 (1993); Toledo World Terminals, 289 NLRB 670,
673 (1988).
In determining whether a union has violated Section 8(b)(2),
the Board has applied both the analytical framework set forth in
Wright Line, supra, as well as its duty-of-fair-representation
framework. See Caravan Knight, 362 NLRB No. 196 (2015).
As noted, under the latter analysis, whenever a labor organiza-
tion causes an adverse action to be taken against an employee,
“there is a rebuttable presumption that it acted unlawfully be-
cause by such conduct it demonstrates its power to affect the
employees’ livelihood in so dramatic a way as to encourage
union membership among the employees.” Id. (citing Acklin
Stamping, 351 NLRB 1263, 1263 (2007); Bang Printing, supra
at 673. This presumption, however, may be overcome if the
union demonstrates that its actions were taken “in good faith,
based on rational considerations, and were linked in some way
to its need effectively to represent its constituency as a whole.”
Id. (citing Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons, Local 299
(Wyoming Contractors Assn.), 257 NLRB 1386, 1395 (1981)).
As noted, the Board has also analyzed 8(b)(2) allegations
under its Wright Line standard, whereby
[T]he General Counsel must establish that [the employee’s] . .
. protected concerted activity was a substantial or motivating
factor in the Respondent’s adverse employment actions. . . . If
the General Counsel makes the required initial showing, the
burden then shifts to the Respondent to prove, as an affirma-
tive defense, that it would have taken the same action even in
the absence of [the employee’s] protected activity.
Ironworkers Local 340 (Consumers Energy Co.), 347 NLRB
578, 579 (2006).42
c. Allegations regarding Simisola
The General Counsel contends that Respondent Local 18 vi-
olated its duty of fair representation when, on April 29 and 30,
2015, dispatcher Deed refused to permit Simisola to examine
and copy the dispatch sheets at Respondents’ joint dispatch
hall. The General Counsel further contends that Local 18, by
raising complaints about Simisola’s conduct at the dispatch
hall, caused PMA and SSA (through the JPLRC) to suspend
her. According to the General Counsel, Local 18 officials were
motivated by animus against Simisola based on her protected
and dissident conduct, including filing and appealing a griev-
ance regarding the 2014 registration process, as well as based
on her filing Board charges against Local 18. Local 18 denies
harboring animus toward Simisola and maintains that any ac-
tion it took against her was motivated by its legitimate interest
in protecting dispatch hall operations. The Union additionally
argues that dispatcher Deed was privileged to withhold the
dispatch sheets sought by Simisola because she requested them
in a manner unprotected by the Act. As set forth below, I agree
with Local 18.
(I) EFUSRAL TO PROVIDE SIMISOLA ACCESS TO DISPATCH LOGS
As mentioned, a union violates its duty of representation by
arbitrarily denying a worker’s request for hiring hall records.

42 Regardless of which theory is employed, where an 8(b)(2) viola-
tion is proven, a derivative violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) will also be
found, in that a union’s causation of adverse action against an employee
necessarily constitutes restraint and coercion of that individual’s exer-
cise of his Section 7 rights. Town & Country Supermarkets, 340 NLRB
1410, 1411 (2004); Postal Workers (APWU), 350 NLRB 219, 222
(2007).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
See Operating Engineers Local 12 (Nevada Contractors Assn.)
and Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employers Assn.), supra.
However, the Board has made it clear that, where such a re-
quest is made in a disruptive manner in the middle of dispatch,
it is not arbitrary for the union to deny it. Electrical Workers
Local 3 (Fairfield Electric), 331 NLRB 1498 (2000). Relied on
by Local 18, Fairfield Electric involved facts quite similar to
those of the instant case, in that a hiring hall user sought during
the dispatch process a list of names corresponding with the
referral numbers on a posted out-of-work list. The dispatcher
told him that he “did not want him to look at the book [with the
names] because he was in the middle of making referrals.” Id.
at 1500. The Board agreed with the administrative law judge
that the charging party did not have a statutory right at that
particular time and circumstance to access records that the
dispatcher was using during dispatch and, correspondingly, that
it was not arbitrary for the union to deny the request.
The General Counsel argues that Fairfield Electric is not
controlling because the dispatcher in that case was “working
on” the very documents requested and affirmatively told the
worker that he could inspect the documents at a later time. I
find these distinctions, to the extent they exist, inconsequential.
In this regard, I credit Deed’s testimony that acceding to Si-
misola’s request would have further delayed his dispatch and
find it irrelevant whether he was literally working on the docu-
ment she wanted to see. Moreover, I do not see any material
difference between telling an employee that they must wait
until dispatch is complete to inspect records (which Deed did
tell Simisola) and announcing what time that would be, as did
the dispatcher in Fairfield Electric. The principle recognized
by the Board in Fairfield Electric applies with equal force here:
there is no recognized right, in the middle of dispatch, to in-
spect or copy dispatch documents on demand. As such, I find
that, based on the time and manner in which Simisola requested
dispatch documents, the Union did not fail or refuse to provide
them in violation of its duty of fair representation.
(III) SIMISOLA’S SUSPENSION DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACT
As noted, the Board analyzes allegations of Section 8(b)(2)
under both a duty of fair representation and a Wright Line anal-
ysis. With respect to the duty of fair representation analysis,
the record evidence amply demonstrates that the Union, by
bringing Simisola’s conduct to management’s attention, issuing
her citations in coordination with SSA’s employer complaints,
took action aimed at causing Simisola’s suspension; indeed,
Local 18 does not contend otherwise. As such, there is a rebut-
table presumption that Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(2). I
find, however, that the Union rebutted that presumption by
demonstrating that it was motivated by its legitimate interest in
running a timely and orderly dispatch, a critical function bene-
fitting its entire constituency. Local 18’s lack of animus is
likewise dispositive of this 8(a)(2) allegation when held to the
Wright Line standard.
While it is true that the appeal of Simisola’s 2014 registra-
tion grievance was pending as of her suspension date, over a
year had passed since she filed that grievance, and the record is
completely devoid of evidence that any representative of Local
18 harbored animus against Simisola based on her grievance
filing or any of her other protected conduct, for that matter.43
While the General Counsel claims that Local 18 attempted to
limit Simisola’s access to the dispatch sheets by changing its
practice of leaving them at the dispatch podium, there is no
evidence that this was anything other than the result of com-
plaints about privacy by other employees. Likewise, I am not
persuaded by the General Counsel’s argument that dispatcher
Deed demonstrated animus against Simisola by failing to in-
form her affirmatively that she had alternative means to access
the dispatch logs; in fact, he made it clear that she would simp-
ly have to wait until he had completed dispatching before re-
viewing the sheets, and on one occasion, he actually acqui-
esced, stopped his dispatching, and showed her where she stood
on the day’s dispatch sheet. That Simisola had previously been
warned about disrupting dispatch, that Deed’s complaints about
her conduct were contemporaneous with that conduct and that
Local 18 took action against Simisola (by issuing her a lesser
penalty than that prescribed by the joint dispatch rules) only
after she had repeated the same disruptive conduct twice within
13 hours further convince me that the Union acted in good
faith. Finally, contrary to the General Counsel, I am not per-
suaded that the “flurry” of phone calls between Respondents’
representatives at the time of Simisola’s activities on April 29
and 30 evidences anything more than the good-faith investiga-
tion he claims never occurred with respect to her conduct.
Accordingly, the complaint allegations against Local 18 re-
garding Simisola’s suspension are dismissed.
d. Allegations regarding Stubbe
The General Counsel alleges that Local 18 caused Respond-
ents PMA and SSA (via the JPLRC) to remove Stubbe perma-
nently from the ID Casual list, effectively discharging him in
violation of Section 8(b)(2), and that its actions also violated its
duty of fair representation to Stubbe. The General Counsel
relies on several theories to support his allegations, each of
which is premised on the assertion that Stubbe was considered
the “ringleader” of the 2014 registration grievances. The Gen-
eral Counsel asserts that: (a) Local 18 officials caused X to file
the 13.2 grievance; (b) Deed knowingly added false statements
to her grievance in order to amplify the allegations against
Stubbe; (c) before interviewing Stubbe or alerting him to the
charges against him, Local 18 officials “prejudged” him, con-
cluded he was guilty and communicated this to the PMA; (d)
Farley failed to adequately represent Stubbe at his 13.2 hearing
and refused to file an appeal on his behalf and (e) Local 18
implemented the area arbitrator’s decision discharging Stubbe
when it could have elected not to do so.
Local 18 argues that it provided Stubbe with adequate repre-
sentation by Local 18, and that it neither solicited or amplified
X’s allegations. With respect to the General Counsel’s claim
that its officials “prejudged” Stubbe, Local 18 avers that, only
after Stubbe had admitted to the conduct alleged by X, did Un-
ion officials conclude that he had violated 13.2 for purposes of
providing X interim relief. Finally, Local 18, like the Employ-

43 As noted, infra, I do not credit the testimony offered by the Gen-
eral Counsel’s witnesses describing Union president Campbell threat-
ening a group of 2014 registration grievants with a loss of work.
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 19
er-Respondents, argues that the parties’ implementation of
Arbitrator Holmes’ award was not discretionary but mandated
by the 13.2 guidelines.
(I) CREDIBILITY
Throughout the hearing, Stubbe’s testimony and conduct did
not convince me of his reliability as a witness. His recollection
was frequently spotty and he admitted to having problems with
his memory. By way of example, on the fourth day of the hear-
ing, he was asked if he recalled certain testimony he had given
the first day (5 calendar days earlier); he responded that he “did
not recall much of what happened” on that day. More signifi-
cantly, his memory at times appeared to fail when he perceived
that a lack of recollection would work to his advantage. For
example, he claimed not to be aware of the practice of posting a
coworker as a “signal” not to enter the bathroom (although he
had previously admitted such awareness in the 13.2 hearing).
(Tr. 725) On other occasions, he appeared overly coy when
answering straightforward questions.44 For these reasons, when
in conflict with the accounts given by other, more reliable wit-
nesses (such as Farley), I give Stubbe’s testimony little weight.
(II) THE GENERAL COUNSEL’S PRIMA FACIE CASE
As noted, to the extent that Local 18 “caused” Stubbe’s dis-
charge, it is presumed to have acted unlawfully, and it is not
necessary to show that the Union knew with certainty that its
actions would be successful. See Caravan Knight, supra at 5
(union’s report of physical threat violated Section 8(a)(2) where
union had reason to believe that “in all likelihood” it would
lead to dissident’s discharge); Town & Country Supermarkets,
supra at 1430 (union caused discharge when it reported em-
ployee for threat of physical harm knowing employer’s history
of discharging employees for such threats); Paperworkers Lo-
cal 1048, (Jefferson Smurfit Corp.), supra at 1044 (union at-
tempted to cause discipline when it reported employee for ra-
cial harassment to employer with a policy of strong discipline
for violation of rules against racial harassment). In this case,
Local 18’s taking the position that Stubbe was guilty of a sec-
ond sexual harassment offense made it highly unlikely that
Respondents PMA and SSA (as potential defendants subject to
Title VII liability for not addressing X’s complaints) would
take a different position and even more unlikely that an arbitra-
tor would overrule both parties and exonerate him. Thus, simp-
ly because Stubbe’s discharge was not a “sure thing,” Local 18
could be guilty of causing Respondents PMA and SSA (albeit
through an arbitration process) to strip him of his dispatch priv-
ileges. Thus, because Local 18 took actions that ultimately
resulted in the implementation of Arbitrator Holmes’ award, it
is presumed that its actions were unlawful.
I also find that the General Counsel met his prima facie bur-
den under the Wright Line standard. While there is no record
evidence to indicate that Stubbe was, in fact, considered the
“driving force” behind the 2014 grievances, it is undisputed
that he did file his own grievance and additionally that he had

44 For example, when asked by Local 18’s counsel if there were any
witnesses he wanted to testify at his 13.2 hearing who were not called,
he replied, “I’d have to think about that for a while.”
at least one conflict with Local 18 president Campbell at some
time in the past. Moreover, while Stubbe’s memory appeared
to be quite foggy on some points, I credit his recollection that
dispatcher Schaffer told him, prior to the incident with Ms. X,
that he was “making enemies” at the Port. While the context
Stubbe put this statement was undoubtedly confusing, that it
went unrebutted by Local 18 leads me to conclude that
Stubbe’s dissident conduct was not held in high regard by the
Union, which provides circumstantial evidence of animus
against him.
(III) LOCAL 18’S BURDEN TO EXPLAIN ITS ACTIONS
TOWARDS STUBBE
As noted, the burden next shifts to Local 18 to demonstrate
that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for role in X’s
grievance against Stubbe (under Wright Line) and that its ac-
tions were taken “in good faith, based on rational considera-
tions, and were linked in some way to its need effectively to
represent its constituency as a whole” (pursuant to its duty of
fair representation). See Caravan Knight, supra at 5.
I find that the Union met these burdens by establishing, by a
preponderance of the credible evidence, that it was motivated
by a genuine belief that Stubbe had repeatedly engaged in sex-
ual harassment at the Port. There is no serious dispute that
effectively responding to workplace harassment is squarely
encompassed within the category of conduct deemed “neces-
sary to the effective performance of its function of representing
its constituency,” even when both accuser and alleged harasser
are bargaining unit employees. See Graphic Communications
International Union, Local 1-M (Bang Printing), supra at 673
(citing Operating Engineers Local 18, supra.) Indeed, Re-
spondents’ 13.2 procedures appear devised to accommodate the
inherent conflicts posed by such a situation, by allowing both
the grievant and the accused to choose either a union officer or
a representative of their own choosing. I credit Local 18’s
witness Campbell who—like PMA’s Robinson—testified
frankly about the potential liability that would be created by
allowing Stubbe, a repeat 13.2 offender, to continue to work at
the Port. Local 18’s good-faith concern satisfies the burden
under both the Wright Line and duty-of-fair-representation
standards and shifts the burden to the General Counsel to
demonstrate that this asserted reason is pretextual.
(IV) THE GENERAL COUNSEL’S ARGUMENTS AS TO PRETEXT
The General Counsel offers a number of pretext arguments.
However, none of his theories regarding the circumstances
leading to Stubbe’s discharge was borne out by the credible
record evidence. First of all, General Counsel’s bare assertion
that, but for the Union’s encouragement, X would not have
filed her 13.2 grievance went unsupported by the record; as X
herself credibly testified, she made the decision alone and un-
der no pressure from Campbell or Farley. The question re-
mains whether any action taken by Local 18 officials in prepar-
ing or handling her grievance was aimed at retaliating against
Stubbe as a Union dissident.
According to the General Counsel, Deed added false state-
ments to X’s grievance form regarding the “bathroom inci-
dent.” (GC Br. at 13.) Specifically, while X testified that
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
Couch told Deed “there’s someone in there,” Deed added to the
narrative portion of the grievance that Couch had prefaced this
statement by saying, “be careful.” It is certainly true that the
Board has found Section 8(b)(2) violated where a union official
reports a union dissident’s misconduct in an exaggerated or
“amplified” manner that causes the employer to discipline the
employee. See, e.g., Caravan Knight, supra; Security, Police &
Fire Professionals of America Local 444, 360 NLRB 430
(2014). In this case, however, I credit Deed’s testimony that he
took down, as best as he could, X’s actual words. That he may
have “spelled out” what Couch communicated (i.e., adding the
words, “don’t go in there”) to me seems more stylistic than
amplifying. The point was that, as Couch himself testified
before the arbitrator, he warned Stubbe not to enter the re-
stroom because a woman was present. I do not find that Deed’s
editorializing about this detail rises to the level of an “amplifi-
cation” aimed at causing his discipline.
I take special issue with the General Counsel’s claim that
Local 18 pronounced Stubbe “guilty” before even notifying
him that he had been accused of harassment. By my reading of
the record, Farley clearly and credibly testified that prior to the
December 20 JPLRC meeting at which the Union offered its
assessment of Stubbe’s conduct, Stubbe admitted to both Farley
and Campbell that he had, in fact, committed the conduct of
which he was accused.45 This admission, Farley explained,
convinced him that Stubbe was, in fact, likely to be found
guilty of a second 13.2 violation, warranting interim relief for
X. (Tr. 2112.)46
Nor can I find fault in Local 18 deciding that Farley, who
had significant experience in defending 13.2 grievances, was
the best representative for Stubbe. Despite the fact that he was
defending a repeat harasser who showed little remorse for his
conduct, Farley spent many hours preparing for Stubbe’s hear-
ing.47 The arbitration hearing transcript as a whole suggests
that Stubbe presented to the arbitrator as an unremorseful and
unsympathetic accused. Nonetheless, Farley made procedural
arguments, as well as arguments for leniency, on Stubbe’s be-
half. Under the circumstances, I cannot find that Farley’s rep-
resentation of Stubbe, or his failure to appeal the arbitrator’s
order, was either arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory. See Foun-
tain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977)
(union’s refusal to process what it considered a meritless case

45 While the General Counsel suggests that Campbell somehow
“tricked” Stubbe during this conversation by not disclosing he was in
fact representing X, there is again no evidence to support such a claim.
Farley clearly recalled Campbell disclosing his representative status,
and Stubbe simply could not recall whether he mentioned it or not.
46 I note that the complaint does not allege that the Union violated its
duty of fair representation in failing to disclose to Stubbe its prelimi-
nary determination regarding his guilt. In any event, I find this case
distinguishable from one in which a union representative affirmatively
supplies substantive evidence of a represented employee’s guilt to an
employer. See, e.g., Caravan Knight, 362 NLRB No. 196, slip op. at 8
(2015).
47 The assertion that Farley somehow attempted to “sabotage”
Stubbe by deliberately having him arrive late for the hearing is simply
not compelling; I credit Farley’s testimony that he made an honest
mistake about the starting time.
not arbitrary but rather “most reasonable and in fact essential to
the grievance and arbitration system”) (citing Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. at 191, supra).
Accordingly, the complaint allegations against Local 18 re-
garding Stubbe’s discharge are dismissed.
a. Allegations regarding Couch
Following Couch’s failure to appear at Stubbe’s 13.2 hear-
ing, the area arbitrator ordered the JPLRC to fashion an appro-
priate penalty for his nonappearance. While there is no dispute
that Couch in fact failed to appear at the hearing (as noted,
supra, he ended up testifying via telephone), the parties disa-
gree as to how and why this came to be. Essentially, the Gen-
eral Counsel alleges that Local 18’s Farley misled Couch into
thinking that he would not have to appear at the hearing and
then seized on his nonappearance as a pretext to discipline him
for his protected, dissident conduct. Local 18 denies this ver-
sion of events, and additionally argues that it only agreed to the
discipline in question (a loss of 14 shifts, with 7 suspended
pending further misconduct), after being instructed by the arbi-
trator to formulate an appropriate penalty for Couch’s failure to
appear.
I agree with Local 18. First, the record as a whole indicates
that Couch knew well that he was expected to appear at the
hearing, and that Local 18 made no effort to “sand bag” him
into not showing. Farley and Couch each told Couch that his
testimony would be required, and, as noted, Couch’s account
appeared untidily refashioned to excuse his nonappearance.
The General Counsel’s remaining witnesses (i.e., Couch’s
family and girlfriend) did little to shed light on what really
happened; in an apparent effort to exonerate Couch, they con-
tradicted themselves, as well as Couch himself. Thus, insofar
as the General Counsel claims that Local 18 “caused” Couch’s
discipline by engineering his nonappearance, I find that the
credible evidence cannot support such a claim under either
Section 8(b)(2) or 8(b)(1)(A).
I next examine whether the Union’s role in determining a
remedy for Couch’s nonappearance amount to violated either
Section 8(b)(1)(A) or (2) of the Act. Applying the Wright Line
standard, there is no dispute that Couch engaged in protected
conduct by filing a 2014 registration grievance. I find, howev-
er, that there has been no showing of animus against him,
which is fatal to the General Counsel’s prima facie case. Other
than testimony by Couch and Biancini, which I have discredit-
ed, the General Counsel offers mainly conjecture regarding
Local 18’s conduct. For example, he argues that I should inter-
pret as animus the fact that Farley, as a “material witness”
against Couch regarding his failure to appear at Stubbe’s 13.2
hearing, nonetheless “participated in the [JPLRC’s] deliberation
of the penalty to be assessed” at its June 2, 2015 meeting. (GC
Br. at 14.) I disagree. While the record is unclear whether
Farley actually participated in the deliberations, even assuming
that he did, I cannot read animus into such conduct. Indeed,
because the committee had been ordered to assess a penalty
based, in part, on what had occurred at the 13.2 hearing, every
JPLRC member present at that hearing became a “material
witness.” The General Counsel’s would seem to suggest that
the very fact that the JPLRC met before assessing a penalty to
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 21
Couch demonstrates animus against him as a union dissident. I
reject that notion and instead find that citing Couch and allow-
ing him to explain himself in person before devising a penalty,
as ordered by the arbitrator, in fact evinces a lack of animus on
Local 18’s part.48
I am also charged with evaluating Local 18’s conduct under
the duty-of-fair representation standard, which presumes a vio-
lation where a union is found to have “caused or attempted to
cause” employee discipline. Here, to the extent that Farley
provided the JPLRC with evidence regarding the circumstances
of his nonappearance at Stubbe’s hearing, it is fair to assume
that Local 18 acted with knowledge that this evidence would
cause the Employer-Respondents to agree to suspend Couch.49
Thus, Local 18 must overcome the presumption that, as exclu-
sive bargaining representative, its conduct was taken “in good
faith, based on rational considerations, and were linked in some
way to its need effectively to represent its constituency as a
whole.” Caravan Knight, supra at 5. I find that the Union has
met its burden. Preserving the integrity of the parties’ area
arbitration procedure by agreeing to penalize an employee for
failing to appear at a hearing is a legitimate interest and certain-
ly necessary to the Union’s representative function. Nor can I
find that the penalty assessed Couch, under the circumstances,
was arbitrary or unfair. As such, I would dismiss the allega-
tions against Local 18 regarding Couch.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Un-
ion, Local 18 is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
3. Respondent Pacific Maritime Association is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
4. By maintaining a rule that states that “[c]asuals causing a
disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-related area
shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked,” Re-
spondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local
18 has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
5. By maintaining a rule that states that “[c]asuals causing a
disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-related area
shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked,” Re-
spondent SSA Pacific, Inc. and Respondent Pacific Maritime

48 The General Counsel also alleges that dispatcher Deed showed an-
imus against Couch by failing to assist him with his 13.2 grievance
(filed months after his suspension) about women using the men’s room.
But the record contains no credible evidence that Couch asked for any
such assistance; instead, Couch merely informed Deed that of the
grievance, stating, “I know what I’m doing.” (Tr. 556) I reject the
suggestion that, by failing to force assistance on Couch under these
circumstances Deed showed animus against him.
49 That Arbitrator Holmes ordered that Couch be penalized in some
matter does not insulate Local 18 from liability for its role in the pro-
cess; arguably, it could have withheld Fawley’s testimony and/or ar-
gued for a lesser penalty.
Association have engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Employer-Respondents violated Section
8(a)(1) and Respondent International Longshore and Ware-
house Union, Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I
find that they must be ordered to cease and desist and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act. In a typical case involving an unlawful workplace
rule, the promulgator of the rule is ordered to rescind the un-
lawful provision and post an appropriate notice. Therefore, I
shall require Respondents to rescind and cease giving effect to
their “Rules for Identified Casuals” at the Port of Sacramento,
insofar as they provide that identified casual longshore workers
causing a disturbance at a dispatch hall or at any other job-
related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently
revoked.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended50
ORDER
A. Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc., its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision located at item 12 of in the
Sacramento Identified Casual Dispatch Rules that states:
“[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any
other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges per-
manently revoked.”
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacra-
mento Identified Casual Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals
causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-
related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently
revoked” and remove such rule from any and all employee
publications or documents to which it is a party.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Re-
spondents’ joint dispatch hall at the Port of West Sacramento,
California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 20, after being signed by Respondent SSA Pacif-
ic, Inc.’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent SSA Pacific, Inc. and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-

50 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent SSA Pacific,
Inc. customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent SSA
Pacific, Inc. to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc.
has gone out of business or ceased its operations at the Port of
West Sacramento, Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
SSA Pacific, Inc. at the Port of West Sacramento at any time
since Friday, February 14, 2015.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. has taken to com-
ply.
B. Respondent Pacific Maritime Association, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision located at item 12 of in the
Sacramento Identified Casual Dispatch Rules that states:
“[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any
other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges per-
manently revoked.”
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacra-
mento Identified Casual Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals
causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-
related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently
revoked” and remove such rule from any and all employee
publications or documents to which it is a party.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Re-
spondents’ joint dispatch hall at the Port of West Sacramento,
California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 20, after being signed by Respondent Pacific
Maritime Association’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by Respondent Pacific Maritime Association and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees of Respondent SSA Pa-
cific, Inc. are customarily posted. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent Pacific Mari-
time Association customarily communicates with employees of
Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. by such means. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by Respondent Pacific Maritime Association to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent Pacific Maritime Association has
taken to comply.
It is further ordered that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it
alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
C. Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Un-
ion, Local 18, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1.Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision located at item 12 of in the
Sacramento Identified Casual Dispatch Rules that states:
“[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any
other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges per-
manently revoked.”
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacra-
mento Identified Casual Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals
causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-
related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently
revoked” and remove such rule from any and all employee
publications or documents to which it is a party.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Re-
spondents’ joint dispatch hall at the Port of West Sacramento,
California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix C.”
51 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 20, after being signed by Respondent In-
ternational Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent Interna-
tional Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to members are customarily posted. In
addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall
be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an
intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union,
Local 18 customarily communicates with its members by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent Interna-
tional Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that Respondent International Longshore and Ware-
house Union, Local 18 has taken to comply.
It is further ordered that the complaint allegations are dismissed
insofar as they allege violations of the Act not specifically
found.
Dated: Washington, D.C. September 13, 2016

51 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in each of the notices referenced herein reading
“Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read
“Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
SSA PACIFIC, INC. 23
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefits
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights.
Specifically:
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule for Identified Casuals at the
Port of West Sacramento that states that you will permanently
lose your dispatch privileges if you cause a disturbance in the
discharge hall or any job-related area.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you n the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our “RULES FOR IDENTIFIED
CASUALS” in effect at the joint dispatch hall for the Port of
West Sacramento by rescinding the provision that states that
Identified Casuals who cause a disturbance in the discharge hall
or any job-related area shall permanently lose their dispatch
privileges.
SSAMARINE, INC
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/20–CA–151433 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefits
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights.
Specifically:
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule for Identified Casuals at the
Port of West Sacramento that states that you will permanently
lose your dispatch privileges if you cause a disturbance in the
discharge hall or any job-related area.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you n the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our “RULES FOR IDENTIFIED
CASUALS” in effect at the joint dispatch hall for the Port of
West Sacramento by rescinding the provision that states that
Identified Casuals who cause a disturbance in the discharge hall
or any job-related area shall permanently lose their dispatch
privileges.
PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOICIATION
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/20–CA–151433 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD24
abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefits
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights.
Specifically:
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule for Identified Casuals at the
Port of West Sacramento that states that you will permanently
lose your dispatch privileges if you cause a disturbance in the
discharge hall or any job-related area.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you n the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our “RULES FOR IDENTIFIED
CASUALS” in effect at the joint dispatch hall for the Port of
West Sacramento by rescinding the provision that states that
Identified Casuals who cause a disturbance in the discharge hall
or any job-related area shall permanently lose their dispatch
privileges.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE
UNION, LOCAL 18
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/20–CA–151433 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street,
S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.