SSA Pacific

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Sep 13, 2016

20-CA-151433 (N.L.R.B. Sep. 13, 2016)

JD(SF)-32-16
Port of West Sacramento
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
SSA PACIFIC, INC.
and Cases 20-CA-151433
20-CA-156741
RONI SIMISOLA, an Individual 20-CA-156786
JOHN STUBBE, an Individual
ALAN COUCH, an Individual
PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION
and Cases 20-CA-153169
20-CA-156732
RONI SIMISOLA, an Individual 20-CA-156792
JOHN STUBBE, an Individual
ALAN COUCH, an Individual
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 18
and Cases 20-CB-151490
20-CB-156767
RONI SIMISOLA, an Individual 20-CB-156787
JOHN STUBBE, an Individual
ALAN COUCH, an Individual
David B. Reeves, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert S. Remar, Esq. (Leonard Carder, LLP),
for Respondent International Longshore and
Warehouse Union, Local 18.
Jonathan C. Fritz and Nicole Buffalano, Esqs.
(Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP),
for Respondent Pacific Maritime Association.
Joseph M. Galosic, Esq., for Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc.
JD(SF)-32-16
2
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARA-LOUISE ANZALONE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case over the course
of 9 days between January 20 and April 8, 2016, in San Francisco, California. This case was
tried following the issuance of an Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Amended
Complaint, and Notice of Hearing (the complaint) by the Regional Director for Region 20 of the 5
National Labor Relations Board on November 30, 2015. The complaint was based on a number
of original and amended unfair labor practice charges, as captioned above, filed by Charging
Parties Roni Simisola, John Stubbe and Alan Couch (collectively, the Charging Parties or the
discriminatees). The General Counsel alleges that Respondent International Longshore and
Warehouse Union, Local 18 (the Union or Local 18) violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) 10
and Respondents Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and SSA Marine, Inc. (SSA)
(collectively, the Employer-Respondents) violated Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et. seq. (the Act). Each
Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint denying the commission of the alleged unfair
labor practices alleged against it.15
At trial, all parties were afforded the right to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to
present any relevant documentary evidence, to argue their respective legal positions orally, and
to file posthearing briefs.1 Posthearing briefs were filed by the General Counsel, PMA and Local
18, and each of these briefs has been carefully considered.2 Accordingly, based upon the entire20
record herein, including the posthearing briefs and my observation of the credibility of the
witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT3
25
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges that SSA, a California corporation, is engaged in the business of
providing stevedoring and longshore services at the Port of West Sacramento. SSA is an
employer-member of PMA, a California corporation with its principal place of business in San 30

1 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh.__” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “U Exh. __” for Local 18’s Exhibit; “PMA Exh. __” for PMA’s Exhibit; “Jt. Exh. __”
for Joint Exhibit; “GC Br. at __” for the General Counsel’s posthearing brief; “U Br. at __” for Local 18’s
posthearing brief; and “PMA Br. at __” for PMA’s posthearing brief.
2 On February 29, 2016, I granted counsel for the General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the
transcript, which was filed the day prior. The record is therefore amended to reflect the proposed changes
set forth in that motion.
3 I have based my credibility resolutions on consideration of a witness’ opportunity to be familiar
with the subjects covered by the testimony given; established or admitted facts; the impact of bias on the
witness’ testimony; the quality of the witness’ recollection; testimonial consistency; the presence or
absence of corroboration; the strength of rebuttal evidence, if any; the weight of the evidence; and witness
demeanor while testifying and the form of questions eliciting responses. Credibility findings need not be
all-or-nothing propositions, and it is common for a fact finder to credit some, but not all, of a witness’
testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 622 (2001).
JD(SF)-32-16
3
Francisco, California, and a branch office at Oakland, California. PMA is an association of
employers whose approximately 50 employer-members are engaged in business in California,
Oregon and Washington as stevedore companies, operators of marine terminals, and equipment
maintenance and repair contractors. On behalf of its employer-members, PMA negotiates and
enters into collective-bargaining agreements with various unions including the International 5
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and its Local 18.
The complaint alleges and PMA admits that the employer-members of PMA annually derive
gross revenues in excess of $50,000 from the transportation of goods and passengers between
California and other States or foreign countries. PMA and its employer-members are thus 10
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Accordingly, I find
that SSA and PMA are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6)
and (7) of the Act.4 I additionally find that Local 18 Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
15
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) has jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
20
This case involves actions taken against three longshore workers at the Port of West
Sacramento (the Port). The General Counsel contends that the Employer-Respondents issued
unwarranted discipline to John Stubbe (Stubbe), Roni Simisola (Simisola) and Alan Couch
(Couch) in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, because they protested the operation of
Respondents’ jointly operated dispatch hall. In addition, it is alleged that discriminatee 25
Simisola’s discipline was motivated by her filing unfair labor practice charges, in violation of
Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. In each case, Local 18 is alleged to have violated Sections 8(b)(2)
and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by causing the Employer-Respondents to take the adverse action in
question. The General Counsel additionally alleges that Simisola’s discipline was based on the
application of an overbroad rule maintained by Respondents, which rule is separately alleged as 30
an independent violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Finally, the General
Counsel alleges that Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by refusing to provide
Simisola with access to dispatch hall records.
A. Factual Background35
1. Respondents’ officers, supervisors and representatives
SSA’s terminal manager at the Port is Frank Patalano. David Robinson is PMA’s labor
relations administrator. Since September 2015, William Bartelson has been PMA’s senior coast 40

4 Since PMA is admittedly subject to the Board’s jurisdiction, SSA is also deemed to be an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. See Pace Industries,
Inc., 320 NLRB 661, 667 (1996) (where one entity of single-employer is subject to the Board’s
jurisdiction, all entities part of that single employer are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction); Insulation
Contractors of Southern California, 110 NLRB 638 (1955) (all members of a multiemployer group who
participate in, or are bound by, multiemployer bargaining negotiations are considered as a single
employer for jurisdictional purposes).
JD(SF)-32-16
4
director of contract administration and arbitration; this position (albeit with a different job title)
was held previously held by Richard Marzano. Todd Amidon is senior counsel for PMA. (Tr.
377, 858, 1206–1207, 1286)5
Tim Campbell has been Local 18’s President since May 2014. Sean Farley was president of 5
ILWU Local 15 (which represents marine clerks at the Port) during 2015. Justin Deed and Joey
Schaffer are joint dispatchers at Local 18. (Tr. 217, 1647, 2006, 2079)6
2. The longshore bargaining unit
10
Since the 1930s, the ILWU has represented West Coast longshore workers; that
representation currently consists of a single multi-employer/multi-port coastwise unit, the origins
of which can be traced to an order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued over 75
years ago. Shipowners’ Assn. of the Pacific Coast, 7 NLRB 1002 (1938).7 Longshore workers
on the West Coast, including the workers involved in this case, are subject to the terms of the15
Pacific Coast Longshore Contract Document (PCLCD), a portion of the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by the ILWU and its employer counterpart, the PMA. (Tr. 860)
3. The parties’ joint dispatch hall operation
20
The origins of the dispatch hall system at the core of this case predate the Act and can be
traced to 1934 award by the National Longshoremen’s Board. This award ordered the creation
of joint dispatch halls in West Coast ports and at least one joint port labor relations committee
(JPLRC) in each port. See Shipowners’ Assn. of the Pacific Coast, supra. Each JPLRC has a
local union and management component with equal voting power. PMA serves as the 25
spokesperson for each committee’s employer component and provides additionally
administrative support for the committee. (Tr. 1209, 1319; GC Exh. 2 at 84)
JPLRCs, including one established at the Port (referred to as the SJPLRC), are charged with
establishing and maintaining registered lists of longshore workers eligible for dispatch to 30
available jobs. They are also authorized to establish rules governing the operation of the parties’
joint dispatch halls. One of these rules (discussed in more detail, infra) prohibits workers from
“causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-related area.” (GC Exh. 14)
JPLRCs, including the SJPLRC, are also charged with investigating and adjudicating claims of
employee misconduct, including that occurring at the dispatch hall. Such a claim, when brought 35

5 At hearing, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege Todd Amidon
and Richard Marzano as agents of PMA. Insofar as these individuals at various times took positions on
behalf of PMA regarding certain aspects of the parties’ grievance and arbitration machinery, I find that
they did act as its agents.
6 At hearing, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to allege joint
dispatchers Justin Deed and Joey Shaffer as agents of all Respondents. Based on the record as a whole, I
find that, insofar as they carry out their dispatching duties, Deed and Schaffer did act as agents of Local
18. I cannot find any support in the record, however, for finding either of them to be an agent of SSA or
PMA.
7 The West Coast longshore industry has a storied organizational history which is set forth in detail in
this decision.
JD(SF)-32-16
5
by a PMA employer against a longshore worker, is referred to as an “employer complaint.” (Tr.
1209–1211, 1788; GC Exh. 2 at 85, § 17.125)
4. The Port’s registration system
5
Three classifications of longshore workers work at the Port, and each are afforded different
dispatch rights: fully registered Class A workers, limited-registered Class B workers and
unregistered identified casuals. Each of the discriminatees in this case was classified as an
unregistered identified casual (also referred to as “ID casuals” or simply “casuals”) during the
relevant period. (Tr. 1657–1658) 10
The PCLCD dictates that casuals, who are not Local 18 members, are dispatched only
after all local and visiting Class A and Class B registered longshore workers and marine clerks
have been offered work. (Tr. 1648, 1670–1673; GC Exh. 2 at 51–52, § 8.41) The PCLCD also
provides that casuals, as unregistered longshore workers, are “subject to greater penalties” than 15
registered longshore workers; as Respondents’ witnesses credibly testified, throughout the
industry, casuals are effectively treated as probationary employees subject to heightened
discipline. (GC Exh. 2 at 103, § 17.861; Tr. 899–900, 960–961, 1517–1519) Casuals are also
subject to a jointly negotiated set of rules, discussed infra, called the “Identified Casuals
Dispatch Rules,” which include the rule alleged by the General Counsel as unlawfully overbroad, 20
as well as an additional (unalleged) rule stating that casuals who are the subject of an employer
complaint “will be placed on the Non-Dispatch List and will not be dispatched until their
grievance has been adjudicated by the [JPLRC].” (GC Exh. 14)
ID casuals may eventually progress to registered longshore worker status. (Tr. 1236, 1241) 25
Specifically, when there is a demand for additional Class B members, casuals are advanced (or
“elevated”) in descending order by work experience, i.e., the hours each has been paid for work.
(GC Exh. 40 at 2) It is undisputed that elevation to Class B status brings with a guarantee of
work, benefits and significantly higher earnings. (Tr. 1016, 1072–1073)
30
5. The 2014 registration grievances
In March 2014, Local 18 conducted a “registration” process, whereby it elevated a number of
ID casuals to Class B longshore worker status. Stubbe, Simisola and Couch, who were not
selected, each filed a grievance in March 2014, alleging that the selection process was tainted by 35
the practice of “chiseling” (i.e., cheating at the dispatch hall) in favor of certain, favored
employees and that their prior ID casual work performed outside of the Port should have been
considered in the registration process. Similar grievances were filed by 8 other ID casuals on the
same date. Each of the grievances was heard by the SJPLRC on June 24 and December 9, 2014.
(Tr. 160–162, 432, 771–772; GC Exh. 15)40
JD(SF)-32-16
6
Discriminatee Couch testified that, during one of the two hearing dates, Union President
Campbell took him as well as 4 other grievants aside for a caucus. According to Couch,
Campbell told the group that, if they did not drop their grievances,
[I]t would be a lot harder for us because they were going to bring 5
some more people in, make a new list and we would be more or
less SOL, because when they do that we’re going to be rotating
with another 30 or 40 people.
(Tr. 434) Couch testified that he understood this to mean that Respondents would create a new 10
ID casual list, thereby diluting the hours for the current ID casuals. According to him, Campbell
next told the workers that, if they did not drop the grievances, “you’re going to be on your own,”
but that if they withdrew them he would “take care” of them. Counsel for the General Counsel
only called one other employee-witness to this conversation, ID casual Peter Bianchini
(Bianchini). Like Couch, Bianchini testified that Campbell told the grievants that, if they did not 15
drop their grievances, 30–40 more ID casuals would be added to the casual rotation and they
could be stuck rotating with these individuals. (Tr. 434, 1072)8
Campbell admitted having a conversation with the group in the hallway outside the June
grievance meeting, but his recollection was markedly different. Campbell testified that, during a 20
break in the meeting, Biancini asked him about the likelihood of further registration, to which
Campbell responded that there would be more registration because Respondents were having a
hard time filling gangs. Biancini then asked whether there would be more casuals added to the
casual list, and Campbell said that yes, there would be more casuals added as well. Campbell
specifically denied asking any of the grievants to withdraw their grievance regarding the 2014 25
registration, or telling them that they would either get stuck in a larger casual rotation or be “on
their own” if they failed to do so. (Tr. 2084–2085)
On December 9, 2014, each of the 11 grievances was denied; Stubbe and Couch each elected
not to pursue his grievance further. Simisola appealed her grievance, and it was pending 30
arbitration decision as of the close of the record in this matter. (Tr. 432, 772, 774–775; GC
Exhs. 21, 40)
6. ID Casual Rule 12 and the Port’s dispatch process
35
Posted at the dispatch hall are the Port’s “ID Casual Rules,” which were jointly negotiated by
Respondents several decades ago. The rules address both the conduct of the dispatch itself, as
well as the conditions under which individual casuals will be considered eligible for dispatch.

8 On the date of the June grievance meeting, 3 of the 11 grievants in fact withdrew their registration
grievances; 2 of those 3 were subsequently “elevated” in a later 2015 registration. (Tr. 435–436, 2101–
2102)
JD(SF)-32-16
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As noted, the General Counsel alleges that one of these rules, referred to as “ID Casual Rule 12,”
is unlawfully overbroad in violation of the Act. This rule, put in relevant context, states:
IDENTIFIED CASUALS DISPATCH RULES
5
The following rules are for the dispatch of Identified Casuals, and shall be
posted in clear view at the Joint Dispatch Hall.
* * *
10
12. Casuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other
job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently
revoked.
(GC 14) It is undisputed that Respondents maintain similar rules barring disruption of dispatch 15
by the other classes of longshore workers at the Port. (Tr. 1216–1221; PMA 8)
The day-to-day operation of the Port’s dispatch hall is the responsibility of Local 18 member-
dispatchers who are elected by the membership. (Tr. 1209–1211; GC Exh. 2 at 85, § 17.121)
The dispatch process begins with SSA sending job orders to the dispatcher assigned to the shift 20
in question. This dispatcher then dispatches by telephone the class A workers registered in the
Port; he then moves on to workers, including casuals, physically present in the hall. During this
portion of the dispatch, the dispatcher stands behind a podium and calls jobs and workers in
sequence. A yellow line is painted on the floor of the dispatch hall in front of the podium where
dispatching takes place. According to Respondents’ witnesses, the purpose of the yellow line is 25
to keep order in the dispatch hall, and, in particular, to enforce ID Casual Rule 12.
While individuals may occasionally cross the yellow line (even when not being dispatched),
the dispatcher may order a worker behind the line if she is disrupting dispatch. (Tr. 1661–1662,
1687; U Exh. 20) Failure to comply with an order to retreat behind the yellow line may result in 30
the worker receiving a “citation” (the Union’s version of an employer complaint). According to
dispatcher Justin Deed (Deed), this device is typically used to prevent workers from “rushing”
the podium when particular jobs are being dispatched, as well as to keep groups of workers from
being loud, distracting the dispatcher and thereby interfering with the dispatch process. As Deed
explained, “[i]f I instruct them to get behind the yellow line, they need to get behind the yellow 35
line.” (Tr. 1893–1895, 1898)
After dispatching in the hall, the dispatcher returns to the dispatch office, where he does
additional dispatching by phone, which consists of filling late job orders, correcting clerical
errors and duplicate assignments and making any required last-minute changes in job 40
assignments. Some of these tasks require the dispatcher to coordinate with the dispatcher for the
Port’s marine clerks, who are represented by ILWU Local 15. The dispatcher then completes the
paperwork necessary to document each worker’s assignment and generates a running tally of the
hours worked in order to ensure, per the dispatch rules, that the registered longshore workers are
dispatched in the order of “lowest hours” first. (Tr. 1679–1685)45
JD(SF)-32-16
8
B. Facts Relevant to the General Counsel’s Individual Allegations
1. Roni Simisola
Simisola has been an ID Casual longshore worker at the Port since approximately May 22, 5
2008. The JPLRC suspended her from April 30 through June 2, 2015 based on her conduct at
the Port’s joint dispatch hall. (Tr. 767)
a. Simisola’s protected conduct
10
As noted, Simisola filed a grievance in March 2014 alleging that she was not elevated in the
2014 registration because of inappropriate dispatching, and she appealed the denial of her
grievance (and that of another grievant) in December 2014. (Tr. 772, 774; GC Exhs. 21, 40)
Prior to Respondents’ June 2015 decision to suspend Simisola, she also filed several Board
charges regarding the operation of the Port’s dispatch operation, including a January 28, 2015 15
charge against the Union and an April 13, 2015 charge against PMA. (GC Exhs. 22, 23)
b. Simisola’s conduct at the dispatch hall9
Simisola regularly photographed dispatch sheets to support her grievance claim that Local 18 20
dispatchers were cheating in the dispatch. Until mid-March 2015, the dispatchers left these
dispatch sheets at the podium following dispatch where they were available for inspection or
photographing. Deed testified that, around this time, five longshore workers complained that
Simisola violated their privacy by photographing them and their dispatch sheets. There was no
action taken against Simisola, but it appears that the dispatchers ceased their practice of leaving 25
the dispatch logs on the podium following the dispatch. (Tr. 441, 985–986, 1688–1689; U Exh.
10)10
On April 9 and 10, 2015, Simisola attempted to photograph the sheets during the dispatch
when she herself was called to the podium. On each occasion, Deed instructed her to return 30
behind the yellow line. (Tr. 982; PMA Exh. 22 at 4) Simisola admitted at hearing that she has
been aware of the “yellow-line” rule since at least June 2014, and had been warned by a
dispatcher as of that date to return behind the line or risk discharge. (Tr. 976–977)11

9 While the testimony regarding these events was not significantly inconsistent, I have generally
credited the testimony of Respondents’ witnesses where it contradicted that of Simisola. I found Deed
particularly credible, in that he clearly worked hard to recall details, was careful in listening to and
answering questions and generally seemed concerned with testifying truthfully as opposed to “candy
coating” any aspect of Local 18’s case. Simisola, for her part, had significant difficulty recalling even
basic facts regarding her conduct in the dispatch hall on the dates she was accused of disrupting dispatch,
April 29 and 30; as such, her testimony was far less reliable. (See Tr. 796–797, 801, 805–806, 809–819)
10 The Union brought up these complaints at an April 14, 2015 SJPLRC meeting, at which time
SSA’s representatives suggested that the Union remind Simisola about Rule 12’s prohibition on
disrupting dispatch. It is unclear from the record whether the Union did so.
11 While Simisola initially testified that, as of April 2015, she had never actually seen Rule 12, she
was impeached by her Board affidavit which stated that she had. (Tr. 968–969)
JD(SF)-32-16
9
(i) April 29
On April 29, 2015, Simisola again attempted to document what she considered to be
evidence of cheating in dispatch. On this occasion, when Deed called her to the podium to
receive her assignment, she began making a video recording (using her cell phone) of him and 5
the dispatch sheets. Deed asked Simisola not to take photographs or videos while he was
dispatching; she did not respond, but simply stared at him, at which point Deed repeated his
request. After another period of silence, Simisola turned around and walked away. According to
Deed, this entire interaction took approximately 2 minutes. (Tr. 1726–1727)
10
After Deed had finished dispatching the ID casuals, he gathered up the dispatch sheets and
went into the dispatch office to complete his dispatching duties (i.e., making follow-up phone
calls and documenting the details of the dispatch into a daily log). A minute later, Simisola
appeared at the office; standing in an entryway near where Deed sat working, she asked if she
could photograph the dispatch sheets. According to Deed, he told her no, explaining that he was 15
still working on the dispatch, and then ordered her back behind the yellow line in the hall.
Simisola did not comply, instead insisting that he must not still be dispatching, because the hall
was empty. She then said she wanted to see where she was in the order of dispatch. Deed gave
in, showing her the dispatch sheet containing her name. Simisola then stated she wanted to
photograph all of the day’s dispatch sheets, to which Deed responded he was still working and he 20
had already shown her where she stood in the dispatch. After more back-and-forth, Deed finally
threated to call Local 18 President Tim Campbell (Campbell), saying “I’m not going to go
through this with you anymore. I’ve got work to do.” (Tr. 1729–1733)
While not complying with Deed’s order to get behind the yellow line, Simisola did back 25
away from the entryway where she had initially stood. Deed called Campbell, who was out of
state at the time. Agreeing that Simisola needed to leave the office, Campbell in turn reported
the situation to SSA’s then-terminal manager Frank Patalano (Patalano), saying that Deed was
being “harassed” and Patalano was needed at the hall.12 Patalano arrived within minutes; after
consulting briefly with Deed, Patalano confronted Simisola about her conduct. According to 30
Patalano, Simisola admitted she had entered the dispatch office and acknowledged that she
wasn’t supposed to disrupt dispatch. Meanwhile, Deed returned to his office to complete the
dispatch paperwork. (Tr. 1411, 1416, 1418, 1739–1740, 1733, 1743)
It is undisputed that, as a result of the incident with Simisola, Deed’s dispatching was 35
delayed; specifically, he was unable to contact two workers in sufficient time for them to make it
to the Port to accept job assignments, instead resorting to continuing down the dispatch list and
offering the assignments to workers out of order. After Simisola had left the hall, Campbell
conferred with Robinson and they agreed that, since the problem appeared resolved, they could
address it at the next regular SJLRC meeting. (Tr. 1419–1420, 1521, 1534, 1739–1740, 1758, 40
1760, 1763–1764, 1785)

12 As Patalano testified, his position as terminal manager made him responsible for the safety of all
individuals at SSA’s operations at the Port. (Tr. 1417)
JD(SF)-32-16
10
(ii) April 30
The following morning (approximately 13 hours after she had left the hall the prior day),
Simisola appeared at the dispatch office while Deed was completing his dispatch paperwork and
asked if she could take photographs of the dispatch sheets. Deed said he was still dispatching,5
and instructed her to return behind the yellow line. Once again, instead of complying, Simisola
asked Deed to confirm that she was not allowed to photograph the dispatch sheets. Deed
responded, “I’m not telling you that. I’m just telling you that you need to get back behind the
line until I’m finished dispatching.” (Tr. 1768–1769)
10
Simisola complied, only to return 25 minutes later again demanding to photograph the
dispatch sheets. As Deed again ordered her behind the yellow line, Class A longshore worker
and Union sergeant-at-arms Alphonso Valdez (Valdez) entered the office. Deed yet again asked
Simisola to leave, but she remained, asking whether she was being refused access to the dispatch
sheets. After Deed again explained that he was still working, Valdez asked Simisola to leave, 15
saying Deed needed to finish his job. When she did not respond, Valdez ordered her to leave,
this time identifying himself as the sergeant-at-arms.13 Simisola questioned whether Valdez did,
in fact, hold that position, but then she retreated to the dispatch hall. This time, Simisola’s
appearance at the dispatch office resulted in a delay of dispatch to the point at which Deed was
late reporting for his own longshore work assignment that day. (Tr. 1421–1423, 1522–1523, 20
1771–1777, 1783–1785, 1997)
(iii) Respondents suspend Simisola
When Simisola refused to leave the dispatch office on April 30, Deed sent a text14 to 25
Campbell and Patalano, the tone and language of which reflected his frustration with Simisola’s
repeated disruptions: “This is bullshit. I’m trying to work. I want something done about this
harassment.” (U Exh. 14; Tr. 1779) Campbell (who was still out of town) and Patalano spoke
briefly, and Campbell asked Patalano to go the hall and assess the situation. (Tr. 1421) Patalano
soon arrived, where he was briefed by Deed and Valdez; after conferring, Deed and Patalano 30
agreed they would each report Simisola’s conduct to the SJPLRC, on behalf of Local 18 and
SSA, respectively. Patalano testified that he decided to file an employer complaint after
conferring with PMA’s David Robinson (Robinson), based on the fact that she had knowingly
violated the very rule she had been warned about the day prior.
35
At an emergency SJPLRC meeting that afternoon, Robinson, Patalano, Deed and Campbell
(who telephoned in) discussed the situation. They agreed that Simisola appeared prepared to
continue disrupting dispatch, and Patalano announced that he was going file an employer
complaint against Simisola. The committee then decided, pursuant to the ID Casual Rules, to
suspend Simisola from dispatch pending the adjudication of Patalano’s complaints. On April 30, 40
2015, the JPLRC informed Simisola that she was barred from entering the dispatch hall pending
investigation of her conduct. On May 1, 2015, Patalano filed two employer complaints against
Simisola stating that she had disrupted dispatch and refused to get behind the yellow line when

13 Valdez corroborated Deed’s version of these events, albeit testifying in what appeared not to be his
first language and without the assistance of a translator. (Tr. 1997–1999, 2001)
14 Patalano recalled getting a “call” from Deed; considering that Deed’s text was authenticated at the
hearing, I believe Patalano simply confused the means by which Deed contacted him. (Tr. 1421)
JD(SF)-32-16
11
ordered. Deed filed corresponding Union citations accusing Simisola of disrupting dispatch on
the days in question. (Tr. 1421–1423, 1522–1526, 1771–1777, 1783–1788; GC Exhs. 14, 24,
34, U Exh. 15, 16; PMA Exh. 21)
On June 2, 2015, the complaints about Simisola’s conduct on April 29 and 30 were heard by 5
the SJPLRC.15 In attendance were Simisola, Deed and representatives of all three Respondents.
Patalano, Deed, Simisola and Valdez testified regarding the events at the dispatch hall on the two
days in question. While initially denying being warned about crossing the yellow line during
dispatch, Simisola eventually admitted that, prior to April 29, 2015, she had been warned that
disrupting dispatch violated Rule 12 and that she knew that crossing the yellow line or entering 10
the dispatch office during dispatch was a violation of the dispatch rules. While she downplayed
the amount of time she spent in the office on the occasions in question, she did not deny entering
the office or refusing to return behind the yellow line as repeated ordered. After the witnesses
testified about each Simisola’s conduct on each of the two days in question, the witnesses were
excused and the committee deliberated16 for at least 45 minutes. (Tr. 1527; 1533–1542, 1791–15
1792; U Exh. 17; PMA Exh. 22)
Ultimately, the committee concluded that Simisola was guilty of disrupting dispatch, in that,
despite being aware of Rule 12, she had repeatedly refused to follow the dispatcher’s instructions
to leave the dispatch office and return behind the yellow line. Despite the fact that Rule 12, by 20
its terms, calls for immediate removal from the dispatch list, the committee instead issued
Simisola a final and binding last chance agreement, which stated that if she were to disrupt
dispatch again, she would be removed. In addition, the SJPLRC decided that Simisola’s penalty
was “time served” (i.e., the 43 days she had been placed on nondispatch while her complaint was
adjudicated. (Tr. 1541–1544; GC Exh. 25; PMA Exh. 22) 25
2. John Stubbe
Stubbe worked as an ID casual at the Port from 2008 until April 2015. Prior to that, he had
worked for approximately 15 years at another West Coast port. On or about April 20, 2015, 30
following an arbitration regarding alleged sexual harassment by Stubbe, Respondents
implemented an arbitration award ordering him permanently removed from ID casual dispatch
list. (Tr. 131–132; GC Exhs. 3, 4)
a. Stubbe’s protected conduct35
Stubbe testified that, in addition to filing his own grievance over the 2014 registration, he
assisted two other ID casuals, Couch and Peter Bianchini, in drafting similar grievances; there is
no evidence, however, that any Respondent had knowledge of this. (Tr. 164–166; GC Exh. 15–
16) Stubbe also claims that, in the fall of 2014, Union dispatcher Joey Schaffer (Schaffer) told 40

15Simisola’s case was originally scheduled to be heard at an earlier SJPLRC meeting; Simisola,
however, was not available and Campbell assisted her in being excused from appearing on that date and
rescheduling her appearance for June 2, 2015. (Tr. 1525–1527, 2098; GC Exh. 24; PMA Exh. 22)
16Deed, who was a union representative on the SJPLRC, was recused from these deliberations. (Tr.
1536, 1544, 1803–1804)
JD(SF)-32-16
12
him that he was “making enemies out there.” (Tr. 219) Immediately after relating this comment,
Stubbe testified as follows:
I’m not – I don’t have any friends, and I never did any – I never
took the city to task about my vessels that they confiscated and 5
basically, you know, primarily about the – about not having any
friends. Basically that was the gist of it.
(Tr. 219) No further testimony was elicited from Stubbe to clarify his putting the alleged threat
in this context.10
b. Stubbe’s interaction with “Ms. X”
In December 2014, Stubbe had two interactions with a fellow ID casual identified in the
record as “Ms. X.” First, on December 6, 2014, X asked Stubbe to perform a strenuous task that
had been assigned to her, explaining that she needed the help because she was pregnant, and 15
asked him to keep that information confidential. Agreeing to help, Stubbe added that, should
anyone ask why he was doing her work, she should tell them that she had sex with him in
exchange. Shortly after this conversation, X informed the walking boss,17 Pauly Rhodd (Rhodd),
about the conversation. Rhodd told Stubbe to apologize to X, which he did. (Tr. 195, 349–353;
662; Jt. Exh. 4)20
Four days later on December 10, Stubbe entered a restroom while X occupied one of its
stalls, despite having being warned by a coworker (discriminatee Couch) that a female worker
was present.18 As Stubbe entered the restroom, Couch (who was standing in the doorway) said,
“there’s somebody in there.” As X exited the bathroom stall, Stubbe addressed her, saying, 25
“how’s it going?” X reported this incident to Rhodd the same day. (Tr. 365, 1814–1815)
c. The 13.2 grievance procedure
Section 13.2 of the PCLCD sets forth a procedure for addressing harassment complaints
arising in the longshore workforce. (GC Exh. 2 at 72–73) Pursuant to guidelines established 30
jointly by Respondents (the 13.2 guidelines), longshore workers may individually file grievances
to be decided by an area arbitrator who conducts a formal hearing, determines whether the
grievance has merit and, if so, what remedy is appropriate. Prior to the hearing, it is not
uncommon for the area arbitrator to order interim relief to ensure the integrity of the process
and/or to protect the grievant; these remedies may include temporary job reassignment, dispatch, 35
transfer, or separation of the accused from the grievant. (Tr. 1255–1256, 1641; GC Exh. 3)
According to the 13.2 guidelines, an ILWU local union, through separate representatives, can
represent both the grievant and accused. Alternately, the grievant and accused each have the
option to have a class A or class B registered worker represent them. (Tr. 891–892) As
Robinson testified, it is not unusual for the PMA, in order to protect the interest of an employer-40

17 In longshore parlance, a “walking boss” essentially amounts to a foreman. (Tr. 1857–1858)
18 Both Couch and X testified that when a female uses the restroom in question (which is marked
“male” but is occasionally used by women), it is common practice to leave their hardhat in the doorway
or have a coworker stand there as a signal for men not to enter.
JD(SF)-32-16
13
member, to take a position regarding the merits and/or appropriate remedy in a 13.2 hearing. (Tr.
1289–1294, 1513)
An employee found guilty of a 13.2 violation is subject to a penalty ranging from a minimum
of seven days off work up to deregistration from the industry. Any party may appeal the 5
arbitrator’s decision to a Coast Appeals Officer. (GC Exh. 3) However, following the issuance
of a final award, the 13.2 guidelines provide that the JPLRCs are required to implement the final
award. (Tr. 1260–1261; GC Exh. 3) While there is no evidence of a JPLRC vacating a § 13.2
decision, the PMA did on occasion in 2012 unsuccessfully attempt to convince the ILWU to do
so. In that case, the conduct alleged to violate 13.2 was, in PMA’s view, also arguably protected 10
by Section 7 of the Act, and the PMA was therefore concerned that the 13.2 award might appear
to constitute unlawful retaliation. (See Tr. 384–388, 1262; GC Exh. 12)
d. X’s 13.2 grievance against Stubbe
Within 2 days of the “bathroom incident,” walking boss Rhodd reported X’s complaints 15
about Stubbe to Local 18 dispatcher Deed. The following day, Deed called X; once she had
described the two incidents, Deed stated that conduct like Stubbe’s “can’t happen out there in the
workplace” and that, if she “felt violated or disrespected or harassed in any way,” she had
options. He then asked if she wanted to file a 13.2 grievance against Stubbe, and X responded
that she wanted to think about it. About a day later, they spoke again, and X said she wanted to 20
move ahead with the grievance. Deed offered to help her fill out the grievance form, and she
accepted.
X and Deed met on December 14, 2014, along with Local 18 President Campbell. After
Campbell read aloud to X the language of Section 13.2, Deed filled out a 13.2 grievance form, 25
reading each line to X and writing down her answers.19 X’s grievance accused Stubbe of sexual
harassment based on the two above-described incidents, alleging that he had engaged in verbal
harassment and subjected her to “unwelcome romantic or sexual attention.” With respect to the
bathroom incident, X’s grievance states that, upon seeing X, Stubbe should have left the
bathroom immediately and later should have apologized for ignoring Couch’s signal. When they 30
got to the part of the form asking for the identity of the grievant’s representative, X asked
Campbell if he would represent her and he said yes, adding a disclaimer that he had never
handled a Section 13.2 grievance before. After X reviewed and signed her grievance, Campbell
filed it. X credibly testified that she was not pressured or coerced by anyone into filing her
grievance and likewise credibly explained that she personally selected Campbell as her 35
representative based on her confidence in him. (Tr. 205, 340, 358–364, 704, 1814–1822, 1826–
1829, 2088–2091; U Exh. 2 at 3; Jt. Exh. 4 at 42)

19 According to Deed, in the narrative portion of the form describing Stubbe’s alleged prohibited 13.2
conduct, he simply wrote down, verbatim, what X told him had occurred. (Tr. 1824, 1826) X confirmed
this, with one exception regarding the bathroom incident. Specifically, while the written grievance stated
that Couch had explicitly warned Stubbe not to enter the bathroom, X testified that all she actually heard
was him use the phrase, “someone’s in there.” (Tr. 360, 365–371; U Exh. 2)
JD(SF)-32-16
14
e. Stubbe’s prior 13.2 complaint
X’s complaint was not the first time a coworker had accused Stubbe of sexual harassment at
the Port. In February 2011, a female Class B longshore worker, identified at hearing as “Ms. Y,”
filed a Section 13.2 complaint against Stubbe alleging that he sexually harassed her by calling
her a “bitch,” and telling her, “[i]f you hurt me, I will knock your teeth down your throat.” At a 5
13.2 arbitration, Stubbe admitted making these comments, which he characterized as a mistake.
The area arbitrator in that case found Stubbe guilty, ordered him off work for 7 days (suspended
pending any future 13.2 violation) and required him to attend diversity training. (Tr. 652–653,
656; GC Exh. 8; PMA Exh. 3)20
10
f. Local 18’s pre-arbitration investigation and Respondents’ interim remedy
On either December 18 or 19, 2014, Campbell, along with Local 15 president Sean Farley
(Farley) called Stubbe. Farley (unlike Campbell) had participated in numerous 13.2 proceedings
and was called in to investigate X’s allegations.21 Campbell identified himself as X’s
representative and said that a 13.2 grievance had been filed against him, to which Stubbe replied, 15
“I knew that was coming.” Campbell said they wanted to hear his side, and Stubbe told them
essentially the same story as had X.22 Campbell then gave Farley contact information for X and
Couch. After interviewing each of them, Farley concluded that Stubbe was guilty of violating
Section 13.2. As he testified, he reached this conclusion based on his experience with 13.2
hearings. (Tr. 2112, 2114, 2023, 2047–2049, 2058–2059)20
Adjudicating X’s grievance was complicated by the fact that the PCLCD was expired at the
time, and the Union had not agreed to arbitrate any grievance during the contract hiatus. On
December 19, Local 18 proposed that X’s complaint instead be heard by the SJPLRC, but PMA
disagreed. (Tr. 1563–1566, 2113; GC Exh. 39; U. Exh. 2) Respondents did, however, fashion 25
an interim remedy at a JPLRC meeting held the following day. At that meeting, Campbell
announced that, based on the witness interviews, the Union had concluded that Stubbe was guilty
of conduct prohibited by 13.2. Campbell and Farley then each stated that they believed, based
on Stubbe’s admitted conduct, that X was entitled to interim relief (i.e., separating Stubbe and X)
pending the adjudication of her grievance. According to Campbell, the parties determined that 30
the only effective interim relief, given the Port’s relatively small size, was to place Stubbe on
non-dispatch pending the outcome of the grievance. (Tr. 2043–2044, 2095–2096; GC Exh. 10)
g. The Stubbe 13.2 arbitration
On February 26, 2015, it was determined that all of the Section 13.2 complaints that had been 35
filed during the contract hiatus would be heard by Area Arbitrator Jan Holmes (Arbitrator

20 Stubbe later filed an appeal of this decision, which was found untimely by the coast appeals officer.
(GC Exh. 9)
21 It is undisputed that Farley had participated in over a hundred arbitrations and had represented the
accused in Section 13.2 hearings at least ten times. (Tr. 2006–2007)
22 I credit Farley and Campbell’s accounts of this conversation. Stubbe’s recollection was both hazy
and inherently implausible; he could not recall whether Campbell identified himself as representing X,
and claimed that he told the two men he had no “decent recollection” of the incidents with X, which had
occurred only two weeks earlier. (Tr. 183–184)
JD(SF)-32-16
15
Holmes) with appeal to Coast Appeals Officer Rudy Rubio (CAO Rubio). (Tr. 1324; PMA Exh.
20) X’s complaint was scheduled to be heard on March 18, 2015. (GC Exh. 37)
Initially, Stubbe selected Class A marine clerk Kevin McDonald (McDonald) as his
representative at the arbitration. In early March, McDonald asked Farley for help in preparing 5
for the hearing, and they decided that, based on Farley’s far more extensive experience with 13.2
arbitrations, he should step in and represent Stubbe. McDonald consulted with Stubbe, after
which Farley and Stubbe spoke and agreed that Farley would defend Stubbe going forward.23
During the following weeks, Farley followed his “normal steps” in preparing for a hearing,
including researching legal issues as well as consulting the well-known Elkouri & Elkouri10
treatise on arbitration. He also discussed the case with Stubbe at least six times, including two
sessions that lasted over two hours each, and spent the weekend before the hearing preparing his
closing statement and procedural arguments. Farley also spoke with X, as well as with witnesses
Couch and Rhodd. (Tr. 2012–2018, 2020, 2023, 2026–2028; U Exh. 19)
15
At the arbitration, Campbell appeared for X and Farley appeared on behalf of Stubbe.
Appearing for Local 18 were Deed and Local 18’s Secretary-Treasurer, and appearing for the
PMA were Robinson and another PMA representative.24 According to Respondents’ witnesses,
prior to Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing, PMA and the Union had not discussed what, if anything, might be
an appropriate remedy for X’s grievance. At the outset of the hearing, Farley moved to dismiss 20
the grievance on various procedural grounds, and also requested that Stubbe be awarded 85 days’
back pay for the time he had been placed on nondispatch. Arbitrator Holmes denied each of
these motions. Next, X, Stubbe, Couch and Rhodd testified; as detailed infra, Couch failed to
appear in person but was permitted to testify by telephone. Farley presented Stubbe and Couch’s
testimony, made objections and cross examined X. (Jt. Exh. 2; Tr. 1512) 25
Stubbe, for his part, admitted before the arbitrator that he had advised X to tell others they
were “exchanging sex” for him doing her work, which he alternately characterized as a “gaffe”
and a “big” error for which there was no way to apologize. With respect to the bathroom
incident, Stubbe did not dispute the basics of the exchange, admitted that Couch had warned him 30
“there’s someone in there” as he entered the bathroom and further admitted that he knew that
female longshore workers would post someone at the door to “stand guard” while they used the
men’s restroom. Couch then testified that he was, in fact, watching the door for X and had
warned Stubbe, “somebody’s in there.” (Tr. 56–63, 67, 73, 545–546)
35
Following the witness testimony, PMA’s Robinson argued that Stubbe had essentially
admitted to a second violation of Section 13.2, and asked the arbitrator to permanently revoke
Stubbe’s dispatch privileges. According to Robinson, PMA’s concern was that, despite
effectively admitting to two 13.2 violations, Stubbe was “not getting it” and was therefore likely
40

23 Once again, Stubbe’s recollection was foggier; to the extent that he suggested that Farley was
somehow involuntarily foisted on him, I do not credit Stubbe. (Tr. 186)
24 It is undisputed that the hearing started late because Farley had misinformed Stubbe about the
starting time. (Tr. 2050)
JD(SF)-32-16
16
to engage in further prohibited harassment, creating a source liability for SSA and its member
employers. (Tr. 899, 1511–1512; Jt. Exh. 4 at 94) He testified:
[a]s the case progressed, it was my opinion that there was no
corrective behavior that could be applied to Mr. Stubbe that would 5
correct his behavior. I personally did not feel that Mr. Stubbe,
after testifying about knocking a woman’s teeth down her threat
and the subsequent case after that, the case that we were actually
there for, in my opinion, he was blaming everybody. He was
taking no accountability and I did not see an individual that was 10
going to be reformed by any penalty short of removal.
(Tr. 1516)
In Stubbe’s defense, Farley argued that the bathroom incident (which involved no 15
inappropriate comments or body language) did not rise to the level of a 13.2 violation. (Jt. Exh.
4 at 86–89) Asked for a closing statement on behalf of X, Campbell stated that Stubbe’s
suggestion that she tell people they had a sexual relationship was “completely out of line,” had
made her “very uncomfortable” and justified Stubbe’s “immediate removal off the I.D. list.” (Id.
at 89–90) In his closing, Farley argued for leniency based on what he described as a “lax 20
enforcement” of the 13.2 rules at the Port, where, he argued sexual jokes were “commonplace.”25
He also cited SSA’s failure to file its own 13.2 grievance upon learning of X’s complaint as
evidence that his actions were not worthy of losing his dispatch privileges entirely. (Id. at 91–
92)
25
Arbitrator Holmes let Stubbe have the last word; he stated that he “had no problem with [X]
filing a complaint” but that PMA was taking advantage of her complaint to retaliate against him
for filing his grievance regarding the 2014 registration process. After Stubbe had spoken on this
issue at some length, Robinson interrupted, stating that Stubbe was entitled to make these
arguments “in another forum, but not here today in this form.” Apparently agreeing, the 30
arbitrator asked if Stubbe had anything else to add, and he said no. (Jt. Exh. 4 at 96; Tr. 925,
2051) There is no evidence that, prior to this point, Farley was aware that Stubbe had filed a
grievance regarding the 2014 registration process.26
On March 31, 2015, Arbitrator Holmes found Stubbe guilty of prohibited conduct in 35
violation of Section 13.2, and ordered him removed from the industry. (GC Exh. 4) On or
around April 20, 2015, after Stubbe had unsuccessfully appealed this decision to CAO Rubio,
Respondents implemented the arbitration award against Stubbe, permanently removing him from
the dispatch list. (GC Exhs. 3, 4)
40

25 As Farley explained, he based this argument on information provided to him by Stubbe. (Tr. 2053)
26 At most, the record indicates that Stubbe told Farley that he wanted to present evidence pertaining
to “an elevation” at the hearing. (Tr. 2019)
JD(SF)-32-16
17
3. Alan Couch
Couch, who had worked as an unregistered longshore worker since 1983, became an ID
casual at the Port in 2004. On June 2, 2015, Couch was disciplined by the JPLRC for failing to
appear as a witness at Stubbe’s March 18, 2015 hearing. (Tr. 431–432) 5
a. Couch’s protected conduct
As detailed above, Couch claims that Campbell told him and four other 2014 registration
grievants that they would lose work to newly hired casuals if they did not abandon their 10
grievances. I do not credit Couch’s version of this conversation. His manner in testifying about
the alleged incident suggested fabrication, and only corroborating witness, Bianchini, related the
conversation in a rehearsed manner, seemingly “remembering” the critical threat only after a
significant, unexplained pause. I instead credit Campbell’s version of the conversation instead,
in which, during a break in the grievance hearing, he merely answered the grievants’ questions 15
about whether further registrations and casual hiring were expected.
Couch also testified that Local 18 President Campbell at some point “before Christmas” in
2014 spoke to him personally about his grievance. According to Couch, Campbell asked him,
“how far are you willing to take this?” Then, when Couch responded, “all the way,” Campbell 20
supposedly replied, “you’re on your own.” Campbell denied that any such conversation
occurred. (Tr. 445–448, 2086) Once again, Couch’s manner in testifying and his overall
presentation did not convince me that this conversation actually occurred. Instead, I credit
Campbell’s testimony; his demeanor suggested forthrightness and his denial appeared quite
genuine.25
The record contains evidence of Couch engaging in additional protected conduct, but all such
conduct occurred following his alleged discriminatory discipline.27
b. Couch’s failure to appear at Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing30
Stubbe and Farley planned to call Couch as a witness to testify about Stubbe’s bathroom run-
in with X. Farley, who had initially interviewed Couch shortly after the incident, also spoke with
him on two other occasions. In either January or February, 2015, Farley interviewed Couch by
telephone and informed him that he would need to be present at an upcoming hearing. Couch 35
said he would need “a few days’ notice” because he worked as a an over-the-road truck driver.

27 For example, in October 2015, Couch filed his own 13.2 grievance complaining about women
using the men’s bathroom; this grievance was denied pre-hearing by Arbitrator Holmes (who was later
upheld by CAO Rubio) as lacking merit. Finally, Couch testified that he, like Simisola, took pictures of
the dispatch sheets at the hiring hall and was instructed on two occasions in the fall of 2015 (by
dispatchers Shaffer and Deed, respectively) that he should not do so. (Tr. 432, 477–479, 509–510; GC
Exh. 28(a), 40)
JD(SF)-32-16
18
According to Couch, Farley said that should not be a problem.28 Farley and Couch spoke again
on March 7, 2015. According to Couch, he expressed concern about having to show up at a
hearing, and Farley told him that he would “record” his statement and he “shouldn’t have to be
there.” Farley’s account of the conversation was more detailed. According to him, he told
Couch he was not sure he would need to appear and might instead be allowed to sign an affidavit 5
or testify via telephone. He denied, however, saying that he was tape recording the conversation
or that Couch would definitely not need to appear. (Tr. 473, 466–472, 2020–2026, 2069)
On Friday, March 13, during a telephonic prep session with Stubbe, Farley suggested that
Couch might not be a helpful witness, but Stubbe disagreed. Farley acquiesced, telling Stubbe, if 10
he wanted Couch to testify, he needed to call him and make sure he appeared. (Tr. 2026)
According to Couch, on the Friday in question, he was truck driving out of town when Stubbe
called him; he rather incredibly testified that Stubbe told him to expect a “cite letter” ordering
him to appear at the hearing, but that he probably did not need to appear, because Farley had said
he was going to record his statement. (Tr. 580-91, 879)29 Couch testified that he nonetheless 15
“stay[ed] close” for the next few days in Southern California and arranged for his mother to
check his mail for a letter from PMA, but decided to drive to Arizona on Monday, March 16,
after she told him no such letter had arrived. (Tr. 464, 585–586)30
Couch also testified that he contacted the Local 18 hall and left a message for Campbell to 20
check on whether he needed to appear. Couch’s testimony about what prompted this call leads
me to believe that, in fact, he received his cite letter around the same time as his conversation
with Stubbe. In his words, he called the hall “after I got the letter—not the letter. I mean, after
[Stubbe] told me about it, I figured I’d call and see what’s going on.” (Tr. 591) He then stated
that he called “the number they gave me on the letter” only to backtrack, explaining that the 25
“letter” to which he had referred was “a letter I’ve gotten from [Campbell] before.” (Tr. 592–
593) No such letter was proffered by the General Counsel to corroborate Couch’s rather shaky
explanation of these events.
According to the General Counsel’s witnesses, who included Couch, as well as his mother 30
and brother, the cite letter arrived at Couch’s residence the following day (March 17); the cite
letter itself, however, is dated March 9. (U Exh. 1; Tr. 255–256, 464) Couch’s mother testified
that, per Couch’s instruction, she recognized the letter as being from PMA and opened it right
away; his brother recalled differently, testifying that she was “hesitant” to open the letter and did
not understand its significance. (Tr. 292–293) At some time prior to the hearing, Couch 35

28 Present on Couch’s side of the conversation (via speakerphone) were Stubbe and Couch’s
girlfriend, Rose Rojas, but I do not credit either of them as to this conversation. Stubbe’s recollection was
devoid of details, and Rosas claimed that Couch definitively said he was not going to attend the hearing,
to which Farley supposedly responded “not to worry about it.” Even Couch himself did not corroborate
this. (Tr. 320–321, 720–721)
29 At hearing, even Couch did not actually appear convinced of his own story. Initially testifying that
Stubbe told him, “keep an eye out for [a cite letter] because you might have to. . .” he then abruptly cut
off, stating, “I didn’t think I —I wasn’t even home.” (Tr. 584) Notably, Stubbe was not asked to
corroborate Couch’s testimony regarding this conversation.
30 According to Couch, he gave his mother this instruction on either the Friday he spoke with Stubbe
or the following day. (Tr. 588–589) This was contradicted by testimony given by his mother who, on
cross-examination, clearly stated that the “only time” Couch ever called her about getting a cite letter was
the following Monday. (Tr. 257)
JD(SF)-32-16
19
telephoned Stubbe and informed him that there was no way he would be able to attend, but it is
undisputed that Couch did not inform any of Respondents of this prior to the hearing. (Tr. 591–
594, 2096)
c. Couch’s interaction with Arbitrator Holmes5
When Couch did not appear at the hearing on March 18, 2015, Stubbe informed the arbitrator
that he had spoken to him the prior week and told him to watch out for his cite letter. After
Couch was connected to the arbitration via telephone, Arbitrator Holmes asked him to explain
his nonappearance. Couch admitted he knew he was supposed to be at the hearing, but said he 10
that he had to make a living. He then became argumentative, asking, “how long is this gonna
be?” and urging the arbitrator, “let’s get on it, because I’ve gotta get rolling . . . I mean they ain’t
paying me for this.” It is undisputed that the arbitrator was not impressed; according to Couch
himself, she was “upset” by his failure to appear and “reamed him out” for being disrespectful to
her. (Tr. 533–543, 542, 954–955; Jt. Exh. 4 at 78) As described, supra, Couch then testified by 15
telephone about the bathroom incident.
Following his testimony, Couch was disconnected from the arbitration. Farley then stated
that Couch’s failure to appear was improper and that his remarks to the arbitrator were
“flippant”; he then suggested that Couch should “at least” be sent a letter of reprimand. 20
Campbell joined in, calling Couch’s conduct “completely rude” and asking that he be penalized.
Farley backed off, stating, “I’m not saying that.” (Jt. Exh. 2 at 81–83) Robinson weighed in,
noting that X had missed a funeral to appear at the arbitration; Campbell stated that this justified
penalizing Couch and suggesting putting him on nondispatch for a ship, which would amount to
missing roughly 6–8 shifts. Farley pushed back, suggesting that he was uncomfortable with the 25
arbitrator fashioning a remedy, considering Couch had no designated representative in the
hearing. Ultimately, Arbitrator Holmes decided that “a penalty would be appropriate in this
particular case,” and that she would “leave it to [the SJPLRC] to figure out what would be
appropriate.” (Tr. 1550; Jt. Exh. 4 at 84–85)
30
d. Respondents suspend Couch
On June 2, 2015, the SJPLRC, pursuant to Arbitrator Holmes’ order, held a hearing over the
appropriate penalty. Couch and Farley testified regarding what Couch had been told about his
need to appear. Couch initially maintained that Farley had excused him from attending, and 35
Farley denied this. Later during the hearing, however, when Couch was asked why he had not
informed anyone from the JPLRC that he was not going to attend Stubbe’s arbitration, he
admitted that, in hindsight, he probably should have done so. (Tr. 475–476, 872, 1550–1552;
PMA Exh. 22)
40
Following the testimony, the committee determined that Couch should receive a penalty of
fourteen shifts off work, with seven shifts suspended. According to PMA’s Robinson, because a
nonparty witness had never failed to appear for a 13.2 hearing before, the committee considered
the penalties applicable for analogous misconduct, such as 14 days off work for a failure to
appear for work, and concluded that something less was sufficient to send impress on him the 45
importance of appearing. On June 2, 2015, the JPLRC issued Couch a “Letter of Reprimand”
setting forth his penalty. (Tr. 1552–1553, GC Exh. 28)
JD(SF)-32-16
20
ANALYSIS
A. The Applicable Statutory Framework
5
The Act aims “to separate membership obligations owed by employees to their bargaining
representatives from the employment rights of those employees.” IBEW Local 1547 (Rogers
Electric), 245 NLRB 716, 717–718 (1979). Indeed, the statutory provisions at the core of this
case were designed to constitute a “wall . . . between organizational rights and job
opportunities.” See Lummus Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1964). This “wall” is 10
policed by two separate mechanisms under the Act. First, Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it
an unfair labor practice for labor organizations “to restrain or coerce … employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Act.” Among those Section 7 rights is “the
right to refrain from” forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations (i.e., engaging in
dissident union conduct). Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962), enf. denied 326 15
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
Union conduct that compromises the “wall” separating membership obligations and
employment rights is also addressed by Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, which makes it an unfair
labor practice 20
for a labor organization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 . . .
[or]; (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of [section 8(a)(3)]. . . 25
Where a union is found to have caused an employer to take adverse action against an employee,
the Board recognizes a rebuttable presumption that “[the labor organization] acted unlawfully
because by such conduct [it] demonstrates its power to affect the employees’ livelihood in so
dramatic a way as to encourage union membership among the employees.” Graphic 30
Communications Local 1-M (Bang Printing), 337 NLRB 662, 673 (2002) (citing Operating
Engineers Local 478 (Stone & Webster), 271 NLRB 1382, 1385 (1984)). Under Section 8(b)(2),
a union that causes employer action against an employee may be found to have violated the Act
even though the questioned action, if taken by the employer alone, would not constitute a
violation of the Act. Thus, the allegations against Local 18 in this case are not dependent on 35
whether PMA or SSA violated the Act, and, regardless of the Employer-Respondents’
motivation in taking action against the discriminatees, Local 18 will be found to have violated
the Act if it caused such action to be taken. Carpenters Local 2205 (Groves-Granite), 229
NLRB 56 (1977). Accord Town & Country Supermarkets, 340 NLRB 1410 (2004).
40
Union conduct that compromises the “wall” separating membership obligations and
employment rights is also addressed by Section 8(b)(1)(A), whereby the Board enforces unions’
“duty of fair representation,” which stems from the right of employees under Section 7 “to be
free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in
matters affecting their employment.” Miranda Fuel, 140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962), enf. denied 45
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Under this analysis, a violation will be found where a union takes
JD(SF)-32-16
21
“action against any employee upon considerations or classification which are irrelevant,
invidious, or unfair.” Id.31
B. Individual Allegations
5
1. ID Casual Rule 12
The General Counsel alleges that, by maintaining a jointly negotiated ban on ID casuals
“causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other job-related area,” the Employer-
Respondents are violating Section 8(a)(1) and Respondent Local 18 is violating its duty of fair 10
representation. It is asserted that the rule is unlawful for two independent reasons. First, the
General Counsel argues that Rule 12 is unlawfully overbroad pursuant to Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004).32 Second, it is alleged that the rule, on its face,
discriminates against non-Union members. Respondents argue that the rule would not be
reasonably interpreted by employees to prevent Section 7 conduct; Respondent PMA 15
additionally argues that Rule 12 cannot be found to unlawfully restrict workers’ Section 7 rights,
because Local 18 waived any such rights implicated by the rule by agreeing to it. Finally,
Respondents assert that Rule 12 does not discriminate on its face.
As set forth below, I agree with Respondents that Rule 12 is not facially discriminatory. 20
However, I do find that Rule 12 is unlawfully overbroad and that its intrusion on individual
employees’ Section 7 rights cannot be waived by the Union.
a. ID Casual Rule 12 as facially discriminatory
25
It is well settled that granting preferential terms and conditions of employment based on
employees’ union membership violates the Act and contractual provisions which operate to do so
are discriminatory on their face. United States Postal Service (National Rural Letter Carriers
Assn.), 345 NLRB 1203, 1214 (2005) (contractual provisions granting preferential treatment to
union members in applying for trainer position unlawful) (citations omitted); Vanguard Tours, 30
300 NLRB 250, 253 n.15 (1990) (unlawful for labor contract to provide for pension benefits only
for union members), enfd. 981 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1992). However, as the Supreme Court has
made clear, illegal objects will not be presumed, and the terms of a parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement will not be found unlawful merely because they fail to disclaim all illegal objects.
NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961); see also Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 35
U.S. 667 (1961).
In this case, although the challenged rule does not explicitly single out non-members, the
General Counsel claims that the term “casual” is a proxy for non-member status. However, as
Respondents established at hearing, certain non-casual longshore workers are, like casuals, 40
ineligible for union membership, thus invalidating any automatic equation of the term “casual”
with non-member status. Moreover, the record evidence indicates that union members subject to

31 A union’s breach of its fair representation duty is also deemed a violation of Section 8(b)(2), in that
any arbitrary union action that adversely affects an employee by definition tends to encourage or
discourage union membership. Miranda Fuel, 140 NLRB at 188.
32 The General Counsel also asserts that the Board’s decision in Local 876, 339 NLRB 769 (2003),
supports finding Local 18 liable for Rule 12’s alleged overbreadth. I will address this argument infra.
JD(SF)-32-16
22
the PCLCD are bound by rules, similar to Rule 12, aimed at preventing disruptions of dispatch.
(See Tr. 860–861, 1325, 1648; GC 2 at 85, § 17.125 & 98, § 17.8 and § 17.81.)33 Finally, the
record is devoid of any evidence that Rule 12, implemented approximately 40 years ago, was
devised with an eye towards discriminating against non-members. For these reasons, I cannot
find that Rule 12, on its face, is discriminatory. 5
b. ID Casual Rule 12 as overly broad
I next examine Rule 12 under the Board’s standard for unlawfully overbroad rules. As noted,
supra, even if Rule 12 is found to infringe on individual employees’ Section 7 rights, the rule 10
would remain lawful if Local 18 validly waived those rights. As Respondent PMA correctly
points out, unions have been found to have waived the Section 7 rights of bargaining unit
members, the most common example being a no-strike clause contained in a collective-
bargaining agreement.34 However, a union’s waiver of represented employees’ economic rights
is not comparable to a waiver of those employees’ right to organize (including their right to 15
engage in union dissident conduct). For this reason, the Supreme Court has noted that:
a different rule should obtain where the rights of employees to
exercise their choice of a bargaining representative are involved –
whether to have no bargain representative, or to retain the present 20
one, or to obtain a new one.
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). In other words, no union has the right to
bargain away the right of individual employees to criticize the manner in which it represents
them.35 In this case, PMA argues that, due to the critical importance of timely dispatch in the 25
longshore industry, Rule 12 in fact amounts to a waiver of employees’ right to strike (in that a
concerted interruption of dispatch would have the same result as a strike). The problem with this
argument is that, to the extent that Rule 12 may be interpreted to apply to employees’ conduct in
protest of the Union’s operation of the dispatch hall in favor of its members, Local 18 lacks the
power to waive such rights. For this reason, the PMA’s waiver defense of Rule 12 is rejected.30

33 To the extent that Rule 12’s wording differs materially from that of these provisions, there is no
evidence that this reflects anything more than the more stringent standards to which casuals are held. See
Pacific Maritime Assn., 155 NLRB 1231, 1234 (1965) (applying more stringent standard for elevation
and registration status based on longshore workers’ differing registration classes).
34 See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (a union may “bargain away [an
employee’s] right to strike during the contract term, and his right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line”)
(footnote omitted).
35 As the Court explained, even waivers of individual members’ economic rights, such as the right to
strike, “rest on ‘the premise of fair representation’ and presuppose that the selection of the bargaining
representative ‘remains free.’” 415 U.S. at 325 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280
(1956)).
JD(SF)-32-16
23
In determining whether an employer’s work rules violate Section 8(a)(1), the Board has held
that:
[A]n employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a work
rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the exercise of 5
their Section 7 rights. In determining whether a challenged rule is
unlawful, the Board must, however, give the rule a reasonable
reading. It must refrain from reading particular phrases in
isolation, and it must not presume improper interference with
employee rights. Consistent with the foregoing, our inquiry into 10
whether the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful begins
with the issue of whether the rule explicitly restricts activities
protected by Section 7.... If the rule does not explicitly restrict
activity protected by Section 7, the violation is dependent upon a
showing of one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably 15
construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has
been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB at 646–647 (citing Lafayette Park Hotel, NLRB 20
824, 825–827 (1998), enfd. mem. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). Rules that are ambiguous and
could therefore be interpreted to ban Section 7 conduct are to be construed against the employer;
employees “should not have to decide at their own peril what information is not lawfully subject
to such a prohibition.” Hyundai America Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB 860, 862 (2011). Here,
the rule in question does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activities. Nor is there any evidence that 25
it was either promulgated in response to protected concerted activity, or has been relied on to
punish employees for engaging in protected conduct.36 The question then becomes whether a
reasonable employee would interpret a prohibition on “causing a disturbance” as a restriction on
Section 7 conduct or whether the rule’s wording is so ambiguous that it could reasonably be
interpreted that way. 30
In this regard, it is helpful to read Rule 12 in its context (i.e., as part of a posted list of “Rules
for Identified Casuals”). The list contains rules governing the conduct of the dispatch itself, as
well as grounds for disqualifying workers from participating in the dispatch.37 To the extent that
Rule 12 governs employees’ conduct during the dispatch itself, it actually functions as both rule-35
types, in that it identifies “causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall” a disqualifying condition
for dispatch. I find that, based on the parties’ long practice of enforcing Rule 12 with the yellow-
line in the dispatch hall, casuals would reasonably understand that, as applied during the dispatch
itself: (a) the rule is aimed at protecting the disruption of dispatch; and (b) they are permitted to
engage in protected conduct during the dispatch without being found in violation of Rule 12, as 40
long as they abide by the dispatcher’s order to remain behind the yellow line.
The problem, however, is that Rule 12 does not merely forbid conduct during dispatch, but
rather must be read along with rules listing other conduct disqualifying workers for dispatch (i.e.,

36 As set forth infra, I find that Simisola’s conduct lost the Act’s protection because she repeatedly
interrupted dispatch.
37 The latter-type rules include, inter alia, bans on assault, intoxication and refusing work.
JD(SF)-32-16
24
“refusal to work as directed” and “damage to company property”). Indeed, Rule 12 by its own
terms applies to disturbances at the dispatch hall during non-dispatch and also explicitly
prohibits causing a disturbance outside the dispatch hall in any “job-related area.” It is here,
without the help of a yellow line, that an employee would have be left to ponder whether Rule 12
forbids disrupting the industrial peace at the Port by criticizing Respondents’ joint dispatch 5
process,38 and specifically what conduct would cross that invisible threshold. Would casuals
donning anti-Union shirts or chanting anti-Union slogans as they left their work shift constitute a
“disturbance” sufficient to result in their permanent loss of dispatch privileges? While Local 18
argues that Rule 12 is necessary to maintain production and discipline and PMA argues that it is
merely an extension of the parties’ no-strike provision, these rationales cannot justify leaving 10
employees under such circumstances to decide—at their own peril—whether or not to exercise
their rights under the Act.
Accordingly, I find that, by maintaining Rule 12, the Employer-Respondents are violating
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As for Local 18, I do not find this case analogous to the Local 87615
case cited by the General Counsel, supra, which dealt with a union rather unambiguously
threatening its members with internal union discipline based on their protected conduct. Instead,
I find that Local 18, as the operator of the dispatch hall, has a fiduciary duty to inform the Port’s
ID casuals of the rules governing their dispatch rights and obligations. See Bartenders Local 165
(Nevada Resort), 261 NLRB 420 (1982); Operating Engineers Local 324 (Michigan Chapter, 20
NECA), 226 NLRB 587 (1976). I find that, by maintaining Casual Rule 12, an ambiguous rule
that “would chill the exercise of employees’ Section 7 rights,” Local 18 failed to meet this
responsibility and thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. See Electrical Workers IUE
Local 444 (Paramex Systems), 311 NLRB 1031, 1040–1041 (1993) (union violates duty of fair
representation by maintaining ambiguous union security clause).25
2. Section 8(a)(3) and (4) allegations against PMA and SSA
To determine whether an employer’s adverse employment action violates either Section
8(a)(3) or 8(a)(4), the Board applies the analysis articulated in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 30
(1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982); approved in NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). To establish a violation of Section
8(a)(3), “the General Counsel must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an
employee’s union activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse
action against the employee.” Caravan Knight Facilities Mgmt., 362 NLRB No. 196, slip op. at 35
2 (2015) (citing Wright Line at 1089). For purposes of Section 8(a)(4), the General Counsel
must demonstrate initially that the employee participated or gave testimony in Board or Board-
related proceedings.39 In either case, if the General Counsel makes the required showing, the
burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action even in the
absence of the employee’s union activity. Id. 40

38 See Glen Berry Mfrs., Inc., 169 NLRB 799, 803 (1968) (“[a]n employee may disturb the peace and
tranquility of a plant by disrupting an existing harmonious relationship between Company and Union, and
in that sense an employee who is having trouble with the Union is in trouble with the Company also”).
39 The Board applies the elements of the Wright Line standard to alleged violations of Section 8(a)(4).
See Newcor Bay City Division of Newcor, Inc., 351 NLRB 1034, n.4 (2007).
JD(SF)-32-16
25
a. Allegations regarding Simisola
The General Counsel contends that Respondents PMA and SSA, through the SJPLRC,
agreed to suspend Simisola because she engaged in protected conduct, including filing and 5
maintaining individual grievances alleging favoritism and discrimination in the 2014 registration
process and filing Board charges regarding dispatch hall operations. PMA and SSA argue that
the General Counsel has failed to demonstrate any unlawful animus against Simisola and
additionally that she lost the Act’s protection by disrupting dispatch. It is undisputed that
Simisola engaged in protected activity as alleged; there is no dispute that Respondents SSA and 10
PMA were aware of this activity. I find, however, that the General Counsel failed to establish
animus on the part of either PMA or SSA towards this protected conduct.
The General Counsel offers no credible evidence of animus against Simisola by the
Employer-Respondents. Indeed, the only evidence he points to is their alleged failure to conduct 15
an independent investigation of her alleged misconduct. (See GC Br. at 16, n.14 (citing cases)).
I find this argument misplaced, in that the undisputed evidence reflects that, on both April 29 and
30, SSA’s Terminal Manager Patalano did just that. On the 29th, he interviewed Simisola and
confirmed that she understood the yellow-line rule. The following day, it appears that Simisola
had already left by the time Patalano arrived, but he did interview Deed and Valdez as to what 20
had occurred. Moreover, Simisola was given ample opportunity to present her version of events
before the JPLRC, which rescheduled its hearing to fit her schedule. Under the circumstances,
the Employer-Respondents’ lack of animus is fatal to the General Counsel’s prima facie case
under Wright Line.
25
The General Counsel also argues that Simisola’s suspension violated the Act because it was
based on: (a) her conduct on April 29 and 30, which the General Counsel claims was Section 7
conduct; and (b) Respondents’ application of ID Casual Rule 12, which I have found to be
unlawfully overbroad. As explained below, I find merit in neither argument.
30
(i) Section 7 conduct as basis for the suspension
It is undisputed that the asserted reason for suspending Simisola was her conduct at
Respondents’ joint dispatch hall on April 29 and 30. The General Counsel alleges that this
conduct (i.e., her attempts to photograph dispatch logs), was protected conduct. Unless that 35
conduct is shown to be so opprobrious as to cost her the protection of the Act, the General
Counsel argues, her suspension amounts to unlawful retaliation.
It is well established that opposition to union officers or policies, sometimes referred to as
“dissident activities” are protected by Section 7 of the Act. Sheet Metal Workers Local 16 40
(Parker Sheet Metal), 275 NLRB 867 (1985). However, a hiring hall user’s otherwise protected
conduct in “policing” the operation of a hiring hall, including raising complaints about the hall’s
operation and demanding access to referral records, may lose the Act’s protection where the user
acts in a disorderly or disruptive manner. Teamsters Local 87, 273 NLRB 1838 (1985). In this
regard, the General Counsel compares Simisola’s relatively “civilized” protest (i.e., repeatedly 45
demanding to see the dispatch sheets and refusing to leave the hall) with cases in which hiring
hall users are found to have lost the Act’s protection based on more extreme and confrontational
behavior, including yelling and cursing at dispatchers. But a polite disruption of dispatch has the
JD(SF)-32-16
26
same effect as rude one; in either case, the Board has made clear that an employees’ right to
hiring hall job referral records must give way to the need for an orderly dispatch. Electrical
Workers Local 3, 331 NLRB 1498 (2000). It logically follows that even a relatively polite
disruption of dispatch to review or photograph dispatch records may be considered unprotected.
5
Here, the credible evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Simisola’s conduct was disruptive
to the dispatch process; after being explicitly instructed not to interrupt dispatch on April 29,
Simisola came back and did just that fewer than 24 hours later. I credit Respondents’ witnesses,
who made clear that Simisola’s suspension was not based on her request for dispatch records, but
rather on the disruptive manner in which she did so. As such, I find that her suspension was not 10
based on protected conduct.
(ii) Rule 12’s impact on Simisola’s suspension
The Board has held that that discipline imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule is 15
unlawful. See Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 112 n.3 (2004). This rule,
referred to as the “Double Eagle” rule, recognizes an exception where the employer can show
that the disciplined employee’s conduct actually interfered with her own work or that of others,
and that this, and “not simply the violation of the overbroad rule” was the cited reason of the
discipline. The Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB 409, 412 (2011) (citing Miller’s Discount 20
Department Stores, 198 NLRB 281 (1972), enfd. 496 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974)). I find that
Simisola’s suspension qualifies for this exception. The testimonial and documentary evidence
amply demonstrate that Simisola’s was cited and penalized for disrupting Deed’s dispatching
work and costing him and others their longshore work.40 Based on this showing, Respondents
were within their rights to discipline Simisola despite Rule 12’s invalidity.25
While the Board now recognizes another exception to the Double Eagle rule for employees
who engage in conduct “wholly distinct from activity that falls within the ambit of Section 7,” I
cannot find Simisola’s interruption of dispatch distinct from her otherwise protected request for
dispatch records. Put another way, simply because Simisola’s conduct lost the Act’s protection, 30
this case is not one in which an employee violates an unlawful rule in the absence of any
connection to Sec. 7 conduct whatsoever. Cf. Continental Group, 357 NLRB at 413 (employer
lawfully terminated employee who violated an overly broad off-duty access rule because, rather
than engaging in protected conduct while on the employer’s property, the employee was in fact
sleeping and living there during his off-duty hours). 35
Based on the above, I recommend dismissal of the Section 8(a)(3) and (4) allegations based
on Simisola’s suspension.

40 That Respondents were not simply mechanically applying Rule 12 is further demonstrated by the
fact that the rule, on its face, dictates that an infraction “shall” result in the permanent revocation of
dispatch rights, not the lesser suspension she actually received.
JD(SF)-32-16
27
b. Allegations regarding Stubbe
The General Counsel alleges that Stubbe’s discharge was caused, at least in part, by
Respondents PMA and SSA in that they (along with Local 18) failed to vacate the arbitration
award against him. PMA and SSA argue that, as mere participants in the 13.2 proceeding, they 5
cannot be held accountable for its results and that, in any event, there is no evidence that they
harbored unlawful animus against Stubbe. As a preliminary matter, I do not agree that the
Employer-Respondents cannot, as a matter of law, be held responsible for Stubbe’s discharge
merely because it resulted from an arbitration process. While the parties had agreed that Section
13.2 arbitration awards would be final, technically nothing prevented them from revising or 10
relaxing this rule in a particular case. In fact, as discussed below, PMA sought to vacate a 13.2
award on at least one occasion.
Moving on to the Wright Line test, I note that, while Stubbe is claimed by the General
Counsel to have been the “ringleader” of the 2014 registration grievances, no witness testified to 15
that effect. That said, there is no dispute that Stubbe engaged in protected activity by filing his
own 2014 registration grievance or that Respondents SSA and PMA were aware of this activity.
However, I find that the General Counsel has failed to demonstrate animus against Stubbe based
on his proven protected conduct. As with Simisola, the General Counsel argues that the
Employer-Respondents’ failure to conduct an independent investigation demonstrates animus. I 20
disagree. While an employer’s failure to investigate alleged misconduct prior to issuing
discipline has certainly been found to suggest animus, such a rationale misses the mark where, as
here, the discriminatee’s alleged misconduct becomes the subject of a hearing before an impartial
arbitrator. SSA and PMA, in other words, did not simply “seize” on X’s complaints regarding
Stubbe’s conduct, but rather allowed him to present his side of the story in a process arguably 25
more thorough and fair than a one-sided, employer investigation.
With respect to Stubbe’s hearing, the General Counsel claims that Robinson’s request that
the arbitrator impose a discharge remedy demonstrated animus against him, because PMA’s role
in such hearings is to be impartial. Based on Robinson’s credible testimony, however, I find that 30
it is not uncommon for PMA—on behalf of a member-employer—to weigh in at 13.2 hearings
involving alleged coworker harassment. Moreover, it logically flows that an employer faced
with admitted misconduct and a second-time offender such as Stubbe would act to protect its
interests by taking affirmative action. The General Counsel also argues that Robinson “falsely
represented” to Arbitrator Holmes that a specific provision of the PCLCD (Section 17.86) 35
required a more severe penalty to be assessed against Stubbe based on his status as an ID casual.
However, the record actually indicates that Robinson simply cited the provision in question as
support for the proposition that, throughout the parties’ grievance machinery, casuals are
subjected to heightened discipline for offenses. In any event, there is simply no evidence to
indicate that he did so based on any protected conduct on Stubbe’s part.40
The General Counsel argues that the discharge penalty assessed Stubbe—advocated for by
Robinson on behalf of the Employer-Respondents—itself suggests animus. First, the General
Counsel argues that I should consider as “comparators” first-time 13.2 offenders who received
less severe discipline than Stubbe. In this regard, I adhere to my ruling on the record that such 45
individuals are not proper comparators. See Diamond Electric Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 857, 858
(2006) (ALJ erred in finding disparate treatment, because, unlike his proposed comparators,
discharged employee had a history of discipline); Hoffman Fuel Co. of Bridgeport, 309 NLRB
JD(SF)-32-16
28
327, 329 (1992) (no disparate treatment found, because other employees did not have
disciplinary history like the discharged employee). The General Counsel next argues that I find
animus based on the fact that the 13.2 arbitration process, on another occasion, resulted in a
lesser penalty for an accused’s second violation. However, this lesser penalty—a 2-week
suspension—was handed down not by Arbitrator Jan Holmes, but by another area arbitrator, 5
significantly detracting from its value as comparative discipline. Nor is there any indication that
the accused in those cases, identified in the record as “Mr. A” did not himself engage in
protected conduct. The General Counsel also suggests that I consider the facts of a third case,
Pacific Maritime Assoc., 358 NLRB 1184 (2012). However, as that decision was invalidated by
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), I find it inappropriate to do so.41 For all of these 10
reasons, I find that the General Counsel’s proffered “comparator evidence” is insufficient to
establish that Stubbe was treated differently based on his protected conduct.

Finally, the General Counsel argues that the Employer-Respondents demonstrated animus
against Stubbe by failing to vacate the arbitration award against him. While it is true that PMA 15
previously sought to vacate a Section 13.2 award based on its concern that it might be viewed as
unlawful retaliation against the accused, there has been no showing that Stubbe’s case presented
such a situation. Unlike the accused in that case, Stubbe’s admittedly inappropriate remarks to a
female longshore worker are not even arguably protected by Section 7, and thus it would not be
logical or appropriate for the PMA to propose compromising X’s right to be free of sexual 20
harassment. There is simply no evidence that, following Stubbe’s unsuccessful appeal of
Arbitrator Holmes’ decision, SSA and PMA’s implementation of the penalty she ordered was
motivated by anything other than a genuine concern for the liability his conduct might cause
them as employers. For these reasons, I find that the Employer-Respondents did not violate
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act with respect to Stubbe and recommend the dismissal of these 25
allegations.
c. Allegations regarding Couch
The General Counsel contends that the Employer-Respondents agreed, through the SJPLRC,30
to suspend Couch because he engaged in protected conduct, including filing a 2014 registration
grievance. As with the other discriminatees, the General Counsel alleges that the Employer-
Respondents demonstrated animus against Couch by failing to independently investigate his
alleged misconduct. This argument has little force as applied to Couch. The credible record
evidence establishes that Couch admitted to Arbitrator Holmes that he knew he was supposed to 35
be at Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing, but chose to work at his truck driving job instead. Asked by the
arbitrator to design an appropriate penalty for his nonappearance, Respondents agreed that he
should be allowed to appear before the JPLRC to explain himself before any penalty was
imposed. As such, not only was there very little to “investigate” with respect to Couch’s
nonappearance, but as members of the JPLRC, the Respondent-Employers demonstrated a 40

41 The General Counsel argues in his posthearing brief that I should take an adverse inference based
on the PMA’s failure to produce additional cases involving second offenses of 13.2. Regardless of the
merits of that argument, I find that the General Counsel waived it on the record when, after a lengthy
debate over documents offered by PMA to rebut such an inference, he stated, “I will not make that
argument. I waive any such argument.” (Tr. 2144, ll. 5–7) I accepted that representation and hold the
General Counsel to it now. See Station Casinos, LLC, 358 NLRB 1556, 1576 (2012). For the same
reason, I deny the General Counsel’s Motion to Strike, filed on June 3, 2016, as moot.
JD(SF)-32-16
29
concern for his internal “due process” rights inconsistent with discriminatory intent. Because the
General Counsel failed to adduce any additional evidence indicating that the Employer-
Respondents took issue with Couch’s protected conduct, I find, as with the other discriminatees,
that the General Counsel failed to establish the element of animus necessary to establish his
prima facie case. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of the Section 8(a)(3) allegations based 5
on Couch’s suspension.
3. Allegations against ILWU Local 18
The General Counsel alleges that Local 18 is responsible for the suspensions of Simisola and 10
Couch, as well as the removal of Stubbe from the ID casual dispatch list, because it caused these
actions in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, and violated its duty of fair representation with
respect to each of the discriminatees in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). With respect to
Simisola, the General Counsel additionally alleges that the Union independently violated its duty
of fair representation by denying her access to dispatch logs. What follows is a discussion of the 15
two, above-referenced statutory mechanisms for addressing union conduct that leads to discipline
of a bargaining unit member and an analysis of the General Counsel’s allegations with respect to
each discriminatee.
a. Section 8(b)(1)(A) and the duty of fair representation20
The Act prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory representative capacity,
from taking action against any employee upon considerations or classifications which are
irrelevant, invidious, or unfair. Miranda Fuel, 140 NLRB 181, 185 (1962), enf. denied 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). The duty requires a union to “represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-25
unit members,” regardless of whether they are union members, Electrical Workers (IBEW) v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979) (emphasis added), and to do so “without hostility or discrimination
toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). Unions must serve members and
non-members alike. Electrical Workers Local 2088 (Federal Elec. Corp.), 218 NLRB 396 30
(1975) (violation of duty found in processing union member’s grievance before nonmember’s
similar grievance). Likewise, failing to adequately represent an employee because he engaged in
conduct considered “disloyal” to the union constitutes a violation of the duty. NLRB v. Pacific
Coast Utilities Serv., Inc., 638 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1980).
35
In interpreting the duty of fair representation, however, the Board recognizes that unions
must enjoy an amount of discretion in serving their represented employees. Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 631 (Vosburg Equipment, Inc.), 340 NLRB 881,
881 (2003). As the Supreme Court has stated, “[a] wide range of reasonableness must be
allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to 40
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.” Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). “Thus it is not every act of disparate treatment or negligent
conduct which is proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A), but only those which, because motivated by
hostile, invidious, irrelevant, or unfair considerations, may be characterized as ‘arbitrary
conduct.’” Steelworkers Local Union No. 2869 (Kaiser Steel Corp.), 239 NLRB 982, 982 (1978).45
It is well established that a union’s duty of fair representation extends to its operation of an
exclusive hiring hall; where a union “causes, attempts to cause, or prevents an employee from
JD(SF)-32-16
30
being hired or otherwise impairs the job status of an employee,” the Board draws an inference of
unlawful coercion, which may be rebutted if the union shows its actions were justified. See
Laborers Local 872, 359 NLRB No. 117, slip op. at 3, n.9 (2013) (citing Stage Employees IATSE
Local 412 (Various Employers), 312 NLRB 123, 127 (1993)). However, the Board also
recognizes a union’s 5
legitimate interest in maintaining order at its hiring hall against
disruptions by members; in retaining its members’ trust in the
fairness of the operation; [and] in protecting its representatives
from unwarranted abuse in the course of their duties….10
New York City Taxi Drivers, 231 NLRB 965, 967 (1977). Thus, when a represented employee
engages in protected activity—such as protesting hiring hall practices—the legitimate interests of
her bargaining representative in representing its constituency must be balanced against the
interests of the individual dissident. Longshoremen Assn. Local 341, 254 NLRB 334, 337 15
(1981). Ultimately, to show unlawful retaliation for protesting hiring hall practices, “there must
be a showing that the discipline was because [the employee] was exercising Section 7 rights and
not because of the manner in which they were exercised.” Teamsters Local 87, 273 NLRB at
1849.
20
The duty of fair representation also includes an obligation to provide hiring hall users access
to job referral lists to determine whether their referral rights are being protected; this duty is
breached when the union arbitrarily denies such a request. A refusal to provide hiring hall
records will be deemed arbitrary unless the union can show the refusal was necessary to
vindicate legitimate union interests. See Operating Engineers Local 12 (Nevada Contractors 25
Assn.), 344 NLRB 1066, 1068 (2005); Operating Engineers Local 3 (Kiewit Pacific Co.), 324
NLRB 14, fn. 1 (1997); Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employers Assn.), 317 NLRB 1099,
1105 (1995). However, not every request to review or photograph dispatch records is protected,
and under certain circumstances, the time and manner in which a request for such records is
made may deem a union’s denial reasonable and non-arbitrary. Electrical Workers Local 3, 30
supra.
b. Section 8(b)(2)
As the Board has stated, “[a]n 8(b)(2) violation can be established by direct evidence that the 35
union sought to have the employer discriminate, or by sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support a reasonable inference that the union requested that the employer discriminate.”
International Operating Engineers, Local 12 (Kiewet Industrial), 337 NLRB at 545. Even what
appears to be an “innocent act” by the union will support an 8(b)(2) violation, if it is shown that
the union knew that action would produce the desired result. Quality Mechanical, Inc., 307 40
NLRB 64, 66 (1992). For example, in Paperworkers Local 1048 (Jefferson Smurfit Corp.), a
union was found to have violated Section 8(b)(2) when one of its officials, in retaliation for
protected activity, reported to the employer that a dissident member had made racial slur.
Although the official did not specifically request that member be disciplined, it was sufficient
that he knew the employer imposed severe discipline against those who engaged in racial 45
harassment. 323 NLRB 1042 (1997). There must, however, “be some evidence of union
conduct; it is not sufficient that the employer’s conduct might please the union.” Avon Roofing
JD(SF)-32-16
31
& Sheet Metal Co., 312 NLRB 499 (1993); Toledo World Terminals, 289 NLRB 670, 673
(1988).
In determining whether a union has violated Section 8(b)(2), the Board has applied both the
analytical framework set forth in Wright Line, supra, as well as its duty-of-fair-representation5
framework. See Caravan Knight, 362 NLRB No. 196 (2015). As noted, under the latter
analysis, whenever a labor organization causes an adverse action to be taken against an
employee, “there is a rebuttable presumption that it acted unlawfully because by such conduct it
demonstrates its power to affect the employees’ livelihood in so dramatic a way as to encourage
union membership among the employees.” Id. (citing Acklin Stamping, 351 NLRB 1263, 126310
(2007); Bang Printing, supra at 673. This presumption, however, may be overcome if the union
demonstrates that its actions were taken “in good faith, based on rational considerations, and
were linked in some way to its need effectively to represent its constituency as a whole.” Id.
(citing Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons, Local No. 299 (Wyoming Contractors Assn.),
257 NLRB 1386, 1395 (1981)).15
As noted, the Board has also analyzed 8(b)(2) allegations under its Wright Line standard,
whereby
[T]he General Counsel must establish that [the employee’s] . . . 20
protected concerted activity was a substantial or motivating factor
in the Respondent’s adverse employment actions. . . . If the
General Counsel makes the required initial showing, the burden
then shifts to the Respondent to prove, as an affirmative defense,
that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of 25
[the employee’s] protected activity.
Ironworkers Local 340 (Consumers Energy Co.), 347 NLRB 578, 579 (2006).42
c. Allegations regarding Simisola30
The General Counsel contends that Respondent Local 18 violated its duty of fair
representation when, on April 29 and 30, 2015, dispatcher Deed refused to permit Simisola to
examine and copy the dispatch sheets at Respondents’ joint dispatch hall. The General Counsel
further contends that Local 18, by raising complaints about Simisola’s conduct at the dispatch 35
hall, caused PMA and SSA (through the JPLRC) to suspend her. According to the General
Counsel, Local 18 officials were motivated by animus against Simisola based on her protected
and dissident conduct, including filing and appealing a grievance regarding the 2014 registration
process, as well as based on her filing Board charges against Local 18. Local 18 denies
harboring animus toward Simisola and maintains that any action it took against her was 40
motivated by its legitimate interest in protecting dispatch hall operations. The Union
additionally argues that dispatcher Deed was privileged to withhold the dispatch sheets sought by

42 Regardless of which theory is employed, where an 8(b)(2) violation is proven, a derivative
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) will also be found, in that a union’s causation of adverse action against an
employee necessarily constitutes restraint and coercion of that individual’s exercise of his Section 7
rights. Town & Country Supermarkets, 340 NLRB 1410, 1411 (2004); Postal Workers (APWU), 350
NLRB 219, 222 (2007).
JD(SF)-32-16
32
Simisola because she requested them in a manner unprotected by the Act. As set forth below,
I agree with Local 18.
(i) Refusal to provide Simisola access to dispatch logs
5
As mentioned, a union violates its duty of representation by arbitrarily denying a worker’s
request for hiring hall records. See Operating Engineers Local 12 (Nevada Contractors Assn.)
and Carpenters Local 102 (Millwright Employers Assn.), supra. However, the Board has made it
clear that, where such a request is made in a disruptive manner in the middle of dispatch, it is not
arbitrary for the union to deny it. Electrical Workers Local 3 (Fairfield Electric), 331 NLRB 10
1498 (2000). Relied on by Local 18, Fairfield Electric involved facts quite similar to those of
the instant case, in that a hiring hall user sought during the dispatch process a list of names
corresponding with the referral numbers on a posted out-of-work list. The dispatcher told him
that he “did not want him to look at the book [with the names] because he was in the middle of
making referrals.” Id. at 1500. The Board agreed with the administrative law judge that the 15
charging party did not have a statutory right at that particular time and circumstance to access
records that the dispatcher was using during dispatch and, correspondingly, that it was not
arbitrary for the union to deny the request.
The General Counsel argues that Fairfield Electric is not controlling because the dispatcher 20
in that case was “working on” the very documents requested and affirmatively told the worker
that he could inspect the documents at a later time. I find these distinctions, to the extent they
exist, inconsequential. In this regard, I credit Deed’s testimony that acceding to Simisola’s
request would have further delayed his dispatch and find it irrelevant whether he was literally
working on the document she wanted to see. Moreover, I do not see any material difference 25
between telling an employee that they must wait until dispatch is complete to inspect records
(which Deed did tell Simisola) and announcing what time that would be, as did the dispatcher in
Fairfield Electric. The principle recognized by the Board in Fairfield Electric applies with equal
force here: there is no recognized right, in the middle of dispatch, to inspect or copy dispatch
documents on demand. As such, I find that, based on the time and manner in which Simisola 30
requested dispatch documents, the Union did not fail or refuse to provide them in violation of its
duty of fair representation.
(ii) Simisola’s suspension did not violate the Act.
35
As noted, the Board analyzes allegations of Section 8(b)(2) under both a duty of fair
representation and a Wright Line analysis. With respect to the duty of fair representation
analysis, the record evidence amply demonstrates that the Union, by bringing Simisola’s conduct
to management’s attention, issuing her citations in coordination with SSA’s employer
complaints, took action aimed at causing Simisola’s suspension; indeed, Local 18 does not 40
contend otherwise. As such, there is a rebuttable presumption that Local 18 violated Section
8(b)(2). I find, however, that the Union rebutted that presumption by demonstrating that it was
motivated by its legitimate interest in running a timely and orderly dispatch, a critical function
benefitting its entire constituency. Local 18’s lack of animus is likewise dispositive of this
8(a)(2) allegation when held to the Wright Line standard.45
While it is true that the appeal of Simisola’s 2014 registration grievance was pending as of
her suspension date, over a year had passed since she filed that grievance, and the record is
JD(SF)-32-16
33
completely devoid of evidence that any representative of Local 18 harbored animus against
Simisola based on her grievance filing or any of her other protected conduct, for that matter.43
While the General Counsel claims that Local 18 attempted to limit Simisola’s access to the
dispatch sheets by changing its practice of leaving them at the dispatch podium, there is no
evidence that this was anything other than the result of complaints about privacy by other 5
employees. Likewise, I am not persuaded by the General Counsel’s argument that dispatcher
Deed demonstrated animus against Simisola by failing to inform her affirmatively that she had
alternative means to access the dispatch logs; in fact, he made it clear that she would simply have
to wait until he had completed dispatching before reviewing the sheets, and on one occasion, he
actually acquiesced, stopped his dispatching, and showed her where she stood on the day’s 10
dispatch sheet. That Simisola had previously been warned about disrupting dispatch, that Deed’s
complaints about her conduct were contemporaneous with that conduct and that Local 18 took
action against Simisola (by issuing her a lesser penalty than that prescribed by the joint dispatch
rules) only after she had repeated the same disruptive conduct twice within 13 hours further
convince me that the Union acted in good faith. Finally, contrary to the General Counsel, I am 15
not persuaded that the “flurry” of phone calls between Respondents’ representatives at the time
of Simisola’s activities on April 29 and 30 evidences anything more than the good-faith
investigation he claims never occurred with respect to her conduct.
Accordingly, the complaint allegations against Local 18 regarding Simisola’s suspension are 20
dismissed.
d. Allegations regarding Stubbe
The General Counsel alleges that Local 18 caused Respondents PMA and SSA (via the 25
JPLRC) to remove Stubbe permanently from the ID Casual list, effectively discharging him in
violation of Section 8(b)(2), and that its actions also violated its duty of fair representation to
Stubbe. The General Counsel relies on several theories to support his allegations, each of which
is premised on the assertion that Stubbe was considered the “ringleader” of the 2014 registration
grievances. The General Counsel asserts that: (a) Local 18 officials caused X to file the 13.2 30
grievance; (b) Deed knowingly added false statements to her grievance in order to amplify the
allegations against Stubbe; (c) before interviewing Stubbe or alerting him to the charges against
him, Local 18 officials “prejudged” him, concluded he was guilty and communicated this to the
PMA; (d) Farley failed to adequately represent Stubbe at his 13.2 hearing and refused to file an
appeal on his behalf and (e) Local 18 implemented the area arbitrator’s decision discharging 35
Stubbe when it could have elected not to do so.
Local 18 argues that it provided Stubbe with adequate representation by Local 18, and that it
neither solicited or amplified X’s allegations. With respect to the General Counsel’s claim that
its officials “prejudged” Stubbe, Local 18 avers that, only after Stubbe had admitted to the 40
conduct alleged by X, did Union officials conclude that he had violated 13.2 for purposes of
providing X interim relief. Finally, Local 18, like the Employer-Respondents, argues that the
parties’ implementation of Arbitrator Holmes’ award was not discretionary but mandated by the
13.2 guidelines.
45

43 As noted, infra, I do not credit the testimony offered by the General Counsel’s witnesses describing
Union president Campbell threatening a group of 2014 registration grievants with a loss of work.
JD(SF)-32-16
34
(i) Credibility
Throughout the hearing, Stubbe’s testimony and conduct did not convince me of his
reliability as a witness. His recollection was frequently spotty and he admitted to having
problems with his memory. By way of example, on the fourth day of the hearing, he was asked 5
if he recalled certain testimony he had given the first day (5 calendar days earlier); he responded
that he “did not recall much of what happened” on that day. More significantly, his memory at
times appeared to fail when he perceived that a lack of recollection would work to his advantage.
For example, he claimed not to be aware of the practice of posting a coworker as a “signal” not
to enter the bathroom (although he had previously admitted such awareness in the 13.2 hearing). 10
(Tr. 725) On other occasions, he appeared overly coy when answering straightforward
questions.44 For these reasons, when in conflict with the accounts given by other, more reliable
witnesses (such as Farley), I give Stubbe’s testimony little weight.
(ii) The General Counsel’s prima facie case15
As noted, to the extent that Local 18 “caused” Stubbe’s discharge, it is presumed to have
acted unlawfully, and it is not necessary to show that the Union knew with certainty that its
actions would be successful. See Caravan Knight, supra at 5 (union’s report of physical threat
violated Section 8(a)(2) where union had reason to believe that “in all likelihood” it would lead 20
to dissident’s discharge); Town & Country Supermarkets, supra at 1430 (union caused discharge
when it reported employee for threat of physical harm knowing employer’s history of
discharging employees for such threats); Paperworkers Local 1048, (Jefferson Smurfit
Corporation), supra at 1044 (union attempted to cause discipline when it reported employee for
racial harassment to employer with a policy of strong discipline for violation of rules against 25
racial harassment). In this case, Local 18’s taking the position that Stubbe was guilty of a second
sexual harassment offense made it highly unlikely that Respondents PMA and SSA (as potential
defendants subject to Title VII liability for not addressing X’s complaints) would take a different
position and even more unlikely that an arbitrator would overrule both parties and exonerate him.
Thus, simply because Stubbe’s discharge was not a “sure thing,” Local 18 could be guilty of 30
causing Respondents PMA and SSA (albeit through an arbitration process) to strip him of his
dispatch privileges. Thus, because Local 18 took actions that ultimately resulted in the
implementation of Arbitrator Holmes’ award, it is presumed that its actions were unlawful.
I also find that the General Counsel met his prima facie burden under the Wright Line35
standard. While there is no record evidence to indicate that Stubbe was, in fact, considered the
“driving force” behind the 2014 grievances, it is undisputed that he did file his own grievance
and additionally that he had at least one conflict with Local 18 president Campbell at some time
in the past. Moreover, while Stubbe’s memory appeared to be quite foggy on some points, I
credit his recollection that dispatcher Schaffer told him, prior to the incident with Ms. X, that he 40
was “making enemies” at the Port. While the context Stubbe put this statement was undoubtedly
confusing, that it went unrebutted by Local 18 leads me to conclude that Stubbe’s dissident
conduct was not held in high regard by the Union, which provides circumstantial evidence of
animus against him.
45

44 For example, when asked by Local 18’s counsel if there were any witnesses he wanted to testify at
his 13.2 hearing who were not called, he replied, “I’d have to think about that for a while.”
JD(SF)-32-16
35
(iii) Local 18’s burden to explain its actions towards Stubbe
As noted, the burden next shifts to Local 18 to demonstrate that it had a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for role in X’s grievance against Stubbe (under Wright Line) and that
its actions were taken “in good faith, based on rational considerations, and were linked in some 5
way to its need effectively to represent its constituency as a whole” (pursuant to its duty of fair
representation). See Caravan Knight, supra at 5.
I find that the Union met these burdens by establishing, by a preponderance of the credible
evidence, that it was motivated by a genuine belief that Stubbe had repeatedly engaged in sexual 10
harassment at the Port. There is no serious dispute that effectively responding to workplace
harassment is squarely encompassed within the category of conduct deemed “necessary to the
effective performance of its function of representing its constituency,” even when both accuser
and alleged harasser are bargaining unit employees. See Graphic Communications International
Union, Local 1-M (Bang Printing), supra at 673 (citing Operating Engineers Local 18, supra.) 15
Indeed, Respondents’ 13.2 procedures appear devised to accommodate the inherent conflicts
posed by such a situation, by allowing both the grievant and the accused to choose either a union
officer or a representative of their own choosing. I credit Local 18’s witness Campbell who—
like PMA’s Robinson—testified frankly about the potential liability that would be created by
allowing Stubbe, a repeat 13.2 offender, to continue to work at the Port. Local 18’s good-faith 20
concern satisfies the burden under both the Wright Line and duty-of-fair-representation standards
and shifts the burden to the General Counsel to demonstrate that this asserted reason is
pretextual.
(iv) The General Counsel’s arguments as to pretext25
The General Counsel offers a number of pretext arguments. However, none of his theories
regarding the circumstances leading to Stubbe’s discharge was borne out by the credible record
evidence. First of all, General Counsel’s bare assertion that, but for the Union’s encouragement,
X would not have filed her 13.2 grievance went unsupported by the record; as X herself credibly 30
testified, she made the decision alone and under no pressure from Campbell or Farley. The
question remains whether any action taken by Local 18 officials in preparing or handling her
grievance was aimed at retaliating against Stubbe as a Union dissident.
According to the General Counsel, Deed added false statements to X’s grievance form 35
regarding the “bathroom incident.” (GC Br. at 13) Specifically, while X testified that Couch
told Deed “there’s someone in there,” Deed added to the narrative portion of the grievance that
Couch had prefaced this statement by saying, “be careful.” It is certainly true that the Board has
found Section 8(b)(2) violated where a union official reports a union dissident’s misconduct in
an exaggerated or “amplified” manner that causes the employer to discipline the employee. See, 40
e.g., Caravan Knight, supra; Security, Police & Fire Professionals of America Local 444, 360
NLRB No. 57 (2014). In this case, however, I credit Deed’s testimony that he took down, as
best as he could, X’s actual words. That he may have “spelled out” what Couch communicated
(i.e., adding the words, “don’t go in there”) to me seems more stylistic than amplifying. The
point was that, as Couch himself testified before the arbitrator, he warned Stubbe not to enter the 45
restroom because a woman was present. I do not find that Deed’s editorializing about this detail
rises to the level of an “amplification” aimed at causing his discipline.
JD(SF)-32-16
36
I take special issue with the General Counsel’s claim that Local 18 pronounced Stubbe
“guilty” before even notifying him that he had been accused of harassment. By my reading of
the record, Farley clearly and credibly testified that prior to the December 20 JPLRC meeting at
which the Union offered its assessment of Stubbe’s conduct, Stubbe admitted to both Farley and
Campbell that he had, in fact, committed the conduct of which he was accused.45 This 5
admission, Farley explained, convinced him that Stubbe was, in fact, likely to be found guilty of
a second 13.2 violation, warranting interim relief for X. (Tr. 2112)46
Nor can I find fault in Local 18 deciding that Farley, who had significant experience in
defending 13.2 grievances, was the best representative for Stubbe. Despite the fact that he was 10
defending a repeat harasser who showed little remorse for his conduct, Farley spent many hours
preparing for Stubbe’s hearing.47 The arbitration hearing transcript as a whole suggests that
Stubbe presented to the arbitrator as an unremorseful and unsympathetic accused. Nonetheless,
Farley made procedural arguments, as well as arguments for leniency, on Stubbe’s behalf.
Under the circumstances, I cannot find that Farley’s representation of Stubbe, or his failure to 15
appeal the arbitrator’s order, was either arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory. See Fountain v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (union’s refusal to process what it
considered a meritless case not arbitrary but rather “most reasonable and in fact essential to the
grievance and arbitration system”) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191, supra).
20
Accordingly, the complaint allegations against Local 18 regarding Stubbe’s discharge are
dismissed.
e. Allegations regarding Couch
25
Following Couch’s failure to appear at Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing, the area arbitrator ordered the
JPLRC to fashion an appropriate penalty for his nonappearance. While there is no dispute that
Couch in fact failed to appear at the hearing (as noted, supra, he ended up testifying via
telephone), the parties disagree as to how and why this came to be. Essentially, the General
Counsel alleges that Local 18’s Farley misled Couch into thinking that he would not have to 30
appear at the hearing and then seized on his nonappearance as a pretext to discipline him for his
protected, dissident conduct. Local 18 denies this version of events, and additionally argues that
it only agreed to the discipline in question (a loss of 14 shifts, with 7 suspended pending further
misconduct), after being instructed by the arbitrator to formulate an appropriate penalty for
Couch’s failure to appear. 35

45 While the General Counsel suggests that Campbell somehow “tricked” Stubbe during this
conversation by not disclosing he was in fact representing X, there is again no evidence to support such a
claim. Farley clearly recalled Campbell disclosing his representative status, and Stubbe simply could not
recall whether he mentioned it or not.
46 I note that the complaint does not allege that the Union violated its duty of fair representation in
failing to disclose to Stubbe its preliminary determination regarding his guilt. In any event, I find this
case distinguishable from one in which a union representative affirmatively supplies substantive evidence
of a represented employee’s guilt to an employer. See, e.g., Caravan Knight, 362 NLRB No. 196, slip op.
at 8 (2015).
47 The assertion that Farley somehow attempted to “sabotage” Stubbe by deliberately having him
arrive late for the hearing is simply not compelling; I credit Farley’s testimony that he made an honest
mistake about the starting time.
JD(SF)-32-16
37
I agree with Local 18. First, the record as a whole indicates that Couch knew well that he
was expected to appear at the hearing, and that Local 18 made no effort to “sand bag” him into
not showing. Farley and Couch each told Couch that his testimony would be required, and, as
noted, Couch’s account appeared untidily refashioned to excuse his nonappearance. The General
Counsel’s remaining witnesses (i.e., Couch’s family and girlfriend) did little to shed light on 5
what really happened; in an apparent effort to exonerate Couch, they contradicted themselves, as
well as Couch himself. Thus, insofar as the General Counsel claims that Local 18 “caused”
Couch’s discipline by engineering his nonappearance, I find that the credible evidence cannot
support such a claim under either Section 8(b)(2) or Section 8(b)(1)(A).
10
I next examine whether the Union’s role in determining a remedy for Couch’s nonappearance
amount to violated either Section 8(b)(1)(A) or (2) of the Act. Applying the Wright Line
standard, there is no dispute that Couch engaged in protected conduct by filing a 2014
registration grievance. I find, however, that there has been no showing of animus against him,
which is fatal to the General Counsel’s prima facie case. Other than testimony by Couch and 15
Biancini, which I have discredited, the General Counsel offers mainly conjecture regarding Local
18’s conduct. For example, he argues that I should interpret as animus the fact that Farley, as a
“material witness” against Couch regarding his failure to appear at Stubbe’s 13.2 hearing,
nonetheless “participated in the [JPLRC’s] deliberation of the penalty to be assessed” at its June
2, 2015 meeting. (GC Br. at 14) I disagree. While the record is unclear whether Farley actually 20
participated in the deliberations, even assuming that he did, I cannot read animus into such
conduct. Indeed, because the committee had been ordered to assess a penalty based, in part, on
what had occurred at the 13.2 hearing, every JPLRC member present at that hearing became a
“material witness.” The General Counsel’s would seem to suggest that the very fact that the
JPLRC met before assessing a penalty to Couch demonstrates animus against him as a union 25
dissident. I reject that notion and instead find that citing Couch and allowing him to explain
himself in person before devising a penalty, as ordered by the arbitrator, in fact evinces a lack of
animus on Local 18’s part.48
I am also charged with evaluating Local 18’s conduct under the duty-of-fair representation 30
standard, which presumes a violation where a union is found to have “caused or attempted to
cause” employee discipline. Here, to the extent that Farley provided the JPLRC with evidence
regarding the circumstances of his nonappearance at Stubbe’s hearing, it is fair to assume that
Local 18 acted with knowledge that this evidence would cause the Employer-Respondents to
agree to suspend Couch.49 Thus, Local 18 must overcome the presumption that, as exclusive 35
bargaining representative, its conduct was taken “in good faith, based on rational considerations,
and were linked in some way to its need effectively to represent its constituency as a whole.”
Caravan Knight, supra at 5. I find that the Union has met its burden. Preserving the integrity of

48 The General Counsel also alleges that dispatcher Deed showed animus against Couch by failing to
assist him with his 13.2 grievance (filed months after his suspension) about women using the men’s room.
But the record contains no credible evidence that Couch asked for any such assistance; instead, Couch
merely informed Deed that of the grievance, stating, “I know what I’m doing.” (Tr. 556) I reject the
suggestion that, by failing to force assistance on Couch under these circumstances Deed showed animus
against him.
49 That Arbitrator Holmes ordered that Couch be penalized in some matter does not insulate Local 18
from liability for its role in the process; arguably, it could have withheld Fawley’s testimony and/or
argued for a lesser penalty.
JD(SF)-32-16
38
the parties’ area arbitration procedure by agreeing to penalize an employee for failing to appear
at a hearing is a legitimate interest and certainly necessary to the Union’s representative function.
Nor can I find that the penalty assessed Couch, under the circumstances, was arbitrary or unfair.
As such, I would dismiss the allegations against Local 18 regarding Couch.
5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
10
2. Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
3. Respondent Pacific Maritime Association is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.15
4. By maintaining a rule that states that “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch
Hall or at any other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked,”
Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.20
5. By maintaining a rule that states that “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch
Hall or at any other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked,”
Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. and Respondent Pacific Maritime Association have engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of 8(a)(1) of the Act.25
6. The foregoing unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY30
Having found that Employer-Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and Respondent
International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act,
I find that they must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In a typical case involving an unlawful workplace 35
rule, the promulgator of the rule is ordered to rescind the unlawful provision and post an
appropriate notice. Therefore, I shall require Respondents to rescind and cease giving effect to
their “Rules for Identified Casuals” at the Port of Sacramento, insofar as they provide that
identified casual longshore workers causing a disturbance at a dispatch hall or at any other job-
related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked. 40
JD(SF)-32-16
39
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended50
ORDER
5
A. Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacramento Identified 10
Casual Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any
other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked.”
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.15
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacramento Identified Casual
Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other 20
job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked” and remove such rule
from any and all employee publications or documents to which it is a party.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Respondents’ joint dispatch
hall at the Port of West Sacramento, California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix 25
A.” Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being
signed by Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc.’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting 30
on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc.
customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent SSA
Pacific, Inc. has gone out of business or ceased its operations at the Port of West Sacramento, 35
Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. at
the Port of West Sacramento at any time since Friday, February 14, 2015.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for 40
Region 20 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. has taken to comply.

50 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)-32-16
40
B. Respondent Pacific Maritime Association, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacramento Identified 5
Casual Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any
other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked.”
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.10
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacramento Identified Casual
Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other 15
job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked” and remove such rule
from any and all employee publications or documents to which it is a party.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Respondents’ joint dispatch
hall at the Port of West Sacramento, California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix20
B.” Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being
signed by Respondent Pacific Maritime Association’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by Respondent Pacific Maritime Association and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees of Respondent SSA Pacific,
Inc. are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be 25
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if Respondent Pacific Maritime Association customarily communicates with
employees of Respondent SSA Pacific, Inc. by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent Pacific Maritime Association to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. 30
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 20 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent Pacific Maritime Association has taken to comply.
35
It is further ordered that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
specifically found.
C. Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall40
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacramento Identified
Casual Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any 45
other job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked.”
JD(SF)-32-16
41
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
5
(a) Rescind the provision located at item 12 of in the Sacramento Identified Casual
Dispatch Rules that states: “[c]asuals causing a disturbance at the Dispatch Hall or at any other
job-related area shall have their dispatch privileges permanently revoked” and remove such rule
from any and all employee publications or documents to which it is a party.
10
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at Respondents’ joint dispatch
hall at the Port of West Sacramento, California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix
C.” 51 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after
being signed by Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent International Longshore and 15
Warehouse Union, Local 18 and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting
on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if Respondent International
Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18 customarily communicates with its members by such 20
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse
Union, Local 18 to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for 25
Region 20 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that Respondent International Longshore and Warehouse Union, Local 18
has taken to comply.
It is further ordered that the complaint allegations are dismissed insofar as they allege violations 30
of the Act not specifically found.
Dated: Washington, D.C. September 13, 2016
35
Mara-Louise Anzalone
Administrative Law Judge

51 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in each of the
notices referenced herein reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read
“Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefits and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. Specifically:
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule for Identified Casuals at the Port of West Sacramento that
states that you will permanently lose your dispatch privileges if you cause a disturbance in the
discharge hall or any job-related area.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you n the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our “RULES FOR IDENTIFIED CASUALS” in effect at the joint dispatch
hall for the Port of West Sacramento by rescinding the provision that states that Identified
Casuals who cause a disturbance in the discharge hall or any job-related area shall permanently
lose their dispatch privileges.
SSA MARINE, INC.,
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
NLRB Region 20
901 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94103
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
415-356-5130
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-151433 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 415-356-5130
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefits and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. Specifically:
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule for Identified Casuals at the Port of West Sacramento that
states that you will permanently lose your dispatch privileges if you cause a disturbance in the
discharge hall or any job-related area.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you n the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our “RULES FOR IDENTIFIED CASUALS” in effect at the joint dispatch
hall for the Port of West Sacramento by rescinding the provision that states that Identified
Casuals who cause a disturbance in the discharge hall or any job-related area shall permanently
lose their dispatch privileges.
PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION,
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
NLRB Region 20
901 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94103
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
415-356-5130
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-151433 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 415-356-5130
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefits and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. Specifically:
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule for Identified Casuals at the Port of West Sacramento that
states that you will permanently lose your dispatch privileges if you cause a disturbance in the
discharge hall or any job-related area.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you n the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our “RULES FOR IDENTIFIED CASUALS” in effect at the joint dispatch
hall for the Port of West Sacramento by rescinding the provision that states that Identified
Casuals who cause a disturbance in the discharge hall or any job-related area shall permanently
lose their dispatch privileges.
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND
WAREHOUSE UNION, LOCAL 18
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
NLRB Region 20
901 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94103
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
415-356-5130
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/20-CA-151433 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 415-356-5130